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ABSTRACT 
The reasons why employers simultaneously demand different work groups 
with varying patterns of activity, conditions of service and earnings is 
inadequately understood. The demand for twilight workers and homeworkers 
is MU nder-re sea rched area, wh 11 e the appropri atenes s of thes~gmented 
labour market model is open to questioning. Therefore, a detailed 
comparison, from the viewpoint of demand, is made of the workforce groups 
discovered within an occupational local labour market. Data collected by 
employer interviews focus on worker characteristics, their different 
working conditions, and employer responses to change. 
Part A states the objectives and hypotheses, surveys the theoretical 
and legal contexts and reviews workgroup literature. The empirical 
programme is described, and brief accounts of prel i mi nary empi rical work 
undertaken in pre-pilot and pilot studies are reported. 
In Part B, organisational structures are outlined before an analysis 
of local labour market and workforce characteristics. An interplay is found 
between group characteristics and levels of supply, the latter being 
important to group formation and to employers' abilfty to exercise 
preference. Levels of knowledge are examined and options for mobility are 
assessed. The structure of the occupational local labour market .is 
addressed by examining: firstly, the different forms of mobility; secondly, 
influences on the wage structure; and thirdly, the net advantages accruing 
to the various workgroups. Conclusions are drawn regarding the relevance 
of neo-classical and segmented labour market theories. It is fOund that 
segmentation exists, firstly between the male and female employees, and 
secondly within the female segment. This latter segmentation is brought 
under closer scrutiny to reveal homeworkers as an extreme example of 
secondary labour when pay and employment conditions are compared with those 
6f full-time and part-time day workers. Preference is exami ned from three 
different standpoints; a costing analysis is undertaken to determine the 
importance of cost-minimisation to labour demand, and employers' stated and 
implied preferences judged by their actions on key conditions of service 
are examined for differential treatment. Employer perceptions are reviewed, 
i i i 
as are the effects of orientations to work on performance level s which 
further illuminates employer preferences. The power structure emanating· 
from supply, collective bargaining and legislation is assessed. 
Part C, draws together the conclusions and uses findings to identify 
factors influencing employer choice. It outlines demand criteria and 
shows that those for twilight workers and homeworkersare similar, although 
reasons for using the latter group are more numerous. Many adjustment 
instruments are shown to be available for adapting labour input to business 
fluctuations so obviating the need for wage adjustment. An adjustment 
sequence is calculated to illustrate its implications for workgroup 
employment and income levels and its universal applicability is considered. 
A labour market paradigm is suggested in which demands and supplfes are 
conceptualized as having two components; initial intentions and effective 
outcomes. It illustrates seven conflict areas which can incorporate 
numerous theories of labour market operation. The appropriateness of much 
labour market theory is discussed, and it is concluded that twilight 
workers and homeworkers are utilised as a mechanism for honouring implicit 
contracts. Policy prescriptions and further·research are considered. 
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PAR T A 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
CHAPTER ONE - RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.1 THE SUBJECT AREA 
In 1973 Bosanquet and Piore1 suggested that women might be the 
secondary workers in Britain. At the outset, the extent and nature of 
duality in the Labour Market (LM) had not been clearly documented and the 
study of women was a neglected area in both economics and sociology. 
Consequently, a research proposal that focused on the employment of women 
as possible examples of secondary workers was formulated, the subject area 
being broadly defined as "An Investigation of the Dual Labour Market with 
Particular Reference to Case Studies". Attenti on was to be concentrated 
on secondary workers to determine how their characteristics and terms and 
conditions of employment differed from those of primary workers in the 
same, or similar, industries. It was intended to assess how revealed 
differences moulded overall labour demand. 
1.2 A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
Several branches of social science (e.g. economics, sociology, law, 
social psychology, politics, history, organisational and management 
studies, and industrial relations) claim work and employment as their 
provinces, although until recently, most of these disciplines have treated 
labour as 'unisex'. Whereas, economists have traditionally taken 
financial rewards as the. basic frame of reference, especially in 
price/auction theories, sociologists have involved themselves with the 
relationships of production. Fragmentation of social science is a serious 
problem since it leads to a narrowness of outlook as studies lose concerns 
with non-work issues and wide general patterns. Allen 29 sees 
specialization within and between social science disciplines as an obstacle 
to understanding women and work. Attempts to combine approaches have been 
made in recent years because it is now recognised that a multidisclplinary 
approach is superi or for gi vi ng a comprehensi ve unbl i nkered o,vervi ew of 
any research topic. Consequently to avoid narrowness of outlook, the 
research was planned as a multidisciplinary project which would combine 
economic and sociological perspectives and would examine certain legal 
issues si nce these were importantly rel evant to the status of secondary 
workers. Issues stemming from the division of labour in the home and its 
impacts on the workplace are also considered. 
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1.3 THE PROPOSED RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The detailed objectives outlined in the author's application for a 
research studentship were: 
(a) an examination of the reasons for the existence of dual labour 
marketsj 
(b) an analysis and comparison of the supply and demand determinants of 
primary and secondary labourj 
(c) a determination and comparison of the employment and income 
sensitivities of primary and secondary workers to business 
fluctuationsj 
(d) an evaluation of the possible advantages to employers of maintaining 
a secondary labour segmentj and 
(e) an assessment of the desirability of eliminating the secondary labour 
segment with respect to the economic and sociological consequences 
and a survey of possible methods for achieving this. 
(NB: Early in the research the term "Dual Labour Market" (DLM) was judged 
to be less appropriate than the term "Segmented Labour Market" (SLM)j 
consequently the latter term has been used throughout.) 
Such a comparative study of primary and secondary labour posed 
numerous questions. For example. did segmentation exist between and/or 
within industries. and if so. to what extent? What were the reasons for 
the existence of segmentation? How did worker groups relate to each 
other. and why and how were individuals allocated to them? How permanent 
was this allocation, and what were the levels of distinction between the 
workgroups? The proposed research sought to address all these questi ons. 
Hence. the empirical study would need sufficient primary data to examine a 
variety of topics. such as: the conditions under which workgroups were 
demanded and employedj the characteristics of each workgroup. and mobility 
among themj and variation in employees' terms and conditions of service. 
including their ability to influence their contracts of employment. It 
was intended to spotl ight any discriminatory practices that applied to 
particular workgroups. These topics could be conveniently classified into 
two broad issues each of which could be investigated from either the demand 
or the supply side of the LM. These were: 
(1) the criteria for the employment of each workgroupj and 
(2) the conditions under which each workgroup was employed. 
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1.3.1 The Cri teri a for Employment 
To establish the criteria of demand it was considered necessary to 
determine when and why particular individuals were sought and then 
allocated to specific tasks. It was envisaged that this would involve an 
exami nat i on of recruitment, sel ect i on and redundancy procedu re data for 
each group of workers, such information being obtained from the demand side 
of the LM. The criteria of supply would involve a consideration of the 
workers' needs and motives in seeking and accepting the particular jobs 
they did. This data could only be obtained by a supply side study. 
1.3.2 The Conditions of Employment 
Employment conditions can be regarded under two broad headings: 
(a) market condit.ions, in the context of which each worker group 
is demanded; and 
(b) terms and conditions of employment as embodied in the 
contract of employment. 
Market conditions, that could either favour or inhibit the employment 
of particular workgroups, were thought to be largely outside the control of 
the parties, but nevertheless they should be identified because they could 
strongly i nfl uence employment and income sensiti vi ti es. On the demand si de 
of the LM, the establishment of market conditions would require an 
examination of price competitiveness, number of competitors, and 
characteristics of the product, because labour's demand is derived from 
product demand. On the supply side, an assessment of the conditions for 
employment would involve an examination of the levels of job competition, 
job segregation and discrimination; these topics could be investigated from 
either the supply or demand sides of the LM. 
Terms and Conditions of Employment relating to the treatment that 
employees received from their employers were embodied in law and contracts 
of employment. These issues could be investigated from either the demand or 
supply sides of the market, and topics would include pay, holidays, fringe 
benefits, training, job allocation, redundancy, dismissal, and the capacity 
to take collective action. It was considered that the treatment received by 
each workgroup would be placed into context by an investigation of relative 
performances; this would be more easily conducted on the demand side. Thus, 
studies on both the demand and supply sides of the market were initially 
envisaged, and it was apparent that such a wide ranging investigation would 
ensue that it was later decided to concentrate on demand, see 1.6. 
As outlined below, the empirical research was designed to examine 
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minutely from economic, sociological and legal perspectives the structure 
of a Local Labour Market (LLM) and the variety of labour demands within a 
. specific industry. These objectives are explored in Parts A and B of this 
thesis. To date, little theoretical attention has been directed to the 
complex inter-relationships of simultaneous demands by the same employer 
for workers with work and employment patterns as diverse as shiftworkers 
and homeworkers. It is therefore to such an uncharted area of LM theory 
that Part C is addressed. 
1.4 CHOICE OF WORKGROUPS FOR INVESTIGATION 
Subsequent to the preliminary investigation and literature survey it 
was concluded that a general and wide-ranging investigation of SLMs was too 
all-embracing and that a more useful piece of work would ensue from 
researching specific primary and secondary workers who could be justifiably 
compared. At the outset of the research only limited work had been 
undertaken 1,61 to establish degrees of segmentation and hence it was 
decided to compare the work performed and pay received by 
men and women full-time day workers (see Appendix II for workgroup 
definitions) to reveal any workforce segregation and earnings discrepancies 
by gender. Having set women full-timers within the context of their market 
position relative to men, the aim was then to compare the pay and 
conditions, jobs undertaken and performances achieved of secondary workers 
with those of female full-timers in order to establish whether further 
segmentation existed. Twilight workers and homeworkers were thought to be 
typical examples of such secondary workers and so these two groups were 
selected for detailed investigation. 
It was considered essential to select workers from the same or similar 
industries, companies and occupations in order to provide 'fair' 
comparisons. To contrast workers in very different industries and/or 
companies might yield inappropriate comparisons due to diversity of task 
and environment, even though the differences exposed could be relevant to 
an SLM paradigm in another context. 
1.5 DATA GENERATION 
No official statistics were available for either twilighters or 
homeworkers and so primary data generation was essential. Literature 
suggested that secrecy surrounded homeworking arrangementsg1 ,275, and note 
4 of Hope et al 124 suggested that employers would be unwilling to co-
operate in investigations. It was concluded that postal, self-administered 
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questionnaires would be ineffective for data generation and that it would 
be more successful to extract data by face-to-face interviews where 
confidence could be engendered and confidentiality assured. It was decided 
to generate data by in-depth employer interviews (see 1.6) and these would 
concentrate primarily on female workgroups; male data would be largely 
confined to earnings and job allocation since these were necessary to 
determine market structure and male/female job-segregation. The advantage 
of a local survey (see 1.7) undertaken by personal interview was that it 
presented an opportunity to collect data of a breadth and depth that would 
have been impossible by larger survey techniques. 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis was intended 
since this was perceived as an integral feature of a good socio-economic 
approach. Although national representativeness was foregone this was more 
than compensated for by achieving a realistic appraisal of generated 
statistics and obtaining a thorough understanding of complex relationships. 
1.6 CONCENTRATION ON THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR 
The objectives outlined in Section 1.3 would involve the generation of 
an immense volume of wide-ranging data on both the demand and supply sides 
of the LM. To establish degrees of possible segmentation would require the 
generation of the same data for each workgroup, but this would be a 
formidable task if the assumed constraining influences on supply and demand 
(see 1.10) were to be investigated. Subsequent attempts to draft and test 
an interview schedule revealed this task to be too ambitious for one Ph.D 
researcher within the context of resource constraint. 
Several homeworker studi ese.g:88-92,123,124,127 had explored supply 
issues and there was a dearth of knowledge regarding the demand for 
homeworkers when this research commenced; indeed researchers saw employer 
co-operation as difficult to obtain 124, Although the scope of the 
investigation had to be curtailed, it was considered important that the 
imbalance between supply and demand knowledge should be redressed. 
Consequently it was decided to concentrate on demand issues and confine 
data collection to employer interviews. 
However, generation of some supply data was deemed necessary because 
it was anticipated that for the secondary workgroups studied household 
commitments might be so influential as to determine the workgroup to join 
when entering the labour market. It was real ized however, that much supply 
information could be obtained from the employer, e.g: worker 
characteristics; levels of supply (which would reveal relative levels of 
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job competition); job segregation; and pay and conditions of service. 
Consequently, the decision to confine data collection to employer 
interviews merely sacrificed the workers' own accounts of their criteria 
and objectives in seeking employment, but these topics were already well 
di scussed in the 1 iterature, see 2.3. 
1.7 THE SELECTED LOCAL LABOUR MARKET 
Having decided to concentrate on the demand side of the labour market 
it was thought that the study would be more manageable if restricted to a 
small geographic region which could be extended should a small sample 
result. Insufficient funding was available to produce numerous question-
naires, or to finance long-distance interviews, thereby limiting the 
geographic area of data collection, but this was additionally advisable 
from a time input perspectiv~ Consequently, it was decided to confine 
data collection preferably to one LLM or a series of overlapping LLMs. 
This had the added merit of holding reasonably constant the levels of job-
competition and the choices of alternative employment. It also held 
constant the capital/labour intensiveness of the labour market as well as 
the levels of employment and unemployment. The prime difficulty was 
envisaged as pinpointing a locality in which a sufficiently large sample of 
establishments in the same industry each employed male and female full-time 
workers as well as twil ighters and homeworker's. 
Literature references124,133,135 had shown homeworkers to be used by 
the 'rag trade' and fortuitously, Loughborough University was situated in 
the region that had seen the birth of the hosiery, knitwear and lace 
industries following Wi1liam Lee's invention in Calverton, Nottingham, of 
the stocki ng frame in 1589159• Foll owi ng prel i mi nary research (see 3.2) 
which revealed that hosiery and knitwear companies employed the chosen 
workgroups, it was decided to confine the empirical study to that part of 
Charnwood Borough that incorporated Loughborough town and its surrounding 
smaller settlements of Shepshed, Barrow-upon-Soar, Sileby, Quorn and 
Mountsorrel, see Fi gure 1 :1. The regi on was well-chosen because, if 
employers proved unsympathet i c and refused to co-operate, the boundary 
could be extended conveniently to include the cities of Leicester, Derby 
and Nottingham that possessed similar industries. 
The chosen region was a good example of a clearly defined LLM, because 
it was surrounded by much open countryside containing residential villages 
offering 1 ittle employment opportunity. The existence of mobility into 
the region was to be assessed from the location of employees' residences 
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relative to their workplaces, but it was anticipated that little cross-
boundary mobility would occur due to the configuration of employment 
opportunity, except perhaps between Sileby and Leicester in the south. 
However, it was probable that mobility would exist between the settlements 
of the study thereby increasing employment choice possibilities. 
Each settlement had a long industrial traditidn, but the smaller 
settlements retained rural aspects. Since most homeworker researches had 
been conducted in inner_cities l23,124,133,135, this research would provide 
. ori g1 nal i nformat ion about homeworker employment in a semi -rural context. 
1.8 SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
Determi nat i on of the extent of segment at ion requi red compari sons of 
pay and conditions of service, but these would be meaningless unless 
workers were performi ng simi 1 ar tasks. Thus, twil i ght and homeworkers were 
to be compared with full-time males and females performing similar jobs for 
the same employer. The comparability requirement precluded the possibility 
of incorporating into the study non-factory producers (see 9.2.1) and 
homeworker agents or intermediaries. This was unfortunate because it was 
suspected that homeworkers employed by intermediaries would experience the 
worst pay and conditions of employment, but these homeworkers had no 
factory counterparts. An intra-industry study was therefore implied and 
this in turn would hold constant the product market and production 
characteristics (e.g., continuous, small-batch etc.), and it was also 
advisable because there was a greater likel ihood that exogenous factors 
affecting variables such as product demand and profits would be more 
similar than in inter-industry research. An inter-industry study had been 
initially preferred to reveal the influential product market variables that 
affected workgroup demand, but desire for genuine comparability might have 
reduced the number of industries from which a choice could be made because 
some may not have used all the groups Simultaneously.: 
Preliminary investigations were undertaken, see 3.2. Data summarized 
in Table 1.1 reveals the number of companies employing twilight and/or 
homeworkers inside the chosen LLM and its adjacent city areas. It showed 
the obvious industry choice as textiles. Hosiery and knitwear (H&K) 
manufacture was the local textile special ism and evidence suggested that at 
least 4 H&K companies used all the selected workgroups. Textiles 
additionally seemed a good choice from the viewpoint of segmentation 
because it was widely regarded as a low-paying industry subjected to 
seasonal variations. The toy, boot and shoe, and leather goods industries 
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were expected to employ workers in substantial numbers on similar 
stitching-type operations, and it was anticipated that these industries 
would have similar product market dynamics to the textile industry because 
they also were largely fashion and seasonally oriented. Hence, it was 
decided to conduct the main investigation in textiles, but should employers 
proved uncooperative, workers from the second group of industries could be 
included as a fall back position to increase sample sizes. The existence of 
regional and industrial fallback positions was considered important given 
the supposedly secretive nature of the homeworking scene91 ,275. 
Subsequently, cooperation obtained from pre-pilot companies (see 3.3) 
encouraged the use of the footwear industry for the pilot study (see 3.6) 
since several fall-back positions appeared unnecessary. 
Engineering, box-making, pharmaceutical, publishing and wallpaper 
industries were excluded along with all industries in the tertiary sector 
of the economy because such workers were perceived as performing different 
types of work to textile workers. Within the selected textile industry, 
empirical data collection was to be limited to direct production workers 
because prel imi nary research had shown many secondary workers to be so 
employed. To include clericals and evening cleaners, even though working 
in the textile industries, would defeat the objective of comparability. 
1.9 WORKGROUP HYPOTHESES 
1.9.1 Hypotheses of Workgroup Demand 
Immediately prior to the commencement of the research there had been 
widespread public concern generated by television 76 and the press77 about 
the poor pay and conditions obtained by home workers. The media had 
depicted them as 'cheap labour' which was deliberately exploited by 
employers because homeworkers' market position was weak. Homeworker 
pressure groups were formed and thei r 1 iterature88- 90 reveal ed an 
additional claim; namely, that homeworkers were used as 'a buffer against 
business fluctuations'. These two demand criteria apparently confl icted 
because, if homeworkers were cheaper to employ, cost-minimizing employers 
woul d not choose in-factory workers at greater expense, nor cushi on thei r 
employment. It was hoped to resolve this dilemma by the research. 
There was little public concern, and few readily available 
publications, about the employment of twilight workers although ongoing 
research by Bosworth & Dawkins 78 ,79 suggested that in contrast to other 
shift workers, twilight workers, who were mainly women, apparently received 
no shift premia. Consequently, preconceptions about twilight workers had 
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little firm foundation, but merely consisted of speculations that they 
'filled the gap between the end of the normal day and the arrival of the 
permanent ni ght shift'; they were thus expected to be found in the same 
numbers as the full-time day workers, since as part-time shift workers they 
were thought to take over the full-ti mers' jobs. If the absence of a 
shift premium was confirmed, this would make twilight workers a slightly 
cheaper form of labour than full-timers paid overtime rates. Their 
employment additionally saved the social costs of introducing a 
conventional continuous multiple shift system which would disrupt the full-
timers' work pattern. Twilight workers were therefore thought to be a 
convenient means of manning operations for 24 hours a day while paying a 
shift premium only to the permanent night workers. It was expected that 
they would be less costly to sever than shift workers if product demand 
dropped, since as low-hour part-timers they might not qualify for statutory 
redundancy payments. Therefore, it was possible that twilight workers 
were used by seasonal or fashion industries during peak production times to 
produce· 'top of the peak' demand. If so, income and employment 
sensitivities would be closely linked to product market dynamics. 
It was anticipated that full-time day male and female workers would be 
demanded to produce the 'bulk of output' regardless of the level of product 
demand, although this expectation conflicted with the 'cheap labour of 
homeworkers' hypothesis discussed above. It was thus suspected that some 
employers mi ght reduce full-ti me day worker numbers to substanti ally fewer 
than those needed to produce their requirements so as to use the homeworker 
group, but it was realized that this presented problems because the level 
at which this tactic ceased to be appl ied would have to be determined. 
However, in the course of this research this 'under-cutting tactic' was to 
be investigated and the full circumstances of the decision exposed. 
1.9.2 Hypothesis of Workgroup Supply - The Life-cycle Hypothesis 
As impl ied in 1.10, the following chronological progression through 
the female workgroups was anticipated. The young female would join the 
full-time group from school and she would remain in it until her first 
pregnancy, whereupon she would withdraw from LM activity for a period of 
confinement or longer. If she wished to maintain LM activity but had no 
daytime child minding facilities, she would enter either 1;he twilight or 
homeworker group while her family was at the infant stage, but with the 
passage of time and with her family demanding less attention she would 
partici pate more 'formally' by joi ni ng the part-ti me group and eventually 
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re-enter the full-time group. Near to, or on, reti rement she would rejoin 
either the part-time or homeworker group, or leave the LM altogether. 
Clearly this anticipated workgroup progression was closely 1 inked to the 
femal e 1 ife-cycl e and was therefore termed the 1 He-cycle hypothesi s of 
female labour supply. It was intended to verify whether or not such a 
chronological progression indeed occurred. 
1.10 ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE FACTORS THAT COULD INFLUENCE THE SUPPLY 
OF, AND THE DEMAND FOR, WORKGROUPS 
Notwithstanding the above hypotheses, individual demand 
characterist ics and workgroup interact ions were so imperfectly understood 
at the outset of the research that it was impossible to construct a simple, 
statistically testable hypothesis that would put overall labour demand into 
perspective. It was envisaged that there would be numerous factors each 
having its peculiar impact, and that these influences would arise on both 
supply and demand sides of the LM and would interact. 
In choosing to focus on twilight workers and homeworkers as possible 
examples of secondary labour, the empirical research was directed towards a 
compa rat i ve study of workgroups withi n the work force, and i mpl i c itly a 
consideration of the 'the number of hours of work', 'the time of day" of 
work' and 'the place of work' si nce it was in these ways that twil i ghters 
and homeworkers differed from full-timers. These effects have been 
called the 'hours constraint',the 'time constraint' and the 'place 
constraint' respectively as is discussed below. 
1.10.1 Assumed Influences on the Supply of Labour 
It was suspected that many factors would influence labour supply; some 
encouraging LM participation others discouraging it. It was anticipated 
that the geographical area tapped would determine the effective supply of 
potential workers, and that numbers attracted woul d depend upon 
the size of the LLM and the concentration of residences within it. If the 
tappable area was influenced by the time and costs of travel relative to 
earni ngs, then worker groups with higher earni ngs, or those with free 
transport, would travel further than lower paid groups. Employer 
strategi es for overcomi ng shortages of preferred workers would probably 
include subsidizing transport, adopting wide ranging recruitment techniques 
and higheri ng wages. 
Some important constraints on supply could be demand imposed, such as 
restrictive recruitment specifications which related either to skill 
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requirements or to the personal attributes of applicants. The more 
restrictive the specification, the smaller would be the pool of potential 
workers and this could be advantageous in over-supply situations in order 
to reduce screening costs. 
At an individual level, household ci rcumstances might be so 
restrictive on availability for paid employment as to limit the number of 
hours, the timing, and the place of employment. Individuals were 
conceptualized as facing either an hours constraint, a time constraint or a 
place constraint, or combinations of these. It was appreciated that the 
apparent severity of these constraints might vary relative to pay, but, 
gi ven the need for true comparabil ity, invest i gati on of thi s poss ibi 11 ty 
fell outside the scope of the ,Project. Although in theory the 
domestic role (for role definitions see Appendix 11) could impose equal 
constraints on the labour supplies of men and women, in practice it was 
expected to impi nge more on women, it still bei ng the norm for women rather 
than men to adopt the rol es of homemaker and family-carer. Hence, the 
'number of hours', and 'times of day' constraints were expected to affect 
the 1 abour suppl i es of women to a greater extent than men's. Si nce the 
homemaker and family-carer roles could be undertaken either separately or 
jointly, by an individual or in partnership, it was likely that these would 
impose varying degrees of constraint. Indeed, the family-carer role might 
be suffici ently restri cti ve to prevent attendance at factory premi ses and 
this would impose the 'place of work' constraint. Consequently, it was 
anticipated that female labour supply would be characteristically different 
from male supply, and that this would have important supply side 
implications for female workgroup formation. The large increase in female 
part-time employment during the 1970s was seen as evidence of the 
importance of these constraints. However, it was suspected that as 
children matured, lower time input requirements to care for them could 
permit modifications in the levels of lM activity; a progression from one 
workgroup to another was envi saged as constra i nts on pai d-work-avail abl e 
time changed, see 1.9.2. 
An efficiency constraint would arise if workers were indolent ~r 
incompetent causing employers to require more personnel, or hours per 
employee, to compl ete a gi yen amount of work. To over.come an efficiency 
constrai nt employers mi ght introduce payment by results schemes to 
encourage higher productivity, and training to improve competence. 
legal constraints, such as planning laws that required homeworkers to 
obtain permission for 'change of use of premises', and social security and 
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taxation laws that set threshol ds for contributions, were thought to cause 
potenti al workers to opt out of LM activity, or to reduce their market 
involvement. Employee tastes and preferences were expected to influence 
labour supply in both upward and downward directions; preference for a 
particular workgroup constrained the supply to other groups when the 
preference could be exercised, and aversion from a group also constrained 
the supply to it. Aversion from 'unsocial hours of work' was thought to be 
a major limiting factor on the supply of shift workers. A taste for 
companionship would lead to a preference for factory employment, while a 
desire to escape from factory discipline would increase supply to the 
homeworker group. Financial need might be the most compelling influence 
that encouraged LM participation of mothers with young families, but where 
the 'time', 'hours' and 'place' constraints prevented factory 
participation, this would also increase supply to the homeworker group. A 
taste for more leisure and/or fatigue with advancing age could yield a 
preference for fewer than full-time hours in both males and females. 
1.10.2 Implications of Supply Influences for Workgroup Formation 
The major constraints on male labour supply were perceived as the 
level of wages and the size of the LLM. By not adopting the domestic role, 
men would have fewer constraints on their paid-work available time. Men 
were generally expected to offer full-time hours, and thus there would be 
few part-time, twilight or homeworking males. The full range of ages from 
school 1 eavi ng to retirement age woul d be present in each male workgroup. 
In contrast, the domestic role would cause female shift and full-time 
day groups to be comprised mainly of women without family responsibil ities, 
whereas the less-than-full-time groups would comprise women with household 
,--
ties. The twilight and homeworker groups were expected to comprise women 
facing particularly strong constraints on their time and thus many would be 
mothers with young children. Formation of theless-than-full-time groups 
was perceived as a response to the 'hours', 'time' and 'place' constraints 
imposed by the domestic role. Responses were visualized on both the supply 
and demand sides of the LM. 
1.10.3 Assumed Influences on the Demand for Labour 
It was considered that business enterprises, existing to make profits, 
would find it advantageous to have cost-minimizing policies that reduced 
payroll expenditure, especially if they had labour-intensive production 
processes or operated in price-competitive markets. It was assumed that 
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employers would pay no more than was necessary to gain the services of any 
worker, and would prefer the cheapest form of labour that satisfied the 
necessary recruitment specifications. They would offer no benefits or 
premia except those required by law, or to maintain an effective working 
force. 
of the 
Because product or service demand varies by industry and sector 
economy, it was thought that preferences,for particular workgroups 
would also vary. Companies that faced constant product demand would prefer 
full-timers, whereas those with wide daily fluctuations would use few-hour 
workers to provide extra cover for busy periods rather than over-recruit 
full-time personnel and have them under-employed for parts' of each day. 
Thus, the less-than-full-time groups would be associated with variable 
product demand. The production process might also influence preference for 
parti cular workgroups. Companies wi th conti nuous manufacturing processes 
that necess itated 24-hour operation to prevent damage to equipment woul d 
prefer the shift working groups, but companies with small batch production 
might choose to operate on a daywork basis. 
It was thought that the cost of equipmentw(flJld strongly influence 
workgroup preference. High-cost machinery and buil dings woul d not be 
viable if they were unused for long periods because generated profits would 
be too small to cover depreciation costs or interest payments on purchase 
price loans. Equipment life spans also affected time periods over which 
amortization could be spread, and a high speed of technical change which 
caused outmoded equipment to be discarded before it had deteriorated, 
because retention meant loss of competitiveness, woul d necessitate 
intensive use of equipment to cover the depreciation charges within 
allotted time spans. Shift workers would therefore be the natural choice 
in these circumstances because the capital non-utilisation costs would make 
such equipment unviable if operated by few-hour workers. It was therefore 
thought possible that, where capital non-utilisation costs were high, males 
woul d be preferred to femal es due to the greater-hour characteri st ic of 
their LM involvement, and that in LMs characterized by capital-intensive 
industries there would be low female participation rates because women in 
those ma rkets woul d have fewer opportuniti es for low-hour employment. 
Conversely, LLMs characterized by labour-intensiveness woul d have high 
female activity rates with shortages of women able to work full-time hours. 
Shortage of business accommodation coul d al so be an important 
determinant of group demands. Expanding companies situated in locations 
precluding extension of premises, especially those with labour-intensive 
operations requiring large worker numbers, might find the homeworker group 
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a particularly useful expedient. It was thought that special circumstances 
would appertain regarding the demand for homeworkers. This group permitted 
manufacture without substantial investment in factory, warehouse or office 
accommodation and indeed some employers could opt for totally non-factory 
modes of production. A national lM was also thought to exist for 
homeworkers since both factory and non-factory producers could send work 
over long distances by post, rail or road. However, special constraints 
placed limits on production in domestic premises because certain operations 
could not be undertaken by homeworkers when equipment was too large to fit 
into the home, or where it required special services, such as high-voltage 
electricity or compressors, not normally installed. Products involving the 
use of unpleasant materials and poisonous, strong smelling or radio-active 
substances should inhibit homeworker use, but researchers had discovered 
homeworkers using hazardous materials.275 A further perceived constraint 
on homeworki ng was the costs of del ivery; where these were hi gh, cost-
minimizing employers would avoid the group, or transfer these to the 
homeworker. 
Employment protection and equal opportunity 1 egi sl at i on regul ated many 
conditions of employment and thus could influence labour demand. The 
exclusion of homeworkers from protection, and the necessary working 
periods requi red to qual ify for certain benefits (see 2.2) were expected to 
affect workgroup recruitment such that employees weak under law might be 
selected as expedients by cost-minimizing employers. Employees working 
fewer than 16 weekly hours needed 5 years continuous service with the same 
employer to receive many benefits; it was anticipated that employers might 
limit twilight workers' weekly hours to prevent claims. The employment in 
factories of women and young persons was forbidden during certain evening 
and night-time hours which prevented them from working shifts unless 
exemption orders were obtained. This formality could deter the 
introduction of female rotating or twilight shifts, and prohibition might 
be used to justify the non-use of women on shiftwork jobs. 
Bargaining strengths were expected to have complex influences on 
demand strategi es. Groups with high disposable incomes were expected to 
have high union membership, and those with low earnings to have low 
membership particularly when dues were flat rate payments that took high 
proportionate deductions from low pay. It was expected that groups with 
hi gh membershi p woul d recei ve more effecti ve represent at ion si nce unions 
would be handicapped in representing low membership groups when their 
interests vied with those of high membership groups. In this respect, it 
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was probably true to say that "he who pays the piper, calls the tune". If 
this pattern of representation prevailed it would improve conditions for 
high membership relative to the low membership groups and widen 
discrepancies between them. Employers could then more easily resist 
attempts to improve conditions for the weakly unionized. Thus, virtuous and 
vicious circles were expected to arise with respect to trade union 
membershi p. To counterbal ance these effects however, cost-mi nimizi ng 
motives would favour the use of weak groups due to fear of high wage claims 
and disruptions. These conflicting demand objectives could therefore 
produce more-or-less equally sized groups over time causing difficulties in 
data interpretation. 
* * * 
The factors discussed above were perceived as the more important 
influences that allocated individuals to workgroups and dictated 
preferences for these. Many issues deriving from such influences have been 
examined in Part B. 
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The preliminary task of the research was to undertake a thorough and 
wide-ranging literature ,survey. It has been confined to relevant 
publications dealing with the central features of the study. The earlier 
part of this chapter deals with contextual material, whereas the later part 
is largely empirically oriented. Section 2.1 reviews theoretical aspects 
of market structure. An exposition of the legal context of the LM follows 
in section 2.2 to provide a background for Chapter 11 which assesses the 
impact of third party intervention on the workgroups studied. Section 2.3 
initially surveys the LM position of women relative to men, and then 
proceeds to examine publications regarding specific workgroups paying 
particular attention to twilight worker and homeworker references. Sections 
2.4 and 2.5 present overviews of the settlements and industries in which 
the empirical research was conducted. Whilst multi-disciplinary research 
facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of a topic, it suffers from 
disadvantages in that literature reviews are laborious and time-consuming, 
and reference lists become extensive. 
2.1 THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
This section of the literature review maps out the theoretical context 
of the structure and functioning of the LM. At the time of research design 
there was little established theory regarding LM disequilibrium and the 
findings of the empirical work revealed the need for a more thorough 
understanding of LM dynamics. Only after data had been collected and 
processed did the author (in Chapters 12 to 16) begin to address this 
topic, as did several other writers concurrently. Nonetheless, relevant 
recently raised issues in theoretical debate are reviewed here to put 
comments made throughout the thesis text into context. 
Whereas economists have taken wage levels as the central feature of LM 
assessments, sociologists' analyses of LM relationships do not rest on an 
establ ished range of theories, but are composed of constantly reappraised 
discussions about various aspects of LM activity. Nevertheless, the debates 
about structure, and the terminology used to describe it, are common to 
both disciplines. 
In 1983 Thurow198 drew attention to the conflicts and inconsistencies 
in economic theories and described the LM area of economic theory as 
" ••• the Sargasso Sea of economic shipwrecks". Indeed, debate about the 
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nature and functioning of labour markets has continued since the beginning 
of the discipline itself and several major schools of economic thought can 
be identified: e.g.C1assica1, Neo-C1assica1, Keynesian, Institutionalist, 
Structuralist, Radical, and Monetarist. Broadly, the Classical, Neo-
Classical and Monetarist theorists maintain that, after making certain 
allowances, markets will eventually reach equilibrium automatically, and 
wage differences for similar work will be competed away by the entries or 
exits of workers. These theorists adopt a 'price/auction model' which 
fundamentally links the level of wages to the level of employment. Studies 
have examined whether persons in similar circumstances receive the same 
earnings, but the results have been disappointing. Phe1ps Brown40 suggests 
an 'ability to work' index which generates a skewed distribution of 
earnings. Becker41 , Mincer42, Shu1tz43, Gri1iches 44, Bow1es 45, Bow1es & 
Ne1son46 and other neo-c1assica1 economists attribute wage differentials to 
differences in training, schooling, I.Q., experience, ability to raise 
finance, and other issues. 
In contrast, many institutionalists attribute persistent wage 
differentials to trade union activities. Keynesian economists claim that 
levels of economic activity can become rigid at less than full employment, 
so that high levels of unemployment can remain without the economy itself 
reaching equilibrium at full capacity. Structuralists see the obstacles 
raised by LM institutions (employers. trade unions, law) as impairing the 
proper functioning of equilibrating forces. Debates regarding which is the 
most appropriate paradigm for the British labour market still persist and 
can become highly complex. 
In discussions about the labour market it is important to ascertain 
levels of aggregation. The Department of Employment (DE)2 annually publish 
much aggregated data and many economic pub1 ications report econometric 
tests using these data and draw conclusions regarding market structure. 
Gordon3 holds that, "only a little can be deduced from aggregate data", and 
this contention was given qualified support by the present author who 
therefore undertook a micro level study. National. regional. and 
local labour markets are conceptual ized, these being defined by the extent 
of their geographic boundaries. The problem however is to define 
boundaries, for both people and commodities move across them and there are 
no water-tight compartments within which a market can truly be said to 
function. Goodman10 visualized a series of overlapping areas surrounding 
zones of employment, possibly of irregular shape due to elongations along 
communication routes. Local 1 abour market (LLM) concepts were developed 
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following the non-competing groups theory of Cairnes4, these being seen as 
operative only within specified geographic areas where pricing, allocation, 
training and recruitment decisions were made according to economic 
variables. Much empi rical research has been conducted within LLMs 
(e.g.Reynol ds 5, Lester6, Robi nson 7, MacKay8 and Bl ackburn & Manng) and the 
findings often show stratified structurings of wages and employment 
conditions. 
More recent strands of theory define internal, external and 
extended internal labour markets (i.e.ILM, ELM, EILM respectively): 
'internal' being a market which functions inside a business organisation; 
'external' being the market that functions outside that business 
organisation, but which is connected to it at various entry ports through 
which external candidates are able to enter the fi rm; and 'extended 
internal' functioning by tapping the pool of applicants that can be reached 
via the social networks of internal workers. These conceptual izations of 
labour markets can also accommodate the possibility of segmentation. Some 
theorists consider that the operation of the ILMs found in monopoly 
capitalist organisations is responsible for segmentation. 
The extent to which firms internally restrict the procuring, 
allocating and rewarding of labour by not entering the open market for 
workers nor paying them in relation to current market forces is topical 
debate. P romoti on and i nterna 1 transfer become important issues in thi s 
context. The importance of institutional factors was recognized by Kerr12 
who argued that organisations developed administrative and customary ways 
of securing workers through procedures establ i shed by employers' 
associations, trade unions and internal personnel policies. ILMs can be 
'open' with most jobs having ports of entry, or relatively 'closed' with 
few entry ports. Ford et a1 201 argue that ILM jobs can be allocated in 
non-competitive, or less competitive, ways. Workers inside firms compete 
with each other in a 1 imited way, but are 'sheltered' from di rect 
competition with persons outside. Mann202 sees the relationship as one of 
mutual dependence with both employer and worker avoiding exposure to market 
uncertai nty. Internal recruitment can be either sponsored (i.e. 
managerial selection of individuals for promotion) or sheltered/competitive 
(i.e. the posting of vacancies on internal notice boards inviting only 
internal competitive applicants). Institutional rules concerning skill, 
seniority and personal characteristics govern recruitment, whi le similar 
rules control rewards. Jobs are hierarchically linked to form job clusters 
some of which have ports of entry at various levels in the hierarchy while 
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others have entry only at the bottom. Doeringer and Piore11 suggest that 
internal structurings are ranged between long and short job clusters which 
can be horizontally or vertically formed. They see technological need and 
economic concentration promoting ILMs, and emphasize the importance of 
firm-specific skills, suggesting that such skills are retained by promotion 
so encouraging long-term career attachments and discouraging inter-firm 
mobility. Long-term attachments are advantageous to both worker and firm: 
the worker has access to jobs denied to those outside; the firm has fewer 
'sunk' costs deriving from recruitment and selection, and it can spread its 
fixed costs associated with specific training over a protracted period of 
time. A1exander 13 sees entry to the ILM from the ELM as governed by 
specific skill/educational requirements. Reder14 suggests that these might 
vary during economic fluctuations as employers adjust quality requirements, 
whereas Thurow proposes a 'queue' th eory 15. However, ILM theory 
presupposes that establishment size is sufficiently large to incorporate 
job clusters with chains of advancement, but many small establishments have 
few employees and this prec1 udes long job clusters. ILM structures are 
therefore most appropriate to large scale establishments. 
Radical Economists63 emphasizing returns to investment and training 
suggest that ILM development demonstrates the exercise of managerial 
control. They see the internal differentiation of workers into job 
structures with promotion as a reward for stability as a managerial control 
strategy to divide workers, weaken collective bargaining and discourage 
concerted action. 
B1 ackburn & Mann 9 argue that the ILM as "fundamentally an 
apprenticeship in co-operation"; They consider skill differences between 
jobs to be minimal, but that ILM operation is strongly related to the need 
for stable 'habitutated' workers who know the fi rm's customs and practices. 
Ford et a1 201 poi nt out that boundaries between ILMs and ELMs have 
been clearly conceptualized but this is problematical since it tends to 
ignore interconnections. Informal links between the ILM and ELM and the use 
of employees as recruiters have been noted by several writers8,16-
18,201,203. Manwaring 18 coined the phrase the Extended Internal Labour 
Market to describe the use of existing workers as channels of recruitment 
through which friends and kin are introduced to the firm. MacKay8 noted 
the use of internal recruitment and linked this with the level of economic 
activity; internal processes were more important in tight than in slack 
LM conditions. When viewing the market from the viewpoint of job search, 
researchers have remarked on the importance to job seekers of maintaining 
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networks with employees inside firms 204• EILM recruitment, similar to that 
of the ILM, can be either sponsored or sheltered/competitive; the 'shelter' 
offered by the ILM to internal workers being weakly reproduced for the 
network-linked potential workers. These 'linked' potential employees are 
'cushioned' from the full competition of the ELM, but not from that of 
workers already in the firm. Such restriction of recruitment to ILMs or 
EILMs represent strategies of 'closure' which can be operated by 
managements or workers. Ford et al 201 consider that despite growing 
literature the EILM concept has remained relatively underdeveloped and 
broadly defined and the term is currently used in a variety of ways. 
Internal recruitment processes can take a variety of forms, but these are 
poorly documented while distinct internal processes become overlooked or 
merged. Studies cite the advantages for employers of EILM use as: (a) the 
control exercised by existing workers over those they sponsor which 
enhances discipline203 ; (b) reduction of the 1 ikel ihood of dissatisfied 
workers 205 ; (c) reduction of managerial effort in recruitment and 
screeni ng, and enhanced chances of recruiti ng moti vated, compl i ant and 
socially appropriate workers 206 ; (d) good industrial relations and the 
reduction of overt control; and (e) convenient arrangements for 
restructuring workforces in poor economic states201• Employees' advantages 
are seen as: (a) control over workgroup composition and (b) enhancement of 
status 201 • Whereas conventionally, employers and employees are portrayed 
as operating opposing strategies, the advantages of recruitment through the 
EILM focus on the areas of consensus. It is now recognised that established 
workers stand at the intersection of thei r fi rm's supply of and demand for 
labour. Ford et a1 201 argue that the EILM is an area that merits further 
investigation; chapter 7 is addressed to this area of analysis. 
Dual labour market (DLM) theory, being an extension of ILM/ELM 
theories, was developed in the USA with particular reference to the urban 
bl ack popul at i on. Women have been characteri sed as Bri ta in's secondary 
workers. This body of literature argues that the operation of ILMs 
dichotomi zes workers into primary and secondary sectors. Many woul d-be 
employees in the ELM are denied access to the superior jobs of the ILM, 
while the absence of job clusters linked to certain low level ports of 
entry create secondary sectors withi n fi rms. Doeri nger & Pi orell , 
Bosanquet & Piore1 and Barron & Norris 61 describe the characteristics of LM 
duality. Barron & Norris61 suggest that five attributes make a social group 
a likely source of secondary workers: (1) dispensibility via voluntary 
turnover, and easy involuntary turnover; (2) clear social difference; (3) a 
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low interest in training; (4) low economism (where economism meant the 
placing of a high value on monetary rewards); and (5) lack of solidarity. 
However, boundaries between primary and secondary sectors are blurred, but 
there is insufficient mobility between primary and secondary sectors to 
compete away differences. There are no precise criteria by which to assess 
primary and secondary jobs or workers, the characteristics shown in Tables 
2.1 and 2.2 are amalgams compiled from early DLM writings. Primary worker 
characteristics make for a stable, reliable workforce with high 
productivity to which employers react by providing good conditions, 
training and wages. Thus, the primary sector has high wage employment 
within ILMs with long job clusters which permit advancement; the secondary 
sector has low wage employments that are unstable, 'dead-end' and manned 
by employees who exhibit 'poor' work habits which might have resulted from 
the nature of their jobs, or originally have caused assignment to the 
secondary sector. While secondary worker characteristics may be a 
rational response to the opportunities available, they inevitably 
perpetuate an unstable work force characterized by high turnover, 
unpunctuality, and absenteeism. The employer compensates by providing low 
wages, poor conditions and inferior capital equipment, thereby perpetuating 
low rates of productivity. 
In addition to dual ity occurring among both workers and jobs, 
Averitt62 sees primary and secondary sectors of the national economy within 
the realm of industrial enterprises; the 'core' of the economy comprising 
large organisations having stable demand and the 'periphery' composed of 
smaller companies having less stable demand because core organisations 
subcontract thei r unstabl e el ements to the peri pheral compani es. It was 
suspected that many secondary-type jobs would be found in industries and 
companies that conformed to Averitt's62 peripheral image and it was 
intended to select such industries for the sample of firms to be 
invest i gated. 
Segmented Labour Market (SLM) theorists Edwards et a1 63 extend dual 
theory by indicating additional segments within primary and secondary 
sectors. Reich et a1 64 suggest further subdivisions, and Blau65 reported 
in Somers66 argues that the term Dual Labour Market is "out of date"; thus 
Segmented Labour Market has become more widely used. The primary sector is 
seen by Reich et al as sub-divided into an 'independent' segment in which 
personnel have a degree of autonomy, and a 'subordinate' segment in which 
jobs are routinized and where personnel are stable and dependable but 
without autonomy. Some factory and many office jobs fall into the 
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subordinate primary segment. Further segmentation within the primary 
sector has been considered as arising from racial and sexual 
discrimination, so that minority workers, although present in all segments, 
face lower wage sub-markets. The radical economists attribute the lower 
segments of secondary employment to del iberate 'divide and conquer' 
tactics. Nichols & Armstrong67 claim that workers are divided because 
that is how managements prefer them to be. 
An Informal Sector (IS) is seen as contributing substantially to the 
national outputs of developing countries68, but employment in the informal 
sector is also relevant to developed economies. The IS is characterized by 
'petty trading' which furnishes subsistence levels of income. Women 
predominate, and activities include small scale selling of domestically 
produced goods such as food, farm produce and artefacts, hawking, market 
haggling, and shoe cleaning. Individuals in the IS often cannot obtain 
employment in the formal sector of the economy either because waged work is 
monopolized by worker categories from which they are excluded, or due to 
chronic unemployment and underemployment68• While homeworking in developing 
countries could be conceptualized as falling into ISs, homeworking in 
developed countries is inextricably linked to formal economies.6g 
Bluestone70 identifies an 'irregular' sector in which income is 
derived from illegal sources or from transfer payments. Workers are 
unemployable and no longer formally enter the workforce. Andersen 71 , 
Sinfield72 , and Goodwin73 have considered strategies for placing this group 
of woul d-be workers. 
In outline therefore, the structure of the LM can be classified into 
four broad sectors which embrace all 
(1) Primary Sector 
(2) Secondary Sector 
(3) Informal Sector 
(4) Irregular sector 
forms of economic activity: 
(i) Independent Segment 
(ii) Subordinate segment 
Despite some lack of precision regarding segment boundaries many 
writers from the economic and sociological disciplines now concur with a 
segmented form of LM structuring and research is reveal ing further sub-
divisions and segments within the broad classification of primary and 
secondary sectors. Freedman's74 concept of shelters is a useful 
contribution. because it offers explanations of the process of segment 
formation and persistence. She claims that individuals seek to avoid job-
competition by various means, and when successful, these strategies provide 
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'shelters' within which employment can be protected and conditions of 
service improved. Shelters are created by trade unions that negotiate 
ent ry and redundancy c riteri a (e.g.qua 1 if i cat ions and sen i ority) and 
professional associations that register practitioners, formulate rules of 
conduct and monitor performance. Closed LM segments exhibiting stratified 
earnings and conditions of service are thereby formed. Mobil ity between 
shelters is 1 imited by restrictive entry requi rements. Ashton 75, whose 
research findings conformed closely to the market shelters explanation of 
segmentation, found that segment boundaries overlapped but they 
nevertheless remained closed entities. 
It has been shown that inequalities in income have remained largely 
unchanged over time 37 , and this would appear to be consistent with 'Dual' 
and 'Segmented' structures. An integral part of SLM theory is that 
sections of the workforce receive lower pay and poorer work conditions than 
other groups in the market, and hence low pay becomes an important focus of 
interest tn the determination of LM structure. Concepts of low pay and 
poverty are relative and change over time, see Fyfe & Pettman 38 and 
Feigehen et a1 39 respectively. The problems and causes of low pay are 
pe rs i stent themes in the 1 iteratu re, with homewo rke rs, rac i a 1 and gender 
groupings having been taken as illustrations. 
The causes of wage differentials and low pay have stimulated much 
econom ic debate. Literature rel ati ng to wage differences and 
discrimination, particularly by race and gender is vast (see selected 
references 47 to 61). Structuralist writers attribute them to various 
forms of employer discrimination. There is evidence to suggest that racial 
discrimination is substantial in the UK, but McIntosh & Smith47 , found 
that although still considerable, it was declining. Custom has also been 
designated as accounting for many observed wage differentials58, but custom 
is merely a perpetuation of discrimination from the past. Hausman et a1 59 
discuss various methods of calculating discrimination, such as Becker's 
coefficient 60• However, Marx 231 wrote about work within wide general 
theories. He examined patterns of labour demand over time and considered 
the development of production techniques, the concentration of capital, 
divisions of labou~ cultural patterns, and then linked these to the overall 
pattern of employment. This broadly based, long term view of employment 
was lost by both economists and sociologists until 1974 when Braverman232 
reintroduced it. Since then sociologists have used the term, 
The Labour Process, to describe the transformat ion of work and employment 
over time. For a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the themes 
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discussed below, see Thompson233 on which thi~ review of the labour process 
is based. 
The sociological study of work has traditionally concentrated on 
issues such as; workplace behaviour, the organisation of work, working 
environments, the class structure, stratification of jobs, hierarchy and 
control structures, but these themes have not been linked together into an 
interrelated overview of employment. Plant and factory stud,ies,emerged in 
the 1930s and were within the context of helping managements to understand 
variations in, and restriction of, output. A strand of research still 
places emphasis on workplace behaviour, but currently focuses on-relations 
between technology and the social organi sation of work 234• Others 
examine the 'rules' underlying the functioning of business organisations, 
particularly patterns of control, industrial relations and the framework of 
bargaining and confl ict. Another approach has been to stress features of 
class and class imagery and their relations to the world of workg,235,240. 
Important criticisms of plant and organisational studies centred 
around thei r i nsul arity from wi der non-work factors. A major alternative 
was provided by attempts to look at orientations to work which integrated 
concerns with the changing natures of class and industrial society and the 
existence of instrumental attitudes that depended on aspi rations and wider 
conceptions current in society. These studies examined people's (usually 
men's; woman's influence was ignored or treated as a problem) perceptions 
as shaped by society-wide experiences and ideology. This sparked a trend 
from the sphere of work towards the wider question of class imagery. 
However in these studies work experience was assumed to be understood 
rather than examined to determine whether it was connected to the work 
process itself or to external factors. Thus it became important to study 
the actual process of work, the informal workgroups and the acts of 
res i stance and confl i ct but there was a broad acceptance of an expandi ng 
economy free from structural confl ict and work deprivation: there was a 
view that automation had reversed the trend towards an ever-increasing 
division of labour and had blurred the clear-cut distinction between manual 
and non-manual labour as part of the move to a post-industrial society. 
With the re-emergence of social and industrial conflict in the late 1960s a 
new emphasis began to arise on the overall aspects of the labour process. 
Reawakened interest in a long-run labour process has produced contri-
butions through theories of work, business organisations, industrial 
relations, and de-skilling. Braverman's concept232 of the labour process 
had three strands: firstly, he saw the need for capital to control labour 
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power, and that this created the basis for alienation; secondly, the 
origins of management lay in the struggle to devise a successful means of 
imposing the employer's will within the social relations of production; 
thirdly, the division of labour based on a subdivision of work enabled the 
separati on of jobs into thei r const ituent e 1 ementsand refl ected the need 
for capital to divide crafts in order to cheapen the parts and provide a 
basis for de-skilling. Science and technology were held to be instrumental 
along with 'Taylorism' (the careful measurement and planning of operations) 
and 'Fordism' (assembly-line type production) in assisting capital to 
achieve the degradation of,work. 
Braverman's ideas have prompted research and criticism; gender-
related classification of skill, the extent, timing and variations in skill 
have been'widely questioned. De-skilling and the degradation of labour 
have emerged as two major areas of labour process debate236• The degree to 
which skill s have been eroded or transformed by capital ist development has 
been contested, and a long-run tendency has been questioned, but a central 
feature is that 'general' skills are reduced to 'job-specific' ones, while 
de-skilling is seen to be a long uneven process. 
The general conclusion to emerge is that de-skill ing and the 
mechanisation of production processes does not lead to a complete 
domination of labour by capital. The consequences of de-skilling for work 
experience has received scant attention although a few studies show that 
workers have an increasing 'pride' in thei r work and that some workers have 
positive identifications with their dexterities237• It is argued that such 
factors can permit the degradation of work without continuing crises. 
Further important strands have concerned the forms of capital's 
control, and whether capital ism or patri archy (the subordi nati on of women 
by men) is responsible'for women's subordination. Of interest are the 
specific origins of control for, during the transition from total domestic 
production to factory systems, loose forms of control became systematic 
management. Marglin19 sees the need for greater control over the productive 
process as being the motivating force behind the widespread replacement of 
domestic production by workshops and later factories during increasing 
activity in the industrial revolution. A common theme is the rejection of 
the view that the capitalist labour process is accompanied by a growth in 
the authority of management, and many writers agree that when labour is 
purchased the employer is acquiring only 'potential', which Marx 231 
--- -, -:-
recognized and called 'variable' capital. Indeed, the search for a 
particular 'type' of worker has been emphasized9; this, Blau & Schoenherr22 
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suggest, operates as an important control device in itself. 
A system described as 'simple control' is based on small size 
enterprises with lack of sophistication in the productive process which 
allows the entrepreneur to directly supervise the work, foremen and pay 
arrangements himself. Edwards21 claims that. when work force size grows too 
large for personal ties, a basis for worker resistance is established; 
simple control is further undermined by the growing concentration of 
economic resources, and thus a transition from 'control' exercised by the 
entrepreneur to . 'management' occurs. 
Organisational theorists, have pointed to the growth of formal . (often 
written) procedures as well as hierarchical chains of autho.rity for 
exerting of control. These developments have been termed bureaucratisation 
and formalfsatfon 20• Edwards 21 charts the replacement of 'simple 
hierarchy' by more subtle mechanisms, such as fragmentation of production 
processes and vertical differentiation between hierarchical levels to 
ensure the continuance of managerial control. In practice, the degree of 
'direct authority' varies from one industry to another and differing forms 
of 'control' and organisation of work make it futile to talk of a single, 
simple labour process. Discussions centre on the variety of responses and 
a formalism/casualism model has been used to describe the range of 
organisational strategies. For instance, in contrast to the bureaucratic 
formalism of manufacturing industry which is usually taken as the frame of 
reference, certain industries have been characterized as being 'casual', 
such as the construct ion i ndustry23-27, and the docks where the move to 
formalism was state instigated28• In particular, homeworkers have been 
characterized as casual labour, but Allen29 points to a common confusion 
between the conditions of work and characteristics of workers. ·Some 
literature portrays homeworkers as 'casual workers', but rather it is 
'casualized work' when judged by its conditions, since many continue 
working reliably for numerous years, often for the same employer, see 2.3. 
Terms such as casual i srn and marginal i srn are therefore seen as 
imprecise and open to many ·different interpretations30,2g. As an 
alternative to the formalf sm/casualf sm framework, Wi 11 i amson31 and Ouchi32 
suggest a markets/hierarchies interpretation of organisational behaviour. 
Control can be exerted by means of the market mechanism via subcontracting 
arrangements which are seen as appropriate when price fixing costs are low, 
and where there are no ambiguities with respect to the qual ity of 
performance. Bresnen, Wray et a1 30 consider this interpretation to be more 
appropriate than the formal ism/casual ism framework for analysing labour 
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demands when direct and subcontracted labour is used simultaneously. 
Market relationships are seen as control mechanisms. Labour 
subcontracting is not a new phenomenon and it was practiced in the metal 
trades 33 and the coal industry34 during the nineteenth century. 
Subcontractors were often responsible for recruiting, employing, training, 
supervising and disciplining their underhands 35 in a similar manner to 
present day homeworker agents. Bresnen & Wray et a1 30 show how market 
and hierarchical control mechanisms can overlap to the point where 
employers adopt market-type contracts with their direct employees by means 
of piece-rates and job prices. 
The task for labour process theorists then becomes that of 
understanding the combinations of control structures, important offspins 
being the use of an ideology of femininity as a means of securing 
compl iance from women workers, and male dominance of trade unions, see 
Dex 281 • In the social relations of the shop floor, even something as 
simple as gender-related banter could become the language of discipline. 
, The ability of capital to organize consent depends on the context of 
productive activity, and forms of control have been shown to alter in 
relation to economic changes which place differing degrees of pressure on 
firms 238 • Although an important contribution has been made by linking 
consent to materi a 1 conditi ons, 'external' factors must a1 so be consi dered 
in order to fully understand the generation of consent. For instance do 
women workers exhibit greater pacifity and compl iance with work 
conditions, and if so, why? Could it be that female loyalty is enhanced by 
the position women occupy in the hierarchy of mental and manual labour239 
and by their social preparation for the world of work during schooling? 
* * * 
It was at this stage of theoretical debate that the author was 
required to design and implement the research programme, and it was within 
the context of the issues discussed above that the empirical work was set. 
In due course, empirical findings pointed to the need to establish a 
theoretical base relating to LM disequilibrium and processes of adjustment. 
Very recently economists have turned their attention to problems of 
disequilibrium, indeed, two articles reviewed below are awaiting public-
ation. Part C is the author's contribution to the debate that is now 
confronting this topic. Such writings are reviewed below in order that 
the issues raiseCl- can- infOrnr- subsequent analysis and discussion of data. 
In recent years attention has been increasingly focused on the nature 
of contractual relationships within firms; Littler36 considers that both 
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industrial and organisational sociology have largely ignored systems of 
internal contract. There has been an increasing awareness of the 
pervasiveness of long employment relations, even in literature relating to 
homeworkers. Oi 185 was the first person to recognize the importance of 
long-term labour relations by noting the hoarding of skilled as opposed to 
unskilled workers on a cyclical basis. This he attributed to what he 
called the 'fixed costs of 1 abour' (i.e. recruitment, selection and 
training investment) which were lost to the employer when the worker left 
the company. 
Implicit Contract (IC) theory picks up these issues; Sloan & 
Wooden'slg9 survey of the 1 iterature rel ati ng to long-term employment 
relations forms the basis of the following discussion. IC theories 
developed from attempts to understand the twin empirical irregularities of 
wage stickiness and involuntary unemployment. ILM literature bears directly 
on IC theory as do the insurance, transaction cost and incomplete 
information areas of analysis. General and firm-specific training have 
important implications, as have fixed costs of labour incurred by hiring 
and training 185• It is held that due to these factors, firms have the 
incentive to develop stable relations with their employees. Transacting 
(i.e. employment contracting) on the basis of worker identity offers 
economies if repeated transactions are expected, especially in an uncertain 
or ill-informed world, or when contracts are difficult to enforce and where 
employees can control performance, usually a costly and difficult thing to 
monitor. Thus, employment relationships, instead of being seen as a series 
of 'spot' exchanges as depicted by traditional price/auction models, are 
viewed as complex long-term attachments. 
IC literature can be divided into two main'streams: writings that 
attempt to rescue price/auction models208,209,210; and those that 
challenge it, such as Williamson et a1 225 who consider that exchange in 
the LM is highly idiosyncratic, and Okun 211 ,222 who asserts that it is 
unlikely to rely on the impersonal price/auction system. The latter type 
Sloan & Wooden199 have termed 'Invisible Handshake' contracts in order to 
distinguish them from the former which they continue to call 'Implicit 
Contracts', but these terms are confusing since both are contracts of 
employment impl ictly constituted. Consequently, that convention has not 
been followed; the former type have been called 'Risk-averse' and the 
latter 'Cost-minimizing' contracts due to their distinguishing features. 
There is much overlap between these two streams of thought and debates 
address five basic issues. These are: (1) worker risk aversion; (2) the 
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value of unemployment; (3) transaction costs; (4) contract enforcement; and 
(5) asymmetric or imperfect information. Contracts themsel ves can be of 
two types: the most usual being (a) implicit wage contacts (i.e. fixed 
wage/variable employment), but some writers prefer, (b) impl icit employment 
contracts (i.e. fixed employment/variable wage). 
With respect to risk aversion, the basic premise is that, relative to 
employers, workers are risk-averse. Firms offer workers employment plus an 
element of insurance, the argument being that workers pay a premium for 
lower variance in wages 209• As part of the exchange for wage certainty, 
workers accept the risks of employment fluctuations by implicitly agreeing 
to lay-offs in trough conditions. Azariadis213 sees differential risk 
averseness as not necessarily based on underlying psychological 
differences, but that workers are dependent on a wealth portfolio 
(i.e.their human capital) which they cannot diversify; firms have various 
types of capital which they can diversify at will. Firms are therefore 
better placed to bear risks. In general, the more risk averse, the more 
reliable will the workers be, and the greater the likelihood of 
fixed wage/variable employment contracts. Thus, implicit contracts are 
seen to give rise to involuntary unemployment in the form of temporary lay-
offs. That the unemployment is involuntary arises because, although 
implicit wage contracts have been entered, it cannot be assumed that laid-
off employees would not prefer to retain thei r jobs. Akerlof & Miyazaki 212 
disagree with this assumption and claim that wage 'stickiness' should not 
affect unemployment because fixing employment and varyi ng wages 1 eads to 
the same wage bill. They argue that employees will negotiate fixed 
employment contracts, accepting lower wages in return because a zero wage 
yields no utility. Thurow198 also questions impl icit wage contracts and 
argues for implicit employment contracts as follows: 
"There is no empi rical evidence for the existence of this set of 
preferences, but it also makes no intuitive sense. A sensible risk-
averse worker, given the choice between the small risks of 
occupational wage reductions and the large risks of many weeks of 
unemployment, would always choose the small risks and flexible wages." 
With respect to the value of unemployment, Sloan and Wooden199 claim 
that lay-offs will occur if employees value leisure and dole payments more 
----- - -. - -- --- ---~- ---. - --- - --- - - -- --_.- -- -
than working for a wage less than the going rate. They see the advantage of 
lay-offs as being the retrenchment of the least efficient or specifically 
trained workers. This they consider to be preferable to reliance on wage 
reductions which might induce the most highly efficient to quit first. It 
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is sometimes assumed that the probability of lay-off is spread evenly 
across workers 212 , but Oi 185 found labour turnover lower among skilled 
workers, Azariadis 213 found more pro-cycl ical employment variation among 
low skilled workers, particularly for those with low seniority, and 
Grossman 214 ,215 also found reliable and unreliable workers to be 
differenti ated by seni ority, with the 1 ess rel i abl e subject to more 
frequent spell s of unemployment. Thus, the more fi rmly establi shed that 
workers are within their firms, the less likely they are to face lay-offs, 
a point explored by Beardsworth et a1 200• 
Transaction costs arise from search and hiring processes. Where 
transaction costs are high for the employer, impl icit fixed wage contracts 
will be preferred. Hence, senior workers with high human capital investment 
are more likely to have fixed-wage contracts199• 
A major difficulty is making the contract stick 
(i.e. contract enforcementj because there is Httleto stop employees from 
entering the 'spot' (i.e,price/auction) market in favourable environments 
and breaking the contract. Risk-averse models resolve this problem by 
extending the IC concept to a two-period model in which firms structure 
contracts to minimize quit behaviour. In the first period, wages are lower 
than expected; in the second, they rise with seniority differentials which 
give incentive to remain. However, Bul1 216 argues that workers choose not 
to quit because they wish to develop reputations as 'reliable' workers so 
as to have access to jobs open only to the rel iable. Furthermore, when a 
firm hires workers it purchases a bundle of services including, skill, 
effort, initiative, and honesty. The worker receives a package including 
pay, conditions of service, safety and fringe benefits. Subsequently, 
either the fi rm or the worker may choose to trade work time for effort; 
these latter risks of IC defaulting are referred to as moral hazard (Le 
Marx's231 vari abl e cap ita 1). 
Most IC models adopt the assumption that information is asymmetric; 
only employers know the state of order books, but whether unemployment is 
higher or lower as a result is an unresolved issue217-221. As Sloan and 
Wooden199 point out, these models do not explain why under- or over-
employed persons are not hired by other firms, it being assumed that they 
stay with the company. Neither do IC model s incorporate aggregate demand, 
but they can depict work-sharing and under-employment, a relevant issue in 
dynamic environments. 
Cost-minimizingIC theories have many similarities, but they differ in 
three basic respects: (1) the reasons for entering the contracts; (2) the 
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ways of 'enforcement'; and (3) in assumptions about worker productivity. 
The distinguishing feature of cost-minimising contracts refers to the 
reasons for entering them. Whereas risk-averse le theorists rely on a 
postulation of worker risk-aversion, cost-minimizing Ies theorists place 
emphas i s on minimizing long-term costs, and/or portraying the fi rm as a 
'reliable' employer. Transactions costs are seen to be reduced when the 
employer deals repeatedly with the same'people, but length of service 
depends on experienced degrees of contentment. It is necessary for 
contracts to be seen as 'fair'. Okun222 suggests tha t fai rness is judged 
relative to other employers, the firm's product price and other consumer 
prices; Blandy and Richardson223 add the wages of other workers in the 
firm. In cost-minimizing le theory it is assumed that productivity is 
variable and difficult to monitor, hence explicit long-term contracts are 
rare. To overcome moral hazard (i.e. labour controls productivity and 
qual it.ll, both of which can be varied) on spot markets, employers enter long-
term contracts which provide 'fair' wages without substantial fluctuations 
even in variable environments. Career labour markets develop which, by 
prior agreement, constrain what employers can do to wages and employment 
conditions. If employers violate these implicit contracts quit behaviour 
results and the firm's reputation is damaged; and this is viewed as costly 
in the long-run. Akerlof224 sees 'fair' wages as a social custom, which 
when broken reduces reputation; the gains achieved by wage reductions 
versus the costs of lost reputation are assessed. Such res offer , 
explanations of involuntary unemployment. As in risk-averse Ies, ,the cost 
of relative stability of wages is the risk of lay-off and this is similarly 
held to generate involuntary unemployment. 
Thus, although le theories address the related issues of wage rigidity 
and involuntary unemployment they also confront employer/employee 
relationships and add to understandings of LM dynamics. In particular they 
offer reasons for the permanency of employment. 
In contrast to long-term employment relations, the need for 
flexibility in recruitment has been recognized by several writers,25-
27,30,200,203,229,230, especially for industries facing unpredictable 
demand. The retention of flexibility and the reduction of uncertainty have 
been offered as reasons for the widespread and apparently growing use of 
subcontracted labour in the construction industry30. Temporary solution 
strategies have also been noted241• As Doeringer & Piore11 state: 
"Employers often seem to favour temporary solutions to tight job 
markets, solutions that do not provide the newly hired with the full 
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career benefits of primary employment. Thus one finds companies in the 
primary sector relying on subcontracting and the use of 
temporary workers to avoid the costs and the risks associated with 
giving primary market status to workers from the secondary sector" 
Loveridge & Mok 242 consider that much of the preference for temporary 
solutions could have resulted from experiences of stop-go growth. 
A recent contribution to the permanent/temporary area of analysis has 
been that of Beardsworth et a1 200 who consider that with some justification 
social scientists have focused their analyses on situations where the 
employer/employee relationship has relatively stable and enduring ties. 
They argue that in certain circumstances employers may deliberately wish to 
distance themse1 ves from workers as an economic and organisational 
strategy. To distinguish employees who have direct and permanent ties from 
those whose link is distanced and attenuated they use the terms 
'Established' and 'Unestab1ished' workers respectively. There are many 
ways of being economically active without being a employee in the 
conventional sense. Loosely-coupled relationships encompass partial and 
irregular employment and subcontracting arrangements. For instance, casual 
workers, seasonal workers, homeworkers, part-time workers, fixed term 
cont ract wo rke rs and ce rta in types of sub-contractor represent examp1 es 
where the employer/employee bonds are relatively weak and unstable. 
Unestab1ished workers at the lower end of the earnings spectrum comprise 
the bulk of those in the 'secondary worker' role, but unestablished workers 
may not have low ski 11 and status. They may be members of e1 i te groups 
(e.g. artists, actors, entertainers, barristers, musicians, models, 
journalists, broadcasters, and photographers operating as freelances and 
consultants) who rapidly move between highly lucrative engagements. 
Examples where dfstance working has become more widespread in recent 
years are temporary secretari a1 work, ski 11 ed computer 'tel eworki ng', and 
the 'networking' of highly skilled senior personnel working on a freelance 
basis via computer in their own homes 226 ,227,228. To achieve distancing, 
managements employ a number of devices which 1 imit the scope of thei r 
responsibilities to the workforce and reduce the need for close control, 
careful management and organizing motivation. Beardsworth et a1 200 
formu1 ate thei r conceptuali zati on of establ i shed/unestabl i shed workers in 
terms of a continuum, with the established worker role at one end and the 
unestab1ished at the other. The continuum is seen as a shorthand term to 
refer to a range of variations in the form of employer/employee 
relationships. The two ends of the continuum are seen as 'ideal types'. 
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Suggested features of the relationship existing between employers and 
established worker are: (a) the period of employment is usually open ended; 
(b) the employer seeks to provide a degree of continuity of employment, if 
not continuity of work and stability of earnings; (c) the employer seeks to 
generate commitment and motivation; (d) the employer will bear certain 
explicit legal responsibilities towards established (e.g.permanent full-
time) workers in respect of statutory insurance contributions, health and 
safety regulations, redundancy payments and dismissal; (e) the employer 
will be more likely to use complex 'bureaucratic' forms of control; and (f) 
a stable workforce will be relatively more conducive to the development of 
trade unions, and the institutionalization and routinization of 
employer/employee conflict. 
For the unestablished worker, features are: (a) employment may be for 
a fixed period (e.g.fixed term contract), or labour power may be bought in 
small parcels (by week, day or hour). Individuals may be employed on a 
part-time basis in order to take them below the threshold at which certain 
legal obligations apply (national insurance contributions). The employer 
may opt out of problems inherent in buying labour power and in effect buy 
labour already embodied in a product. This may be achieved by variations 
on the theme of subcontracting and putting-out; (b) given the above, there 
will be little attempt to ensure continuity of employment, but the inputs 
of unestablished workers will be varied at will; (c) there will be little 
attempt to generate commitment or improve motivati on; (d) legal obH gati ons 
will be minimized; (e) complex bureaucratic control mechanisms will be 
inappropriate or unworkable, and the most important methods of control may 
be those stemming from hiring and firing or withholding payment for 
substandard or late work; and (f) a less stable and more transient 
workforce will result having individualistic orientations which will be 
less conducive to trade union development. 
Figure 2:1 characterizes the possible relationships between skill 
level and established/unestablished status. Towards the perimeter of 
quadrant A are workers with high occupational status, earnings and job 
security. Towards the perimeter of quadrant B are workers with high 
earnings (in high demand periods), high status but low levels of job 
security. In quadrant C workers enjoy good levels of job security, but 
command relatively low earnings. Workers in quadrant D have low earnings 
and job security and are the archetypal secondary workers of the dual and 
segmented labour markets. Although there are apparent parallels with 
primary and secondary workers, caution is necessary due to the presence of 
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highly skilled elites among the unestablished group; the notion of 
unestablished workers cuts across boundaries of labour market segments. 
Beardsworth et a1 200 argue that the location in the LM of unestabl ished 
workers of different types remains an open question. Employers are seen 
as exercising strategic choices between established and unestablished 
workers, although constraints can arise from technological and 
organisational factors, LM conditions or institutions and government 
policy. Control over the established/unestablished mix is exercised, this 
being a view closely linked to Atkinson's230 concept of a flexibl~ firm. 
Atkinson sees firms attempting to enhance their functional, financial, 
and manning level flexibility by differentiating between: (a) a core of 
stable, secure, functionally flexible employees; (b) a 'first peripheral' 
group of routine workers with high turnover; (c) a 'second peripheral' 
group of part-timers, short-term contract workers etc; and (d) 
subcontractors and agencies that provide still more flexible inputs; these 
different sections of the workforce being controlled and managed in 
significantly different ways. This organisational form allows the firm to 
react rapidly to market fluctuations. Employers may choose to trade 
control against flexibility and reduced labour costs; control may switch to 
output regulation, dismissal threats, or contract or order non-renewal. 
Beardsworth's200 fi rst draft suggests that work force mi x osci 11 ates 
with environmental conditions, the important issue being how conditions 
affect choice. Two propositions were offered: 
(i) in low demand and high unemployment unestablished workers will be a 
relatively attractive option (even though normally short supply skills 
are readily available) because they will be an effective device for 
reducing wage costs by bidding against each other, and will provide 
flexibility by being easily shed. 
(ii) in high demand and low unemployment unestablished workers will be 
unattractive; their costs will rise as employers bid against each 
other, and being more mobile they will be less reliable at a time when 
employers particularly require reliable workers. 
In case (1), dfsestablishment of workers will involve modificati on 
towards more part-time, temporary or subcontracted 1 abour, perhaps with the 
use of petty entrepreneurs to handle the latter. Labour, embodied in 
fi ni shed goods, may be purchased rather than manufacturi ng by the fi rm's 
direct labour, thereby using the satelite firm's workforce as its own 
unestablished workers. Such 'outsourcing' can be used to take advantage of 
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price competition among satelite firms while avoiding the costs of direct 
employment. In case (ii), the process of incorporating workers into the 
fi rm (i.e. the process of establ ishment) can be achieved by making 
previously marginal categories into established workers, or by providing 
permanent full-time posts as opposed to temporary or part-time ones. 
In oscillating between these strategies employers alter their workf-
orce mixes; the weakening of bonds between employers and employees, seen as 
costly and constraining on flexibility, being practised as deliberate 
policies. Thus, Beardsworth et a1 200 emphasize the role of variations in 
the workforce mix for providing adjustment to LM dynamics, a topic pert-
inent to Part C, but where findings suggest exactly opposite reactions. 
By examining methods of adjustment, Thomas & Deaton 196 found diversity 
and "a confusing jumble of actions" and judged firms to be more likely to 
change adjustment strategies in response to shortages rather than surpluses 
of 1 abour, partly because shortage was more vi si bl e. They questioned the 
validity of emphasizing the price mechanism as in neo-classical economics 
for in none of the three occupational LMs they studied were pay adjustments 
exclusive, or ·even dominant; indeed they argued that wage adjustments acted 
as de-stabilizers. Choice of adjustment was based on 1 imited search for 
cost minimising options because, they argued, search procedures were 
themselves costly. Limited search for the cheapest adjustment was therefore 
perceived as a cost-minimising strategy in its own right. They developed 
simple models of adjustment. In Figure 2:2, Ei is the actual labour stock, 
Ei * is the desired labour stock and during time period to to tl there is a 
labour stock balance. During tl to t2 a shortage of labour arises, but no 
action is taken due to time lags between instrument introduction and 
effectiveness. At t2 the instruments become effective and reduce the 
shortage by the time t3' after which equilibrium is restored. This model 
the'refore suggests inter'mittent periods of disequil ibrium in a general 
state of labour stock balance. Figure 2:3 illustrates how a labour stock 
shortage might be el iminated in order to return to equil ibrium. Line S 
depicts existing labour stocks, and line 0 the desired stock; the 
diagonally hatched area represents labour shortage with its consequent loss 
of production. Line R at tl shows the amount by which desired numbers can 
be temporarily reduced by subcontracting work, while line E shows the 
effect of a temporary adjustment to outward flow by raising the retirement 
age for existing workers, thereby highering the employment level to that 
indicated by the lower dotted aTea. At t2Jhe retirement age reverts to 
its previous level and successful recruitment is introduced until t3 is 
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reached when a labour stock balance is achieved by a fall in the desired 
stock which also brings the subcontracting strategy to an end. 
A wide range of instruments were found to be available and these were 
grouped into four operands according to their modes of impact: (1) the 
reduction of desired man-hours: (2) increasing the average hours worked 
per employee: (3) reducing the outflows of labour: and (4)' increasing the 
inflows of labour. Operand (1) operated by affecting product demand; 
operand (2) operated by influencing the stock of labour: and operands (3) 
and (4) influenced labour flows. Most instruments carried constraints on 
extensive use, and a preference for temporary and familiar rather than 
permanent adjustments was noticed, temporary adjustments being introduced 
in order to "learn by doing". 
Blandy & Richardson 197 found that wage rates did adjust, but that 
certain non-wage adjustments were also important in many occupations. 
These non-wage adjustments were: (ll promoti on rate changes: (2) 
recrui tment rate changes: (3) qual itychanges: and (4) hour changes. 
They considered that the more long-term the r'elation between workers and 
firms, the more equivalent workers became to the firm's fixed capital and 
this placed them on a more equitable footing relative to the owners of 
capital. Adjustments were concentrated on those workers who had not 
established long-term relationships with their employers, but this was seen 
as inequitable for workers who were unable to obtain such long~erm 
relationships due to high levels of unemployment. They saw the conditions 
of service offered to employees as "least-cost packages" over the long-
term, and considered that profit maximizing behaviour was not simply a 
matter of minimizing the short-run wage bill: focusing on short-term 'spot' 
markets was therefore misleading in an assessment of LM efficiency. They 
considered Okun's222 concept of "fair play" to be an essential element in 
the pursuit of efficiency. 
Jonsson243 perceived labour as a risk-taking (via damage to health) as 
well as a risk-bearing (e.g. lay-{)ff) factor of production. His focus of 
interest was the determination of company policy by workers and he saw that 
whereas labour was not usually compensated by profit sharing for the risks 
it took, capital received its share of profits in the form of dividends. 
He argued that as an alternative to the usual democratic or distribution 
persuasions for co-determination of company policy, labour could justify it 
on a contractual basis. 
Thus, adjustment to disequilibrium is now being addressed and the idea 
of labour as a risk-bearer is also pertinent to issues discussed in Part C. 
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2.2 THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF TIlE LABOUR MARKET 
The legal context of the LM needs examination because different acts 
and conventions applied to the workgroups and affected their LM statuses. 
Employment law derives both from statute and common law, and the 
definition of employment status (i.e.employed or self-employed) is that 
which the courts and tribunals apply to individual cases, see Leighton249• 
There is no legal definition to distinguish between full-timers and part-
timers, but there is a special definition for the provisions of the 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act (EPCA), see below. The DE defines 
part -timers as worki ng fewer than 30 hours per week. 
The Employment Protection (Con sol idation) Act, 1978 (EPCA) 
consolidated the major enactments governing relations between employer and 
employee during the 1970s. Legal provisions regulating trade union 
activities, particularly picketing have been amended by the Employment Acts 
of 1980 and 1982, but at the time of the empirical survey the 1978 Act was 
in force; consequently that body of law has been examined in detail to 
facilitate an assessment of its impact in Chapter 11. 
The 1978 provisions for elllployees covered the following topics: 
(1) a written statement of the main terms and conditions of employment; 
(2) an itemized pay statement; 
(3) rights to trade union membership and activities; 
(4) time off with pay for public duties; 
(5) recovery of debts on the employer's insolvency; 
(6) guaranteed payments; 
(7) redundancy: 
(a) consultation rights of a trade union; 
(b) redundancy payments; 
(c) time off for job search or to arrange training; 
(d) unfair dismissal on the grounds of redundancy; 
(8) dismissals: 
(a) unfair dismissals; 
(b) the right to a written statement of the reasons for dismissal; 
(c) rights to notice on termination of employment; 
(9) maternity rights: 
(a) protection from dismissal for pregnancy; 
(b) the right to return to work; and 
(c) maternity pay. 
As defined by the 1978 Act an employee was a person who was or had been 
engaged under a contract of employment, which could be oral or written, 
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expressed or implied, of indefinite duration or for a fixed term, whether 
for training, apprenticeship or other purposes. In law an employee had a 
contract of employment as soon as he/she commenced work, even if a written 
statement of its terms and conditions as required by the Act had not been 
given. Written statements did not constitute the contract. but were 
evidence as to its contents. Contracts of apprenticeship had to be in 
writing. Both employer and employee were bound by the terms and conditions 
offered and agreed whether or not they were in writing. Within 13 weeks of 
the employee's appointment, the employer had to furnish a written statement 
of the main terms of employment with an additional note on disciplinary and 
grievance procedures. The statement could be used as important evidence of 
an unwritten contract during proceedings. A written contract had to include 
all the terms and conditions of employment. The Act listed topics that had 
to be included in the statement. Special rules governed the calculation of 
a week's pay for time-. piece-, shift and rota workers. and for employees 
with variable hours or commission payments. In general. a week's pay meant 
a week's normal earnings or average earnings. Fixed term contracts required 
clearly defined starting and finishing dates with no provision for earlier 
termination or future extension. 
An employee working 16 hours or more had an automatic right to an 
itemized pay statement which include the gross salary, details of fixed and 
variable deductions. net sala~ and the method and amount of payment. The 
rights to trade union membership and activities forbade the employer to 
take action which prevented or deterred employees from joining or belonging 
to an independent trade union and he could not penalize them for taking 
part in its activities. An 'independent' union was one which was not under 
employer domination or control, certificates of independence being issued 
by the Certification Officer. Dismissal in relation to the above was 
automatically 'unfair'. Actions short of dismissal, such as the docking of 
payor benefits, refusal of promotion, trairiing or job transfer, or threats 
of dismissal or redundancy infringed an employees rights and were also held 
to be 'unfair'. 
Employees holding public positions, such as members of local councils, 
health .or water authorities, statutory tribunals. governors of educational 
establ ishments. or J.P.s were permitted reasonable time off to perform 
their duties. The recovery of debts provision enabled employees to obtain 
payments of certain debts when payment could not otherwise be made because 
assets were frozen. Employees not provided with work throughout a day in 
which they would normally work due to a reduction in business were entitled 
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to guaranteed payments in respect of each compl ete worki ng day lost, but 
not for days in which some work was provided. The right to introduce 
short-time or temporary lay-offs was determined by an individual's 
contract, either expressly, implied or by custom. Collective agreements 
which were superior to the Act's provisions could be exempted by the 
Secretary of State. The guaranteed payment was cal cul ated by multi plyi ng 
the employee's normal worki ng hours by the guaranteed hourly rate as 
specified by law. 
There were four redundancy provisions. Trade union consultation rights 
required the employer to consult the appropriate recognized trade union 
whenever he proposed to make an employee redundant and to notify the 
Secretary of State when planning to undertake 10 or more redundancies 
within specified periods. Trade union representatives could be shop 
stewards, district, regional or national officials. Consultation was 
required before the statutory notice of dismissal period commenced. 
Redundancy payments were compensatory lump sums to any employees who 
fulfilled the prescribed conditions~ If the dismissal was wholly or mainly 
due to some cause other than redundancy, such as inefficiency, 
unsuitability or health reasons, there was no entitlement to redundancy 
payment, but the onus of proof was on the employer to establ i sh that the 
employee was not redundant. Redundancy payments were laid down by law; in 
March 1980 the maximum reckonable service was 20 years, and the weekly 
payment was limited to E110. It was calculated as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
for each year of reckonable service from 
age 41 to 65 (man) or age 41 to 60 (woman): 
for each year of reckonabl e service from 
age 22 to age 40: 
for each year of reckonable service from 
age 18 to age 21: 
1.1/2 weeks' pay 
1 weeks' pay 
1/2 week's pay 
Continuous reckonable service is defined in 11.4.1. Service below the 
age of 18 and above the ages of 60 (woman) or 65 (man) do not count as 
reckonable service. Payment is reduced by l/12th for each complete month 
over the ages of 59 (woman) and 64 (man) so that entitlement ceases 
completely at ages 60 and 65 respect ively. The maximum payment in March 
1980 was £6,300 (i.e., 30 weeks at £110, the entitlement of a man with 20 
years reckonabl e service between the ages of 41 and 64 with a week's pay of 
£110). Employees subjected to redundancy had the ri ght to 
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time off with pay for job search or to arrange traini ng for future 
employment up to a maximum of 2/5ths of any weekly wage. The 
unfair dismissal on the grounds of redundancy provision specified the rules 
for permitted redundancy. 
There were 3 dismissal provisions. Dismissal was defined as 'the 
termination of employment' and employees had the right not to be 'unfairly' 
dismissed. Remedy was through an industrial tribunal, but the dismissee 
had to establ ish that he/she was an employee, and had been 
unfairly dismissed. The rules for 'fair' dismissal were defined. If the 
employer failed to give a fair reason, then the dismissal was deemed 
unfai r. Inadmissabl e reasons for fai r dismissal were those associated 
with trade union membership of activities, unfair selection for redundancy, 
'spent' conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, and 
cases where the employer disregarded customary arrangements or agreed 
procedures relating to selection for redundancy. Employees had the right 
to written statements of the reasons for their dismissals on either oral or 
written request; these had to" be provided within 14 days and could be used 
as evidence in proceedings. Both employers and employees had 
rights to notice on termination of employment, notice being more generous 
for employees. 
Maternity provisions gave 3 important rights: protection from 
dismissal; return to work rights; and maternity payment. For 
protection from dismissal the employee had to satisfy the prescribed 
conditions after which dismissal became automatically unfair, unless 
pregnancy made it impossible to perform the job adequately, or it was 
agai nst the 1 aw to conti nue. She had the ri ght to return to work withi n 29 
weeks after confinement; a period governed by special rules. Maternity pay 
was payable regardless of the intention to return. Taxes and national 
insurance were deductible from the payment which could be paid by lump sum 
or by weekly/monthly instalments. The employer could recover the full 
amount from the maternity fund which was financed from social security 
contributions, provided that this was claimed within 6 months of the last 
date of payment. 
The impacts of the 1978 provisions on var·ious workgroups are 
considered in the light of the empirical findings in Chapter 11 
* * * 
Two enactments, the Equal Pay Act,1970 (EPA) and the Sex 
Discrimination Act, 1975 (SDA) were designed to equalize the positions of 
women and men. The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) was established to 
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oversee this body of law. Much equality legislation is obscure and the 
EOC's function is to clarify the law's meaning; it also performs 
consultati ve. advi sory and gui dance act i vi ti es at formal and informal 
levels. 
The EPA establ ished 'equal pay for like work'. whereas the Treaty of 
Rome, Article 119. established the principle that equal pay should be for 
'work of equal value'. Under UK law it has been possible for workforce 
segregation to circumvent the Act by frustrating a clear definition of 
'like work' and has allowed discriminatory pay structures to continue 
because remedy under the EPA was by 'individual' application to an 
industrial tribunal. Thus. its operation has been shown to be 
ineffectua1 80• The European Commission has ruled that the UK EPA does not 
comply with the European Commission directive since it did not enable a 
woman to claim equal pay for work of 'equal value'. and consequently, it 
had to be amended. 
The British Government publ ished a Draft Order on the EPA which the 
Trades Union Congress {TUC)81 considered sought to "tinker with it", and 
condemned as 'a slap in the face of women workers' as well as for 
parl iament and the EEC. The TUC82,83 made demands for comprehensive and 
cohesive changes to the EPA and SDA to make the equality legislation more 
effective by tackling the problem of indirect discrimination and extending 
its scope to the use of positive action programmes to cover collective 
bargaining and employment, education and training. 
The EPA was amended in January 1984jthe amendment extended the use of 
job evaluation in equal pay claims at industrial tribunals257 ,258. A woman 
can now claim equal pay with a man if she is in the same employment and is 
engaged in work of the same or broadly similar nature, or on work of equal 
value. Discrimination in access to promotion opportunities, transfer, 
training or dismissal is unlawful. The Act makes no provisions for 
external intervention to remove discriminatory clauses from collective 
agreements, or for other procedures dealing with conditions of employment 
other than pay. It is restricted to settling complaints that arise in 
practice. Consequently, pol icies with prima facie discriminatory clauses 
can remain legally unchallenged until thei r implementation results in 
discrimination which contravenes the EPA. Although women have access to 
industrial tribunals and the EOC, there is no mandatory requirement to 
bring claims. Thus equal pay legislation in Britain now allows claims on 
the basis of 'equal pay for work of equal val ue' however dissimil ar men's 
and women's jobs, but from establishments where job evaluation schemes have 
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not been undertaken, or where such schemes discriminate by sex. However, 
when data for this research project were collected these legal changes had 
not occurred. 
The EPA and SDA make no reference to full-time or part-time employment 
and until 1981 an employer could resist equal pay between a man and woman 
on the grounds of working hours making a material difference. However, in 
1981/2 the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) in the case of Clarke and 
Powell v Eley (IM) Kynoch Ltd81 ruled it unlawful to pay lower rates, or to 
se 1 ect fo r redundancy on the bas i s on 1 y of fewe r than no rma 1 hours. 
Recently, interpretations of the EPA and SDA have invoked the concept of 
indirect discrimination on grounds other than sex and this has extended 
protection to part-time workers. However, it allowed indirect 
discrimination if the employer could prove commercial advantage, other than 
the use of cheap labour (e.g.the removal of a twil ight shift). Robinson & 
Wallace257 ,258 conclude that inferior treatment of part-timers is more than 
occupational segregation of men and women. Thei r research showed it was 
often determined by assigning part-timers to low grade jobs in comparison 
to full-time women; they doubted whether the law as it stood could improve 
the conditions of part-time employment. 
The SDA made illegal any discrimination on the grounds of gender or 
marital status, whether direct, indirect or accidentally indirect, but it 
did not refer to age discrimination. It covered employment, training, 
education, the supply of facilities, goods, services and housing. Of the 
667 cases brought between 1976 and 1978 less that 10% were won84• Social 
legislation incorporates sex discrimination aspects because these were 
exempted under Section 51 of the SDA. It assumes that women are housewives 
and are dependent on men who are responsible for earning the family living 
and paying tax. Official statistics show these assumptions to be wrong for 
many working women and families; approximately 1 in 3 marriages fail. 
* * * 
Special statutory regulations apply to twilight workers and these 
sprang from restrictions on the employment of women and young persons 85 
whose normal factory hours were 1 imited as shown in Table 2.3, and whose 
permitted overtime hours above these maxima were as shown in Table 2.4. 
The effect of the general restrictions as contained in the Factories Act, 
1961 was to preclude the working of shifts, although application could be 
made to the Factory 'Inspectorate for exemption orders to authorize the 
employment of, women and young persons between 6a.m. and 10p.m. on any 
weekday and between 6a.m. and 2p.m. on Saturdays. The Factories (Evening) 
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Employment Order, 1950 (SI 1950, No.1837) which was introduced by the 
Secretary of State to extend permitted working times was made under the 
Oefence (General) Regulations Act 1939 and provided that the employment of 
women between 5p.m. and 10p.m. need not be treated as overtime 
employment86• Thus 'special exemptions' allowed women to be employed part-
time during the evenings as twilight workers on weekdays other than 
Saturdays. If obtained, women aged 18 and over could be employed between 5 
p.m. and 10 p.m., but continuous spells of work could not exceed 4.1/2 
hours unless they included an interval of 10 minutes or more. Notice had 
to be clearly posted (Form F 1684) specifying the periods of employment, 
and if spells exceeded 4.1/2 hours, of intervals of rest for each day of 
the week •• On any day in which a woman worked an 'evening shift' she 
could not also be employed outside the period of employment shown on form 
1684. These restrictions applied to factories (as defined in Section 175 
of the Factories Act 1961) engaged in the making of wearing apparel and to 
other specified types of business. 
* * * 
Ewi ng 244 observed that the 1 egal machi nery for protecti on of 
homeworkers can be traced back to the 1890 House of Lords Select Committee 
Report on the Sweating System246• This identified three central problems: 
(1) inadequate wages, "barely sufficient to sustain existence"; (2) many 
hours of labour, making "the lives of workers periods of almost ceaseless 
toil"; (3) unsanitary working conditions, which were "not only injurious to 
the health of the persons employed, but also dangerous to the public". The 
Government responded by enacting the Factory and Workshops Act of 1891 
which imposed the duty on employers to keep lists of homeworkers, but not 
until 1895 were these lists to be sent to the Factory Inspectors with the 
general purpose of protecting the consumer not the homeworke~ Under the 
Factory and Workshops Act 1901 homeworker employers had to register with 
the Local Authority rather than with the Factory Inspectorate which was 
given access to registers. Authority was given to the Secretary of State to 
create special orders to specify trades to be covered by the legislation; 
merely 5 such.Orders have been produced. Emphasis was placed on protecting 
the consumer by preventing the spread of disease rather than looking after 
homeworker interests. There were no requirements to register premises, and 
LA lists were not open to public inspection which made it difficult to 
assess the extent of non-compliance. 
The 1908 Select Committee of the House of Commons 247 considered it 
essential that earnest efforts should be made to deal with th,e homeworkers' 
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"ever-present burden of gri ndi ng poverty". Consequently, the Trade boards 
Act 1909 created Boards in a few industries where sweating was especially 
bad (tailoring, box, chain, and lace manufacture) and provided for further 
Boards in other industries on the initiative of the President of the Board 
of Trade. The aim of the Boards was to abolish the poverty wages associated 
with 'sweated trades'. The Boards were renamed Wages Councils in 1945 and 
the House of Commons Paper 182, Appendix 9128 listed industries covered by 
Wages Councils in which homeworkers were employed. 
Wages Council legislation established two principles: fi rst1y, the 
setting of legal minimum wages; and secondly, the establishment of an 
inspectorate to enforce them. The Inspectorate adopted a special formula to 
convert piece to time rates and then made a judgement as to whether the 
person in question was an 'average' worker, but the Wages Councils were 
unable to raise the general level of homeworker wages because a substantial 
majority of homeworkers were excluded from protection. 
'Bad' employers poss ib1y did not comply with regi strat i on procedures 
which could suggest why Wages Council Inspectors found only 5 cases of 
underpayment of Statutory Minimum Remuneration (SMR) in 1972, and why Hakim 
& Dennis126 concluded that underpayment was not a widespread practice. In 
the early 1960s Gui1baud119 claimed that, the Wages Council system had 
achieved the general principle for which it was established, but most 
writers would disagree88 ,91,92,113-117,120-125. Field & Winyard108 argue 
that, " ••• the majority of Wages Councils have failed to prevent the 
widespread occurrence of low pay in their industries", but Bay1iss 120 
considered that breaches of minutiae, rather than refusal to pay the basic 
rates, was the major offence. Penalties for non-comp1 iance were very low 
at £100 for each offence. 
ACAS248 has recently drawn attention to Section 17 of the'Wages 
Council Act of 1979 which effectively requi red an employer to pay for any 
overheads that workers' incurred in the production process; Hakim 229 found 
that homeworkers outside Wages Councils received no such payments, but that 
Wages Councils had negotiated holiday and holiday pay agreements. This 
illustrated that the Counci 1s had been able to exert a beneficial 
influence over homeworkers in thei r specific industries and indeed they 
. provided the only prote,c.tion available to homeworkers. However, NBPI 1l7 
and Beaumont 125 concluded that because the Councils had tended to 'keep 
wages 1011 in thei r industries, they should be abolished. It was announced 
in the 1985 Budget Statement that Wages Councils were soon to be abolished. 
Thus, these measures have generally been inadequate to deal with the 
2 - 29 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
problems inherent in homeworking120 , and as Ewing244 notes, the most 
conspicuous failure has been the registration procedure. 
Health and Safety laws which regulate the guarding of machines and 
the safety of factory processes (i.e.imposing rules with respect to 
dangerous substances) and premises (i.e.by stipulating heating, lighting, 
cleanliness and hygiene) have changed significantly for the benefit of 
factory workers without any alteration to measures relating to homeworkers. 
Health and Safety has been a persistent concern. The House of Commons Paper 
128 referred to problems and dangers that could arise in the home: e.g. 
work being undertaken without supervision of Factory Inspectors; no 
nati ona 1 insurance contri buti ons 1 eave the homeworker unprotected; and the 
likel ihood of injuries,e-spec:ially to young children; "a small home 
cluttered with items of work is not conducive to the development of the 
family and the full use of a home". Dangerous practices, tools and 
substances are occasionally used; Bolton127 claimed that sewing machines 
were supplied without proper guards. As recently as February 1985 the 
.Health and Safety Executive announced that they were to undertake a 
crackdown on the sweatshops in Leicester, but they also alluded to tracing 
difficulties due to many being small businesses which were sometimes 
illegal and housed several to one building 207• 
Self-employed status excludes homeworkers from the EPCA provisions 
unless they can prove themselves to be employees, which few can, but the 
Inland Revenue treats them as employees and taxes them when they earn above 
the threshold. Thus, much of the recent employment protection legislation 
is thought not to apply to homeworkers either because they are not engaged 
under a contract of employment, or because they are unable to satisfy the 
requirements of continuous service. With respect to the first of these 
obstacles, employers, the DE and the Inland Revenue view homeworkers as 
self-employed but the major problem in determining status is caused by the 
flexible and irregular work patterns of homeworkers. In Airfix Footwear 
Ltd v Cope, the Employment Appeals Tribuna1 250 held that there may be 
ci rcumstances when homeworkers can be regarded as employees for the 
purposes of employment protection legislation, but this case was of limited 
value as a precendent because it said nothing about the general position of 
outworkers or the facts and principles to be applied in other cases. 
Establ ishing employment status is a complex matter. 'Contract of 
service' is defined in common law which has continually adapted to provide 
operational tests, but establishing a test against which to evaluate 
employment relationships is difficult. The contemporary legal approach in 
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.differentiating between direct and self employment is now very complicated, 
see Leighton 249 for a discussion of its development (e.g.the control, 
multiple and entrepreneurial tests). Since 1969 the entrepreneurial 
test, which posed the issue of whether persons 'were in business on thei r 
own account,253, has been broadly followed. The courts have been more 
assertive by occasionally disregarding the intentions of the parties and 
the '1 abe 1 s' in documentary evi dence and witnesses' statements. To 
determine whether persons are in business on their own account involves an 
extensive check list of items to be considered and balanced, each of which 
has its complexities. The dividing line between direct and self-employed 
status is often very fine. For instance, when using the entrepreneurial 
test, Leighton249 found that out of 25 firms covered by her case studies, 6 
had mislabelled at least some of their workforce. 
To avoid these complexities and ensure protection, attempts were made 
to introduce legislation by means of a private members bill. The 
Homeworkers (Protection) Bill, 1978, defined a homeworker as: 
"An individual who contracts with a person, not being a professional 
cl i ent of hi s, for the purposes of that person's busi ness, for the 
execution of any work (other than the production or creation of any 
literary, dramatic, artistic or musical work) to be done in domestic 
premises not under the control or management of the person with whom 
he contracts, and who does not normally make use of the services of 
more than two individuals ln the carrying out of that work, and in 
this Act work contracted to be executed by a homeworker is referred to 
as 'homework'." 
This definition has been used for the purposes of this research. It would 
have amended the following statutes: 1887 c.46; 1960 c.37; 1970 c.41; 1973 
c.39; 1974 c.37; 1975 c.52; 1975 c.71; 1975 c.65; 1976 c.74; and 1978 c.44. 
Provision was to be made for statutory instruments to regulate the 
maintenance of documentary records and for the inspection of these by trade 
union officials. The Bl11, which was intended to come into force on 1 
January, 1980 was aimed at giving homeworkers the same status and 
protection as other employees, but it was frustrated ln its passage through 
the House and fell with the Callaghan government in 1979; the DE 
Homeworking Unit (see section 2.3) has not since met. 
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2.3 LITERATURE RELATING TO WORKGROUPS 
This section firstly examines male/female differences at national, 
industrial and occupational levels and then considers specific information 
relating to the workgroups studied. 
The world recession of the 1980s brought about several changes in the 
British labour market, notably that the level of unemployment dramatically 
increased. Figure 2:4 shows that the main fall in employment occurred in 
manufacturing industries, the service sector remaining fairly constant in 
its employment trends254• Official unemployment statistics are contested 
as fair reflections of realitY"because they are indeterminate 
underestimates in that they exclude those married women (and men, see 
below) who may be actively seeking work but who cannot claim benefit for 
various reasons. There may be much hidden unemployment among women who 
traditionally have not registered as unemployed since they are discouraged 
by lack of local opportunity, even without a receSSion, and because they 
are not entitled to unemployment benefit through not paying national 
insurance contributions. Available statistics show that in January 1984 
the number of people continuously unemployed for one year was 1.1 million, 
a 19% increase in long-term unemployment since January 1983. 
The gap between male and female unemployment rates was narrowing until 
1980, the male rate reaching over 15% before the end of 1982 compared to a 
rate of 7.5% for females, see Figure 2:5. The narrowing since 1983 is 
partly due to changes in unemployment benefit regulations introduced in the 
1983 budget which required older men not to register, but Table 2.5 shows 
that EEC women were generally less affected by unemployment between 1980 
and 1981 than were men255• 
Flows into employment (Table 2.6) indicate that nearly 10% of women in 
employment in 1981 had been economically inactive (neither working nor 
seeki ng work) the previ ous year compared to only 3% of men. Cl early the 
trend for married women to re-enter the LM had continued during the 
recession. 
In 1951 women comprised 34% of all employees, but this had risen to 
44% by 1983254• The number of females in employment has fallen sjnce 1980 
with the recession in contrast to a persistent fall in male numbers in 
employment since 1970 (Figure 2:6), which it is claimed stems from the 
decline of traditionally male dominated industries. 
Consistent patterns are apparent: Table 2.7 shows 1977 statistics of 
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womens' participation in economic sectors of each EEC country255. The 
broadly similar patterns imply that strong and pervasive influences act on 
the allocation of female labour. Fewest women are in agriculture (average 
6.6%), only 26.7% work in industry on average, whereas two thi rds of 
worki ng women (66.7%) have jobs in service sectors. -Furthermore, women 
earn less than men in all economic sectors in each EEC country255, see 
Table 2.8. It is sometimes argued that women have higher absenteeism and 
voluntary turnover, fewer working hours, and intermittent and shorter 
working lives and that these features cause such patterns. These issues 
thus become discussion topics. 
Segmentation may exist between industries62 : primary industries are 
progressive, pay high wages and introduce modern technology; the secondary 
are 'customary', retain old fashioned techniques, are labour intensive and 
pay low wages. Figure 2:7 illustrates that women in Britain have not 
entered industries in direct relationship to their proportion in the LM250. 
They are predominantly found in the clothing and footwear,food drink and 
tobacco industries; light engineering; and public administration, some of 
which exhibit secondary characteristics. Hence there was some evidence of 
the 'overcrowding' effect105 which can depress female wages. 
Women comprise over 50% of the workforces in clothing and footwear, 
the distributive trades, insurance, banking, finance, business, 
professional, scientific and miscellaneous services. Relatively few women 
are employed in mining, quarrying, shipbuilding or construction. Some 
imbalance can be explained by falling jobs numbers in production and 
manufacturing industries while service industries were expanding. 
Male/female segregation appears to be concentrating women in a few 
i ndustri es. 
At an occupational level, women comprise a very small proportion of 
managers, administrators, and high professionals, about 50% of the lower 
professionals (mainly teachers), and 75% of clerks. Women similarly 
comprise only about 13% of foremen and inspectors and skilled manual 
workers, but they comprise over 40% of semi -sk ill ed and unsk ill ed manual 
workers. In education, most women are primary teachers whereas most men 
are secondary teachers. In health, most doctors are men and most nurses 
are women. Even in industries in which women predominate they are 
normally found in low grade work. Particular occupational groups are 
associated with low pay, and it is in such occupations that many women are 
found 256 , see Fi gure 2:8. However, payment systems operate to gi ve men 
opportunities to supplement earnings by overtime shift premia and bonuses 
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which were less available to women 257 ,258. 
Table 2.9 shows the average number of hours worked by european women 
relative to men in the same sector; in all sectors of all countries women 
worked fewer hours. Those in manufacturing industry worked more hours 
than those in agriculture and service sectors. Women in UK industry 
worked the fewest hours of all EEC women in industry, which reflects the 
presence of part-time workers in UK industry. 
* * * 
Dex's281 newly published book is designed to illustrate the 
traditional neglect of women, particularly part-time workers, in economics 
and sociology and the shortcomings that this has had for established 
theories. Beechey279 says that it is now recognised that an analysis of 
women's domestic labour is long overdue and is vital to an understanding of 
women's subordi nati on at home and in employment. 
Various dimension of the disadvantages faced by women in the LM are 
documented by numerous writers87 ,88-96,52,53. This body of literature 
suggests that disadvantage can take several forms. Job segregation, 
under whi ch hi gh-pai d work is 'men's work' whil e much 1 ow-pai d work is 
'women's work', places obstacles before women in selection procedures and 
circumvents equal pay law. Statistical discrimination 94 can occur against 
all women on the basis of the characteristics exhibited by only a few, and 
employer views about women's roles and their close ties to home and family 
can also act in discriminatory ways. Women's changing role in society is 
assessed by many writers97-101 who cover such issues as the restructuring 
of working hours, part-time work, provision of creche facilities, more 
convenient shopping hours, training facilities within firms and the status 
of 'women's work'. Others 51 - 53 ,97,281, discuss the discrimination that 
starts in school by the restriction of curricula, and the socialisation 
processes by which girls train for the marriage rather than the labour 
market. Kl ei n101 draws at tent i on to the probl ems encountered by mi ddl e-
aged women re-entering the LM, and OECD publications101-104 suggest ways of 
integrating older workers. 
Women's low pay relative to men's is widely debated; writers conclude 
that women's lower earnings result from numerous factors, such as lower 
basi c pay, overti me, shift premia and fewer fri nge benefits84 ,106,257 ,258. 
Other dimensions of the employment relationship are viewed as similarly 
unfavourable; e.g. fewer working hours, lower responsibil ity, fewer 
promotions, less training and lower skill classifications. Allen140, and 
others cited in Dex 281 , consider the subordination of women to have 
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occurred via social, cultural and physical influences, and with the mode of 
reproduction in the household unit; many feminist writers see patriarchy as 
the cause, see Dex 281 • Allen argues that women's activities are 
continuously marginalized by language, ideologies and material conditions, 
and that society ignores women as "social persons" by encapsulating them 
within those of husbands and sons29• Homes are seen as consumption rather 
than production units where women are in the position of construed 
dependence, yet having to shoulder all the time-consuming, laborious, 
caring work into which paid employment has to be fitted; these copditions 
reinforce LM divisions. 
The relationship between Wages Councils and low pay receives much 
attention. Marquand 107 indicates the importance of structural 
characteristics and summarizes the five characteristics of low paying 
industries as: (1) a high proportion of women workers; (2) a high 
proportion of unskilled workers; (3) industries dominated by small firms; 
(4) contracting industries; and (5) particular institutional factors, such 
as Wages Council s or government employment. Field and Winyard108 also 
suggest that the crucial variable in determining low pay is industrial 
structure, since this determines the ease with which trade unions and 
employers can organize. A proliferation of small firms is seen as an 
obstacle to increasing general wage levels, and point out as does Hakim229 , 
that smallness of firm size (7 employees on average) is characteristic of 
Wages Council industries. Nearly two-thirds of Wages Council workers are 
women108• 
Armstrong284 noted that skill divisions overlapped with the degree of 
capital intensity, men monopolising capital-intensive processes and being 
classed as skilled whatever the degree of skill invested in the operations 
performed. Dex281 concluded ,that there was a series of factors maintaining 
the sexual division of labour including, societal valuation of paid work, 
union negotiated labels for skills, and the attitudes to, and acceptance 
of, the sexual divisions by both women and men. Coyle 282 and Phillips & 
Taylor283 concluded from their studies that women's work on hand-fed 
machines was classed as less skilled than the automatic machine minding 
work of men, just simply because women were performing it. There were 
instances when men took on women's jobs and succeeded in having them 
redefi ned as sk i 11 ed. 
Dex 281 remarks that it is not surprising that males rates should be 
higher, since male dominated trade unions have historically fought to 
improve rates. Women, on the other hand, have been low in membership and 
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often under-represented by craft unions. 
Orientations to work stUdies have begun to chart the differences in 
attitudes between women and men; men are often seen as more economistic 
than women and therefore as possibly more insistent on high skill gradings. 
Studies have generally failed to account for the interdependence in men's 
and women's ori entati ons. Recent fi ndi ngs show that 1 arge proportions of 
men do not give pre-eminence to work 281 (as is often asserted by employers 
of women), and that there are many similarities in men's and women's 
orientations. Coyle 280 and Yeandle 282 found women to be very attached to 
their employment; many worked from financial need, but nevertheless derived 
satisfaction and status from it. Orientations to work should thus be 
examined within the context of prevailing social structures. Debate also 
surrounds the possibility that orientations might be unstable and change 
with varying circumstances, see Dex281 for a discussion. 
Increasing attention is paid to the difference between 'work' and 
'employment'; work being the application of effort and concentration to a 
task, employment additionally involving a reward. This distinction is 
particularly appropriate to many women who work laboriously and unpaid in 
their own homes, many combining this with paid employment. One parent 
famil ies are now more commonpl ace (partly because one in three marri ages 
end in divorce) than is impl ied by the structuring of official documents 
and social benefits. The number of children now growing up in nuclear 
families (i.e. where mother, father and children, usually perceived as two, 
are all present) form a minority of young children. There is less stigma 
attached to single parenthood than formerly and many women now find 
themselves as sole providers for dependents. 
A persistent theme in debates concerns the influence exerted on LM 
participation by the dual. roles women generally perform; namely, by acting 
as providers of free caring services in the domestic environment, while at 
the same time undertaking paid employment, often part-time. Dex & 
Shaw's287 comparison of British and US childcare facil ites revealed that 
far more US women worked full-time and paid for childcare which they could 
claim against taxation. British childcare was sparse or expensive relative 
to earnings and therefore women worked part-time and/or negotiated informal 
help from husbands, older children, kin and neighbours, a situation 
illustrated by Yeandle's study280. Homeworking is also a strategy for 
1 i nki ng together domestic labour and paid employment, as Yeandl e's study 
also illustrates. 
The part-time employment pattern, sometimes seen as part of a general 
2 - 36 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
shift in social patterns and women's more active (some would say more 
visible 69 ,91) part in the economy, has not significantly changed during 
the recession, and may even have accelerated slightly, see Table 2.10. 
However, Dex & Perry288 found that women did not unequivocally suffer more 
in recessions than men, but that part-time work was more unstable than 
full-time. In 1981 41.6% of all women in employment in all industries 
worked part-time in contrast to only 5.9% of men 257• The increased 
participation of women is variously allied to: increased emphasis on 
consumption and thus the need to increase the family income; ~r more 
available time due to the application of modern technology to domestic 
labour saving devices; or de-skilling and the replacement of men by lower 
paid women. 
Robinson & Wallace 257 ,258 claimed there were 4.5 million part-timers 
in 1981, occupying 3.8 million jobs. This accounted for 21% of total 
employment; part-time employment growth equalled the entire increase in 
female employment. In 198184% of part-timers were women, most were 
married and more than 75% were in the lowest occupational jobs. An 
important feature of part-time employment appeared to be labour 
intensiveness; 87% of part-timers were in labour-intensive industries. 
Female full-time and part-time jobs were found to be classified by the same 
grading structure, but there was a high proportion of part-timers in the 
low grade jobs al though no di scri mi natory pay rates for the same grade jobs 
prevailed257 ,258. 
Often in service industries hours were low enough to keep earnings 
below the national insurance threshold. Robinson & Wallace concluded that 
part-timers' hours were determined to meet the operational requirements of 
firms rather than workers' needs; Dex281 cites Beechey & Perkins,286 
unpublished study which suggested that flexibility was the keynote to 
understandi ng employers' demands for part-ti mers, and that women's cl ai med 
preferences for part-time patterns, given childcare needs, made them a 
highly suitable workforce. Bosworth & Dawkins259 reported several reasons 
why clothing and footwear employers used part-timers (i.e. (1) the 
inability to recruit full-timers (50% of responses), (2) that the processes 
did not need full-time cover (30%), and (3) to suit the needs of workers 
(10%)), and considered these to confirm DE results261• They suggested 
that the reasons given for the use of part-time workers might vary by size 
of establishment, by proportion of women in the workforce, and by the 
proportion of part-timers in the workforce. There was indication that 
establishments using a high proportion of females were less likely to allow 
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hours to sui t the needs of the workers. 
With regard to why the proportions of part-timers in their labour 
forces changed. clothing and footwear employers indicated the following 
reasons: (I) to suit the needs of particular workloads or departments 
(48%); (2) part-time work had been extended to additional jobs or 
departments (23%); (3) at the request of workers (16%); (4) the 
introduction of shift work (e.g. twilight workers (3%)). The following 
reasons were given for reductions in the part-time components of clothing 
and footwear companies: (l) the need for maximum cover of equipment (28%). 
and (2) reductions because they had taken part-timers when full-timers were 
unavailable (21%). Part-timers were the first to be made redundant in 2% of 
companies. Bosworth & Dawkins saw these findings as suggesting that part-
time employment had secondary characteristics. In a somewhat dated study. 
the DE260 indicated that late arrival. early finish and voluntary absence 
were the principal reasons for lost pay. and that the incidence of lost pay 
was highest in the younger age groups. Full-timers tended to be worse than 
part-timers. (see Table 2.11 for .the incidence of lost pay. and Table 2.12 
for the hours lost in all manual categories). These data imply that part-
ti.ers had the best all-round performances with respect to lost hours and 
the incidence of l,oss of pay. The incidence was lower for Dlen than women. 
but when they did lose pay men were absent for the same time periods. 
* * * 
At the outset of the research. publ i cati ons on twil i ght workers and 
homeworkers were relatively sparse and little was known about these 
work groups. No official statistics were gathered for either group and 
consequently their numbers and importance to the economy were unknown. In 
an historical review. Bythelj37 mistakenly concluded that homework had 
ceased. Low Pay Unit publications88 -92 • Morsel09• ILOllO. EEC 111 • 
Amsdenl12• and Evans & Morgan113 provided useful starting points. 
Part-time evening workers usually worked between 5pm and 9pm. or 6pm 
and 10pm; the name twilight worker being derived from these times. 
Direct articles on twilight workers were few. IDS studiesI36.142.143 and 
Brown144 yielded some useful information. and the DE Gazette regularly 
reported the number of applications for exemption certificates (section 
2.2). Thus. the 1 iterature occasionally classified them as part-time shift 
workers and oblique references to them appeared in part-time and shift 
work publicati ons. Vari ous arti cl es descri bi ng the i ncreas i ng trend in. 
and the characteri sit; cs of. women's part-time employment duri ng the 1970s 
made scarcely any mention of twilight workers l42 -158. Passing 
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references to them occurred in publ ications on women workers because the 
majority of twilight workers appeared to be women. Other publications 
referred to them as 'moonl ighters' (i.e. employees with a main job who 
additionally worked in the evenings), but little firm information could be 
gleaned from this 1 iterature, especially specific information about 
twilight worker pay. 
The IFF 79 gave the most detailed and specific information on evening 
shifts, in which shift work was defined as, lOa pattern of work in which one 
worker replaces another on the same job within a 24 hour period'141, but 
there was no clear indication whether twilight workers conformed to that 
definition. It stated that twilight shifts accounted for a significant 
number of shift workers. As a proportion there was evidence of a slight 
decline since 1964, but absolute numbers had increased from 67,600 in 1964 
to 80,500 in 1978 in the manufacturing sector, see Table 2.13. 105 
studies142,143 provided evidence to support this observation. Exemption 
orders consistently increased from 2~64 in December 1959 to a peak of 
23,096 in December 1974, but then declined to 13,841 in December 197778• 
These figures relate only to workers covered by the Factory Acts and were 
for exemption order applications rather than for orders actually used. 
The reasons for this apparently falling trend in twilight working since 
1974 are obscure. It could be associated with equal pay legislation, or 
opposition from trade unions, or because many twilight workers would have 
been reclassified by EPCA as full-time employees and would qualify for 
legal provisions such as redundancy payments. This would make twilight 
workers more expensive to employ and discourage their use. In 1978 the 
80,500 twilight workers were concentrated in a few industries with over 
one-third of them in food, drink and tobacco (Table 2.14), but this is not 
surprising given the number of public bars and restaurants to be manned in 
the evenings. Of the 2162 establishments employing twilight workers in the 
IFF survey79, 1120 (52%) operated another shift system in addition to the 
twil ight shift. whereas 104'2 (48%) had no other shifts.There appeared to be 
an association between twil ight working and certain other types of shift, 
but no attempt was made to analyse these relationships, see Table 2.15. 
Many establishments used more than one shift system and there. was an 
indication that twilight working might quite often have been a component in 
24 hour working. The average length of twilight shift was 4.34 hours; 
over two-thirds lasted 4 hours, but overtime was extremely rare, occurring 
in only 3% of establishments. 
Several problems were identified with twil ight shifts; 105142 ,143 
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spotlighted difficulties in providing supervision and machinery 
maintenance. Recruitment difficulties arose respecting skilled maintenance 
and supervisory personnel for part-time evening employment. These services 
were therefore provided by full-time employees working overtime which 
imposed heavy burdens unable to be permanently sustained. 
The reasons for using twilight workers were not openly confronted in 
the 1 iterature, but there was an impl ication in Bosworth & Dawkin's259 work 
relating to clothing and footwear industries, see above. IDS studies142,143 
indicated that twilight shifts were introduced only for production needs. 
Three companies from a confidential Loughborough University study (Or C J 
Wrigley, Dept. of Economics) said it was used to attract female labour, and 
one commented that the company was, "flooded with applicants and could 
afford to be selective". 
* * * 
As Hakim134has recognised, 1 iterature on homeworkers can be group into 
three strands: 
(1) studies by independent researchers and pressure groups based on 
empirical research: e.g.Brown(88), Cri ne(91), Edwards & 
Flounders(123), Hope et al(124), Shah(133), Allen(29,69,140), 
Huws(226,262), Rubery & Wil kinson(273) and Wray(186). 
(2) studies by public bodies investigating pay and conditions, often in 
particular industries:e.g. ACAS(248,264), CIR(114,1l5), NBPI(1l6,1l7), 
Cragg & Dawson(265), Hakim (126,134,138,229,267,268), and Select 
Committees of the House of Commons(245,247), and of the House of 
Lords(246). 
(3) reviews of existing information or legislation: e.g.Bolton(127), 
Fi el d(89), TUC(129), ILO(llO), Ewi ng(224), Townshend-Smith(274), 
Drake(266), Leighton(249, 269,270) and Newell(272). 
A limited bibliography of the historical origins of homeworking is provided 
withi n reference 118. 
Much homeworking literature concentrates on a fairly narrow set of 
labour supply issues. During the 1980s homeworking publications have become 
quite numerous. They have generated much interest and some attention has 
been di rected at demand issues, these merely advancing cost-cutting and 
flexibil ity as motives for using homeworkers140,229,245. Studies generally 
do not address the issue of how homeworkers are used to provide 
flexibility, straightforward hiring/firing being implicitly assumed. Part C 
of this thesis addresses this topic. Common supply side issues concern 
. speculations about the number of homeworkers, their reasons for undertaking 
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paid work at home, their levels of pay, employment status and working 
conditions, but homeworker data has not been compared to similar data for 
: on-site workers dOing the s~me wo~k. --
Homeworkers' working conditions first generated concern at the turn of 
'the century when allegations of exploitation abounded; similar discussions 
re-emerged in the 1970s prompting a range of responses. The Low Pay Unit 
published bi-monthly newsletters and reports88- 92 and formed a Homeworkers' 
• Association. The DE established a Wages Inspectorate HomeworkingUnit 
,having one Inspector in: each Division. It also created an Advisory Comm-
,ittee comprising trade unionists, DE officials and employers •. Numerous 
voluntary organisations formed to press for homeworker protection and i 
reforms; among these-were the National Homeworking Campaign, London 
Homeworking Campaign, Leicester Outwork Campaign, and Sa1tley Homewor~ 
Campaign. Sufficient pressure was generated to prompt an unsuccessful 
Pri vate Members Bi 11 and caused a House of Commons Sel ect Committee to 
,'examine eVidence 245 • The latter reported that homeworkers were used by 
employers for two principal reasons: firstly, as a buffer against 
-' -
f,luctuations in demand; and secondly, as a means of cutting costs by 
reducing overheads, saving factory space and improving competitiveness. It 
highlighted the vulnerability of 'traditional' homeworkers. Several Local 
Authorities have now appointed Specialist Homeworking Officers to monitor 
worki ng conditi ons. 
Attention has recently focused on the wide range of 'distance-working' 
employment relationships which include direct employment, genuine self-
employment, and those areas that appear to bridge the gap, such as 
homeworking, outworking, sub-contract working, and freelancing on commis- i 
. I 
___ ~i 0~~26 ,229,262,268. ' . Therefore cl ear defi niti ons became important. ' 
Definitions of homeworkers have varied; the CIR1l4,1l5 defined them 
as,"recei vi ng work and payment di rectly from a manufacturi ng establ i shment 
for work done in the home". The NBPI 116 ,117 classified 3 groups as: (1) 
those employed di rectly by fi rm and appearing on the payroll; (2) those 
employed by agents or intermediaries of a firm; (3) those of self-
employment status. This showed a better awareness of the complexities of 
organizing domestic production. However, because the research topic focused 
on factory-attached 'traditional' homeworkers, often perceived as having 
the worst employment conditions l38 , the definition' contained in the 
Homeworkers' (Protection) Bill 1978 has been adopted, see section 2.2. 
Speculations about homeworker numbers have varied widely; in July 1907 
there were an estimated 9,000 homeworkers in East London, by 1948 the TUC 
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estimated 20,000 in the garment industries and 25,000 nationally127, the 
NBPI 116 suggested 15,000 in 1968, the CIR114 claimed 18,500 in 1972, and in 
1976 the 10S136 stated that about 250,000 women worked for industry at 
home. Hunt100 estimated that, "3.7% of women were working in their own 
houses" in 1968. The OE estimated for the HC Select Committee245 there to 
be 200,000 - 400,000 homeworkers. More recent and reliable figures based on 
the 1981 Labour Force Survey, were published in 1984138 and estimates 
showed that up to 1.68 million men and women in roughly equal numbers 
worked at or from home. This figure included people working from home as a 
base, (i.e.self-employed craftsmen, professionals and freelances) and in 
-this category men predominated heavily (71%). Women formed the majority 
(also 71%) of persons who worked at home mainly as homeworkers as defined 
by the Homeworkers (Protection) Bill, but statistics showed that white 
coll ar servi ce work had overtaken tradi ti onal manufacturing work. Even so 
there were an estimated 72,300 'traditional industrial homeworkers' (more 
than the total employees of British Rail 275 ) linked to the formal 
economy. Hence, in number terms, Allen29 justifiably concluded that the 
. construction of marginality around homeworking was open to serious quest-
ioning. A minority of Allen's sample69 worked for small local entrepre-
neurs, the majority working for large national or international companies. 
This was not a marginal economic activity, but it was bound up with the 
formal economy, and with the mode of reproduction in the household unitl40• 
Homework was found to be moving into new areas in the late 1970s138 
with the advent of new technology and this trend was expected to continue. 
Huws' sample226 ,262 consisted of home-based executives, computer program-
mers' systems analysts, word processor and key punch operatives who were 
more highly paid than traditional manufacturing homeworkers and some were 
even cl assed as employees. Those cl assed as self-employed were generally 
paid lower rates than on-site workers, and had more irregular employment 
than homeworkers classed as employees. She concluded that chil dcare was 
the major reason for taking work at home (74% of sample), but that other 
reasons were important such as, work flexibility and convenience (35%), 
1 ack of other work (14%) and the need to keep up-to-<late (12%). 
A wide range of pay levels was discovered, although low pay was the 
most usual finding. Rates varied from 4.1/2 pence per hour in 1974 
(Brown88) to £1.0 per hour in 1976124; Huws 226 ,262 found the highest paid 
professional workers. An often arti cul ated cl aim was that the overri di ng 
motive for undertaking homework was economic necessity29,89, whereas 
employers were believed to perceive homeworkers as working for 'pin 
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money'. Surveys showed that some low pai d homeworkers worked for well -
known, well-respected companies122,123 and there were indications that such 
companies paid particularly low rates. Tendering by agents and the 
selection of the lowest tender was seen as a major source of low pay29. 
Expenses such as heating, 1 ighting and power were often incurred and not 
reimbursed, and this had been a cause for concern since the turn of the 
century. Work collection and delivery costs were sometimes borne by 
homeworkers, and many were inconvenienced by work storage that consumed 
valuable, usually necessary, domestic living space134,135. Homeworkers were 
paid almost exclusively by the piece or job load and calculation of hourly 
rates was very difficult because no accurate records were kept by either 
employer or homeworker. 
Abolition of Wages Councils in favour of collective bargaining is 
unlikely to solve homeworker problems because it has been shown that few 
homeworkers are in trade unions 268,229. The traditional trade union view, 
as portrayed by Bolton127 , was that trade unionists wished to see 
homeworking abolished due to its perceived threat to factory jobs and pay. 
He outlined the difficulties that trade unions faced in trying to improve 
the lot of homeworkers. These difficulties were well illustrated by the 
statement, in para 2527128 of Mrs. Patterson, a trade unionist who said, 
"I cannot say it is a walk over on the negotiation of rates for 
workers inside the factory, but the one real battle I have every time 
is to put even a half-penny on the piece~ork rates for homeworkers. 
There is tremendous opposition to getting any improvement there". 
More recently the Trade Union Statement 129 indicated that trade union 
antagonism had changed to a desire to help, and indeed several trade unions 
including the National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers (NUHKW) and 
the Nation Union of Tailors and Garment Workers, have repeatedly attempted 
to improve homeworkers' conditions130 (see 1l.2.l(c» but tracing 
homeworkers and the shortage of time and information were seen as great 
obstacl es for the trade uni ons. 
Links between ethnic minority workers and low pay were drawn by 
Stephen131 and Jain & Sloane132• Ethnic minority groups were regarded by 
some as a 'reserve army' and Cri ne 91 saw homeworkers in that 11 ght, but 
Shah133 i nvesti gating the employment conditi ons of immi grant homeworkers in 
East London found that they were skilled and relatively well paid. Hakim134 
considered language difficulty to be a reason for undertaking homework. 
Secrecy surrounding the homeworking arrangement was linked to welfare 
rights88,124 and homeworkers were found to be afraid of visits from social 
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security, p lanni ng and tax inspectors because they feared loss of 
benefi ts. Home workers needed permi ss i on for 'change of use of prem i ses', 
were liable for tax and national insurance contributions, and lost transfer 
payments, rent and rate rebates, and assistance with school meals and 
uniforms when their earnings were above the thresholds. Low earners were 
naturally concerned about the 'poverty trap', especi ally when thei r work 
was unstable or temporary, but the low earnings obtained implied this to 
be unlikely. It was expected that such circumstances would frustrate 
homeworker willingness to cooperate in the proposed research. 
Many discussions have centred around homeworker characteristics and 
Bolton127 argued that the 19th century great depression set today's 
patterns: 01 der women separated from their famil ies, young mothers 
supporting a family, the under-employed, and the disabled; the only 
substantial section to be added has been immigrant labour. Homeworkers 
sometimes enlisted the assistance of families to complete 
workl oads88 ,124,127. Women of all ages and ci rcumstances undertook 
homework, but the shortage of childcare figured prominently among the 
reasons advanced for women undertaking paid work at home. OPCS263 indicated 
that lack of childcare facilities was influenl:ial on women's work 
decisions. Over 33% of women in the OPCS sample were prevented from 
working by the need to look after children, and would have returned to work 
had adequate childminding facilities been available. However, Allen argued 
that concentration on childcare as a reason for homeworking had presented a 
partial view; redundancy, retirement, caring for the sick, handicapped, and 
elderly, poor personal health and disability, unemployment and single 
parenthood were also important causes140• Hakim134 and Huws226 ,262 implied 
that homeworking offered flexibility of hours, but Allen69 found that 
homeworkers had little choice because the timing and amounts of work to be 
completed were so constraining as to leave little or no choice in practice. 
She concluded that the idea of autonomy to organize work according to 
wishes was a myth. 
Lack of legal protection and state benefits have been a great concern, 
researchers having found that employers classed homeworkers as self-
employed, and that few homeworkers paid national insurance contributions 
and therefore di d not qual ify for unemployment benefit. All en140 asserted 
that homeworkers were caught in a conceptual limbo between employment and 
domestic labour, work and home, into which they were frequently trapped by 
responsibilities for infants, the sick, the old and the handicapped. This 
highlighted the law's neglect of the issue of how work and payment for work. 
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were organized, and she pointed to the myth of the separation of home and 
work for many women arguing that women's labour had been an integral part 
of production throughout the long period of industrialisation140• 
Consequen~y, homework was an old form of production that had been 
thoroughly integrated into developed i ndustri al i srn to become inextricably 
linked with the formal economy, although the analysis of homework's present 
day role was in its infancy29,69,140. 
* * * 
Thus, despite the body of protective employment law and the EOC's 
activities, the literature survey generally indicated 'LM inequality between 
women and men, and between various groupings within the female workforce. 
2.4 LITERATURE RELATING TO mE SELECTED LABOUR MARKET 
Charnwood Borough Council was formed 1974 with the merger of the towns 
of Loughborough and Shepshed and the parishes of the Rural District of 
Barrow-upon-Soar, then giving it a popul ation of 130,000162• It compri ses 
23 parishes163 and covers an area of 108 sq. miles in a triangle between 
Derby, Nottingham and Leicester. The central area is the Soar valley, the 
River Soar being the main southern tributary of the River Trent. Along the 
Soar lie most of Charnwood's larger industrial shoe and hosiery villages, 
culminating in Loughborough, Leicestershire's second town. Hosiery mills 
mark the area's industrial history; Loughborough is also well-known for its 
engineering and educational establishments. To the south of the borough 
lie the busy towns of Syston, Thurmaston, Birstall, and Anstey, but these 
form the outer suburbs of Leicester and have consequently been excluded for 
the purpose of this study due to their 'city' associ ations. Loughborough 
is accessible by rail (main midland route to St. Pancras), road (A6 and M1) 
and air (East Midlands Airport). 
From A.D 1400 to 1660 the wool trade was important, but it decl ined 
and by 1700 malting was more significant. The region has been central to 
the development of the H&K industries, three important inventions having 
been developed either within or very close to Charnwood's boundary. About 
1800 Joseph Paget introduced the worsted hosiery trade and also about that 
time a Mr. Cartwright set up mohair spinning. John Heathcote lived in 
Long Whatton, (just outside the boundary), went to school in Hathern (just 
inside the boundary) and between 1805 and 1808 worked in his Kegworth 
workshop on a model of the first bobbin-net machine which was a 
mechanisation of pillow-lace making162,164. He set up in partnership with 
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a Mr. Boden and brought the bobbi n-net trade to Loughborough in 1809. On 
Friday, June 28, 1816 there was a 'Luddite' attack on hi s factory; 55 
frames were smashed and 200 men thrown out of work. Later that year 
Heathcote moved hi s operations to Tiverton in Devon where its successor 
still remains. According to Chapman165 the term 'Luddite' owed its 
origin to a spontaneous machine breaking incident in Shepshed, although 
some writers place it in Anstey166. In Loughborough, between 1857 and 
1860 Mr. A Paget invented an automatic narrowing machine which worked 3 
times faster than other machines and produced more regular fabrics, and 
between 1846 and 1864 William Cotton was inventing and perfecting his 
fully-fashioned multi-width knitting machine which was capable of mass-
produci ng shaped, regul ar-kni t goods. Many other improvements to H&K 
machines were invented in the nearby cities between 1758 and the present 
day. Thus local manufacturers draw their labour from a region with long 
traditions of H&K production. Today's H&K products include fully-fashioned 
knitwear, socks, cardigans and jerseys; the manufacturers being supported 
by local knitwear dyers and accessory producers. 
However, engineering was the largest industrial activity in 1980. 
Loughborough housed Herbert Morri s L td.(crane and hoi st manufacturers), the 
Brush Electric Company (motors, generators, control gear, transformers and 
rail traction equipment), Taylor's Bell Foundry and other branches of 
engineering including textile machinery, precision tool, sheet metal 
products, boiler and compressed air equipment manufacturers, as well as 
bus and coach builders. The well-known children's Ladybird books are 
printed in Loughborough and there are also box, drawing office supplies, 
tent and marquee manufacture. It is the home of the Pharmaceutical and 
Sci entifi c Equi pment Di vi si ons of Fi sons L td, and Ri ker Laboratories L td 
also manufacture pharmaceutical goods and fine chemicals. 
In Shepshed, footwear and hosiery are the traditionally manufactured 
goods, with men's and chil dren's socks as the major items, but it al so 
houses the Precision Rubber Division of Dunlop Ltd and other factories 
making hosiery shapes, display units, boxes and cartons, glove fabrics and 
other knitted textiles. In the Domesday survey it was mentioned as 
'Scepeshefde Regis' which referred to a hill where sheep were grazed. It 
had a weekly wool market which flourished until the end of the 14th 
century. Throughout the centuries woollen and hosiery industries remained 
pre-eminent in Shepshed which was relatively isolated until the 19th 
century when the Charnwood Forest Navigation Canal and later the Charnwood 
Forest Railway were built to link it with Loughborough and Coalville. 
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Sileby stands on the east side of the Soar and is another hosiery and 
footwear town specializing in ladies' and fashion footwear. In 1980 it 
also contained engineering, brickmaking and wallpaper manufacture. A few 
framework knitters' houses still survive, but its industrial village 
character is being changed by large residential developments. 
Quorn and Mountsorrel are less industrialized. Both straddle the A6 
on its route between Loughborough and Lei cester on the Soar's west bank. 
Footwear, elastic and elastic webbing are manufactured in both settlements. 
Mountsorrel is famous for its granite quarry, but it also manufactures 
boxes, cartons and rivercraft and on its southern boundary is a Rolls Royce 
engine factory. Barrow-up-on-Soar is a small resi denti a1 and i ndustri al 
town on the east bank of the Soar. Its industrial base is mainly hosiery, 
catering for the chain store market, but it also has limestone and 
manufactured concrete goods. 
Most of the remaining settlements of Charnwood are small, and 
characterized by agriculture. These include; Barkby, Barkby Thorpe; 
Beeby, Cossington, Cotes, Hoton, Newtown Linford, Prestwo1d, Queniborough, 
Ratcliffe-on-the-Wreake, Rearsby, Seagrave, South Croxton, Swith1and, 
Thrussington, U1verscroft, Wa1tham-on-the-Wo1ds, Wan1ip, Woodhouse, and 
Wymeswo1d. Important residential settlements within the selected region 
of Charnwood are Hathern, Mountsorre1, Quorn, Queniborough and Roth1ey, and 
the settlements excl uded from the survey of Bi rstall, Syston, Thurcaston 
and Thurmaston. 
Thus, labour was drawn from the settlements in the countryside 
surrounding Loughborough town, but the factories were largely located in 
the settlements underlined above. Table 2.16 details Borough related 
statistics of the principal settlements in the chosen region163• Charnwood 
Borough had unemployment rates of 3.7% (total), 4.1% (men) and 3.0% (women) 
in March 1980. The area usually had a lower than national unemployment 
rate, possibly due to its diverse industrial base. Nevertheless, the 
unemployment storm clouds had been gatheri ng; "January 1980 saw the worst 
batch of redundancies the area had ever known, with worst hit being the 
hosiery and knitwear industries,,167. Unemployment rates rose to 5.5% (men) 
and 5.7% (women) by October 1980, as the deepening recession impinged more 
on women. 
There was local general knowledge that the H&K industry employed many 
women. The chosen settlements had long traditions of footwear, hosiery and 
knitwear manufacturing. Head160 claimed that the transition to factory 
production was slow, partly because of the well-established system of 
2 - 47 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
'putting-out'. Marglin19 argued that the factory system was not 
technologically superior to the putting-out system until technological 
change was channelled exclusively into that mould: the factory system being 
introduced to transfer control over the product and the time worked to the 
capitalists to end what was perceived as workers' dishonesty and laziness. 
In pre-factory times its was usual for wives and daughters to 'hand-finish' 
garments knitted by thei r menfol k: these settlements had been associated 
with domestic production and putting-out since the beginnings of the 
industry. The author therefore considered it to be highly appropriate that 
these same small settlements and industries should be studied as examples 
of modern day homeworki ng. 
2.5 SURVEY OF LITERATURE RELATING TO SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
The H&K trades comprise all those firms engaged mainly in the 
'knitting' of goods. The industry is defined not by raw materials, but by 
the nature of the process. Since William Lee mechanized the knitting 
operation in 1589 for the purpose of knitting hose the industry has been 
called the 'hosiery' industry even though his invention has been developed 
and modified to produce a wide variety of products. Today, hosiery 
applies to many kinds of knitted produce including underwear, outerwear, 
gloves, scarves and other ki nds of cl othi ng. However, the maki ng-up of 
clothing cut and sewn from knitted fabrics is excluded from Minimum list 
Heading (MLH) 417, and similarly, such manufacturers have not been included 
in this research. The location of the UK H&K industry is as shown in Figure 
2:9, from which it is seen that that the East Midlands is one of the two 
principal regions for the manufacture of H&K goods. 
An HMSO Working Party reported in 1946 that the percentage breakdown 
of workers engaged in the main productive operations of the hosiery 
industry was: winding 5%; knitting 25; making-up 49%; mending, boxing and 
countering 17%: dYeing and finishing 4%170. Worker numbers had decreased 
substantially over the decade prior to 1980, the extent being claimed as, 
"one in ten jobs lost of over the last 5 years .. 167 : Table 2.17 
shows declines in both employment and industrial production173,177. 
HMS0170 furnished evidence to show that this had been the employment trend 
since the second world war. To assist the industry the MFA set quotas to 
prevent the home market being swamped by exports from developing countries, 
a matter of persistent agitation by the industry since its early 
development (cf Henson, Felki n161 wi th 179). The NEDO Sector Worki ng Party 
reviewed the industry, collected statistics (Table 2.18), and issued 
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guidelines to manufacturers on the improvement of home marketingl71• It 
encouraged them to grow by exporting high quality goods to developed 
countries, since UK manufacturers exported less to West European markets 
than most other EEC producers in 1976172• The Loughborough District Trade 
Union Official backed this kind of export drive 178. 
Table 2.19 shows that the Briti sh textile industry generally had a 
fragmented structurej although a few large establishments existed, it was 
characterized by a proliferation of small manufacturing units. This 
structure has been associated with low pay (section 2.2), and thus the 
industry appeared a good subject for a study of segmentation. Total sales 
of the H&K industry (MLH 4171 in 1978 were ;t:l,013M. The major components 
of this figure were: pullovers, jumpers and cardigans, f398Mj weft- and 
warp- knitted fabrics, f325Mj underwear, f141Mj tights, f91Mj socks, 
f52Mj and knitted shirts,f33M171• 
Pool168 concluded that H&K companies operated in competitive 
conditions and suggested that Employers' Associations acted as competition 
levellers by providing the same information to all manufacturers. 
I.C.C.l69 claimed that small companies were more profitable than large ones 
due mainly to their greater flexibility and adaptability to changing 
circumstances and fashions. Seasonal and fashion fluctuations were 
confi rmed by HMS0170, NEDOl 71-173, and a recent ill ustrati on of a short-
term fashion trend has been the hand-knit boom of the late 1970s174,175. 
Nevertheless, the regularity of summer and winter seasons was expected to 
produce similar seasonal product market conditions for many manufacturers. 
Unstable profits in the industry were confirmed by Pool 168 and the 
respondents to the pre-pilot study who insisted that the industry had 
suffered badly in competition with cheap imports from developing countries. 
These claims were repeated by respondents in the main study. The Multi-
fibre Arrangement (MFA) also bears witness to these conditions172,173. 
According to Poo1168,1957 there was a preponderance of small to medium 
sized firms served by Employers and Research Associations who promoted 
competition by acting as direct agents in helping the survival of the many. 
This had the effect of making the industry more competitive although it was 
not designed to do so. It was done by giving members equal access to 
technological, costing and marketing information which created market 
conditions whereby cost and price differences were minimized. In his 1955 
Report he concluded that his inquiry had establ ished that the two 
fundamental conditions of effective competition, complete freedom of entry 
and a multiplicity of independent firms producing closely competitive 
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products, were satisfied to a very high degree. Several firms in his 
sample had started modestly in outbuildings such as sheds, garages, 
converted stables or even in the living room of the proprietor's home, 
often necessitating the additional use of homeworkers. Boraston et al 176 
found the H&K industry to be highly competitive with comparatively low 
profit margins. They remarked on the close social relations between 
knitters and managers, but concluded that size of establishment 
significantly affected trade union influence; large establishments were 
more independent while smaller ones placed more reliance on full-time trade 
union officials. 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE LITERATURE: HYPOTHESES REVISIONS 
The literature survey yielded clear insights to suggest that women in 
general, and twilight and homeworkers in particular, might be classified as 
secondary workers in a segmented LM structure, but it provided few 
guidelines, little concrete evidence and insufficient data to construct a 
statistically testable single hypothesis of general demand that would 
integrate men and women workers, and shift, full-time, part-time, twilight 
and homeworking work patterns into a unified boqy of theory. The issues 
discussed in Chapter 1 still appeared to be relevant and so the proposed 
empirical research was to concentrate on the identification of key 
variables in order to provide the basis for econometric treatment by other 
researchers. The original hypotheses of worker supply and demand did not 
need substantial revision prior to the outset of data collection. Women 
workers were widely reported as earning less than men which suggested 
male/female segmentation, additionally, the 'cheap labour' hypothesis of 
1 abour demand suggested further segmentati on. The questi on remai ned, if 
homeworkers were very cheap to employ, why did they not form the majority 
of each employer's workforce? Nevertheless, the 'under-cutting tactic' 
supposedly frowned on by trade unions needed investigation. No detailed 
indication had been found of the principal causes of female workgroup 
creati on, such as the rel ative importance of home and family constra ints, 
'divide and conquer' techniques, shortages of worker numbers, skills or 
factory space. However, in the absence of better explanations, the 'cheap 
labour' hypotheses formed the basis of female, especially homeworker 
demand, whil e the 'fill the gap between day and ni ght' assumpti on sti 11 
formed the basis of preconceptions about twilight workers. 
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3.1 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL DESIGN DECISIONS 
The empirical programme emerged from a complex decision process backed 
by thorough investigation. The following decisions. were taken: 
(a) a multi-disciplinary approach was to be adopted. 
(b) the research was to be conducted at the micro level. Due to financial 
constraints, a local labour market study was to be undertaken in the 
north of Charnwood Borough rather than a national survey, but should a 
low response rate be obtained, the boundaries could be extended to 
encompass the city areas of Derby, Nottingham and Leicester. 
(c) an industry conforming to Averitt's62 peripheral image was to be 
selected. To permit 'fair' comparisons and hold environmental factors 
reasonab ly constant, an i ntra-i ndustry study was to be undertaken in 
the H&K industry. Workers would be performing the same or similar 
jobs for the same employers, and direct production workers only were 
to be compared. As a fall-back position if a low response rate was 
obtained, the footwear industry might be included. Data was to be 
collected over a short time period to avoid environmental changes. 
(d) si nce there were advocates and opponents for all theori es, 
determination of LM structure was to be an important feature of the 
empi rical work so as to identify which theory best fitted the 
ci rcumstances. Poss ibl e segmentation was to be exami ned fi rstly by 
comparing full-time men with full-time women, and then comparing 
twi 1 i ght workers and homeworkers (as exampl es of secondary 1 abour) 
with full-time women. The primary focus was women's LM position which 
was to be put into context by examining that of men. 
(e) data was to be collected by means of employer interviews and would 
concentrate on demand issues, but woul d also examine supply issues 
where these impinged on demand. Three distinct data collection stages 
were involved, see Table 3.1. 
3.2 PRELIMINARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
There was a lack of general knowledge, publications and statistics 
relating to homeworking, largely because it had been widely believed to 
have disappeared prior to 1914. Primary data had be generated and so, 
concurrently with the 1 iterature search, prel imi nary i nqui ri es were 
undertaken in an attempt to tap information sources about workgroups 
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generally, and homeworkers in part icul ar, without jeopardi zi ng access to 
possibly unco-operative firms. Clearly, people employed in local 
industries could possess valuable information about current practices, as 
could agents of official bodies with responsibility for monitoring 
employment relationships. Therefore. personal networks were informally 
tapped along with formal structured approaches to relevant institutions. 
Informal discussions were undertaken with friends and acquaintances 
currently working in industry and as homeworkers. More formal unstructured 
di scuss ions took pl ace with representatives of the Chamber of Trade, the 
Citizens Advice Bureau and workshops for the disabled. Results indicated 
that several local companies used the workgroups concerned, and gave some 
insight into workplace arrangements. Another fruitful activity in 
identifying companies was a detailed analysis of the situations vacant 
advertisements in the local press. Such preliminary investigations, 
summarized in Table 1.1, revealed the number of companies employing 
twilight and/or homeworkers inside the chosen LLM and immediately outside 
it in the adjacent city areas. 
To ensure that differing perspectives of twilight and homeworking 
arrangements had been considered prior to compiling the interview schedule, 
formal structured discussions 
(a) publ ic health officer; 
were conducted with local officials: 
(b) 
(d) 
(f) 
inland revenue officer; 
DE officer; (c) 
(e) 
social security officer; 
wages inspector (with responsibility 
for homeworkers); 
factory inspector; 
(g) National Secretary of the National (h) 2 district trade union 
Union of Hosiery Workers (NUHKW); officers; 
Preliminary investigations revealed much local awareness that H&K 
industries employed many female workers, operated in price-competitive 
product markets subject to seasonal and fashion fluctuations, and that many 
companies had unstable profits. Many thought the industry had suffered as a 
result of cheap imports from developing countries, claims that were echoed 
by respondents during the main study and evidenced by the Multi-fibre 
Agreement. High female employment was confirmed by the local DE Official 
who was responsible for collating industry statistics. He claimed that; 
"The region had a high level of female manual employment largely due 
to the hosiery industries". 
Although the DE collected employment statistics, numbers by industry 
were confidential. However, the compiler indicated that the telephone 
directory's yellow pages would furnish the most complete duplication of his 
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list of companies. The DE Official expressed opinions that H&K employers: 
" ••• seemed afraid of LM legislation", and " ••• appeared not to 
understand it", and " ••• were unwilling to regard twilight workers as 
'normal' employees because they were brought in on a temporary basis", 
and " ••• often did not issue statements of terms and conditions of 
service to twilight workers as requi red by employment legislation". 
He also had private knowledge about low levels of homeworker p~. 
The Factory Inspector, who had his office in the City of Nottingham, 
expressed the opinion that small rather than large companies tended to use 
homeworkers. In the course of his duties he visited many ethnic minority 
women who were undertaking homework. 
3.3 THE PRE-PILOT STUDY 
Issues raised by the preliminary work posed many questions. By 
ordering these into a flowing and logical order an interview schedule was 
designed for testing via a pre-pilot study. The schedule was divided into 
three sections, each being subdivided into several topics as follows: 
(1) Company Strategies and Policies 
Topics i ncl uded: the characteristics of the company (number of workers and 
branches); profit levels; expansion and contraction policies; labour and 
product market conditions; employment policy; response to legislation; and 
the employment and unemployment levels in its locality. 
(2) Employment Condition and Worker Performance 
Topics included: recruitment; training; job allocation; dismissal and 
redundancy; existence and appl ication of sickness, pension, maternity and 
holiday schemes; the provision of facilities; worker productivity; quality 
of work; experiencejabsenteeism; turnover; mobil ity between groups; the 
incidence of disputes; whether the employer deducted tax and national 
insurance contributions for homeworkers; and trade union involvements with 
the above dimensions of the employment situation. (This was the longest 
section of the schedule) 
(3) The Cost of Employment 
Topics included: pay levels; methods of payment; premia and bonuses of 
various types; hours of work; and whether costs were incurred in work 
coll ect ion/del ivery and machi nery mai ntenance for homeworkers, and if so, 
thei r order of magnitude. 
Much thought had been given to the exact form and scope of the 
i ntervi ew schedul e because it was to be used in census fashi on over a very 
short period on a 'once and for all' basis. Comparisons of pay and 
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conditions of service could only be fairly and accurately conducted if all 
data were collected concurrently. It was anticipated that, because 
homeworking was a very sensitive area of the LM9l,124,264, the interviewee 
might refuse or quickly curtail an interview should the wrong approach be 
made; for this reason a rule was self-imposed that only one visit to each 
establishment would be attempted. This course of action was adopted to 
protect future researchers. 
The schedule was lengthy, but there was no indication which issues and 
questions could be safely discarded, or indeed whether all important topics 
had been included. Consequently, a pre-pi10t study was planned with the 
broad objective of reducing the size of the schedule without undermining 
the thrust of the research. . It was felt that the duration of each 
interview had to be minimized to gain the co-operation of busy industr-
ialists in competitive industries. It was decided to conduct the pre-pi10t 
study within the selected H&K indust~ but outside the selected LLM. 
Three companies were approached, but one refused to co-operate. A 
large establishment situated centrally in one of the nearby cities assisted 
by inviting the author for an afternoon's visit around the factory to 
. 
discuss in depth its labour recruitment and adjustment policies with senior 
management. This presented an excellent opportunity to establish background 
information about industry-wide product demand, competition, profit levels 
and range of outputs, as well as to test the relevance of questions and 
seek advice about the availability of data to be extracted. 
The schedule was properly tested in a third H&K company in Derbyshire 
that specialized in full-fashioned knitwear of acknowledged high quality. 
The interview lasted for 4 hours during which time it was shown to be 
impossible to collect, under section 2 of the schedule, detailed data for 
each employee due to shortage of time and the specific nature of the data 
requi red. The interviewee, the managi ng di rector, was extremely he1 pfu1. 
In neither of the visited pre-pi10t companies was any reticence to confront 
the homeworker topic encountered; each used homeworkers, although the large 
city centre company administered this through an intermediary. 
The pre-pi10t exercise was extremely valuable in that it identified a 
few areas where the schedule could be reduced: either data was 
unobtainable since records were not kept, or access would be refused or too 
time consuming. Given the large number of employees and the wide range of 
topics to be delved into, it was clearly impracticable to obtain emp10yee-
specific data. Collection of establishment-aggregated data was thus 
resolved to be the only practical option. Rankings were introduced for 
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those topics where doubt about the keepi ng of records had been expressed. 
None of the explored issues was shown to be irrelevant although some 
questions were superfluous since the information could be obtained from 
elsewhere. Rather than just narrow the field of investigation, the pre-
pilot exercise had also indicated the need to widen it. It showed the need 
to wi den the schedul e's range to i ncl ude the topi cs of mach i nery 
utilisation and the use of shift workers in order to obtain firm-specific 
demand patterns since the 1 abour forces in both pre-pi] ot companies were 
segregated by gender into capital and labour intensive types of production. 
Consequently, several alterations were made to the research instrument. 
Questions relating to opinions, profits and responses to legislation were 
excluded since it was considered to be a better use of valuable interview 
time to concentrate on the extraction of quantitative data; it had been 
experienced that respondents furnished a vast amount of qualitative, 
explanatory data in the course of answering quantitative questions. 
Questions were therefore re-drafted to facilitate yes, no, DK answers, or 
to provide values. The layout was carefully re-designed to save interview 
time; anticipated answers were provided to permit speedy circling creating 
time for shorthand notes of all comments. Immediately after each 
interview, comment sheets were compi] ed from these verbatim reports. The 
revised interview schedule is included as Appendix I. 
3.4 BACKGROUND TO THE PILOT STUDY 
A decision was made to to test the revised interview schedule in a 
pilot study within the selected LMM but outside the selected indust~. It 
was decided to conduct the pilot study in the boot and shoe manufacturing 
industry because there were such establishments in the lLM and it was 
expected that footwear manufacture would exhibit similar characteristics to 
the H&K industry, such as seasonal bus i ness fl uctuat ions, workforce 
utilisation, and in the types of machinery used. It was anticipated that 
sewing operatives might move freely between the H&K and footwear industries 
of the lLM and consequently it would be advisable to study both industries. 
A literature survey confi rmed s imil arit i es in market condi t ions 
between H&K and footwear industries. The footwear industry was also 
subject to seasonal and fashion fluctuations and to intense foreign 
competition. It predominantly employed women, many on stitching operations 
that were labour intensive, and it had experienced a falling employment 
trend over the previous decade. 
Between 1966 and 1978 employment in the footwear industry fell by 
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31,000 to 75,000 employees, total output fell by 20% and the number of 
firms in the industry fell by 30% to 560 firms in 1978180• Fifty six per 
cent of the workforce were women, and manufacturing was concentrated in 
Northamptonshire, Leicestershire, East Anglia, Lancashire, Somerset, 
Bristol and the South West, see Figure 3:1. In 1950 only 4% of U.K. 
footwear sales were imported, but by 1978 imports totalled 42% of sales. 
There were few economies of scale obtainable beyond an employment level of 
250 persons181 and consequently the majority of manufacturing units were 
medium sized. The UK footwear industry was technologically equal to those 
of other countries, but its major constraint in 1980 was international 
protectionism. More than 75% of the world's footwear producing nations 
operated behind significant tariff and non-tariff barriers it was 
claimedl81• Consequently, calls were made for EEC to negotiate a Footwear 
Agreement similar in nature to the Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA) for 
textil es. 
Regarding trade union organisation, the H&K and footwear industries 
were similar in their reliance on full-time officers due to similar work 
organisations that inhibited collective action. The boot and shoe 
manufacturing industry, famous for its conciliation and arbitration 
procedures, had an agreement on incentives based on a time study with 
prescribed values for converting time into earnings l76• 
3.5 INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUE 
Initial contact was made by telephone to request an interview. On 
making contact with the individual responsible for labour management, 
normally the person with highest authority, the purpose was explained and 
an interest expressed in twi 1 ighters and homeworkers. In antic ipati on of 
sensitivity about secondary labour, emphasis was placed on the overall 
patterns of 1 abour demand rather than on demand for homeworkers. The 
probable time commitment was also discussed. All such telephone requests 
were greeted with cordiality and where subsequent interviews were arranged 
the utmost co-operation was offered by all members of each establishment's 
staff. It is bel i eved that no hosti 1 ity was encountered because the wi der 
aspects of the study were stressed rather than giving the impression of 
probing into homeworker use. 
The schedul e (Appendi x 1) was const ructed to all ow topi cs to flow in 
logical order, and question sequence was deliberately arranged to put 
respondents at ease at commencement by covering biographical and other 
important but uncontroversial issues. By this strategy it was hoped to 
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gain the confidence of respondents wary about answering detailed questions 
on the 'delicate' topic of homeworking. Controversial questions were 
placed about three quarters into the schedule to ensure that respondents 
would be relaxed and reassured regarding confidentiality by the time they 
were reached. Furthermore, numerous questions would have been answered by 
that point, few of which could be regarded as delicate, that a sudden 
change of attitude would have been required to hedge or refuse an answer. 
It was hoped that this arrangement would encourage frankness, which in 
retrospect, it did. To allay possible fears about specific probing 
regarding homeworkers, each question was first directed towards shift 
, 
workers, then full-time, part-time and twilight workers; homeworker 
replies were collected lastly. The schedule's final section again 
comprised uncontroversial questions so as to leave a pleasant parting 
atmosphere and the impression that homeworkers had not been the most 
important feature. Questions were collected into five sections: 
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE COMPANY AND RESPONDENTS; 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE WORKFORCE GROUPS; 
C. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE; 
D. REMUNERATION; 
E. PERFORMANCE. 
Apart from Section A being a natural starting point, it enable 
respondents, some of whom were entrepreneurial owner/managers, to discuss 
the subjects they appeared to 1 i ke most, i .e.themsel ves, thei r companies 
and trading. This was a convenient prelude to an amicable interview and it 
yielded much useful information. If it was sensed that time would not 
permit the schedule's completion, interviewees were discouraged from 
discussion. The questioning sequence was always rigorously adhered to. 
Worker numbers, skill levels, numbers of operations and methods of 
payment were identified by the completion of a box chart similar to that of 
Figure 4:i!o. The remainder of the schedule was completed by systematically 
recording details in the spaces provided, or by circling the appropriate 
ready-typed answers since. this obviated repetitive writing of the same 
answer and provided sufficient time for shorthand, verbatim notes to be 
made of comments, phrases and distinctive words. Within 24 hours these 
were transcribed to ensure that nothing that had been said was lost. 
Worker characteristics were considered relevant to the effects of the 
domestic role, differently sized LLMs, racial and gender segregation and to 
provide some evidence of financial commitments. Conditions of service were 
considered necessary to determine the structure of LLM as a pre-requisite 
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to ident ifyi ng the i nter-rel ati onships of workgroup demand and they were 
introduced sequenti ally from the recruitment to worker quit. Respondents 
willingly replied to all questions including those on work allocation, 
redundancy and remuneration. Difficulties with answers about remuneration 
did not generally spring from an unwillingness to answer, but rather from 
complications caused by piecerate methods of payment.· Questions applicable 
to only one group were asked of all groups to avoid the impression of 
probing into sensitive areas. The final section E on worker performance was 
well chosen as a concluding topic since it allowed respondents to evaluate 
the workgroups and explain production difficulties. Where circumstances 
allowed, interviews were terminated by general discussions about capital 
equipment used, and the establishment's policy on labour usage. 
3.6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE PILOT STUDY OF FOOTWEAR MANUFACTURERS 
The pilot study was undertaken during October 1979, and the sample of 
interview companies comprised 70% of the population of footwear 
manufacturers in the LLM, i.e.7 establishments. Products included boys' and 
ladies' fashion footwear. 
Forty-hours was the standard work-week 1 ength, but there were part-
timers who averaged 33.5 hours per week. The employers definition of part-
time typically was 'workers with fewer than the normal weekly hours of the 
establishment'. The pre-pilot study had indicated the presence of a 
sizable group of part-time workers, but at the time this was not thought to 
be of importance. However, the fi rst two pilot interviews revealed a 
similar situation in the footwear manufacturing industry and their 
significance was increasingly realized. Part-timers were frequently 
referred to by respondents who found difficulty in answering some of the 
questions without drawing distinctions between them and the full-timers. It 
was feared that if part-time and full-time statistics were aggregated, it 
would mask any characteristic differences between the workgroups. 
Consequently, subsequent to the first two interviews of the pilot study, 
statistics for part-timers were collected separately. As a result, the 
number of part-time workers present in the pilot sample is somewhat 
understated, but fortunately the two companies where part-time statistics 
were not collected separately were small in size. 
Fifty-five homeworkers, but no twilight or shift workers were used by 
these footwear establ ishments, see Tabl e 3.2 for workforce compositi on. 
Table 3.3 shows that some 60% of all workers were classed as highly 
skilled. There was a strong bias towards the higher skills in the male 
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full-time and female part-time groups, and towards the semi-skilled 
category in the homeworkers group. Employers al ways sought experi ence of 
s imll ar work before recruiti ng workers, and although thi s requi rement was 
sometimes relaxed for the in-factory groups it was not for homeworkers. 
Several ex-hosiery workers had been recruited to these footwear 
establ i shments. Each establ i shment's workforce· was compl etely job 
segregated by gender, with men operating various large-sized machines and 
women performing varied stitching and hand operations. Less than 10% of 
factory operations were performed by homeworkers. 
The National Union of Footwear, Leather and Allied Trades (NUFLAT) 
represented all the in-factory workers, but none of the homeworkers were 
believed to be members. All establishments successfully operated closed 
shop agreements; respondents indicated that the union concerned itself 
al most wholly with remuneration. 
Space limitation precludes the inclusion of the detailed statistics of 
this pilot survey, but the overall picture was of a male segment that was 
predominantly British, was generally older than the female groups (63% of 
men were aged over 40 years), and had proportionately more skilled workers 
who travelled further to work than the female segment. FUll-time females 
1 i ved nea re r to the facto ri es, were younger than the men (but 01 de r than 
homeworkers), were proportionately less skilled than the men and part-
timers, but more skilled than the homeworkers. 
Homeworkers were generally British, were the youngest group of 
workers, 73% had dependent ch il dren, and 40% were owner-occupi ers. 
Respondents complained of a shortage of full-time men and women, but stated 
that there was an excess supply of homeworkers. In all respects 
homeworkers had poorer work conditions. There was much competition for 
homeworking jobs; often wives or ex-employees were contacted making 
advertising unnecessary. More stringent selection criteria operated than 
for in-factory workers and these were usually concerned with 
characteristics such as trustworthiness which respondents judged to be 
indicative of an ability to work unsupervised. There was no training and 
no opportunities for promotion or up-grading. Holiday, pension and bonus 
benefits were generally not extended to homeworkers, although two small 
establ ishments gave minimum amounts of holiday pay. Supply of work to 
homeworkers vari ed more than to i n-f actory groups. Neverthel ess, several 
respondents considered that many full-timers and part-timers would opt for 
working at home if permitted to do so; respondents stood firmly against 
such mobil ity. 
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Remunerati on data suggested that there were two distinct grades of 
homeworker. Firstly, the skilled machinists who often received equal 
remunerative treatment, and secondly the semi-skilled hand workers who 
obtained the minimum pay (or even less) than was permitted for in-factory 
personnel at age 18. Homeworkers' average weekly earni ngs were 
considerably lower than those of in-~actory workers, but this could spring 
from either: lower rates of pay than those paid to in-factory counterparts; 
or lower rates due to lower skills; or limitation of earnings. Of the 
homeworker sample, 64% could have been paid lower rates than those normally 
paid for similar skills 'inside', but it was not possible to establish the 
exact extent of underpayment due to absence of personnel performing 
identical tasks inside the particular factory employing these homeworkers. 
All but 4 homeworkers were paid by piece rates. Where it was normal to 
calculate pay by time rates for an operation inside the factory, the 
minimum pay allowed to personnel aged 18 was often converted to piece rates 
for homeworkers who could be aged 30 or over. 
A clear spill-over effect from trade union activity was evident for 
those homeworkers who received either equal treatment or minimum pay 
rates, even though employers thought them not to be union members. 
Nevertheless, many homeworkers knew of the union's existence from their on-
site days. Employers considered that trade unions would expect homeworkers 
to be 1 ai d off before factory workers. 
By most measures of performance, homeworkers were ranked equal to or 
better than full-time day workers. These aspects included quality of 
work, voluntary turnover, competence, refusal of work (the proxy for 
absenteeism), and disputes. No records were kept of homeworker hours of 
work so assessments of homeworker productivity were purely subjecti ve. 
Homeworkers were judged to be less rel iable than in-factory workers and 
this was sometimes blamed on lack of supervision. 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM TIlE PILOT STUDY 
Several issues were identified as important. These data indicated 
that homeworkers were, in fact, cheaper to employ (a full analysis of this 
issues has been left to the main study), but despite this, employers 
generally limited homeworker numbers regardless of shortages of in-factory 
full-timers and excess supplies of homeworkers. These actions suggest that 
the 'cheap labour' criterion of demand was not the major motive of 
employers. The importance of control was unarticulated but implicit in the 
allocation of lower skilled work to homeworkers and in recruitment of them 
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via the extended internal labour market (EILM) as Manwari ng 18 terms it. 
i.e •• external contacts of workers who were members of the internal 
workforce. Regular contacts with internal workers could provide better 
links and probably more control over the homeworker. Differently size 
LLMs for the various workforce groups were implied by full-time men. who 
were the highest paid group. travelling furthest to work. 
The decision to include part-timers as a separate workgroup was 
justified by the differences between them and full-timers. particularly 
their skill levels. Part-timers were clearly an important element in 
recruitment decisions. since they were present in all establishments 
visited. Consequently. it was decided to include them as a separate group 
in the main investigation. Although it would have been preferable to 
include specific detailed questions about machinery costs and utilisation. 
it was necessary to include these issues as open-ended discussion at the 
termination of each 2 hour interview should the time be available and 
established rapport be favourable. This strategy was adopted because 
machinery costs could be obtained from elsewhere. It was also decided to 
confine data collection for men mainly to job allocation. remuneration. 
training and a limited number of other issues to minimize the time 
requirement on these topics since the focus of attention was female labour. 
Male performances were not considered because they were not in competition 
for the same jobs as women. Other than these additions and deletions. the 
pilot interview schedule remained unchanged for the main investigation. 
The strategy of 'homing in' the pilot studies towards the chosen 
i ndustri al LLM by conducti ng pil ots fi rstly wl thl n the selected 1 ndustry 
but outside the selected LLM. and secondly within the selected LLM but 
outside the selected industry had provided valuable insights and gave 
experience in conducting interviews in appropriate firms without 
jeopardizing the chances of success or reducing sample sizes for the main 
investigation. In retrospect. it can be concluded that the footwear 
manufacturi ng industry was well-chosen as. a subject for the pil ot study 
because anticipations of mobility between footwear and hosiery industries 
was confi rmed to a 1 imited extent. and patterns of 1 abour usage by these 
industries exhibited remarkable similarities. 
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In order to avoid a distorted picture which could occur in changing 
environments, all main study interviews were confined to the month of March 
1980. This allowed wage and conditions of service comparisons to be fairly 
made, and a simultaneously accurate picture to be portrayed. Table 3.1 
illustrates the data collection programme. 
4.1 THE SAMPLES 
It was intended to approach all establishments in the LLM because 
limited access was anticipated and the largest possible sample was desired. 
No official catalogue of the region's H&K companies existed, other than 
the DE Officer's confidential list, but as he suggested, the current 
telephone directory yellow pages provided a good duplication. The list of 
companies using twilight and homeworkers compiled to produce Table 1.1 was 
augmented from yellow pages and attempts to further extend it by asking 
respondents for names of competitors confirmed that it was complete. All 
companies were approached; although it was impossible to visit all. 25 
i ntervi ews were successfully compl eted. Si x compani es refused: two stated 
that they were in the midst of redundancies and were too pre-occupied; two 
sister establishments refused because it was Head Office policy not to give 
i ntervi ews, but workforce numbers were suppl i ed; two further estab 1 i shments 
declined for no stated reasons. In addition 8 establishments could either 
not be contacted, or mutually convenient times could not be arranged. 
However, 3 of the latter gave shortened telephone interviews and although 
detailed statistics on conditions of service could not be obtained in the 
curtailed time, labour utilization practices were ascertained. These 
establishments have not been included as part of the sample, but they 
strongly appeared to conform to the same patterns of labour usage as in the 
25 formally interviewed establishments. It was calculated that 64% of 
establishments then operating within the LLM were included in the sample 
and this would have been increased to 72% had the telephoned 
establishments been included. 
4.1.1 The Respondent Sample 
Of the 25 respondents, 22 were male. Tab 1 e 4.1 summari zes the 
interviewees' years of current experience, but it would be misleading to 
assume that the average duration of 9.8 years typified their total 
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experience in the industry. Two respondents had been factory managers for 
one year, but each had previously gained many years similar experience in 
other establishments. Four owner/managers had formed their companies less 
than 10 years previously after working as managers for other employers. 
Three di rectors of 1 arge, long estab 1 i shed compani es were members of the 
founding families and as such had been associated with the industry for 
vi rtually the whole of thei r 1 ives. Therefore, the comments offered and 
the data provided by these respondents were well-informed and 
representative of their establishments and of the industry generally. 
4.1.2 Profile of the Establishment Sample 
Table 4.2 lists the sample by decreasing size of workforce and shows 
type of ownership and establishment age. Ten were public limited liability 
companies and 4 were owned by the same large company. Six different 
conglomerate company groups owned one interviewed estab 1 i shment each. 
Figure 4:1 shows establ ishment size plotted against its age. Publ ic 
companies are encircled, the (x) symbols denoting that 17 establishments 
principally produced knitwear whereas (+) symbols indicate that 8 
establishments specialized in hosiery. However, 4 of these made subsidiary 
products: one manufactured both knitwear and underwear; one hosiery and 
underwear; and two produced knitwear, hosiery and underwear. 
There was a wide cross-section of establ ishments; sizes ranged from 
the smallest with only 4 employees to the largest with 236. The adjectives 
'large' and 'small' are therefore relative to the sample's size range, and 
the distinction is somewhat arbitrary. A 30 employee establishment was 
chosen as the cut-off point between large and small because clustering 
occurred below that size, and it conveniently separated the public limited 
companies into the large sector. Large sector companies were predominantly 
knitwear manufacturers (11 knitwear, 3 hosiery), while the small sector was 
more equally balanced (6 knitwear, 5 hosiery). 
In an analysis of the H&K industry, Pool 168 claimed that firms grew 
over time. This implied that the largest companies would be the longest 
established. It was realized that a good fit to a regression line would not 
establish causation, but to test Pool's hypothesis, a linear least-squares 
regression182 was calculated to examine whethe-r, for this sample, the size 
(y) of an establ ishment increased with its age (x). This yiel ded the 
equation: 
y = 17.7 + 1.42x (withr2 = 0.54) 
Only 54% of the variance in y was attributable to the regression of y 
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on x, while 46% of the variability in an establishment's size appeared to 
be associated with factors other than its age. However, certain qualitative 
data could account for much of the scatter. For instance, the 
establishment marked T in Figure 4:1 was, in reality, a growing company 
that had, 31 years previously, taken over the premises of an existing 
hosiery establishment, and thus could be considered as older than 
indicated. Those marked B were establishments that had additional branches 
outside the LLM and the parent companies were therefore larger and often 
older than shown. Company P could not expand its premises because it was 
closely confined by residential housing and had therefore reached its 
optimum size in that location. 
largest establishment, L, and its 
In fact, it had been taken-over by the 
manufacture segregated. Establishment C 
had contracted since its post-war peak; obviously some companies were more 
successful than others. Moreover, the adjustment process of Chapters 14 
and 15 shows how worker numbers can vary to create over- and under-
capacity situations, and this must additionally frustrate regression 
analysis when worker numbers are the dependent variable. Thus, the above 
qual itative data has permitted a better interpretation of the regression 
exercise by indicating that many of the scattered points would in reality 
be a closer fit. This indicates the benefits to be obtained by combining 
qualitative and quantitative analysis in socio-economic studies. Indeed, an 
absence of such qualitative data would throw the use of regression analysis 
into doubt in this instance because Figure 4:1 presents an instantaneous 
picture of a dynamic situation in which birth, growth, stability and 
decline are all represented. In general terms most establ ishments had 
apparently grown over time. 
4.1.3 Profile of the Worker Sample 
Figure 4:2, a diagrammatic representation of the profile of the 
compl ete di rect product i on workforce, rel ates to Fi gure 4:3 wh i ch shows 
aggregate group numbers and percentages comprising the sample of 1532 
direct production workers. See Appendix III for abbreviations used for the 
various workgroups, segments and components. 
The male segment comprised 349 indoor workers, and because there were 
no male homeworkers, the component (Im) and segment (M) were identical. 
The core of the male segment had 201 shift workers and 142 full-time day 
workers; the only male group that could have been regarded as secondary 
comprised 6 part-time day workers most of whom were over reti rement age. 
The composition of the shift worker group (Srn) was identical to (S) because 
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no women worked shifts. 
The female segment comprised both indoor and outdoor components; the 
composition of the female groups (Tw) and (Hw) being identical to (T) and 
component (H) because there were no corresponding male groups. The core of 
the female segment comprised 565 full-time and 477 part-time day workers; 
secondary groups were the 14 twilight workers and the 127 homeworkers. 
Homeworkers, although relatively few in comparison to core female workers, 
were almost as numeroUS as the full-time males. H&K industries normally 
employed more females than males and in this sample the overall ratio of 
all men to all women was 1:3.86 However, the ratio of finishing operatives 
to knitters varied sl ightly by company and by size of company, but the 
greatest variation appeared to stem from the kind of product, hosiery 
companies generally having a lower ratio than knitwear companies 
(i.e.hosiery=I:2.1, knitwear=I:5.03). A more detailed analysis of the 
workforce has been deferred to section 4.3 as this will be more readily 
appreciated after a consideration of organizational patterns. 
4.2 ORGANIZATIONAl PATTERNS 
A background.awareness of the organization of capital and labour, and 
the manufacturing processes to which these were applied, is useful to put 
the empiri cal research into context. 
4.2.1 Manufacturing Processes 
Companies varied in their approach to the relationship between orders 
and production. Some produced to meet specific orders, i.e. the order was 
first placed by the customer who stipulated the style, colour and sizes. 
Others first manufactured products and then sought customers. Different 
approaches to the order/product relationship were associated with the 
dangers inherent in manufacturing output before it was sold; materials must 
be purchased before producti on and these were costly and ti ed up 
circulating capital. Time-lags could create cash-flow difficulties since 
seasonal peaks required companies to have money available for the 
forthcomi ng season's orders. To mi ss the busy season coul d be di sastrous 
for establishments in trading difficulties since a bad choice of style, 
design, pattern, colour, texture, or even weight, could make garments 
unsaleable. Consequently, employers who varied stocks were subjected to the 
vaguenesses of both fashion and the weather. The author was informed that 
unsold stocks had resulted in the demise of 3 knitwear manufacturers from 
one small settlement during the previous 10 years. 
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Whatever the order/product relationship, garment manufacture in both 
hosiery and knitwear establishments occurred in two distinct, easily 
separable stages. Stage one comprised the knitting and formation of basic 
shapes. Stage two involved the making-up of these shapes into finished 
garments and their presentation for sale. In the industry, and in this 
thesis, these stages have been referred to as knitting and finishing 
respectively. 
4.2.1(a) Hosiery Processes 
Socks were knitted in tubular form on single or double cylinder, 
automatic, circular knitting machines costing between £8,000 and £12,000 
each. The machines, being automatic, needed intermittent attention to 
prevent production faults and secure yarn supply. Machines were arranged 
in rows in adjacent alleys to facilitate the servicing of between 14 and 20 
machines which made each operative responsible for between £112,000 and 
£240,000 worth of machinery. Knitting was therefore a highly productive 
operation and also highly capital intensive. Finishing operations, which 
were sometimes performed in separate premises, comprised toe-closing, 
dyeing, turning, pressing, examining, pairing, labelling, packaging and 
preparing for dispatch. Toe-closing has traditionally been achieved by 
the highly skilled, labour-intensive 'linking' operation in which the 
knitted loops in the toe ends were carefully matched and joined together. 
Except for very high quality hose, linking was being replaced by various 
stitching systems using machines costing between £5,000 to .f].5,OOO. Toe-
closing had thereby become de-skilled, although more capital intensive. 
Some of the 1 arger manufacturers dyed thei r own products, but many 
subcontracted to specialist dyers. Examining, pairing, labelling and 
preparing goods for sale were the most labour intensive manual operations 
and manufacturers had searched for, but not found, a viable automatic 
process. Monitoring of quality and progress was often assisted by smooth 
topped racks for interim storage which provided easy, simple and quick 
checki ng. 
4.2.1(b) Knitwear Processes 
Knitwear production followed a similar pattern to hose manufacture, 
but maki ng-up operations were more numerous since the garments had more 
compl ex shapes and were composed of several separate pieces. Outerwear 
garments were manufactured by two baSically different principles; the 
fully-fashioned and cut-and-sew methods. Fully-fashioned garment pieces 
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were shaped by the machine during knitting; machine prices ranged from 
£250,000 to £340,000 for the more complex, each of which had up to 16 
knitting heads. In the cut-and-sew method, large circular knitting machines 
costing between £22,000 and £40,000, or flat- or vee-beds (£26,000 to 
£37,000) produced continuous fabric from which the shapes were cut in a 
manner identical to clothing manufacture from woven cloth. In both 
methods, the knitti ng machi nery was automatic, requi ri ng control of 
settings to prevent fabric faults and servicing to ensure continuity of 
yarns. Operatives minded one, or sometimes two fully fashioned machines 
each, thereby bei ng responsible for up to £680,000 worth of machinery which 
made the knitting of such knitwear the most capital intensive operation in 
the industry. As with hose manufacture, machines were arranged in rows and 
alleys for easy routine attention, and this caused the knitting and 
finishing stages to be separated into different factory locations. To 
ensure continuous production, several rows or courses of connective thread 
were inserted between garment pieces or blanks, and after the fabric had 
left the machine the pieces were separated by hand-unravelling the 
connecting thread by drawthreading, a very simple but time consuming manual 
operation for which homeworkers were often used. Drawthreading was used to 
separate collars, cuffs and welts produced on heavier gauge machines, the 
peripheral knitted loops of these sub-pieces being manually threaded onto 
bars by an operation known as running-on, before bei ng loaded onto finer 
gauge machines for fashion knitting, an operation called bar-loading. In 
large establishments the division of labour was such that specialist bar-
loaders were employed to assist the knitters. 
Finishing operations comprised stitching garment pieces together by 
lockstitching and/or overlocking. A lockstitch machine produced the same 
stitch as a domestic sewing machine. An overlock machine, used for seal ing 
seams, prevented fraying by throwing the thread around the raw edges before 
passing it through the fabric. Both of these machines commonly were used 
for making the cheaper cut-and-sew garments; in true fully-fashioned 
quality garments, the highly labour-intensive linking operation was used 
whereby each looped stitch of the two pieces to be joined was selected by 
the skill of hand and eye and carefully placed on the appropriate pins of a 
linking dial before passing yarn through them loop-by-loop. Loose ends 
from stitching operations were 'bartacked' out of sight, and buttons and 
buttonholes added using specialized machinery. After completion, the 
garments were steamed and pressed into shape 
labelling, bagging and preparing for dispatch. 
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could often be reclaimed by mending, a skilled, but time-consuming hand 
operation; quite frequently styles were designed which required hand sewing 
or embroidery. As with hose manufacture, finishing operations were not 
automatic, each item bei ng hand mani pul ated. These were 1 abour-i ntensive 
jobs, with one machine per operative (where machinery was used). Machinery 
prices varied according type, model and make, but typically, lockstitch 
and overlock machines ranged between £800 and £1,200 each. Some garments 
were knitted using coloured yarns thereby obviating later dyeing, but 
dyeing was often performed on self-coloured garments, and even on patterns 
where yarns of differing dye affinities picked up different colours from 
the dyebath. 
4.2.1(c) Organization of Processes 
Production in all establ ishments was organised on a 'batch' system, 
with each style, colour and size being bound into standardized bundles. 
Garments or paired socks had been traditionally counted in multiples of 
dozens; although a strange numbering system the practise continued in all 
establishments with output still counted in terms of hundreds (or 
thousands) of dozens per week. The number of dozens that constituted a 
batch varied among establishments; in some it was 10 dozens, in others 20, 
30 or 50 dozens. Knitting machines, being automatic, could be fitted with 
counters to record output which was batched for control purposes and during 
the subsequent finishing processes there was a continuous flow of work from 
one operation to the next in a manner suggestive of a conveyor belt. Each 
finishing operative worked in batches so as to check flow and permit 
accurate wage calculation. This complicated the taking-over of a 
co 11 eague's work or machi ne as was requi red by a shift system. Full-time 
male time-rate workers were often employed to provide a human conveyor belt 
by man-handling batches between processes and operatives. In contrast 
to the continuous flow of work available to factory employees, homeworkers 
had to operate by discreet, small-batch methods since their work was 
delivered at weekly or twice weekly intervals. The implications of the 
nature of work supply are di scussed in 9.6.1. 
In all establishments, work patterns (4.2.2d) and the sequencing of 
operations caused segments to be physically segregated into different work 
areas, and the two stage sequence of production permitted establishments to 
specialize in one stage only, i.e. either knitting or finishing •. Large 
companies tended to segregate the knitting and finishing operations into 
sepa rate est ab 1 i shment s, s omet i mes in d iffe rent regi ons, because thei r 
4 - 7 
CHAPTER FOUR INTROOUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
knitti ng machi nes were sufficiently numerous to compl etely fi 11 avail abl e 
premises. Thus there were entirely male, and entirely female segregated 
establishments, although some of the latter used retirement age full- or 
part-time men for routine deliveries between establishments. Some 
integrated companies segregated the knitting and finishing stages into 
different parts of the same factory and this type of organization has been 
called a segregated work force. Other companies with small premises 
segregated knitting and finishing within different areas of the small room. 
Regardless of how segregation was effected, production processes followed 
the same sequence and flow. Of the 25 interviewed establishments, 6 were 
segregated and performed only stage two; one performed only stage one (i.e. 
knitting on commission from larger companies and using homeworkers to 
separate knitted blanks); 11 had segregated workforces; and 6 had their 
workforces segregated into different work areas, see Table 4.3. In only 
one establishment were men and women full integrated; women had proved to 
be more satisfactory (see 5.2.la) and were used alongside men for hand-
machine knitting, but even so, the finishing operations occurred in a 
separate area of the same room. 
This latter example emphasises that separation of the workforce by 
gender resulted from the sex-typing of jobs (see 8.2.1). Efficient 
production required the positioning of machinery to reduce internal 
transport and to provi de a smooth, convenient flow of work through the 
sequence of operations. In all instances, factory layouts had been adopted 
to achieve this flow within the constraints of the number of machines to be 
housed in the existing, often 01 d, accommodation. 
The two easily separable stages of manufacture permitted individuals 
without factory premises to undertake the whole, or parts, of the finishing 
stage by using homeworkers since finishing equipment was 'domestically' 
sized. The'knitting was generally unsuitable for domestic production 
because the automatic knitting machines used for hosiery and knitwear were 
large-sized. However, certain types of small hand machine were ideally 
suited for home use (e.g. Griswold circular, and hand flat machines). 
4.2.1(d) Patterns of Reorganizatfon 
Section 4.1.2 illustrated the dynamics of the survey llM, and while it 
indicated stable, expansionary and contractionary trends, it concluded that 
firms generally grew over time. Expanding establishments tended to become 
short of factory space for additional machinery and operatives, especially 
small entrepreneurial companies that had commenced from low financial bases 
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and had been unable initially to obtain large or extendable premises. 
Nevertheless, production above full capacity had been achieved by the use 
of secondary workers. Floor space had been reorganized to introduce 
additional machinery into space formerly occupied by simple, 1abour-
intensive, space-consuming operations that required hand manipulation (such 
as turning, examining, folding, pairing, mending, labelling and packaging) 
which were subsequently 'put-out' to homeworkers. Such 'fi rst-
phase rationalization' persisted until new or additional premises were 
obtained. 
After added floor space had been provided, production could take place 
on more than one site if necessary. With multi-site production, 
reorgani zati on usually continued by p1 aci ng the fi rst stage of producti on 
on one site and confining the second stage to one or more other sites. 
Whether production proceeded on one or more sites, the increased floor 
space allowed simple put-out hand work to return to internal production. 
The provision of additional space and the bringing inside of the finishing 
operations has been termed 'second-phase rationalization'. Second phase. 
reorganization had given rise to the entirely female establishments (marked 
** in Table 4.2) that were without twilight and homework labour. However, 
in first-phase rationalized establishments a hardcore of well-respected 
homeworkers benefited from constant workloads because their jobs were 
essential and not undertaken on-site. This growth process helps to explain 
why homeworkers comprised higher proportions in the female segments of 
small companies which were most likely to have undertaken first-phase 
rationalization. 
4.2.1(e) Varying Productivity Levels 
In the first stage of production, each operative was highly productive 
because numerous automatic machines (or knitting heads) were allocated to 
each kni tter. In the second stage, operatives either used no machinery at 
all or operated one non-automatic machine each. Consequently, the second 
stage had low productivity relative to the first. Although employers 
balanced their capital and labour resources to permit a constant work 
throughput at each production stage, as pace increased, or an unbalanced 
amount of overtime was applied, uutput levels became out of phase and 
snarl-ups of work in progress occurred. Bottlenecks arose (see 12.5.2a) 
because more output was achievable on high than on low output operations 
with a given additional input of labour, see Figure 12:5 which illustrates 
such unbalanced overtime input. As production demand increased a greater 
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number of additional operatives were required for the low productive than 
the high productive operations so as to process the large increase in 
output from high production machinery. When demand decreased, a relatively 
large number of these low output operatives became superfluous, since each 
produced small er proportions of total output than high output operatives. 
This suggests that when men do capital intensive· and women do labour 
intensive jobs, as in the H&K industry, men will have relatively more 
stable employment but their piece-rate earnings will vary over a wide 
range. 
4.2.2 The Organization of Labour 
4.2.2(a) Divisions of Labour 
Differences in size of company resulted in variations in the divisions 
of labour. Male segments of the larger establishments of the sample 
contained specialist knitters, bar10aders, yarn distributors, warehousemen, 
dyehousemen, and supervisors. They also employed special ist mechanics, 
many of whom worked full-time days to service finishing machines. In the 
female segments of these establishments, numerous operatives of the same 
type were required because each produced a small proportion of the 
company's output. Alleys of similar machines were arranged in separate 
departments according to the operation performed. The volume of work was 
such that it enab1 ed them to divide the requi red processes into a 1 arge 
number of different jobs, some of which arose only intermittently or were 
of such low volume as to require only a part-timer, a demand criterion 
i dent Hied by Bosworth & Dawki ns259• 
Small sector employers claimed that they could not afford the 
employment of specializing personnel. In their male segments, 
knitter/mechanics both operated and serviced the machi nes and some 
additionally acted as supervisors. Small integrated establishments had no 
auxil iary males to give back-up services and lack of such facil ities had 
imp1 ications for choice of payment system, see 4.2.2 (c) below. Within 
the female segments of small establishments several operations, usually the 
hand variety, were combined into one job. Few machines of each type were 
needed, so the different models were arranged sequentially according to 
production flow, and were gathered together into the 'finishing 
department'. This contrasts with the much larger establ ishments that had 
several departments within the finishing stage of production, each with its 
own departmental manager. 
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4.2.2(b) Management Structures 
Factory managers assisted by departmental managers who themselves were 
supported by production supervisors were present in only the largest estab-
1 i shments. Structured communi cati on routes to control both product and 
labour were clearly evident. In contrast, small companies were generally 
characterized by the absence of formal ized structured control mechanisms, 
although some owner/managers had supervisory assistance. Small company 
owner/managers worked manually al ongsi de the kni tting operatives and con-
ducted trade in between times aided by secretarial help. Thus, managerial 
control structures varied according to size of establishment. Large compa-
nies could be characterized as having formalized hierarchical and bureauc-
ratic control structures related to manufacturing processes as suggested by 
Marglin 19 and Goldman & Van Houten 20• In small companies, the workshop 
type of simple contro1 21 of both product and labour was 'personalized' by 
the very close friendly associ ati on of owner/managers and workers on the 
factory floor, a characteri sti c al so observed by Boraston176• 
4.2.2(c) Methods of Payment 
The methods by which employees were recompensed were closely allied to 
divisions of labour. It was common for the two basic forms of remuneration 
(i.e.time rates and piece rates) to be used simultaneously. The time based 
schemes remunerated at (x) pence per hour for only the hours worked, whil e 
under payment-by-results (or incentive) schemes employees earned (y) pence 
per unit, or dozen units, completed. The piecerate method of payment led 
to complications when workers were relocated or given extra tasks (see 
8.2.2a), so some switching between methods occurred. In order to be 'fair' 
to time paid workers during heavy work loads a few companies paid them 
productivity bonuses to recompense them for high productivity, see 8.4.5. 
As a concession for return to an entirely piece rate system from the 
various flat rate payments that had been introduced during government 
incomes pol ici es (i.e.consol i dati on), an enhanced graduated weekly payment 
system had been nationally agreed for when output levels were particularly 
low and short-time working was needed, see sub-section 1l.2.1(a). The 
merits and demerits of using payments systems as a LM adjustment mechanism 
are assessed in 13.2, which also concludes that "incentive schemes are most 
appropriate for repetitive jobs to encourage dexterity and speed, and time 
rates are more suitable for tasks where precision is more important than 
speed, or for one-off, varied or complex jobs in which the recording of 
operati ons is inappropri ate". 
4 - 11 
CHAPTER FOUR INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
With the introduction of each new style, new rates had to be establ ished 
for all operations, but this could lead to wage drift, see 8.3.4(a). Table 
4.4 shows the numbers and percentages of workers in each group recompensed 
by each system. Clearly H&K were predominantly piece work industries due 
to the repetitive nature of bulk production of particular garment styles. 
However, vari ous jobs were unsuited to piece rate methods and work group 
differences are highlighted by the proportionate variation of time payments 
which indicate the performance of such jobs. For instance, 62% of full-
time and 83% of part-time males were time workers in comparison to less 
than 20% in all other groups. These variations can be explained by 
reference to Tabl es 8.1 and 8.2 which show that the majority of these mal es 
were doing jobs that were either unsuitable for piece-rates (e.g., 
mechanics and supervisors) or varied tasks (e.g., stores or warehouse 
duties). Shift workers were, without exception, time paid for flexibility 
reasons, some being only temporarily transferred. Within the female 
segment, time workers were either those on precision jobs (e.g., mending, 
linking and inspection) or were those who performed semi-skilled hand jobs 
in which a variety of operations were undertaken, these latter also being 
done by some part-time men. The 15% of part-timers paid by time rates 
suggests that employers had modified thei r hi ring standards rel ating to 
hours (Instrument U,14.2.4) rather than their skill stipulations 
(Instrument S) by resorting to part-time females to obtain precision 
workers. The two time paid twilight workers were being so remunerated 
temporarily while undertaking training, it being intended to transfer them 
to piece rates when proficient. 
4.2.2(d) Work Patterns 
The concept of the 'normal' or 'basic' day in sample establishments 
was typically 8 working hours and this applied to both single and multiple 
shifts. Although some night shifts comprised more than 8 hours, workers 
maintained the 'normal' or 'basic' week of 40 hours. Each group's 
average weekly hours and overtime is fully considered in Section 9.6, see 
Tabl es 9.33, 9.34. 
In Figure 4:4 typical work patterns (shown horizontally) and relative 
size of each workgoup (shown vertically) have been plotted as bar charts 
against the time of day to illustrate the group interactions and 
communications that regularly occurred. 'Vandyked' band ends denote that 
start and finish times varied. Only knitters worked the shift patterns and 
only men were employed on the 'normal' knitting operation. Employers 
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variously claimed that women were "unable", "unwilling" or "prohibited" 
from working shifts, these same explanations being used to justify women's 
non-employment on highly paid knitting operations. The most usual pattern 
was the double day shift 5 days per week. In these one man worked from 6 am 
to 2 pm, and another from 2 pm to 10 pm. Of the 11 establishments 
operating shift systems, only 2 worked a continuous 3 shift 5 days per week 
pattern (for a fuller description of shift-work patterns see Bosworth & 
Dawkins 78 ,79,141). The very costly fully-fashioned machines were used by 
these establishments. Working times for single shifts were typically 7.30 
am to 4.30 pm with a 1-hour break for lunch, these times applying to both 
men and women full-timers. One estab1 ishment worked 8.1/2 hours 4 days per 
week to allow an"ear1Y finish on Fridays for weekend shopping:' 
Part-timers had individually variable start and finish times depending 
on thei r commitments, preferences and employers' permissi on. They averaged 
30 hours per week and this allowed mothers to deposit children at school, 
start work at 9am and finish at 4pm to coincide with school times. It was 
cl aimed that mothers with primary school chi 1 dren generally" worked fewer 
hours in order to dovetail with school finishing times: Working hours of 
both twilight and part-timers varied individually and, as 11.4.1 considers, 
hours worked are critical to the statutory provisions received. Twilight 
workers with 15 or 16 hours per week (see Table 9.33) attended for 4 hours 
per evening, and 4 days per week; those with 22 weekly hours attended for 
4.1/2 hours, 5 days per week. Start times were either 5pm or 6pm and 
finish times were between 9pm and lOpm. 
Homeworkers were generally unable to interact with indoor components. 
Although thei r actual hours were not accurately known, thei r work pattern 
as borne out by respondent comments and implied in the 1iterature140, has 
been similarly depicted in Figure 4:4. Although hypothetical, this work 
pattern would be necessary for mothers of young children to combine 
domestic work with the equivalent of full-time employment, and it is 
obvious that such a work pattern would be fatiguing if sustained. It 
illustrates that some work was performed before preparing children for 
school with another burst of activity between escorting them and preparing 
lunch. There was a long break in the afternoon to collect school children, 
shop, prepare the evening meal and put children to bed. Further work 'was 
done in the evening. This work pattern is consistent with statements made 
by homeworkers on radio and television broadcasts 76 and although it 
stretched intermittently from roughly 7 am to 10.30 pm with no real rest 
periods only about 8.1/2 hours of productive activity took place. This 
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underlines Allen's140 assertions of neglect regarding the organisation of 
work and its payment and the mythical separation of home and employment for 
many women; 13% of her homeworker sample worked more than full-time hours. 
It also clearly illustrates the myth about homeworker autonomy in the 
choice of work scheduling. Figure 4:4 indicates the lack of 
communication that could have existed between male and female segments and 
between the secondary groups and the core of the workforce and management. 
Most of the indoor components could have been unaware that their employers 
used twil ighters and homeworkers, since there were no points of contact 
unless twilight workers inadvertently arrived before the full-timers left. 
The only effective communication link for twilight workers would have been 
with the second crew of shift workers, who could act as intermediaries on 
the following afternoon. Furthermore, work patterns, job segregation, and 
the physical separation of shift workers and the female segments all 
suggest that there was little daily interaction between the male shift 
workers and the daytime groups since meal breaks did not coincide. The 
greatest level of communication and interaction was possible between fu11-
and part-time females whose work operations were integrated. 
Band-wi dths in Fi gure 4:4) which represent re1 at i ve numbers, show that 
interviewed estab1ishments.were populated mainly by females during normal 
daytime hours; the H&K industries can therefore be justifiably termed 
'fema1 e' industries. 
4.3 VARIATIONS IN WORKFORCE COMPOSITION BY SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENT 
The percentage that each group comprised in the 1532. total direct 
production workforce is shown below each box in Figure 4:3. Group 
percentages within each of the 25 establishments' workforces varied 
considerably. Tables 4.2(a & b) detail proportionate compositions 
according to size of establishment, defining 'large' as 30 employees or 
more as in sub-section 4.1.2. 
Variations in the male segment can be interpreted by reference to male 
occupations (8.2.1 c) because, other than shift and full-time day knitters, 
workers in male groups were not substitutable for each other. The majority 
of male full-timers worked on later stages of production that required 
different skills, see Table 8.2. Tables 4.2 show that 8 firms (57%) in the 
large sector used a shift pattern compared to only 3 (33%) in the small 
sector. In the large sector, only two establishments (marked K in Tables 
4.2))emp10ying 14% of the worker sample, knitted on a full-time day plus 
overtime basis. Respondents indicated that "extended days" stemmed from 
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two influences: firstly, small establishments had insufficient men (e.g. 3 
knitters) to run successful shifts systems since there was little room for 
manoeuvre; secondly, weak order books did not justify shift operation, but 
when orders increased shift systems would resume. Nevertheless, 
substantial overtime gave these factories considerable production 
flexibility and increased worker earnings. 
Shift workers, were employed in the large sector as knitters (190= 
60%). Allowing for the 30 knitters in establishments marked K, full-time 
males in the large sector (99=31%) performed operations other than 
knitting, but in the small sector, only a solitary part-timer was so 
engaged. Single and double stars in the DP column of Table 4.2 denote that 
these establishments undertook only the first stage or only the 
second stage of manufacture respectively. Males in second-stage 
establishments ~ worked fu11- or part-time work patterns. 
In sharp contrast, all groups in the female segment performed the same 
series of operations, see 8.2.1(c), and these were undertaken only an a 
daytime basis: No shift system had ever been tried because as was stated, 
"It would be impossible to recruit sufficient females to work a shift 
system". This assertion is doubted by the author who had interview a local 
city bakery company for a different research project where shift women 
(some working nights) were in plentiful supply. 
Table 4.2 shows that all large establishments used both full- and 
part-time females, whereas only 8 (73%) of the small establishments used 
full-timers and 10 (91%) employed part-timers. In both large and small 
sectors when twil ight shifts were used, a shift system for knitting was 
also present, so causing premises already to be occupied. Twilight shifts 
were generally used by large establishments (4 out of the 5). Only two 
twilight workers were employed in the small sector and these were being 
introduced as an experimental alternative to homeworking. Conversely, 
homeworkers were used more heavily by establ ishments in the small sector 
(8=73%) than in the large sector (9=64%), and the 72 homeworkers comprised 
the highest proportion (43%) in the total female segment of the small 
sector in comparison to only 5% of the large sector. Of the 1014 female 
workers in large establishments, 534 (53%) were full-timers as against 31 
(18%) in small companies, an indication that the larger firms more 
successfully attracted full-time females. A more even distribution is 
observed for the part-time groups, with 413 (41%) and 64 (38%) in the large 
and small sectors respectively, but in the small sector, part-timers 
outnumbered full-timers by more than 2:1. 
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The findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows: 
(i) knitting machines were only used on a shift or extended day basis, all 
other machines being operated either on a full-time day basis or less; 
(H) employers switched between male groups only for the knitting 
operations, the majority of full-time day males performing work 
requiring skills other than knitting; 
(iii)males could obtain non-knitting full-time jobs only in large H&K 
estab li shments; 
(iv) 95% of shift working was in the large sector; 
(v) female workgroups were heavily used by both sectors; they performed 
the same set of operations and could be readily substituted for each 
other; 
(vi) large establishments more successfully attracted full-time females; 
(vii)part-timers outnumbered full-timers by more than 2:1 in the small 
sector;' 
(viii)twilight workers comprised a very small proportion of all labour 
forces; 
(ix) twil ight shifts mainly existed in the large sector and were 
accompani ed by other shift work patterns, but they di d not constitute 
an integral part of those patterns because finishing jobs, not 
knitting operations, were performed by twilight workers; 
(x) homeworkers were the largest female workgroup in the small sector. 
These findings pose several interesting questions, for instance: 
* Why do small establishments use more homeworkers? 
* Why do part-time females outnumber full-time females in small 
establishments? 
* Why are twilight workers found in conjunction with shift patterns? 
Part C of the thesis considers many of the issues raised in this chapter. 
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The nature of the topic dictated that, although the research was 
primarily concerned with demand, supply influences should also be 
considered since female workgroup formation could be influenced by 
constraints on market-available time. As interviewing was confined to 
employers (see I."), data presented in this chapter are somewhat limited in 
that each supply influence could form an entire research project, but here 
it is used to verify some preliminary assumptions and establish the 
background for the more central study of workgroup demand. 
For a given level of residential development the size of the area 
tapped will affect the supply of potential workers. Sub-section 1.10.1 
postulated that the distances employees might be prepared to travel would 
depend on their earnings and travel costs in terms of time and money. 
Workers with low earnings would travel shorter distances that those with 
high earnings. Constraints imposed by the roles adopted by women in the 
family unit were expected to limit the time available for market work 
thereby causing them to opt for employment with fewer than normal hours, 
times outside the normal workday, or away from the normal workplace, 
whereupon their earnings would probably be lower and this would impinge on 
the geographical area tapped and reduce the number of households from which 
labour could be drawn. From this it could be inferred that there would be 
smaller pools of such female workers. 
Section 5.1 tests the validity of the prediction of differently sized 
external local labour markets (ELLMs) by analysing relative distances 
between home and work for each workgroup. Section 5.2 examines the level s 
of supply that employers stated they faced for each group and Section 5.3 
investigates the suggestion that free or assisted travel to reduce employee 
costs could be a strategy for overcoming shortages of labour by expanding 
ELLM boundaries. Section 5.4 reviews differential recruitment methods as a 
further strategy for attracting labour and Section 5.5 examines the 
relaxation of the full-time (40 hours per week) stipulation. Inferences 
able to be drawn from these data 'are discussed in Section 5.6. 
5.1 DISTANCE BETWEEN FACTORY AND RESIDENCE 
Table 5.1 shows the number of workers in each group residing within 
specified distance bands around thei r factories. Sample sizes were 
unavoidably reduced due to insufficient time to extract information from 
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records. Whenever statistics had to be sacrificed, an assessment was 
obtai ned regardi ng home-to-factory vari ations by workgroup. Although 1 ess 
precise data, there was a general consensus that males travelled further 
than females. There was some indication of elongation of boundaries along 
bus routes as suggested by Goodman10• 
The cumulative percentage distribution (Figure 5:1) confirms the 
prediction that workgroups were drawn from differently sized ELLMs. When 
compared with earnings levels (sub-section 8.3.1) an association with 
travelling distance was revealed; the higher the earnings, the larger the 
area tapped. For example: 
(a) proportionately, males, who had higher earnings travelled further than 
the full-time femal es; 
(b) part-time females generally travelled shorter distances than full-time 
females and although they received the same pay rates (see 8.3.1 (b», 
their fewer average hours resulted in somewhat lower earnings; 
(c) almost all twilight workers resided within 1 mile of their factories. 
Even though pai d the same rates, earnings were lower than for other 
in-factory females due to 'fewer hours (see Table 9.33); and 
(d) homeworkers were a special case. This sample of homeworkers 
expended neither time nor money on travel and so the entire costs were 
transferred to the employer (see Tables 9.1 & '9.2) who was in a 
position to determine his own ELLM boundary. Homeworkers were the 
largest female group in the 5 - 7 mile distance band. With regard to 
suggested segmentation within the homeworker group itself (see 12.2) 
it is possible that these were the 'primary',or 'core' homeworkers 
and that employers were wi 11 i ng to transport work out to them over 
considerable distances to obtain their skills. 
It is therefore concluded that travel costs offset by higher earnings, 
were important determinants of the geographical area tapped when travel was 
funded by the employee. For employees who worked fewer than full-time 
hours, time spent in travel was possible earning time and thus each 
additional distance unit had a high marginal cost. For full-time 
employees, travel time fell outside normal earning times so the marginal 
cost of each unit of distance was not as high as for the less-than-full-
time groups. A more detailed investigation of this using employee-
specific data could more fully test such a hypothesis. 
Employers were al so asked the names of settlements from which they 
drew their 1 abour. The settl ements and numbers of commuters reveal ed that 
there was only a limited amount of mobility between the chosen area and the 
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neighbouring larger settlements of Coalville, Ashby-de-la-Zouch, Syston, 
and Leicester, but that companies were able to draw from the rural villages 
in the surrounding countryside. There were relatively more overlaps 
between the smaller settlements of Barrow, Shepshed and Sileby with the 
town of Loughborough itself, whose compani es were abl e to benefit from 
rural bus services to a better extent that were the smaller settlements. 
Neverthel ess, the general impress ion gai ned was that Shepshed and Si 1 eby 
were, to great extents, self-contained occupational LLMs. 
5.2 LEVELS OF GROUP SUPPLY 
The findings of 5.1 suggest two antithetical deductions. Firstly, 
that groups willing to travel furthest will be in greatest supply because a 
larger number of households can be drawn upon, whereupon males and 
homeworkers will be in greatest supply followed respectively by full-time, 
part-time, and twilight females. The opposite inference is that employers 
resort to strategies to attract labour from further afield when faced with 
workgroup shortages and thus the sequence will be reversed. 
To clarify the position regarding differently sized ELLMs respondents 
were asked to state the levels of supply; attempts to quantify these 
1 eve 1 s were made by co 11 ect i ng data on the average numbe r of app 1 i cants 
responding to each advertisement and the number of unsolicited applications 
for jobs in each workgroup. Respondents stated both the present and the 
most usual situation prior to the oncoming recession which was resulting in 
slackening markets that were eroding the characteristic differences between 
the workgroups. They also confined thei r answer to 'suitable' applicants 
rather than to the total potential supply; the concept of suitability is 
considered in sub-section 9.3.1 
5.2.1 Stated Levels of Group Supply 
Figure 5:2 shows the levels of group supply that respondents claimed 
to face under usual ci rcumstances pri or to the recessi on. It was 
anticipated that they would have clear perceptions of the potential labour 
pools on which they could draw, but many "don't know" replies were 
obtained. These were occasioned by not having tested the ELLM due to 
their ability to retain existing personnel, and this indicated internal 
adequacy although the external market could have 'had excesses or shortages. 
5.2.l(a) 40-hours-per-Week Males (Sm+Fm) 
Responses for males were not as clearly defined as those for females. 
5 - 3 
CHAPTER 5 THE SUPPLY OF LABOUR 
Seven establ ishments (employing 183 males) stated that there were 
adequacies, and a further 10 (44 mal es) had not needed to test the market 
for a protracted period of time. One large factory (75 males) reported an 
exce s s. In contrast, 3 factories employing only 13 males in total 
reported shortages; it was therefore concl uded that a· genera 1 adequacy of 
male labour existed in these ELL Ms. Since two of the firms reporting 
shortages were in the same settlement as the large factory with the excess, 
establishments in that settlement were examined as a case study. 
This settlement had a long history of H&K and footwear 
manufacture and the establ i shment with an excess of mal es was the 
largest male employer in the sample. The respondent claimed that 
because hosiery and footwear industries predominantly employed women 
there was a shortage of female labour, but men had to travel away from 
the settlement to obtain employment; indeed, he rarely needed to 
advertise and when he did, "the factory was inundated with appl icants 
who wanted to work nearer to home". This he believed was "the 
opposite of the national situation". 
Of the 5 other establishments, 2 had reported supply of male 
labour to be adequate "at all times"; another that,"males rarely left 
thei r jobs"; these 1 atter compani es had not tested the ELLM recent ly. 
However, 2 small employers had reported shortages. In the first, 4 
knitters were employed on a full-time day basis and paid by time-
rates. Pay was relatively low for the basic 40 hours, but the men 
regularly worked 6 weekly hours of overtime to increase their earnings 
to parity with those of local companies. In the second, 3 knitters 
were employed on a full-time day basis manufacturing heavy gauge mens' 
outerwear on domestic-type hand-operated knitting machines, the 
proprietor admitting this to be "a repetitive and boring job". No 
overtime was available and average pay rates were low so this yielded 
particularly low average earnings. There had been a sustained high 
male voluntary turnover level, to counteract which the proprietor had 
"resorted to women" for the kni tt i ng ope rat i on whom he had found to be 
"more satisfactory and stable". Nevertheless, a limited number of 
the machines had been motorized and these had been allocated to men. 
With regard to the fact that only 7 males were employed by the 2 
establ i shments report i ng shortages wh i1 e 75 men worked for that with an 
excess it is apparent that there was, as claimed, an excess of experienced 
labour in that particular small settlement. It would appear that males were 
avoiding those companies reporting a shortage perhaps because of the 
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relatively poor pay to which the full-time day work pattern contributed. 
It therefore seems reasonab1 e to conc1 ude that mal es were showi ng 
themse 1 ves to be d i sce rni ng in thei r choi ce of emp 1 oyer. One company had 
reported a shortage in the other small settlement and in this, an above 
average wage company, the propri etor he1 d strong vi ews about recruitment, 
selection and trade unionism and was the only employer who volunteered 
comments that he wou1 d penal i ze employees for joi ni ng the uni on by removi ng 
'perks' and reducing high annual pay increases to the level s nationally 
negotiated. this employer was therefore probably creating his own shortage 
by setting over-stringent selection criteria relating to personal 
attributes. 
A shortage of skilled knitters is regarded as typical of the industry 
genera11y179. However, these findings clearly indicate that the potential 
labour available to companies can vary substantially within a confined 
geographic area. In this LLM, a company's supply of male labour appeared to 
depend on its wage levels, its location and its employment record. This 
underlines the importance of a reputation as a good employer as is 
postulated by cost-minimising IC theorists. The findings could also 
suggests that a solely full-time day working pattern was unpopular if it 
led to low earnings. 
5.2.1(b) Full-time Females 
Of 22 establishments employing full-time females two reported 
adequacies, while 3 small compani es had not tested the ELLM. Seventeen 
estab1 ishments reported shortages of "suitable" workers. For these I 
employers, 'unsuitable' referred to lack of experience, or to an obvious I 
lack of abil ity when tested on factory machines, see a1 so 9.3.1. It was I 
thus concluded that there was a general shortage of full-time females. 
5.2.1(c) Part-time Females 
Of 24 establ ishments employing part-time females, one response was 
missing while two had not tested the market. Three respondents qualified 
replies by stating that the supply was only adequate for personnel with 
experience of certain specific specialized skills (e.g. linking) as is 
denoted by the abbreviation SK in Figure 5:2. All the respondents reported 
an excess of part-timers and it was concluded that a general excess of 
part-time females existed in the EllM. 
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5.2.1(d) Twilight Workers 
Only 5 establishments employed twilight workers at the time of survey, 
but 5 employers who used them intermittently also responded. All reported 
an excess, one respondent commenting that he need "never advertise for 
them", and another had been "bombarded with appl icants" when he had been 
"foolish enough to put an advert in the paper". It can be concluded that 
a large excess of twilight workers existed in the EllM. 
5.2.1(e) Homeworkers 
All establ i.shments (22) that had ever used homeworkers responded to 
the question on homeworker supply. Only one made a "don't know" reply 
because ex-employees were al ways approached and the ELLM was never tested. 
Eighteen respondents indicated a greater excess than for part-timers. 
Several said that the excess was confined to the low-skill operations and 4 
of these gave double and conflicting replies; i.e., shortages of skilled 
operatives and excesses of semi - and unskilled workers. Nevertheless, 3 
companies experienced an adequacy of skilled machinists. It can be 
concluded that there was a general excess of homeworkers in the EllM. 
To summarize: males were generally adequate for requirements, but an 
i ndi vi dual estab 1 i shment 's supply coul d be affected by its ci rcumstances. 
There were widespread shortages of full-time females, especially 
experienced machinists, but excess supplies of potentially suitable workers 
for all other female workgroups. However, for certain skilled 'female' 
operations there were general shortages of experienced personnel across all 
workgroups, a situation confirmed by the literature195• However, these 
fi ndi ngs refl ect assessments by respondents based on thei r experi ences in 
these particular occupational ElLMs and, although reliably obtained, the 
responses gave no measures of the extent of the excesses and shortages. To 
remedy this, quantifiable questions asked. 
5.2.2 Average Number of Applicants per Advertised Vacancy 
This topic prompted a low response rate for several reasons. Firstly, 
not all companies advertised their vacancies. Secondly, a few had not 
advertised for labour in the recent past due to the depressed state of the 
product market. Thirdly, some found the response rate to advertisements 
varied with the season, so that it was inappropriate to give a quantitative 
reply; during summer holiday periods there were few applicants, but 
approaching the Christmas spending periods there were many. Consequently, 
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only from the larger establishments were quantitative replies received 
because they undertook more recruitment than did small companies. 
With the exception of certain skilled operations advertising for both 
twilight workers and homeworkers was rarely necessary (see Table 7.1) since 
there was an excess supply. Consequently, there were no responses for 
these groups. Table 5.2 summarizes the answers which referred to all 
applicants and not just 'suitable' labour as discussed in 9.3.1. Although 
these statistics are inadequate for quantifying excesses and shortages, 
they complement the findings of sub-section 5.2.1 by indicating a greater 
supply of potential part-time than full-time females despite their smaller 
catchment area. The general practice of not advertising for twilight and 
homeworkers suggested an even greater over-supply of these groups than had 
been indicated by respondent eval uations. 
5.2.3 Number of Unsolicited Applications per Week 
This topic was easier to answer than that dealing with applicants per 
advertised vacancy. Statistics in Table 5.3 again refer to all applicants 
rather than to suitable labour, and most respondents commented that many of 
these unsolicited applications were from unsuitable personnel. Unsolicited 
appl ications from potential twil i ght workers were so infrequent that no 
statistics could be quoted. This was surprising particularly in view of 
the fact that all had been recruited via the informal channel, but it was 
probable that since so few jobs existed in the LLM there was little to be 
gained by a potential twilight worker approaching a company unless she knew 
that it was currently operating a twilight shift or recruiting for one. As 
a respondent for a company in a small settlement said; 
"I only have to let it be known (i.e., to the existing daytime 
workers) that I'm going to introduce a twi light shift and by that 
eveni ng I have as many women as I want". 
The application rate for homeworking jobs averaged one per week, but 
very few of these were appointed. Again this was a lower rate than had been 
expected following the preliminary literature survey, but perhaps potential 
homeworkers were di scouraged by constant rebuffs and ceased to approach 
companies other than those known to be recruiting. These findings 
complement the stated supply of full- and part-time females by showing 
that there were 3 times more unsolicited applications from part-timers than 
from full-timers, but the low number of applications for twilight worker 
and homeworker jobs neither confirmed nor denied the much larger potential 
supply of these workers. 
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Thus, although the attempts to quantify levels of supply were somewhat 
inconclusive they tended to confirm the stated supply levels reported in 
sub-section 5.2.1 which indicated that full-time females were in short 
supply while all other female groups were in excess 
5.2.4 Job Competition for Suitable Applicants 
This section 5.2 has revealed a picture in which male supply levels 
were generally adequate although they varied slightly according to 
locations and characteristics of employers. There was a shortage of female 
full-timers while all other female groups were in excess. Since the 
corollary of employer supply is employee job competition these findings 
indicate that, under normal situations prior to the recession, males faced 
some competition in certain locations, but that full-time females had 
little competition for jobs. In contrast, there was considerable 
competition for part-time jobs, and data suggest that it was fierce for 
homeworking jobs, and fiercer still for twilight jobs, partly because there 
were few of them to be obtai ned. 
5.3 PROVISION OF TRANSPORT FACILITIES 
It was postulated in sub-section 1.10.1 that an employer could extend 
the boundaries of his ELLM by providing transport assistance, but that this 
would only be adopted for 'preferred labour'. In order to investigate this, 
the transport assistance provided by sample companies was questioned. 
5.3.1 Variety and Coverage of Transport Assistance 
From the 25 interviewed establishments only 4 offered transport 
assistance to a few employees, because in these isolated instances, 
managements had perceived public transport facilities to be both infrequent 
and costly. Table 5.4 details the types of assistance given, the number 
of in-factory workers, and the average female earnings for each 
establishment. In view of the small sample size, no firm conclusions can 
be drawn except that transport provision was not a widespread strategy. 
5.3.1(a) Free Private Bus Schemes 
Three establishments each situated near the outskirts of a small 
settlement operated free bus schemes. Two were large factories (140 and 130 
employees each), the other was a segregated 'female' establ ishment (58 
women) with no competitors in its vicinity. The private bus schemes aimed 
to attract full-time females, and only 3 part-timers from all these 
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companies indirectly benefited by a I-directional journey per day. No 
transport assistance was provided by these establishments for their males 
who worked shifts, nor for twi 1 i ght workers. 
5.3.1(b) Subsidized Transport 
The smallest establishment to provide assistance had 50 employees and 
paid slightly below average wages. Like the companies mentioned in (a) 
above, it was situated in a small settlement served by poor publ ic 
transport. Car expenses at the rate of 3 pence per mil e were offered to 
full-time employees travelling more than 3 miles in each direction, and the 
scheme was intended to attract and retain relatively larger numbers of 
male knitters (i.e.19 as opposed to 4 in comparable companies) to work 
full-time days plus overtime. It did not apply to part-time or twilight 
workers, and it appeared that no full-time females benefited from it. 
The wage statistics provided by these 4 factories were either for 
skilled or semi-skilled labour and so they only indicate whether a company 
was an above or below average wage employer for that skill level. No 
meaningful conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect of wages on the 
need to provide transport, since two were above and two were below average 
employers. Transport assistance would therefore seem to be provided either 
to attract full-time females (in short supply) to large establishments in 
outlying areas, or to obtain knitters for full-time day operation (an 
apparently unpopular work pattern when it led to low earnings). 
5.3.2 Effects of Transport Assistance 
In order to assess whether an assisted transport strategy was 
effective in attracting full-time females, the composition of the female 
daytime workforces and distances travelled were examined as in Table 5.5. 
The establishment offering a mileage allowance was omitted from Sample A in 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 because its stated aim was to attract male full-time day 
knitters and thus was irrelevant to the ability to attract females. 
5.3.2(a) Ability to Attract Full-time Females 
As seen from Table 5.5 the 3 establ ishments (Sample A) providing free 
transport were able to attract proportionately more full-time females (61%) 
into their daytime work forces than all other establ ishments (Sample B) that 
did not provide assistance (52%). However, a fairer comparison would be 
with only those establishments of similar size to those of Sample A; these 
are shown as Sample C in which full-timers comprised 57% of the daytime 
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workforce. Thus it appears that the provision of transport had only a 
slight effect on the ability to recruit short supply full-timers, but that 
larger establishments tended to attract proportionately more of them 
irrespective of the provision of transport facilities. This finding is 
consistent with that of Bosworth & Dawkins 259 who found that large 
companies were less likely than the small firms to modify working hours to 
meet the needs of workers. 
5.3.2(b) Abflity to Expand External Market Boundaries 
Table 5.6 shows travelling distances of full-time females in relation 
to the provision of a free private bus. These are plotted as cumulative 
percentages in Figure 5:3 to reveal that establishments providing transport 
(Sample A) were only able to persuade slightly more full-timers to travel 
from the outer distance bands than were similarly sized establishments in 
Sample C not providing such assistance. It would be unwise to draw firm 
conclusions from this small sample, except that these factories did' not 
significantly expand the outer limits of their ELlMs. However, it is 
likely that as large factories in small settlements they were.placed at 
actual di sadvantage; if so, thei r pol icies of transport assi stance mi ght 
have been intended to place them on more-or-less equal terms with other 
similar establishments, but with 1 imited success since two continued to 
experienced shortages of full-time labour. 
5.4 USE OF RECRUITMENT TECHNIQUES TO TAP THE OUTER DISTANCE BANDS 
In sub-section 1.10.1 it was postul ated that an employer faced with 
labour shortages might indulge in costly wide-ranging recruitment 
techniques in attempting to extend the boundaries of his catchment areas, 
but that this strategy 'would be adopted for preferred labour only. 
Relationships could exist between the proportions of particular groups 
recruited by the formal channel (Table 7.l), the distances they travelled 
(Table 5.1 and Figure 5:1), their supply levels (Figure 5:2) and preference 
ranking (Table 9.5 and sections 9.3.2(a) and 9.3.3). For example 51% of 
males, who were the unchallenged preference for knitting operations, had 
been recruited by formal methods and were more heavily drawn from the outer 
distance bands than the other in-factory groups. Associations be,tween 
recrui tment channel s, supply and travelling distance are further 
substantiated when male recruitment is examined more closely; of the 124 
recruited informally from the EILM by 'word of mouth' methods, 110 were 
employed in the settlement where an excess of men had been reported and a 
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preference for working close to home had been expressed. see 5.2.1 (a). 
It is likely that many men would reside close to the large employer that 
recruited informally, and consequently. virtually all males from the outer 
distance bands would have been recruited formally. 
Of the preferred full-time females who were in short supply. 75% had 
been recruited by the formal channel and their catchment area was the 
largest of the in-factory female groups. The relationship between 
recruitment and supply was masked for the part-time females due to the 
stated practice of initially advertising for full-time females (see 9.3.2 
(a»), but on failing to attract them. appointing less-preferred part-
timers from the many who rep 1 i ed to adve rt i sements. Th is pract i ce had 
resulted in a 44% formal recruitment level of part-timers. Nevertheless. 
their lower formal recruitment was accompanied by their having a smaller 
catchment area, with only 3 part-timers residing beyond the 5 mile distance 
band. The relationship is clearly shown for twilight workers, none of 
whom had been recruited formally. They were in large excess and were 
generally the least preferred group; only one twilight worker resided more 
than 1 mile from her factory. Of the homeworker group 12% had been 
recruited formally, but these were women who generally possessed short-
supply skills. A further 12% were ex-employees (i.e. ex-full-timers who 
had left. usually for maternity). Absence of data for individuals 
prevented detailed analysis to determine whether the workers who resided 
furthest from the factories were those recruited formally, but it 
reasonable to assume that they were, and that the shortage of workers with 
particular skills was responsible for the relatively large catchment area 
for homeworkers. 
It is concluded therefore, that employers adopted formal recruitment 
methods to reach outside their immediate localities when shortages of 
'suitable' labour existed. Evidence suggests that those recruited formally 
were from outer distance bands, but precise inter-relationships between 
distance. earnings and recruitment could not be tested by the grouped data 
available. As males were drawn proportionately from further afield this 
might imply that earnings had the greatest effect on travelling distances. 
5.5 RELAXATION OF THE 40-HOURS-PER-WEEK FACTORY SERVICE STIPULATION 
Figure 5:4 is intended to illustrate the effects of relaxations of 
hiring standards on female labour supply within specified catchment areas. 
Graph AA shows the differences (positive or negative) between the numbers 
of part-timers and fUll-timers within the various distance bands. and Graph 
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BB shows the differences in numbers between full-timers and all the less-
than-full-time workers. Graph AA shows that when only the hours 
stipulation was relaxed (Instrument U, Figure 13:1) there were numerically 
more part-timers than full-timers actually employed within a 4.3 mile 
radius of the factories despite their lower stated preference ranking in 
Table 9.5. Part-time numbers should be regarded as a minimum; had there 
been any full-timers seeking work they would have been appointed, but more 
part-timers could always have been recruited by all employers whereupon the 
excess would have been considerably greater than that shown. If, as 
postulated in sub-section 1.10.1, and evidenced by Section 5.1, part-timers 
did not travel as far as full-timers because their lower earnings and the 
opportunity costs of travel made it costly, then it can be assumed that 
beyond the 4.3 mile catchment area there would be similar excesses of 
potential part-timers over full-timers who wished to be active but who were 
unable to gain employment due to insufficient local opportunities. A large 
'hidden' pool of part-time female unemployment is thereby suggested. 
Graph BB of Figure 5:4 shows that, when 'daily work times' (Instrument 
V, Figure 13:1) and 'place of work' (Instrument W) stipulations were also 
relaxed, there was a majority of less-than-full-time workers in every 
di stance band. In general, this numerical difference increased with the 
size of catchment area and the second steep rise of Graph BB was produced 
by homeworkers being the largest group in the 5 - 7 mile distance band. 
5.6 INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN REGARDING INFLUENCES ON WORKGROUP SUPPLY 
Although only the second-best choice (see 9.3.2(a», the high number 
of part-time females employed (Figure 4:5) suggests that the relaxation of 
the 40 hours per week service requirement dramatically increased the female 
activity rate and had a greater influence on increasing female labour 
supply than did attempts to increase the size of the catchment area for 
full-timers. 
It should be noted that two large establishments were missing from the 
sample because records necessary to provide reliable answers were not made 
available. Had these workers been included in the graphs of Figure 5:4 it 
woul d have resulted in 53 more full-ti mers than 1 ess-than-full-ti me workers 
being plotted, and this might have eroded some of the excess of part-timers 
over full-timers in the 4.3 mile catchment area of Graph AA. However, it 
was unlikely to have done so since discussions had revealed that both of 
these establishments were in the same neighbourhood which was well served 
by public bus services and that many of the full-timers used a particularly 
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good bus service to travel from settlements between 6 and 10 miles distant. 
To have added these workers therefore would merely have removed the second 
rise of Graph BB and might even have caused it to fall somewhat. Their 
inclusion might also have eroded the slightly beneficial impacts that 
transport facilities and formal recruitment methods appeared to have 
furnished, but these strategies were insignificant since so few employers 
adopted them. 
Predictions of differently sized·ELLMs were proved correct insofar as 
employers were able to recruit proportionately more workers from further 
afield in relation to higher earnings, but with the data available it has 
not been possible to distinguish between the different influences on 
distance travelled. However, the apparently large increase in labour supply 
provided by relaxations of the stipulations relating to hours, place and 
time of work suggest that the domestic role imposed severe restrictions on 
many females' ability to work full-time; hence full-timers were in short 
supply despite their larger catchment area relative to the other female 
groups, and despite the limited transport and substanti al formal 
recruitment strategies adopted. This implies that the female less-than-
full-time workgroups were formed largely as a result of supply side 
constraints rather than as deliberately intended policies of employers. 
Thus, employers had apparently adopted the most effective method of 
increasing labour supply since part-timers comprised substantial 
proportions of female segments. 
Clearly, an employer's supply of potential workers will be affected by 
the 1 evel s of competiti on for those same workers. Although men were 
drawn from a relatively large LLM their supply was judged to be only 
adequate, and a virtual absence of less-than-full-time groups suggests 
that males were not subject to domestic role constraints. However, men 
had a wide selection of blue-collar employments to choose from whereas 
females were largely confined to H&K, footwear and box-making industries 
for manual jobs in the selected LLM, see section 2.4. It was probable 
therefore, that men's discernment, as highlighted by case studies in 
5.2.1(a), deterred them from entering H&K industries due to fluctuating 
employment and earnings caused by the seasonal and cyclical variations in 
activity, see Chapter 15. Certainly, these findings highlight the need 
for employers to maintain a good reputation for even where there are 
potential excesses in the ELLM, a poor reputation can result in labour 
shortages. 
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Another essential prel iminary was to establ ish who the workers were, 
gi ven that workgroup di fferences exi sted with respect to home-to-factory 
di stances. Thi s chapter exami nes the femal e workgroups with the objecti ve 
of identifying characteristic differences and addressing the suggestion of 
migrations of individuals among the groups in ways that could be associated 
with thei r 1 ife-cycles. Sub-section 1.5.3 suggested that the woman's 1 ife-
cycle could be the motive force behind the formation of the less-than-full-
time female workgroups. Should this be the case, then childless women, and 
older women whose families had grown independent, would find working full-
time hours to be easier than women with dependent minors, "and would thus 
dominate the full-time group. Women with dependents having claims on their 
time would comprise the part-time, twilight and homeworker groups. To 
assess this hypothesis, .ge and family commitments are considered in 
sections 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. Attention has been drawn to the presence 
of racial minorities in the homeworker group133, and this could imply that 
employers demanded them due to thei r weak market positi on. Therefore,the 
racial composition of the workgroups is examined in section 6.3. Section 
6.4 analyses the types and locations of residences for the following 
reasons: (i) to indicate the home background of homeworkers in order to 
assess the proposition th"at women are motivated into becoming homeworkers 
because they live in isolated locations 275 ; (ii) to provide evidence of 
mortgage commitments that could support a proposition of financial need 
following the debate on homeworker motivation; and (iii) to give an 
indication of the location of homeworkers' homes should a subsequent labour 
supply study be undertaken in this lLM. Section 6.5 investigates the level 
of 'moonlighting' (i.e., the multiple holding of jobs) thought to be 
practiced particularly by twilight workers and homeworkers, and section 6.6 
draws conclusions regarding the life-cycle hypothesis of supply and the 
female workgroup composition. 
Two respondents from large establ ishments were unable to give 
immediate answers regarding the number of employees in each SUb-<jfO\Jp. and 
time did not permit, nor was permission given, to consult records. 
However, they were willing to discuss worker characteristics in general 
terms, but chose not to answer specifically rather than mislead by 
answering incorrectly. Therefore, the total worker numbers to which 
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statistics in this Chapter relate were reduced by the numbers employed by 
these two establishments. There was no evidence to suggest that the 
characteristics of workers from these establ ishments differed from those 
for whom stati st ics were obtai ned; rather, extemporary expl anat ions and 
remarks tended to indicate strong similarities. 
Certain employers exhibited low levels of awareness about the personal 
details of employees, particularly those having hierarchical managerial 
structures that were relatively 'distant' from their employees. Most 
respondents were generally unconcerned about the 'outside' commitments of 
thei r workers and thereby demonstrated thei r 'production' rather than thei r 
'person' orientations to the work situation. However, all respondents in 
the sub-sample could assess employee ages given the 10-year spans, although 
fewer of them had knowledge of family commitments, type and location of 
residence and moonlighting for which there were lower levels of response. 
Therefore, both relative percentage (i.e. the proportion of the full sub-
sample reported in this chapter, including missing values) and adjusted 
percentage (i.e. the proportion of 'known' cases, omitting missing values) 
have been provided. Quoted percentages are always adjusted values unless 
otherwise stated. 
6.1 AGE DISTRIBUTION 
Table 6.1 details the age distribution for all female groups. It had 
originally been intended to classify into 5 year ranges, but pilot studies 
demonstrated that such detail was too difficult and time-consuming, so 10-
year spans were adopted as a compromise. Figure 6:1 depicts for each 
female group a histogram showing the workers' age profiles. There were 
clear differences between the full-time workers' profil e and those of the 
other groups, i.e. the 30 to under 40 year age span had fewer full-timers 
whereas it was dominant in all other groups. Another clear distinction of 
the full-time group was in the 16 to under 20 age span were there were 98 
full-time females (24% of the group), the largest number in any span even 
though it covered only the 4 years between leaving school and age 20. A 
pro rata equivalent for a 10 year period would have been 245 workers. In 
contrast, there were no teenagers in either the part-time or twil ight 
groups. The homeworker group possessed 3 teenagers (3%): 2 were sti 11 
school children who had taken school day-release to gain practical factory 
training and had subsequently undertaken work at home as a prel iminary to 
entering the factory full-time; the other was an unmarried mother working 
at home to care for her child. 
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The full-t i me age profil e showed a s 1 i ght drop in the 20 to under 30 
span whereas all other groups showed increases; the 10-year spans probably 
concealed some crowding towards the lower age limit in the full-time group 
and the upper limits in the others, since these trends were emphasized in 
the 30 to 40 age range. Indeed, the 30 to under 40 full-time cohort 
displayed a large fall from 93 (23%) to 57 (14%) in contrast to the part-
time group that displayed a spectacular threefold increase from 39 (11%) to 
123 (35%). Twilight numbers also increased in the 30 to under 40 range, 
whereas homeworkers remained constant at 31 workers (28%). 
The trend of loss from the full ti'me group was reversed in the 40 to 
under 50 span. Numbers in the full-time group increased from 57 (14%) to 
67 (17%), whilst the other groups decreased: the part-time group' fall ing 
1 argest from 123 (35%) to 91 (26%), the twi 1 i ght group from 6 to 4 workers 
and homeworkers from 31 (28%) to 25 (22%). These reversed trends then 
continued into the 50 to under 60 age spans. All groups naturally showed a 
reduction in numbers after the state retirement age of 60, but it is 
noteworthy that 34 (10%) part-timers were still employed after that age 
compared to only 11 (3%)full-timers. It seems possible that senior 
citizens found the 8-hour factory day too demanding and responded by 
joining the part-time group, or it could have been a strategy for reducing 
earnings to below pension/taxation thresholds. The ~oncentration of 
senior citizens in the part-time group could have implicationsfof the 
impact of redundancies as is considered in 9.4.2 and 11.4.1. 
These group losses and gains during the normal child-bearing and early 
rearing phases were to be expected from the life-cycle hypothesis, and the 
reversal of the downward trend in full-time numbers during the 40 to under 
50 age span supports the notion of a migration through the groups as 
children matured and mothers were able to revert from part-time, twil ight 
and homework employment to work more hours as full-timers. Figure 6:1 
also indicates mean values that have been calculated by standard 
formulae182. The arithmetic mean, modal and median ages are givenin Table 
6.5; discussion of their significance is deferred to sub-section 6.6.1. 
6.2 FAMILY COMMITMENTS 
Pilot studies showed employers to have little knowledge of the ages 
and numbers of their workers' children so it was inappropriate to ask these 
questions. Nevertheless, many could differentiate between workers who had 
'dependent' families who needed regular minding, and those either without 
families, or whose children were sufficiently grown-up to be left 
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unattended (herein defined as 'non-dependent'). Respondents were generally 
unconcerned about the 'outside' commitments of thei r workers but were 
nevertheless aware of family responsibilities, often grudgingly, due to 
requests for 'time off'. 
Table 6.2 indicates that while the majority (69%) of the full-time 
female group had less intensive family commitments (i.e. 47% without 
children and 22% with older non-dependent families) a significant minority 
(31%) had responsi bi 1 iti es for young dependents. Respondents di d not know 
what arrangements these full-timers made to reconcile the domestic and 
factory demands pl aced on thei r time, but several remarked on the 
comparative ease with which young Asian mothers could work the full-time 
work pattern, apparently due to thei r coherent extended family background 
traditions which enabled kin to mind dependent minors. The substantial 
minority of full-time women with dependent children could also be a 
reflection of the varied patterns of modern family 1 He and 
responsibilities. 
In contrast, the cohorts of working mothers with young dependent 
chil dren were majorities in the 3 other groups (Pw=56%, Tw=100%,Hw=68%). 
Part-ti me and homeworkergroups al so had substant i al mi noriti es (35% and 
28% respectively) of workers with non-dependent famil ies, an indication 
perhaps that middle-aged women found the dual tasks of domestic role and 8 
hour factory day too exacti ng and opted for 1 ess intense acti vity (or no 
market work at all). An examination of family commitments lends support to 
assumptions and speculations that the majority of homeworkers have young 
children 69 ,226,262,275; all had children except the two school girls 
previously mentioned and one with an ailing husband who worked from home to 
attend to his needs. 
The strong attachment of women to the LM is underl i ned by the fact 
that nearly half of the female segment of this sub-sample (49%) had 
dependent families. It can therefore be concluded that the findings of 
this section are strongly consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis. 
1-~~-~:N:~r~:IGuI:ed bY- em:10yer respondents in the pilot ::udies-~info~med I 
I the main survey. The repl ies were as patterned in Table 6.3,w'hich 
I indicates the categories to which employers allocated workers~ t",This 
shows that all the workgroups studied were very largely composed of, women I 
whose ethnic origin was defined by employers as "8ritish", which' t? them I 
meant ethnically originating in the UK. Thus the implication, that those I 
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workers whose ethnic orlglns were outside the UK formed a substantial 
proportion of the homework labour force (see Section 3.2 and133 ,134) is 
refuted for this particular LLM because this sample of employers did not 
.se1ec~such workers for either the twi1 ight or homeworker workgroups. 
-- - ------ " .. _----._- .. -- ... -------------------- ------~--
6.4 RESIDENCE CHARACTERISTICS 
6.4.1 Types of Residence 
It has been assumed that manual workers who were owner/occupiers would 
have mortgage commitments and that the repayments of these could comprise 
substantial outgoings from family budgets. To gain insights into whether 
the twilight and homeworker groups of the study might have had pressing 
financial motives pushing them to undertake market work, a persistent 
theme in homeworking 1iterature88 ,140,124,134,135, attempts were made to 
collect information on their owner/occupier status. The taking of home 
ownership as an indicator of financial motivation was not intended to imply 
that those residing in LA housing or other rented accommodation did not 
find raising a family to be a financial burden and thus did not have 
similar motives; it was chosen as the only available measure given the 
source of data. It was expected that employee records would specify 
addresses and that this would indicate residential status because it was 
thought that employers wou1 d have full know1 edge of the local iti es from 
which they drew their labour. Unfortunately, there was a low response rate 
on this topic which again reinforced the strong impression that employers 
involved themselves very little with the outside circumstances of their 
employees. No detailed knowledge was available for twilight workers, and 
this reflects their low level of integration into the factory labour force. 
Table 6.4 shows group composition according to residential status. 
There were hi gher proportions of owner/occupyer home workers (83%) and part-
timers (67%) than full-timers (53%), but this could have been expected 
given the age distributions. It was likely that many of the full-timers 
who lived in rented accommodation would also be the younger workers in the 
two spans from school leaving to less than 30 age ranges, many of whom 
would be unmarried and living in parental homes. This same cohort would 
probably also closely coincide with the 47% without children, see Tables 
6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. Neither would the young workers have had the heavy 
fi nanci a1 commitments that arose from home ownershi p and dependent 
families. Of the 53% of full-timers who were owner/occupiers there could 
have been a sizable overlap onto the 31% who had dependent children. 
Thus, although individual worker statistics were unattainable there is 
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evidence on the basis of aggregate age, family commitments and residential 
status data to suggest that substantial proportions in each group, but 
particularly in part-time and homeworker groups, did have considerable 
financial and family responsibilities and therefore could have had strong 
financial motives pushing them into paid employment. These data suggest 
that there was a substantial minority of young full-timers without these 
financial and family constrai nts. lack of twil ight worker data is 
unfortunate because some respondents commented, in response to other topics 
(9.6.1), that twilight workers displ ayed the greatest financial incentives 
of all workers. 
6.4.2 location of Residence 
No respondent was aware of any employee or homeworker who lived in a 
truly isolated situation. All lived within or on the outskirts of 
established settlements although some resided in small country villages 
having no industry. However, many of these settlements suffered from 
infrequent or relatively costly bus services, so that indications in the 
1 iterature that homeworkers undertook work at home because of inadequate 
public or private transport were neither confirmed nor refuted. 
6.5 MOONLIGHTING 
The issue of moonlighting was explored because the IDS reports142,143 
had shown some twilight workers also to have daytime jobs and this had been 
confirmed by the pre-pilot study, see below. Several respondents were 
unaware of any multiple job holding among their workers as this information 
was seldom divulged. Thus, there were no known multiple job holders among 
the twilight workers. However, most respondents suggested that males in 
their late 20s with family and mortgage responsibilities more frequently 
held additional jobs than did older men or factory women. Two such young 
men were known to serve in local bars and others were suspected of having 
second jobs; similar evidence had been furnished by the pilot study. In the 
female groups, one young full-timer was known to work as an evening 
waitress and one part-timer also acted as a homeworker for the same 
employer. 
Three homeworkers worked for more than one manufacturer; indeed one 
employer had employed 6 such multiple-job holding homeworkers during the 
previous 7 years, but indicated that he had no strong objections. In 
contrast, the pre-pilot respondent had revealed annoyance when this topic 
was raised, admitting that, "it sometimes did occur", and indicating that, 
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"those homeworkers responsible would be terminated if discovered ••• 
permitting homeworkers to use the company's machine for other work was 
assisting competitors". Consequently, this practice was likely to remain a 
closely guarded secret, particularly when the employer was perceived as 
antagonistic, so although 9 (6%) homeworkers could be identified out a 
grand total of 136, this figure was likely to be an underestimate. 
In short, moonlighting did not appear to be a widespread practice and 
the limited amount that did occur was most prevalent among young males and 
homeworkers. In the light of the redundancy, allocation of work (9.4) and 
earnings data (8.3.3), the practice of homeworkers' multiple job holding 
was probably a strategy for overcoming variable work supply in an attempt 
to ensure continuity of earnings, and/or to increase weekly income. If. so, 
it provided further evidence to support the view that homeworkers had real 
need of their incomes. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS ON WORKGROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
In this LLM the claim (section 3.2) that racial minorities were 
heavily represented in the homeworker group has proved to be incorrect. 
Data on family status, home ownership and moonlighting support the often 
articul ated contention that homeworkers need the money earned from 
homeworking to supplement family budgets. The suggestion that many 
homeworkers had no choice but to work from home due to isolated 
ci rcumstance or poor transport faci 1 i ties coul d be nei ther supported nor 
refuted. Thus, the general picture to emerge from this demand-side 
generated supply data is cons i stent with supply-si de research fi ndi ngs in 
that child-rearing was an important influence on the search for less-than-
full-time jobs. Furthermore, these data have revealed additional reasons 
for undertaking homework, such as care of the sick, and single-parenthood, 
see also Jordan 275 and Allen69• 
6.6.1 The Life-cycle HYpothesis of Female Labour Supply 
Referring again to Figure 6:1, the full-time group was characterized 
by a bi-modal age profile which had its first mode at age 19.8 years before 
the normal childbearing phase began, and its second mode at age 512 years 
after the normal childrearing phase had ended, see Table 6.5 for mean 
statistics. Its low point, at 37.8 years, almost exactly coincided with 
the modes of all other groups. The part-time workers' age profile was a 
positively skewed distribution with a modal age of 37.2 years and that of 
twilight workers was 37.1 years which supports the suggestion that twilight 
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working was an outlet for women who could not meet the demands of daytime 
factory employment. Homeworkers' modal age was 36.5 years, but 
nevertheless, 59% of the group were younger than age 40 as opposed to only 
46% of the part-time group. The comparatively high percentage of 
homeworkers in the 20 to 30 age range, and lack of increase in the 30 to 40 
span, when part-timers showed correspondingly large increase, lends weight 
to the speculation that they might transfer to the part-time group. 
Thus, the profiles provide evidence to support the life-cycle 
hypothesis of a migration from the full- to the less-than-full-time groups 
during the child bearing and rearing years and then a reversal of this 
trend after famil i es had become independent. Expenses occasi oned by home 
ownership and growing families could have furnished pressures encouraging 
substantial numbers of part-timers, twilighters and homeworkers to 
undertake productive market work. It is concluded therefore that supply 
side constraints were important influences on female workgroup formation. 
While differences in the shape of the female age profiles and other 
issues considered in this chapter suggest that mobility occurred between 
the groups, respondents indicated that this mobility did not directly occur 
wi thi n establ i shments, see sect ions 8.2.2(b) and 8.2.5 which exami ne i nter-
group mobil ity. 
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Classical and Neo-classical price/auction theories of LM functioning 
generally presume that both employers and employees have access to 
information about possible opportunities and freedom to exercise choice 
among them; the mobfl ity prompted by thi s knowledge tending to equal ize 
rewards. Empirical studies have examined LLMs and revealed that often 
information, knowledge or choice can be very 1 imited; for example, 
Blackburn & Mann9 concluded that there were few opportunities or incentives 
for the exerci si ng of choi ce by ma 1 e manual workers in Peterborough. If 
LMs are structured into non-competing groups as predicted by SLM theorists, 
then virtually no mobility between LM segments will be expected in order to 
sustain persistent differences between them. Both information and knowledge 
are pre-requisites of mobility, so lack of these is consistent with SLM 
theory, although not necessarily a condition of lack of mobil ity. 
Recruitment processes that tap the internal, external and extended internal 
markets are therefore rel evant to the issue of market structure si nce ILMs 
are held to be influential in creating and sustaining market segments, see 
sect ion 2.1. 
This chapter examines recruitment practices and levels of knowledge in 
order to assess the relevance of different theories of market structure. 
Section 7.1 examines and assesses methods of recruitment, and sections 7.2 
and 7.3 consider the levels of information and knowledge pertaining in the 
LLM. Section 7.4 evaluates the merits of formal and informal recruitment 
channels within the context of identified obstacles to reliable 
information, and then exami nes the rel ati ve importance of these channel s 
for workgroup recruitment. Section 7.5 considers implications of the 
findings for labour market theories. 
7.1 CHANNELS OF RECRUITMENT 
Table 7.1 shows that 6 different methods had been used to recruit the 
work groups. These methods have been classified into forllal and informal 
channels of recruitment. Employers using the formal channel tapped directly 
into the ELM whereas recruitment via the informal channel often relied on 
the intermediary services of existing workers and tapped the EILM as 
described by Manwaringl8• Table 7.1 shows that internal recruitment was 
absent. This arose because upgrading opportunities were rare and promotion 
extremely 1 i mited or even unwanted (secti on 8.2.2(a» so supervi sors were 
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usually recruited from the ELM by newspaper advertisements. Hence, Table 
7.1 indicates that the ELM and EILM routes were well developed but that the 
ILM was undeveloped, there being entry ports for every job. The absence of 
an internal market indicates that one of the support mechani sms for a 
segmented structure was absent. 
7.1.1 Employers' Uses and Perceptions of Formal Recruitment Methods 
The formal channel comprised both Public and Private Employment 
Services and the employer's own advertising initiatives. The informal 
channel was composed of 'word-of-mouth' contacts via establ i shed worker 
referals, the contacting of ex-employees, the use of waiting lists and 
unprompted "door-callers~ Nei ther internal adverti sements nor sponsored 
promotions were used. There are 73 values for males mi ssing from Table 
7.1, but discussions relating to these indicated that data presented 
resembled practices in missing establ ishments. Most of the points made 
relate to women finishing operatives as the primary focus of the study, but 
many of these are equally applicable to men. 
Table 7.1 reveals that establishments recruited very low proportions 
of their full-time (6%) and part-time (1%) females from the Public Agencies 
(i.e. DE Job Centres and Careers Services) and that there was general 
dissatisfaction with the Job Centre's achievements, for as respondents 
explained, applicants were "mostly unsuitable", see section 9.3.1 for a 
discussion of suitability. However, the Job Centre had the merit of 
offeri ng free servi ces whi ch wue appreci ated by many employers. 
Job Centre efficiency was perceived as depending heavily on rapport 
and understanding between establishments and individual DE Officers, but it 
was impracticable for the DE Officers to pre-screen and reject those 
applicants without the required skills, since people often untruthfully 
claimed experience, see section 7.4 for the association of selection 
criteria and Job Centre unpopularity. More satisfaction was expressed with 
the Careers Service which directed school leavers into the industry since 
no pri or experi ence was expected; 22 of the 34 full-timers appo i nted vi a 
the Publ ic Agencies having been recruited by this route (Table 7.1). 
Only one establishment had recruited daytime workers via a Private 
Agency, but as with Job Centres, it was inadequate in filtering. unsuitable 
personnel. All other respondents considered Private Agencies to be 
extremely costly, and deliberately avoided them. 
Majorities of males (51%) and full-time females (60%) had been 
recruited via local newspaper advertisements as had a substantial minority 
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(39%) of part-timers. A minority of homeworkers (11%), who possessed short 
supply speci fi c ski 11 shad al so been recruited by thi s method, but it was 
generally very unpopular for unskilled homeworkers since respondents were 
inundated by appl icants and resented the time· spent in screening 
procedures. Privately place newspaper advertisements had the advantage of 
making applicants personally responsible for approaching that employer, 
unlike an approach from the DE. Apparently fewer false claims regarding 
acquired skills were made because better quality recruits resulted and less 
time was wasted on unsuitable appl icants. This made the employers' own 
adverti sing i ni ti atives the most successful and popul ar formal method of 
recruitment. 
7.1.2 Employers' Uses and Perceptions of Informal Recruitment Methods 
Majorities of the part-time, twilight and homeworker groups (52%, 93% 
and 76% respectively) had been recruited via the informal communications 
networks existing within the LLM. These, employers called the "word of 
mouth" methods because most functioned by the verbal passing of 
information between the employer, his employees and their families, friends 
and neighbours. Employers often deliberately took the initiative and 
asked for recommendations, but employees frequently had prior knowledge of 
job vacancies for they were aware of the pressures of work. Thus, 
employers were sometimes confronted by applicants before they had made it 
known they wished to recruit. The steady stream of letters and door-
callers who arrived as a result of this "inside information", augmented by 
those who "just called in on spec", presented a cheap supply of appl icants 
to be tapped, but few un prompted enquirers possessed short supply skill s, 
and most were regarded as unsuitable. Other strategies were to post 
'situations vacant' notices on front doors, or in nearby shop windows, but 
these were still regarded as 'word of mouth' referals since information was 
usually transmitted verbally within the locality. 
Word of mouth methods were perceived as helping the employer to 
overcome information obstacles (section 7.2) and assisting in the more 
accurate assessment of applicants. For instance, existing employees could 
often provide information that was otherwise unavailable, such as past work 
habits, the appl icant's general performance relative to their own, 
qual itative assessments of commitment to work, abil ity to integrate into 
the workplace, and reliability for working unsupervised. Furthermore, 
informally recruited applicants often resided close to the factory and this 
was perceived as an advantage. Existing employees already appreciated the 
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employer's requirements and preferences, so they acted as pre-screening 
devices by which applicants with unsuitable characteristics were filtered 
out. Employees were seen as unlikely to risk their own reputations by 
recommending people with poor workmanship or unpleasant personalities. The 
maintenance of a pleasant factory atmosphere was important and (see 9.3.1 
and 10.1) employee referals were seen as helping to achieve this since 
employees did not recommend those with whom they could not work. Generally, 
employers perceived such recruits to be less likely to quit at an early 
stage than persons attracted from afar with no prior means of obtaining 
qual itative information, see below. However there were ri sks associ ated 
with EILM recruitment and great care had to be exercised during selection 
to ensure that "cliques of families and friends" did not accumulate to 
create factions that vied with each other. 
From a supply viewpoint, applicants from the EILM could obtain some 
information from their contacts about the relative level of and variability 
in earnings, the quality of personal relations, the complexity of the 
product and the factory's physical envi ronment: all shown to be areas of 
uncertainty in section 7.3. 
Waiting lists were not widely resorted to, but where they were, they 
usually consisted of names of well-l iked unprompted applicants with either 
specific short-supply skill s, or of individuals with the 'right' personal 
attributes for whom no opening was available at the time of call. Waiting 
lists usually accumulated for groups in excess supply. Applicants who took 
the initiative in seeking their own employment opportuni ti es commended 
themselves to employers who generally frowned on individuals relying on job 
openings from the Public or Private Agencies. 
Of the homeworkers, 12% had been recruited from among ex-employees, in 
contrast to less than 2% of other groups. This was widely regarded as "the 
most satisfactory recruitment method for a homeworker" because 
productivity, skill level, quality of workmanship and the personal 
attributes of reliabil ity and commitment to work were well-known, and a 
good understanding between employer and homeworker was already established. 
Without these the ex-employee would not be approached or appointed if she 
appl ied for a homeworking job. Since homeworkers had to work unsupervised 
it was crucial to employers that these qualities were satisfactorily met • 
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7.2 OBSTACLES TO RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE ON THE DEMAND SIDE OF THE LABOUR 
MARKET 
On the demand side of the LLM employers faced important obstacles to 
rel iable information about the quality of potential employees. Throughput 
of work was of prime importance since production was their 'raison d'etre', 
see 10.1. Hence, of great concern to all employers was productivi ty which 
varied greatly among individual s, see 9.6.1. Most employers perceived this 
variation to arise from two cumulative influences: (a) inherent aptitude, 
and (b) commitment to work. 
No employer had any satisfactory means of determining the inherent 
aptitude of an applicant, particularly that of an unknown recruit from the 
ELM. It was asserted that operatives' natural abilities presented 
surprises even after many years of management experience in; the industry. 
To overcome thi s obstacle to rel iable information, two strategies were 
adopted ei ther si ngly or in combi nati on. Appl i cants were fi rst tested for 
manual dexterity during the sel ecti on i ntervi ew, particul arly for skilled 
machining jobs, and then appointees were introduced on a temporary basis 
for them to be assessed during a trial period of 4 - 6 weeks. 
Employers attempted to assess commitment to work from general 
appearance, bearing, good employment record, age, marital status, presence 
of children and financial need which in turn was assessed from comments, 
background and family composition. For example: a neat appearance might 
indicate a tidy approach to work; an applicant's bearing indicating whether 
she would chatter or be argumentative and thereby loose production; a bad 
employment record would always be taken to indicate unreliability and an 
ea~y quit. Responsibilities for children taken to indicate paramount 
personal commitments which might lead to absenteeism and unpunctuality. 
Financial need was seen as an advantage to the employer because it 
suggested high productivityon piece-work jobs, but this had dangers in 
that it could also result in low quality workmanship if rushing occurred, 
and so an applicants' assessed reliabil ity was an important 
cons i derati on. 
Each employer therefore had his own 'rule of thumb' devices for 
anti cipati ng an appl1 cant's performance and attachment to the company, but 
these methods rarely made allowances for individual variation. However, 
the adopted strategies were only partially successful in predicting the 
quality of appointees, for wide productivity variations among employees 
became apparent even after the trial employment period had been 
successfully compl eted. 
7 - 5 
CHAPTER 7 KNOWLEDGE, RECRUITMENT AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 
7.3 OBSTACLES TO RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE lABOUR 
MARKET 
Many prospective employees were generally not deprived of information 
about job opportunities as is evidenced by the widespread use of informal 
recrui tment methods, although parti cul ar indivi dual s coul d 1 ack knowledge 
of specific openings when vacancies were filled before information 
disseminated. However, lack of relevant information about terms and 
conditions of employment existed to complicate a comparison of prospective 
employers, this being the obverse of employers' inabil ity to assess 
appli cant productivi ty. Uncerta i nty stemmed from vari a ti ons withi nand 
among establishments, but the major obstacle was the piece-rate method of 
payment which caused uncertai nty about future earni ngs, the majori ty of 
workers (84%) being paid by piece rates (Table 4.5). Even very experienced 
applicants had problems in predicting from quoted piece prices what weekly 
earnings would be, average earnings were similarly unhelpful as applicants 
were unaware of how their own productivity compared with that of other 
workers, see section 7.2. Furthermore, being fashion industries, company 
products were unique, jobs varied by company, by product, by style and in 
complexity. Quoted piece rates therefore meant 1 ittle until experience had 
been gained of the work's complexity •. In addition, manufacturing material s 
coul d present machine and handl ing difficulties and these reduced normal 
productivity causing further uncertainty. Thus, for a variety of reasons, 
an employee's earnings could vary considerably even when identical effort 
was appl ied, and this had 1 ed to both wage drift (see, 8.8.1) and to 
relatively high union involvement in wage disputes (see 11.2.2). 
Further obstacl es to accurate earni ngs i nformati on arose from 
variations in the divisions of labour, large firms being characterized by 
more divisions than smaller ones, see section 4.4.2(a). For instance, an 
applicant might in her previous job have performed operations that in the 
new factory were divided into several tasks undertaken by different people, 
or vice versa, and so quoted prices meant little when different jobs were 
being compared. Faced with all these compl ications, even the experienced 
had few bench-marks by which to pre-judge potential earnings, while 
inexperienced recruits had additionally the uncertainty of their own 
aptitude whil e recruits from the ELM al so faced uncertainty about inter-
personal relationships and could have doubt whether they would find a happy 
worki ng atmosphere. 
The above obstacl es were parti cul arly acute for femal e groups whose 
productivity, in the prevailing state of job segregation, was determined by 
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manual dexterity. Male knitters were slightly less affected by uncertainty 
since their machines, being largely automatic, made assessment of output 
more rel iable. Nevertheless, the age and maintenance of machinery could 
affect 'break-down' time, machi nery coul d be of a different type or model 
to that previously used, there could be a different number of machines to 
mind and the product range would be different. 
Further obstacles arose because not only were earnings affected by 
piece rates, product styles, complexity of operations and the divisions of 
labour, but also varied long-term due to fluctuations in the factory 
activity. Employees concerned with annual earnings would need to know the 
factory's regularity of orders; information that was not readily available 
to recruits from the ELM, but in any case, past regularity of orders did 
not guarantee it in the future. Therefore, neither short- nor long-term 
earni ngs coul d be accurately predicted. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS ON THE MERITS AND RELATIVE USES OF CHANNELS FOR GROUP 
RECRUITMENT 
From a demand viewpoint, the formal channel had the merit that 
information was transmitted to a wider locality and was thus likely to 
reach a wider audience than that achieved by disseminating information 
informally through the EILM. This could have had the effect, ceteris 
paribus, of drawing on a larger geographical area than was tapped by local 
communications networks, see 5.1. Such an enlargement would be particularly 
desirable for augmenting workgroups for which there were shortages of 
suitable potential workers (i.e. full-timers), but labour drawn from 
relatively far afield rarely had prior connections with the company, and 
thus the obstacles to reliable knowledge were manifest. 
The informal channel had the double merit of providing more 
qual i tative and better quati tative information than the formal channel for 
both employer and employee. This assisted each to partially overcome the 
obstacles to reliable knowledge before appointment which apparently helped 
to reduce voluntary turnover, see below. However, the EILM was 
inappropriate when there were insufficient people with access to the local 
communi cati on networks to sati sfy demands. 
The merits and de-merits of the channels suggested that formal methods 
would be used when there were shortages of labour in order to extend the 
geographical area tapped; the informal channel would be used for all 
groups for which plentiful potential supplies of suitable labour existed, 
because informal methods were inexpensive (9.2.2) and provi ded more 
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reliable prior knowledge. Figure 7:1 depicts the relative importance to 
group recrui tment of the formal and informal channel s and supports thi s 
hypothesis. It shows that the formal channel was important for males who 
were generally only adequate for requirements and particularly important 
for full-time females who were in short supply. The practice of advertising 
only for specific short supply homeworkers is further evidence for the 
association. The informal channel was the most important for all other 
female groups for which there were excess supplies. For a fuller 
discussion of the supply/recruitment relationships see section 5.4 which 
provides evidence to support the short supply/formal channel link. 
Selection criteria also have important associations with recruitment 
methods. For exampl e, previ ous experi ence was the most important 
requ i rement for daytime females (Tables 9.3, 9.4), and th is gi ves an 
insight into the unpopul arity of both the Job Centres and Private 
Employment Agencies that were unable to verify the previous experience and 
skill claims of applicants. Possession of the 'right' personal attributes 
was a more important factor for twfl i ght workers and homeworkers who had to 
work unsupervi sed (Tables 9.2, 9.3), and so informal methods that furni shed 
qualitative information were particularly appropriate for them. 
Comparisons between recruitment and voluntary turnover data (see 9.6.6 
and Tables 9.28 and 9.29) suggest that a negative association generally 
existed between the informal channel and voluntary turnover. Twilight 
workers were an exception to this relationship, but there were few and 
conflicting turnover results for this group. Moreover, several respondents 
claimed that twilight workers soon became, "disillusioned with working in 
the evenings", and "they don't always realize what they have taken on", 
because given their family commitments, they also needed child-minding 
assi stance from others. Twil i ght workers appeared to gi ve up their jobs 
more readily than members of other groups, see 9.6.6(b), and coul d have 
been a special case. Most full-timers had been recruited formally 
(74.5%) and they had high relative turnover, whereas part-timers and 
homeworkers, who were more heavily recruited by informal methods (see 
comment on part-ti me recruitment, secti on 5.4), di spl ayed lower 
turnover. The lower turnover/informal recruitment association probably 
occurred because employers and employees were better matched by informal 
methods by vi rtue of improved prior knowl edge. The small er geographi cal 
area drawn on for part-timers (Figure 5:1) meant that travelling time was 
reduced which could have been an important element. Caution should be 
exerci sed with the 'better matching' hypothesis however, because the 
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relationship could have stemmed from excess supply which influenced 
employees to retain their jobs even when dissatisfied because they 
perceived difficulties in obtaining alternative employment. 
Recrui tment channel s al so provi de confi rmation for the preference 
ranking implied by actions (Table 9.20). Employer advertisements, being an 
expensive recruitment method, were used more heavily for the preferred 
full-timers. 
It is concluded therefore, that complex inter-relationships existed 
between the levels of supply, the importance of selection criteria, 
recruitment methods, recruitment costs and voluntary turnover. For 
example, when levels of potential supply permitted skill requirements to 
be satisfied, then personal characteristics became the most important 
sel ecti on criteri a (secti on 9.3.1(b», and thus the informal channel became 
the most appropri ate by being able to furnish better personal attribute 
information. Further, the informal methods were inexpensive which appealed 
to cost-minimisers. It is further concluded that the formal channel was 
inferior to the informal channel which provided more reliable prior 
knowledge for both employer and employee, and that consequently, employers 
used informal methods until the available supplies of suitable labour was 
exhausted, after which they resorted to the more costly formal methods. 
7.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE FOR MARKET STRUCTURE 
Table 7.1 shows that almost half of the worker sample (46%) had been 
recruited via the informal channel from the extended internal labour market 
and had therefore obtained access to both quantitative and qualitative 
information about job opportunities prior to selection, even though a 
considerable uncertainty about terms and conditions of service could have 
persisted. Open approaches to the exter~al labour market via formal 
recruitment methods were also well developed for particulir workgroups, but 
internal transfer was very limited and so H&K companies were without 
internal labour markets that functioned to provide labour. 
Clearly, in this industrial LLM well established communications 
networks for disseminating job opportunity information were operating and 
it can therefore be concluded that the low levels of direct mobility (see 
8.2.2) between the segments and workgroups were not caused by a widespread 
lack of information. This situation suggests that obstacles other than lack 
of reliable information were preventing workgroup mobility and the 
el imination of job segregation by sex. Divide and conquer67 , or rather 
divide and prosper, tactics could be indicated. 
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8.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MOBILITY AND STRATIFICATION FOR MARKET 
STRUCTURE 
Neoclassical theorists, whilst believing that competition for jobs is 
a leveller, accept that a range of wages can arise from differences in 
acquired human capital and from the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with jobs; the balance of these job-associated advantages and disadvantages 
was termed 'net advantages' by Adam Smith183• After allowing for 
skill/education etc42-46 , jobs with low wages should have compensatory net 
advantages, and vice versa, if the neo-classical price/auction model of 
market operation is valid. Thus a stratification of net advantages should 
counterbalance those parts of the stratified earnings structure which 
cannot be explained by skill differences. 
In the SLM model, a stratified structure of earnings is a necessary 
though insufficient condition; non-competing worker segments should exist 
and be accompanied by insufficient mobil ity across segment boundaries to 
erode earnings and conditions of service differentials. If mobility occurs 
then boundaries can be eroded by competition as in the neo-classical model 
and the market will not be permanently segmented. Thus mobility, or the 
lack of it, and the structure of earnings and net advantages are important 
indicators of market operations and the appropriateness of LM theories. 
Mobil ity can be i nfl uenced by both pull and push factors. Itmay 
arise because: 
(a) employees perceive a demand for their services and have opportunity to 
exercise choice of employment; this is a J!!!l! factor; or 
(b) employees are dissatisfied with their present employment and desire a 
change; this is a push factor. 
Mobility can take two basic forms. It can be: 
(c) mobility within the labour market, i.e, both intra-firm or inter-firm, 
the latter being between firms in either the same or different 
industries and/or regions; or 
(d) mobility into and out of the labour market by variations in activity. 
In order to determi ne the structure of thi s i ndustri al LLM, these 
various dimensions of mobility are considered in Section 8.2. Earnings are 
examined in Section 8.3 to: (a) discover the earnings structure; (b) reveal 
what factors influence their levels; and (c) investigate the possibility of 
segmentation. Male knitters are taken as the frame of reference for 
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comparison with the women. Terms and conditions of service are examined in 
8.4 to discover whether stratification of net advantages occurs. Section 
8.5 draws conclusions on market structure. 
8.2 MOBILITIES 
S.2.l Job Mobility 
This section in addressing job discrimination attempts to establish 
whether particular workgroups, or categories of worker were permanently 
denied access to certain jobs. 
S.2.lea) Job Segregation on the basis of Gender 
All establishments had clear-cut sex-typing of jobs. Men operated the 
large, automatic, motorised knitting machines which were always implicitly, 
and often expressly, regarded as a male preserve. The variety of dextrous, 
often manual, finishing operations were considered to be female jobs. Table 
8.1 shows that of the 1532 direct production workers only 29 (i.e. 9=2$ of 
males and 20=1$ of females) had managed to break into the other sex's 
traditional domain. 
Female knitter data requires explanation since it appears that they 
were more successful in crossing segment boundaries. Whereas men used. 
highly productive, automatic machinery which permitted simultaneous minding 
of several machi nes or knitting heads, 16 of the 19 women knitters (i.e, 9 
full-timers, 7 homeworkers) used unmotorised hand-operated machines of the 
Griswol d (small circular) and 'hand-fl at' domestic types capable only of 
very low productivity rates. It had proved difficult to retain men on the 
hand-fl at machi nes ~nsi de the, factory, the parti cul ar respondent, who had 
resorted to women knitters for such low productivity work, considering 
these machi nes to be inferior to the more usual automatic powered type. 
Only 3 women full-timers operated motorised, circular, interlock machines 
used for underwear manufacture in a company specializing in heavier gauge 
fashion outerwear, while one part-timer worked as a semi -skilled 
warehouseperson. 
Proportionately, men had been slightly more successful than women in 
breaking into the other's job market. Running-on and pressing were 
dexterously skilled women's jobs performed by one male Asian full-timer and 
one male British part-timer. Pairing, folding, box-assembly and inspection 
were relatively semi-skilled operations performed by 4 full-time males for 
whom no personal details were known, and 3 part-time men believed to be 
over state-retirement age. Additional qualitative material revealed that 
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a further company (not shown in Table 8.1) had employed 2 youths for a 
short period in the past on lace-attaching, and another sometimes used male 
part-time students during vacations for folding and packing operations. 
These data indicate that males performing female operations tended to 
be mi nority group workers from reti rement age~r student cat~9o~~c~~~ Most 
I women 'male' job-holders were doing jobs seen as "inferior". Wit'h' '~e~pect 
to mobil ity between male and female jobs therefore, it is concluded 'that 
job segregation by gender was almost total. 
8.2.1(b) Job Segregation on the basis of Race and Age 
No clear-cut evidence emerged to indicate deliberate race or age job-
segregati on, a lthough among the few' men who performed 'female' job!Yt'here 
i was some indication of bias towards age minorities (8.2.1(e)j. In'1972 a 
i Committee of Inquiry into a dispute between employees of the Mansfield 
Hosiery Mills limited, Loughborough and their employer184 r~port~d that 
Asian bar-loaders had been denied opportunity to enter knitting jobs:' This 
Inquirymay have discou~ag~~~is~~i_minatory practices on the basis of race. 
8.2.1(c) Job Segregation on the Basis of Workgroup 
Table 8.2 depicts an 'either/or' situation in which employers opted 
either for a shift or for a full-time day pattern for their knitting 
processes accordi ng to thei r personal preferences and the state of order 
books. All shift workers (including bar-loaders, see 4.2.1(b)) were linked 
to knitting, and in addition, 48 full-time men performed knitting on an 
'extended day' pattern whereby they worked an 8-hour day with additional, 
often substantial, amounts of regular overtime. Within all establishments 
male workgroups were segregated by task and were therefore not substitutes 
for each other. Most men full-timers in companies having shift systems were 
dyehouse and distribution personnel who were thereby linked to the 
finishing stage and thus to the women's daytime work pattern. 
Conversely, each female workgroup was substitutable for the others 
since all were used for the range of finishing operations. Viewed across 
establishments, job segregation was absent, but it did occur within 
establishments by certain jobs being allocated to specific workgroups. 
Table 8.3 shows that job segregation was very low for the indoor component, 
hand-machine knitting in one company (s;ee 5.2.1(a) and 8.2.1 (a)) being the 
one operation performed only by full-timers. In no other establishments 
were full-timers, part-timers or twilighters deliberately excluded from any 
job. In sharp contrast, 10 (40%) establishments used only homeworkers (75 = 
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59%) for certain, largely semi- or un-skilled,operations: 7 companies did 
all their semi-skilled hand-finishing work on an outwork basis; two 
undertook the highly skilled linking operations externally, and one 
manufactured high quality, distinctively styled socks on unmotorised small-
circular knitting machines. Two of the 3 companies offering skilled work 
claimed not to have deliberately sought exclusivity,· but of having failed 
to attract internal recruits; however for exclusive homeworkers (see 
Appendi x I I) there was no adequate frame of reference for compari son of 
ea rn i ngs, see 8.3.3. 
8.2.I(d) Conclusions on Job Segregation 
Certainly, job segregation was widely practised on the basis of 
gender, and some segregation also occurred within the male and female 
segments. When the male segment is viewed in aggregate, both shift and 
full-time day workers performed knitting operations, but within 
establishments having both shift and daytime men, the shift workers were 
the knitters while the daytime workers performed other work. Within the 
female segment, segregation did not occur with respect to race, age or 
indoor workgroups, but in sharp contrast, a majority of homeworkers 
performed ma i n ly "semi -ski 11 ed jobs not undertaken insi de thei r factori es. 
To ascertain whether these varying types of job segregation derived from 
job discrimination or merely from lack of opportunity to recruit otherwise, 
employers' choice possibilities were assessed. 
8.2.I(e) Employers' Choice Possibilities 
With respect to selection of women for men's jobs, it is probable that 
of the 565 women working full-time some could have reliably undertaken 
regul ar overt i me or shift work to achi eve the hi gher earni ngs associ ated 
with kni tt i ng processes. Indeed a few young full-ti mers were "as anxi ous as 
the men to work overtime", (9.6.8(b)). It would thus seem feasible to have 
selected women for knitting jobs, although training would have been needed. 
An element of job discrimination is therefore implied. 
Regarding the selection of men for women's jobs, the consensus of 
employer opinion was that males were generally able to obtain higher 
earni ngs el sewhere and woul d have had 1 ittl e incenti ve to break into the 
women's sector of the market. This argument raises speculations as to why 
those men doing women's jobs were from race and age minority groups, and 
implies that they were excluded from better jobs, but insufficient data are 
available to pursue this topic further. Selection of homeworkers for 
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skilled operations was clearly possible since several establishments had 
done so. Nevertheless, in a substantial minority of cases they were 
de 1 i berate1y confi ned to low-ski 11 jobs. Thi s suggests that consi derab 1 e 
job discrimination on the basis of skill operated against them. That 
shortage of appropriate indoor workers was given as the reason for certain 
skilled operations being performed by homeworkers provides further evidence 
to support this conclusion. 
8.2.1(f) Job Discrimination 
Employers characterized women as being "unwilling to", "unable to" or 
"prohi bited from" worki ng shifts. The former exp1 anati ons were exemp1 i fied 
by pointing to the number of part-time women who were "unable to work even 
normal full-time hours". When knitting was a daytime activity it was 
asserted that: 
"the setting of machines is too heavy for women ••• there are large gear 
wheels that have to be lifted about". 
"Women are not mechanically minded ••• " 
The same heaviness argument was also used to explain why women were 
not used for distribution duties, while "unpleasant working conditions" was 
used to explain' their absence from dyehouse work. These arguments 
illustrate how the ground shifted as circumstances changed. However, women 
in other occupat ions (e.g.po1 ice and nursi ng) work shi fts and the author 
has since visited a bakery in a nearby city that found it easy to recruit 
women for permanent night work. In H&K industries exemption orders are 
generally easy to obtain,and many women work extended days (including some 
homeworkers), while many (e.g. cleaners) do heavy work. Thus, statistical 
job discrimination based on some part-timer's work characteristics is 
indicated against those women who could have performed knitting on shift or 
extended day patterns. Respondents claimed: 
"We've not had any applications from women for men's jobs"; 
"men wou1 d be embarrassed in women's departments"; 
"men wou1 d feel effemi nate usi ng sewi ng machi nes". 
H&K industries have had long histories of men associated with knitting 
while wives made up garments161 and tradition dies hard as is evidenced by 
the archaic method of counting output in dozens, see 4.2.1(c). 
Complacency arising from entrenched employer/employee attitudes, and 
deliberate job segregation, are the most likely explanations for a lack of 
applicants of the wrong sex, and this reflects the self-perpetuating 
processes of past discrimination. Homeworkers cannot be regarded as having 
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been discriminated against with respect to the knitting operation since the 
automatic knitting machines are too large for domestic premises. 
8.2.2 Intra-Establi shment Mobil ity - The Internal Labour Market 
Mobility within firms can take two basic forms in that employees can: 
(a) change jobs within the same workgroup; or (b) switch between 
workgroups. In the former, which has received more attention from ILM 
theorists, the employee's status and circumstance can be improved by 
promotion or upgrading, worsened by demotion, or remain unchanged after 
horizontal transfers. The skills attached to jobs can vary considerably 
since they serve different funct ions and ari se from varyi ng di vi si ons of 
labour. This form of mobility can therefore be regarded as skill mobility. 
The second form of i ntra-fi rm mobil ity, i.e. workgroup switchi ng in whi ch 
personnel perform the same task but in a different workgroup, has received 
less attention. The two forms of mobil ity can overl ap such that a 
workgroup switch can also involve a skill switch. 
8.2.2(a) Mobility Within the Same Workgroup 
(i) Skill Mobility 
The pilot study showed that standardization of skill was sufficiently 
complex to merit separate research since there was a wide diversity in 
tasks, divisions of labour and product styles. Such a study was impract-
icable in this project, but, since there were clear understandings in the 
industry of the skill level associated with each operation, respondents' 
cl assifications were accepted. This decision prevented an objective anal-
ysis of whether skill grades varied by gender, workgroup and race, but 
nevertheless subjective judgements based on observations are offered. 
It is the author's opinion that the skill demanded to perform many 
stitching operations was greater than that required to operate automatic 
knitting machines, even though the latter needed regular checking for 
accuracy and occasional resetting to different gauges. (Dex281 cites other 
contemporary writers282 ,283 who reached simil ar conclusions, see page 2-
35.) Moreover, si nce many st itchi ng machi nes were hand-fed, women were 
immobile at work stations whereas knitting operatives could move freely 
among the machinery minded. Knitting has traditionally been regarded as the 
most highly skilled manual operation in the industry, but this belief could 
have devolved from the value of equipment since very costly damage can 
result from carel essness; knitti ng 
sewi ng mac hi nes, see 4.2.1 (a)&(b). 
machines are much more expensive than 
- .~: In -lhe -absence of objective measures, 
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skill levels shown in Table 8.4 were those identified by respondents, and 
they relate to the requirements of jobs not to the dexterity of operatives. 
Table 8.4 indicates that for men, knitting, and thus shift work, was 
classed as a skilled operation, only bar-loading being semi-skilled. Of 
mal e full-time jobs, 69% were cl assed as skill ed compared to only 33% of 
male part-time jobs. In the female segment, the skill levels of jobs held 
by full-timers (73%), part-timers (71%) and twilighters (71%) were roughly 
equivalent, whereas only 52% of homeworker jobs were skilled. Robinson & 
Wallace257,258 found that part-timers were frequently placed in low skill, 
low grade work, and concluded that this was a major reason for pay 
differentials. However, in the pilot study of the footwear industry (see 
3.6), part-timers were disproportionately in high-skill work, perhaps 
indicating that a major reason for their recruitment had been shortage of 
full-time workers as Bosworth & Dawkins259 had also found, see 2.3. 
Across companies, skill segregation was not practiced against any 
workgroup, but within certain companies, homeworkers were deliberately 
selected for low-skill work (see 4.2.l(d», and data also suggest that 
similar practices operated against male part-timers. 
Deskilling, as postulated by labour process theorists, has certainly 
taken place in both the knitting and finishing sections of the industry. 
For instance, knitting machines are now more automatic than formerly and as 
one factory manager commented: 
"knitting is not a skilled job any more, we should really call them 
machine minders, but the machines are so expensive we claim there's a 
two year training period because they have to mature before they can 
have full responsibility for such costly equipment." 
On the finishing side, there is now limited use of the linking process 
which is viewed as a high-skill, labour-intensive job, but more costly 
equipment incorporating various stitching devices is the alternative for 
these closing processes. Deskilling of the linking operation has occurred 
with the invention of machines for random linking, i.e. where 'point-for-
point, loop-for-loop' matching is sacrificed in favour of a modified sewing 
process in which several loops are randomly bodged together in a 'belts-
and-braces' approach. Although an i nferi or 1 inked garment ensues, the 
employer benefits by employing fewer women on these much speedier, but more 
costly machines which require less skill. Typical random linking machines 
have been produced by Rosso, Exacta, Mathbi rk, Boehri nger and Arndt276• 
Further deskilling of knitwear operations has occurred with the invention 
of 'rib-to-plain' fully-fashioned machines and automatic rib transfer vee-
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bed machines 277• The resultant shortened processing obviates skilled 
female labour for the running-on of ribs and semi-skilled male labour for 
the bar-loading of ribs onto fully-fashioned knitting machines; such 
machines also completely dispense with drawthreading, a un-skilled woman's 
job usually put-out to homeworkers. In each case more automation results, 
and this is accompanied by rises in the purchase price and consequently in 
the non-utilization costs. Inevitably this places operatives in more 
influential positions by making stoppage time correspondingly more costly. 
The H&K industry's experience has thus resulted in lay-offs rather than a 
total degradation of labour; indeed, both status and influence can be 
enhanced by operating costly equipment which is further confirmation that 
capital cannot completely dominate labour. 
(ii) Promotion, Demotion and Up-grading 
Based on ILM theory, it was expected that internal mobility would 
result from promotion to supervisory levels or by up-grading to more highly 
skilled and better paid manual operations within job clusters. However, 
there were virtually no job clusters for ,the women,and few for men who had 
limited opportunity for promotions and up-grading to better jobs; in only 
one establishment,. was up-grading to a high-skill job regarded as feasible. 
Neither did horizontal transfer occur other than on a temporary basis. The 
reason given was because payment was by piecerates which allowed earnings 
to rise with long practice and acquired dexterity. It was claimed that 
operatives resisted job-switching due to lower earnings deriving from the 
learning curve. To introduce job relocation, resort had to be made to 
compensatory payment methods, see (iii) below. Table 8.5 indicates that 
female opportunities were generally slight. This could be partially due to 
some or all of their supervisors being men in 13 establishments. Full-
timers had better promotion opportunities than part-timers, but even so 
there were no opportunities in 14 (64%) establishments. Only 6% of the 
supervisor sample were part-timers. On average, 18 operatives were 
controlled by one supervisor. No opportunities were available for twilight 
workers who were either left unsupervised, or were supervised by shift 
workers or by daytime supervisors who had time off in lieu. Respondents 
said that of good operatives, few wanted promotion owing to lost piecework 
earnings; indeed, 5 respondents (20%) stated that, across the industry, 
supervisor's earnings were lower than those obtained by good operatives and 
that this had caused dilemmas and made promotion difficult. For instance, 
should the employer promote his best operative and lose output, or choose 
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someone less competent? Consequently there were no formalized, structured 
procedures for promotion, demotion or job transfer, and two companies 
responded by using good "all rounders" who would switch to any job. 
The ILMs of the H&K industry can therefore be.described asentirely 
open with entry ports at every job and no clusters through which to climb. 
(iii) Payment Method Mobility 
In small integrated establishments with no back-up personnel 
additional duties were periodically required of the knitters such as 
unloading yarn deliveries, machine maintenance, storeroom work and cleaning 
the machinery and work area. Such breaks in continuity could not be 
expected from piecerate workers since earnings were correspondingly 
reduced. Thus, jointly agreed, individualistic, complex time rates were 
negotiated which included compensation for normal productivity, shift and 
overtime premia. These pre-arranged time rates were introduced by agreement 
when additional tasks were needed. There were simi 1 ar arrangements for 
women who temporarily switched jobs to ease short-term bottlenecks or to 
occupy individuals who were under-employed. Thus, payment method switching 
was a peculiar form of flexibility which facilitated internal mobility and 
was relevant to the establishment's labour adjustment mechanism, see 
Sect i on 13.2. 
8.2.2 (b) Inter-group Mobility 
Table 8.6 shows the levels of internal female inter-group mobility. 
Without exception respondents described the levels as either "non-existent" 
or "very low", but no accurate records were kept. Only 24 women (2%) coul d 
be identified as having permanently switched groups internally and these 
were mainly from the full-time to the part-time or homeworker groups. 
Four companies with zero mobility claimed to have achieved this by refusing 
requests for transfer. Mobility between the daytime and homeworker groups 
usually arose from pregnancy (transfer being from the full-time group), or 
for retirement (often from the part-time group). Two companies kept 
waiting lists of good employees who wanted to switch to the homeworker 
group thereby indicating a positive demand for homework jobs. Respondents 
indicated that indirect inter-group mobility occurred after periods of LM 
inactivity and that the part-time group was the most usual to re-enter; 
nevertheless, inter-group mobility was rare. 
These data show that homeworker numbers were deliberately restricted 
and that the working lives of female H&K workers were characterized by 
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intermittency. A cycle of migration through the workgroups did exist but 
it was discontinuous: it occurred either in conjunction with inter-firm 
mobility or after periods of LM inactivity. Indirect mobility was 
additionally evidenced by employers being able to recruit trained and 
experienced part-timers, twi1ighters and homeworkers even though levels of 
training for these groups were relatively low (9.4.1(b)). 
8.2.3 Inter-Estab1fshment Mobflity 
Although questions on inter-establishment mobility were deliberately 
omitted after the pre-pi1ot study because it had indicated such records to 
be unavailable, its existence can be presumed from evidence contained 
elsewhere. Sub-section 5.2.4 concludes that men faced only limited, job 
competition, and that full-time females also faced very little. In these 
market condi t ions, and with several fi rms the same 1 oc a 1 ity, men and 
full-time women would have alternative employment opportunities. It is 
thus likely that considerable inter-fi rm mobil ity occurred. Indeed, the 
normal practice of always seeking experienced workers indicated this to be 
so as did the relatively high levels of, voluntary turnover among women. 
However, the "don't know" responses relating to male supply (see Figure 
5:1) suggests that mobility was lower for men than women. There was 
considerable competition for part-time work, and fierce competition for 
twilight and homeworking jobs. M2mbers of these work groups had 
therefore substanti ally less chance of switching jobs. Moreover, since 
findings (Figure 5:1) indicate that part-timers and twilight workers did 
not, on average, travel as far to work as full-timers it can be speculated 
that these groups had lower i nter-fi rm mobi1 ity, partially because there 
were fewer firms within the distance bands travelled. In the absence of 
fuller statistics further discussion is precluded. 
8.2.4 Mobility Into And Out Of The Labour Market 
Although choice of employment was very limited due to high job 
competition, twilight workers had the highest relative turnover level. 
Several respondents percei ved intense employee di ssat i sfact i on with 
twilight working jobs, for instance: 
"they don't know what they are letting themselves in for. They have 
to work hard and then the husband starts nagging that they never get 
to see each other, so they gi ve up, or take ti me off". 
Sub-sect i on 9.6.6(a) reports a hi gh early drop-out rate of homeworkers 
which, when put into context by the "take it or leave it" attitude of 
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employers, and the scarcity of 'good' homeworking jobs, suggests that many 
homeworkers had little alternative but to voluntarily leave the LM. 
Moreover, temporary employment (9.4.2(a&b)) was imposed on twfl i ght workers 
and homeworkers and this forced intermittent employment patterns whether 
they wished it or not, such that mobility was shown to be a characteristic 
of twil i ght and homework employment. The di sconti nuous nature of i nter-
group mobility (see 8.2.2(b)) indicates that daytime workers are also 
mobile into and out of the LM at critical life stages, such as childbirth, 
the child's entry to school or nursery, and retirement. Less discontinuity 
in mi ddl e 1 He was i ndi cated by several respondents who encouraged moves 
into the full-time from the part-time and secondary workgroups while 
limiting moves in the opposite direction. 
8.2.5 Summary of Conclusions on Mobility 
By most dimensions, mobil ity was very low for all workgroups. There 
was virtually total job segregation by gender and substantial skill 
segregation was practiced against the homeworker group and possibly the 
male part-timers, race and age minorities. Very little promotion or up-
grading of skills or direct inter-group mobility occurred although 
discontinuous mobility between the female groups did occur and was 
associated with life-cycle influences. An examination of the female age 
profiles (6.1) also provides evidence for women's inter-group mobility, it 
being characterized by a flow of females out of the full-time group 
coinciding with flows of entrants into the part-time, twilight and 
homeworker groups. An over-supply of job competitors (see 5.2.1(c) to (e)) 
for the less-than-full-time groups permitted the retention of different 
conditions of service, benefits and earnings levels (see below and chapter 
9) while the lack of internal mobility, except on a temporary basis, 
demonstrated the absence of internal labour markets. Reported turnover 
rates and recruitment of experienced personnel suggests that inter-firm 
mobility was high, particularly among full-time females. However, twilight 
workers and homeworkers had high levels of mobility into and out of the LM, 
much of which was involuntary, and for homeworkers, often of a short 
duration, see 8.2.4 & 9.4.2. 
8.3 THE EARNINGS STRUCTURE 
8.3.1 Earnings Levels 
The comparative earnings reported in this section have been derived 
from stated gross average weekly and/or average hourly earni ngs. Where 
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both measures were provided the stated values were first cross-checked and 
then averaged across establishments. 
8.3.1 (a) Male/Female Earnings Levels 
Table 8.7 shows that males earned more than females. Even those males 
whom employers had classed as "semi-skilled", and who were directly 
comparable with the females insofar as they worked the same basic weekly 
hours with no overtime nor shift premia, earned more than the women classed 
as "skilled" by the same employers. Knitters, working 40 hours weekly on 
shifts, earned 54% more than skilled females, 66% more with overtime 
payments. Hence a distinctly stratified earnings structure prevailed 
between men and women in the H&K'lM. 
8.3.1 (b) Workgroup Earnings levels 
Shift workers averaged 22% more pay than the full-time day males who 
were similarly performing knitting operations, but full-time day males 
averaged more overtime than the shift workers thus narrowing the earnings 
gap. Table 8.7 does not detail the earnings of female work groups 
separately because all in-factory groups received identical pay rates. 
Consequently, part-time and twilight earnings were pro-rata to their hours. 
Homeworker pay is considered in 8.3.3. 
8.3.2 The Human Capital Effect on the Earnings Structure 
Human capital theorists claim that wage differentials will arise as a 
compensation for the costs of acquiring skills. Classification of skill is 
a complex issue which encompasses dexterity, knowledge and authority; 
comparisons of different jobs are thus fraught with difficulties. Various 
measures and techniques have been devised, but no interviewed establishment 
reported using job evaluation when setting male/female rate differentials. 
In the absence of job evaluation,skills can be incorrectly assessed and 
thus can result in over-grading some jobs while under-grading others. 
Hence, an element of discrimination can arise from the skill 
classifications used for job-grading and it is the author's opinion that an 
under-estimation of machining skills required in finishing operations had 
occurred. Differentialsbetween knitters and the various sewing machinists 
thereby overstressed the actual skill differences between these jobs. A 
comparison with full-time day knitters to exclude shift and overtime premia 
reveals that the men received on average £17 per week (27%) more than the 
women. Furthermore, differentials between the full-time skilled and semi-
8 - 12 
CHAPTER 8 MARKET STRUCTURE 
skilled was smaller for males than for females: skilled full-time men 
averaged 5% more than thei r semi -ski 11 ed counterparts whereas the women's 
skilled/semi-skilled differential averaged 18%, which underlines the 
inferior position of semi-skilled women. Without employee-specific data on 
the precise operations performed by semi-skilled-men and women it is 
impossible to say whether the female skill differential was badly 
undervalued, but there appears to be a prima facie case to indicate that 
it arose because women generally performed operations requiring high levels 
of dexterity, whereas men performed warehousing and distribution duties 
largely requiring strength. 
The incentive method of payment automatically compensated for the 
human capital effects deriving from experience and inherent abil ity and 
respondents said that the range of wages yielded by differing abilities was 
considerable (see 9.6.1 and 10.4). Individual time-rate equivalent 
incentive earnings ranged from £0.90 to £1.75 per hour in the one factory 
where full and accurate hourly rates were disclosed for all employees. One 
operative regularly earned £7 per week more than her peer while attending 
for the same weekly hours and sharing the same work. Diversity of ability 
and application,yielded a wages structure in which no two individuals 
received the same weekly earnings, but this particular structure can not be 
regarded as evidence of segmentation since it derived entirely from human 
capital influences. Thus, the values given in Table 8.7 reflect ability 
and experience but are the average levels of the ranges earned. 
To summarize, wage-rate differentials based on skill classifications 
were probably discriminatory against women and were thus segmentalist, but 
although human capital effects yielded a range of wages, these were from 
identical piecerates and were therefore not segmentalist. 
8.3.3 Discriminatory Wage levels 
A discriminatory wage is here defined as being a wage that is lower 
than that paid to other workers for identical work of the same quality. 
Although additional costs could be attached to employing each workgroup 
wther than national insurance contributions and homeworker delivery costs, 
see 9.2), as cost-minimizing IC theory recognises, wage rates must be seen 
to be equitable for a reputation as a good employer to be achieved. 
Al though indoor groups were recei vi ng the, same pay rates, thi s had not 
always been so for part-timers who, in two establishments, had previously 
been paid 6% below full-time piece rates. In one factory this ruling still 
stood but was not put into effect; in the other, the trade union had 
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intervened 6 months previously and negotiated an end to the practice. 
Thus, at the time of interview no discriminatory wage levels actually 
operated for the indoor component. 
Estimation of homeworkers' hourly earnings usually present 
difficulties for researchers because productive time is rarely accurately 
recorded by either worker or employer, see Section 2.3. Researchers have 
often found very low hourly earnings and, considering productivity to be 
average or higher, have claimed that discriminatory pay rates applied to 
homeworkers. Merely to consi der the average weekly earni ngs of a 
homeworker is unhelpful for comparison purposes since the level of skill 
required by the job, inherent ability, hours worked and the level of 
productivity deriving from dexterity and experience all affect the value. 
A more revealing measure for determining discriminatory practices is to 
compare the pay received by in-factory and outworkers performing the same 
work for the same employer; such information is given in Table 8.8. It is 
acknowledged that some respondents might have tried to conceal 
discriminatory rates, but the forthrightness of respondents suggested that 
this was not a frequent occurrence. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that 
the figures presented in Table 8.8 are more likely to be under- rather than 
over-estimates. In addition to stating the comparative levels, 12 
respondents indicated their homeworkers' average weekly earnings and these 
are summari zed in Table 8.9. 
Tabl e 8.8 shows that out of 139 homeworkers, 49 (35%) recei ved the 
same piecerates as indoor workers, so regardless of their hourly earnings, 
these homeworkers were not discriminated against. However, 35 homeworkers 
(25%) were paid lower piece rates than their indoor colleagues doing the 
same work for the same employer, the percentage reduction ranging from 5% 
to 10% with an average of 7.5%. (Subsequent to the survey an instance of 
20% reduction came to the author's knowledge.) It is noteworthy that 
respondents admitting to reduced piecerates were generally from large 
establishments not relying' heavily on homeworker output, and the practice 
of under-payment was usually justified by the claim that it compensated for 
delivery costs; these are assessed in section 9.2.2(f). Table 8.3 showed 
that 75 homeworkers in 10 establishments did jobs not performed inside 
their factories and for many of these there were no means of determining 
whether discriminatory rates applied. It seemed likely that rates were 
lower than for similar work in other factories, where it was admitted that, 
after complaints, investigation had shown differentials to have arisen 
between the rates paid inside and outside the factory for work of similar 
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grade, see wage drift (8.3.4(a». Homeworkers whose hand fi ni shi ng 
operations often did not change with style could not benefit from wage 
dri ft. Lack of empl oyee-specifi c data and compl exit i es of job vari ation 
prevented this being checked. 
Homeworkers' quoted average weekly earnings- varied considerably; 
those of skilled machinists ranged from £20 to £60 per week; semi-skilled 
hand workers achieved as little as £9 per week, or an estimated £0.80 per 
hour, but whether this derived from low piecerates or low productivity was 
not made explicit. A homeworker averaging £0.80 per hour could earn only 
£32 for 40 hours when working a prolonged schedule (see Figure 4:4) and 
this is 42% less than her average semi-skilled indoor counterparts who were 
themselves judged to be low paid. Seventy-eight homeworkers averaged 
approximately £21 per week (Table 8.9). If these workers also averaged the 
20 hrs/wk of productive work (see 9.6.8 (a» the equivalent earnings for a 
basic 40 hour week would be £42,30% less than the indoor component. It 
should be noted that the 20 hour estimate of homeworker hours was based on 
the time needed by an average indoor worker to perform the same work, so 
lower productivity cannot be used to explain wage differences. 
Respondents clilimed that many homeworkers limited their earnings 
deliberately to keep below the tax and national insurance thresholds. 
This tactic appeared to have been tolerated for hand workers, but generally 
denied to machinists who had to agree to minimum deliveries, see 9.6.8(a). 
Thus, it is contended that because at least 25% of homeworkers were 
paid discriminatory rates, and a further 40% could have received pay lower 
than similar workers in other factories, homeworkers were a form of cheap 
labour. Indeed the cheap labour criterion of demand could have been 
operative in 82% of establishments. Thus, homeworker wage rates revealed 
a stratified structuring of earnings for the same work. 
According to the above definition, for lower rates to constitute 
di scri mi nat ion the qual ity of workmanshi p must be the same. Sub-sect ion 
9.6.3 shows only a 1 ittle di fference overall between daytime and 
homeworkers in the quality of work produced as assessed by their employers. 
Indeed, if a homeworker was unsatisfactory her supply of work was stopped. 
It can be concluded therefore that many of the home workers in the LLM were 
discriminated against in pay. 
8.3.4 The Customary Wage Structure 
8.3.4 (a) The Intra-Establishment Wage Structure 
Every establishment had wage differentials between segments and within 
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segments. The earnings differential between shift knitters and skilled 
full-time females ranged between 33% and 75% within establishments and 
averaged 45.5% (sd=13.7) acros s es tab li shments. 
Within the female segment, variations in the skill needed and in 
divisions of labour (4.2.2(a)) created various grades of job. Employees 
performing different jobs, but on the same grade had piece rates set to 
yield the same earnings to average workers. Larger establishments used 
between 3 and 5 basic pay grades, but smaller establishments varied from 
one grade for all workers to a different grade for every operation. 
Table 8.10 shows that segregated factories had the largest 
skilled/semi-skilled differentials, and that large integrated factories had 
smaller skill differentials than the all company mean, while small 
integrated factories had approximately the same as the all company mean of 
15%. Thus, semi -ski 11 ed workers in segregated estab 1 i shments earned very 
low wages, whereas the average wages of semi-skilled workers in large 
integrated establishments were equivalent to the wages of skilled workers 
in segregated establishments. 
Grade differentials were generally maintained over time. As products 
and styles changed, new piece rates were negotiated, the most widely 
adopted method being to introduce the new line, average the number of 
dozens completed per hour, and then set the price per dozen to yield the 
employees average hourly earnings. During the timing sequence employees 
often worked more slowly than normal, either deliberately or because they 
were unaccustomed to the work, so that after the price had been set, and 
their normal speed attained, the new rate would yield a wage increase. 
Hence, wage drift occurred and customary di fferenti al s became di storted 
when some grades drifted more than others. Erosion of customary 
differentials had led to internal disputes and one respondent had 
successfully negotiated a wage reduction immediately prior to the interview 
because, "one department's wages had got out of step with the others". 
Local press reports reveal that this was not an isolated incident. 
In addition to customary indoor differentials there was a widespread 
recognition by all persons having contact with H&K industries that 
homeworkers customari ly earned 1 ess than factory workers. 
8.3.4 (b) The Inter-establishment Wage Structure 
The range of reported wages reveals an inter-establishment wage range, 
and respondents were usually well aware of their company's standing in the 
LLM and often showed they intended to maintain it. Claims such as, "more 
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generous than el sewhere", and, "we pay more than at other pl aces", proved 
correct when checked against actual values. Although no pattern was 
immediately discernible regarding low and high wage employers, a clear 
pattern emerged when segregated establishments were isolated and the 
remainder were subdivided into large and small classes as shown in Table 
8.10. Large integrated establishments paid on average, above the 'all 
company' level as did the small integrated establishments although to a 
lesser extent. In contrast, the segregated establishments generally paid 
considerably below all company rates. It shoul d be remembered that all 
segregated establishments would have been large had they remained 
integrated, but when segregation occurred both large and small 
establishments were created. Hence, these differentials offer evidence to 
support claims of 'divide and conquer' tactics; indeed weekly earnings of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers in similarly sized integrated companies 
averaged respectively £9 and £11 more. 
8.3.5 The Institutional Impact on the Wage Structure 
Much that is relevant to the institutional impact is discussed in 
section 11.2 which analyses the power structure emanating from collective 
bargaining. Pay awards in the national agreement take the form of a 
percentage addition to all existing piecerates, see 1l.2.l(a) which all 14 
unionised establishments followed. Table 11.3 shows the impact of the 
national pay awards on the non-unionized sector and reveals that 8 of the 
11 non-unionized factories also adhered to the agreement and a further 2 
followed the precedent, although sometimes paying below the agreed 
percentage. Hence, there was a strong institutional impact on the wage 
structure via activity at national level and its effect was 
to raise general wage levels rather than influence internal wage 
structures. 
Local union activity affected the range, rather than the general 
level, of wages. Local officials' activities tended to narrow inter-
establishment differentials since negotiations and recommendations were 
based on judgements of rates for comparable work in other factories (see 
1l.2.l(a) Pay). Moreover their efforts to remove the 6% mark-down of part-
time rates (Section 8.3.3) had also compressed the internal wage range and 
counteracted the market force of over-supply. 
Notwithstanding these union influences, only 49 homeworkers (35%) 
received the same rates as factory 1 abour and there had been 1 ittl e local 
intervention to prevent this. The local union impact was therefore 
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conspicuously lower than for the indoor component. National union attempts 
on the NJIC were vigorously resisted by employers who managed to retain an 
environment in which discriminatory rates could be offered. Nevertheless, 
those homeworkers linked to factory rates benefitted from the annual 
increase, so an indirect benefit accrued irrespective of unsuccessful 
national union activity. 
8.3.6 Summa~ of Conclusions on the Earnings Structure 
There were wide earnings differentials between males and females that 
could not be explained by human capital influences. All in-factory females 
received the same basic rates since discriminatory wage rates were no 
longer operative against part-timers, although they did apply to 
homeworkers. Each establishment had its customary skill differentials 
which were i~fuenced by internal divisions of labour and tended to be 
stable over t{m-e. 
In addition, an earnings structure existed between establishments. 
Influences on this could not be investigated, but the impression was gained 
that this too had customary elements.. Segregated establishments paid 
lower rates than integrated establ ishments suggesting that employers were 
taking advantage of workforce divisions. Trade union activity at national 
level had an impact on the general levels of earnings, whereas their local 
activities tended to narrow inter-establishment differentials. 
Thus, numerous factors influenced the very wide range of earnings 
values observed and a stratification of workgroup earnings prevailed that 
was consistent with a SLM structure. 
8.4 THE STRUCTURE OF NET ADVANTAGES 
8.4.1 Holid~ Arrangements 
All factories completely closed for the holiday periods. The national 
agreement was for 27 days hol iday and 17 (68%) establishments adhered to 
it; no company gave additional days to long-service workers; 7 firms (28%) 
gave 26 days and one 28 days. No special arrangements were formerly agreed 
with parents of young children on school vacation; at least 18 
establishments reluctantly permitted individual flexibility of hours, 
whereas two strictly refused hours reduction and the re-timing of 
attendance. All the in-factory workgroups of each establishment, with 
the exception of twilight workers, received identical treatment for holiday 
pay, although rates varied slightly among establishments, see 11.2.1 (a). 
Holiday pay for twilight workers, who by implication were excluded from the 
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national holiday pay agreement (see, 11.2.1 (a) Holiday Pay), was not a 
live issue due to infrequent employment at holiday times, but 4 
estab 11 shments gi vi ng permanent employment treated them i dent i cally with 
the other groups. Homeworkers rarely received holiday pay; only two small 
establi shments whi ch reli ed on them heavily gave thei r total of 5 
homeworkers their average wages on the same basis as other workers. 
Factory closure gave homeworkers the same days of holiday periods although 
arrangements could usually be made for extra work to be delivered. Thus, a 
of 
stratified structuring.holiday arrangements prevailed only insofar as 
homeworkers were concerned. 
8.4.2 Special Sickness Benefit 
No establishment had a formally agreed leave arrangement for parents 
of sick children; the only option being to "take time off without pay". 
Only one establishment had its private contributory sick pay scheme for 
the factory component, but in most firms sick pay schemes applied only to 
"staff members" (i.e., management, supervisors, mechanics, and certain 
office personnel) and these arrangements highlight the special, elevated 
status of staff ~orkers. No stratification was discovered among workgroups 
who were overwhelmingly without company sickness schemes. 
8.4.3 Special Maternity Arrangements 
It was thought possible that a predominantly female industry would 
provide maternity schemes with terms and conditions supplementing those of 
the EPA, but no establishment had introduced any such scheme. Indeed, many 
respondents showed opposition to the statutory provisions. In the light of 
this opposition it was surprising to discover that 18 establishments had, 
"never needed to hold a job open". Four had held jobs (averaging 1 per 1.3 
years) and a further 3 expected that they "might be called upon to do so 
soon". No establishment was prepared to extend this provision to 
homeworkers; in fact, the suggestion was generally considered to be 
preposterous since homeworkers were considered to have the opportunity to 
simultaneously mind children and carry out work. "1 didn't ask them to have 
chil dren" was a general response often with the rejoinder, "1 have orders 
to get through on time". Consequently, no stratified structure existed 
with respect to speci al materni ty benefit, the only benefit bei ng under 
law. 
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8.4.4 Private Pension Schemes 
Sixteen establishments were without private pension agreements. but 3 
operated a scheme for staff members only. Another had a contributory 
scheme confined to males because. "females moved more frequently and 
insurance compani es di dn't 1 ike it". However. 4 had contri butory schemes 
for all men and women. but part-timers did not participate in two of these 
although the reasons for this were unclear. In only one company with a non-
contributory scheme did part-timers benefit alongside all men and full-time 
women. No schemes applied to twilight workers or homeworkers. 
Consequently. although the i nci dence of pri vate pensi on schemes was very 
low. differential benefits were received: staff benefitted most. followed 
by males in general. then full-time females. part-time females and finally 
twilighters and homeworkers who were entirely without benefits. 
8.4.5 Bonus Payments 
Five companies (20%) had productivity based bonus schemes for staff 
and time-rate workers to provide parity with piece-rate wo"rkers by 
recompensing them for high productivity when workloads were heavy. One 
sock factory increased indoor workers' piecerates after 500 dozens had been 
completed to encourage very high productivity. Another with "boring" work 
(5.2.1(a)) pai d an attendance bonus to factory workers to reduce 
absenteeism. None of these schemes appl ied to either twil ight or 
homeworkers. However. 18 (72%) establishments had no bonus schemes of any 
kind. Therefore, bonus schemes were relatively rare. were production 
oriented and were stratified insofar as they applied only to factory 
labour, mainly full-timers who were most likely to reach target outputs for 
bonuses to become operative. 
8.4.6 Concessionary Goods Schemes 
All factories had concessionary goods schemes which applied to every 
workgroup including homeworkers. although two respondents commented that 
homeworkers might be unaware of available items unless delivery drivers 
informed them. a situation that underlines their distance from the 
companies for which they worked. Nevertheless, the schemes were not 
intended to have a stratified application. 
8.4.7 Miscellaneous Benefits 
Seven establishments had free or subsidized Christmas dinners or 
dances and a further 7 gave Christmas gifts that ranged from tins of 
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biscuits to 2 weeks' average pay. In most companies there was general 
uncertainty as to whether these 'perks' were also given to twilight workers 
and homeworkers but one establishment specifically excluded them. Four 
companies presented awards for 25 years service, but it was considered 
highly unlikely that either twilight or homeworkers could qualify for 
these. No other benefit schemes were encountered. A stratified 
application of miscellaneous benefits to the detriment of twilight workers 
and homeworkers was therefore evident. 
8.4.8 The Provision of Facilities 
In general, companies merely offered the minimum facilities required 
by law. Medical provision in all companies consisted of first aid boxes 
and trained personnel who were not always present during twilight shifts. 
One company had a full canteen to serve two establishments during daytime 
hours; it thus applied to full- and part-timers. Shift and twilight 
workers were only able to obtain drinks and snacks as were all other groups 
in all other establishments. PAYE and national insurance contribution were 
submitted to the Inland Revenue for all factory groups, but no 
establ i shment submi tted nati onal insurance contributi ons for homeworkers, 
although 6 (27%) establishments deducted PAYE when necessary. Transport 
facilities, discussed in section 5.3, also had unequal applications. All 
but one establ ishment allowed employees to listen to the radio; in two 
others this was limited to 2 hour sessions during mornings and afternoons. 
Only 6 (24%) firms provided radio. Rest periods were of 10 or 15 
minutes duration in every 4 hour stretch and twilight workers were 
permitted the same length of break, but did not always take these. Part-
timers were refused breaks by 4 (16%) establishments if present for fewer 
than 3 hours per half day. Homeworkers were treated identically with 
factory labour in that all machinery and equipment was provided and 
maintained by the establishments. All factories undertook and paid for work 
delivery unless homeworkers lived so near that they chose to collect and 
deliver it themselves. In general, facil ities for all groups were 
very 1 i mited, but those occasi onally provi ded seldom appl i ed to twil i ght 
workers and homeworkers even where they were appropriate. A limited 
strat ifi cat i on therefore exi sted. 
8.4.9 The Stratification of Net Advantages 
The choice of an industrial LLM controlled for the relative 
disadvantages of employment insofar as the exogenous influences on 
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companies were concerned. Thi s meant that sample companies and factory 
workers were operating in very similar environments. Relative net 
advantages are therefore revealed by the impacts of the various dimensions 
of the employment relationship. In addition to the topics considered above. 
other relevant conditions of service have been analysed in section 9.4. 
Tables 9.8 to 9.19 detail this information and Table 9.20 summarizes it to 
show that employers generally treated the workgroups differently with 
respect to training. redundancy. dismissals and transport and that the 
inequalities had similar impacts to those of the benefits discussed above. 
Table 8.11 summarizes the relative application of various conditions 
of service by showing. for each workgroup and topic. the number of 
establishments that offered provisions. Companies operating schemes only 
for certai n categories of worker (e.g.staff) have been omitted. as have 
provisions that did not have stratified applications and those benefits 
emanating entirely from law. The rank order of net advantages shown at 
the foot of the table indicates a stratified structuring of conditions of 
service and of perks and benefits that favoured the male and female core 
factory groups whilst placing twilighters and homeworkers at greater 
disadvantage. 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO LABOUR MARKET STRUCTURE 
The foregoing sections of this chapter. and particularly Tables 8.7. 
8.8 and 8.11. showed that stratification was present with respect to 
earnings and net advantages, and that these inequalities did not 
counterbalance each other as was required by the neoclassical model; rather 
they exaggerated the inequalities by virtue of higher earnings being 
accompanied by somewhat better terms and conditions of service. Thus the 
neoclassical model of LM functioning was rejected in favour of the SLM 
model. 
There were substantial earnings differentials between the male and 
female segments. It is doubtful whether these can be explained in terms 
of acquired human capital as further research is required to provide 
objective measures of skill. In its absence, the present author concludes 
that both job and wage discrimination was practiced against women causing 
their persistent relegation to a secondary sector of the H&K LM. 
In addition to this male/female segmentation. both an earnings and a 
net advantages stratified structure prevailed within the female segment 
which could not be explained by human capital differences since all groups, 
in aggregate, were performing the same range of operations for the same 
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sample of employers. Female full- and part-time employees received 
identical pay rates and faced similar conditions of service. All had 
relative permanency of employment, although there was more competition for 
part-time jobs and possibly a greater chance of redundancy, see 9.4.2(b). 
Twilight workers received the same pay rates, but they faced inferior 
benefits and facilities and were often employed on a temporary basis 
(Tables 9.12, 9.14 and 9.16). Thus, their employment was secondary when 
compared with either of the daytime groups and this placed them in a 
separate segment inferior to daytime females but superior to that of 
homeworke rs who often recei ved lower payment for i dent i ca 1 work. 
Homeworkers' conditions of service were less beneficial than those achieved 
by twilight workers who had the legal status of employees, see 1l.2.1(a). 
Many home workers had part i cul arly unstable workloads (9.4.3) and no 
security of tenure. These circumstances placed homeworkers in an even more 
inferior segment. Consequently, the female segment was itself segmented 
and the boundaries of these were not eroded over time because there were 
persistent over-supplies of potential workers for these secondary segments 
and very low levels of direct inter-group mobility (Tables 8.1 and 8.6). 
Although indirect,inter-group mobility existed, workers' employment options 
appeared to be confined to the sub-segments as a result of the critical 
life stage through which they were passing, and hence there was 
insufficient cross-boundary competition to erode segment barriers. 
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9.1 PREFERENCE, AND ITS EXECUTION 
This chapter addresses the topic of recruitment intentions relating to 
workgroups and categories of worker (i.e. preference). Worker selection is 
conceptual ized as having two comp0rjents as is illustrated by chapter 15: 
firstly, initial intentions, i.e. intended demand or preference; and 
secondly, the ability to satisfy intentions, i.e. eventual choice, 
effective or observed demand. If there are shortages of preferred workers 
then the observed outcome will be different from initial intentions because 
compromises will have been made, but if sufficient worker supplies are 
available then preference and choice will be identical. Workgroup 
preference is assessed from three different standpoints. Firstly, the 
total weekly cost of employing the average member of each workgroup is 
calculated to determine whether cost-minimization determines preference. 
Secondly, stated preference is examined, and thirdly, group preference, as 
implied by the employer's actions, is assessed by examining training, 
redundancy, work allocation, and dismissal procedures to see whether words 
and actions are complementary or conflicting. An additional benefit 
accruing from these approaches has been the careful mapping of workgroup 
differences, this itself being a contribution to knowledge. 
9.2 THE COST OF LABOUR 
The cheap labour hypothesis of homework er demand suggests that 
homeworkers are demanded because they are particularly cheap to employ, but 
it is cl ear that low wages do not necessarily mean cheap labour because 
additional hidden costs could make low wage workgroups more expensive. 
Various elements of the employment relationship can generate costs for the 
employer and all such expenses are examined to determine the relative cost 
of the average member of each work group. 
9.2.1 Cost Calculation for the Mode of Production Decision 
The factory system of production has become the traditional frame of 
reference for organisational analysts studying manufacturing industry. 
Until the 1970s it had been widely assumed that the domestic mode of 
production had disappeared after the sweating exhibition in the early part 
of this century. An automatic choice of factory production is thus implicit 
in much microeconomic theory, but the presence of homeworkers in an 
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industry indicates that such a choice is not automatic in practice. A 
choice of mode therefore becomes a preliminary necessity, and the following 
suggestions could form the basis of a theory regarding this decision. 
For domestic production to be a viable possibility, both the product 
and the manufacturing operations used must exhibit particular 
characteri stics. The product shoul d: 
(i) be easily portable; and 
(ii) use materials that are safe in domestic premises; and 
(iii) have a volume appropriate to domestic premises; and 
,(iv) contain a large work-to-volume ratio (work being measured in 
time spent on each item). 
The manufacturi ng operations shoul d: 
(v) comprise a hand operation; or 
(vi) use easily portable tools and/or machinery; and 
(vii) use suitable energy sources for domestic premises; and 
(viiiluse tools and equipment that are suitably sized for homes. 
The terms, easily portable, safe, appropriately or suitably sized in 
the above list can be defined as follows: 
easily portable; 
safe; 
appropriately sized; 
suitable energy source; 
can becarriedbyoneun-aided person. 
free from poisons, strong fumes, smell s, 
acids, alkalies or radio-activity; having low 
noise levels; equipment satisfying factory 
inspectorate safety regulations. 
can be mani pul ated by one 'Unai ded person 
through a normally sized domestic doorway. 
gas and AC single-phase electricity as 
normally installed in homes: not requiring 
high voltage, 3-phase or DC electricity, 
compressed air or steam. 
When ,product and 'operation characteristics coincide, choice of 
domestic production becomes a possibility and this makes the cost 
calcul ations relevant. Shoul d these characteristics be only parti ally met, 
the employer may opt for a quasi-factory system whereby some of the 
manufacturing operations are performed in domestic premises. 
To make a decision, cost/benefit calculations for each mode should be 
compared. It is contended that cost of production mode functions include: 
Cost of the mode of production = f(cost of premises. rates on premises, 
administration of the production unit, 
equiplllent and labour costs) 
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The benefit function will include an assessment of production flexibility 
put into context by the stability of product demand, levels of competition 
and expected profit margi ns. Certain costs (e.g. canteen and fi rst aid 
facil Hies, etc.) that are incurred in a factory can be avoided by the use 
of domestic premises. These should be omitted when calculating labour 
costs for the entirely domestic mode, but when a quasi-factory system is 
chosen these costs are not 'saved' by the use of homeworkers. Therefore, 
the appropriateness of items to be included should be considered. 
All employers included in the survey had decided to obtain factory 
premises, having been selected simply because they had factory labour, but 
22 had additionally opted for the quasi-factory system by also using 
homeworkers. It should be noted that sample establishments were interviewed 
because they were located in the llM; in only a minority of cases had the 
author any prior knowledge regarding the use of homeworkers. Research into 
the potential extent of domestic production in advanced economies is 
overdue, and the above approach is therefore offered as a starting point. 
9.2.2 Calculation of the Cost of the Average Member of Each Workgroup 
Having made the mode of production decision, it is argued that cost-
minimizing employers will compare the costs of workgroup members to 
determi ne the cheapest manni ng pol icy. The costs of employment compri se 
di rect and i ndi rect sums. Di rect 1 abour costs are composed of wages, whi ch 
for comparison purposes should also reflect performance. Additional costs 
are incurred in quality control/since poor workers will necessitate greater 
levels of supervision and inspection, and fringe benefit~since short 
supply workers could be attracted by these. Expenditure on recruitment, 
selection and training are investments in labour that are sometimes called 
sunk costs because they cannot be retained when the employee quits. 
Indirect costs arise from statutory obligations and the basic 
workgroup differences, i.e. their number of hours, times of day and place 
of work constraints. Each constraint imposes pecul iar costs which 
necessitate the inclusion of various items in the calculation if fair 
comparisons are to result. 
In the following calculations, full-time employment at 40 hrs/wk is 
the chosen frame of reference. Consequently, to permit fair workgroup 
comparisons, each group's hourly costs have been factored to yield the 
equivalent of 40 hours. It is contended that the employment cost function 
(C) will include the following elements: 
C = feW + L + B + S + K + T + P) 
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where: w = the 'effective' wage, 
B = fringe benefits, 
K = capital non-utilization, 
P = place constraint cost. 
EMPLOYER PREFERENCE 
L = legislative benefits, 
S = sunk labour costs, 
T = time constraint cost, 
Each element is discussed and then calculated using survey data. Table 
9.1 itemizes the cost of each element for each workgroup. 
9.2.2(a) The Effective Wage (W) 
The effective wage function, which reflects performance, is: 
W = f(earnfngs, productivity, qualfty and lost productfon tfme by 
absenteefsm and unpunctuality) 
Computed values should represent the 40-hour equivalent of average 
weekly earnings, these comprising basic pay, shift premia and normal 
regular overtime. They should also reflect productivity and performance, 
including quality. Productivity is allowed for by piece-rates, but costs 
a ri sing from spoil age, and qua 1 ity cont ro 1 shou 1 d be added and ave raged 
among employees. The effective wage therefore reflects the performance of 
the average member of each workgroup, which is important when workgroup 
productivity is low, absenteeism high or quality poor. Gross annual 
piecework earnings for each workgroup, including holiday pay and 
expenditure on supervision and inspection, should be divided by actual 
annual hours to allow for absenteeism and unpunctuality, and multiplied by 
40 to give the equivalent weekly payment. 
Values shown in Table 9.1 have been calculated from data presented in 
Table 8.7. To show male/female differences, skilled men and women full-
timers have been incl uded as well as shi ft workers. To overcome women's 
skill differentials and permit female workgroup comparisons, skill 
differentials have been pooled to give an averaged wage level. Lack of 
precision regarding home workers' earnings necessitated an estimate which 
was based on sub-section 8.3.3 and Tables 8.8 and 8.9. Because the 7.51 
markdown of Table 8.8 was thought too low while the quoted 421 markdown 
was considered un representatively high, a 151 markdown for homeworker 
earnings was assumed as this represented the mid range of reductions known 
to exist in the LLM. In practice, material spoilage costs were negligible 
because spoi led items were sold as sub-standards to local market traders 
and this usually covered costs. 
It was impossible to adjust earnings for group performance differences 
because no actual values were provided, but overall, differences were 
judged to be slight, see 9.6.9. The average cost of supervision per 
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employee has been included for the daytime groups, but not for the 
twilighters and homeworkers who generally were not supervised. 
9.2.2(b) Fringe Benefits (L + B) 
Fringe benefits (B) can arise because the employer offers them or 
because they are imposed by law. Legislative benefits (L) are statutory 
obligations relating to health, safety and employment" protection which, 
following the decision to manufacture in a factory, are inescapable. The 
legislative benefit function is: 
L = f(national insurance contributions. holiday benefits. medical 
facilities. redundancy. dismissal and maternity provisions) 
Voluntary fringe (i.e.non-legislative) benefits (B) are those offered 
by the employer and are not required by law. Such benefits are escapable 
and could be given to selected groups in the workforce, or to specific 
categories of worker. Thus, the voluntary fringe benefit function could 
vary with job status, and might include both contributory and non-
contributory items. The non-legislative benefit function could be: 
B = f(enhanced Sickness. health, and pension benefits. bonuses. long-
service awards, transport, canteen and social facilities, 
concessionary goods schemes) 
To calcul ate the average cost of each employee when workgroups are 
contracted for different weekly periods, annual expenditure should be 
divided by the total hours worked by the benefiting group and multiplied 
by 40 to give the full-time weekly-equivalent. Where all workgroups benefit 
equally the cost should be apportioned, but it can be overlooked when the 
exercise is for comparison purposes since such expenditures will have a per 
capita impact and leave comparisons unaffected. Even when homeworkers are 
present, legislative benefits such as health facilities can still be 
ignored because these expenditures are inescapable irrespective of whether 
homeworkers benefit or not; no savings accrue in these respects from 
homeworker use. They must be included in the 'mode of production' 
calculations. Several benefits in the function (e.g.dismissal, 
redundancy, maternity, retirement and long-service schemes) might not 
impose costs, but they could do so and should be included. To calculate 
possible expenditure, it is necessary to project average past performance 
to obtain an average annual sum per employee over a given period, say 10 
years, on the assumption that past performance is an indicator of general 
workgroup performance, and is a workgroup characteristic. The employer's 
part of the national insurance contribution as appl icable in March 1980 
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when the threshold for contributions was £19.50 has been included in the 
benefit element (L + B) of Table 9.1. The appropriate amount, relative to 
actual earnings has been included. Medical facilities and other benefits 
have been calculated from generated survey data omitted due to thesis space 
considerations, but these generally incurred very small costs. Reference 
has been made to data reported in chapters 8, 9 and 11 in the calculation 
of group fi gures. Vol untary fri nge benefits were 1 ess costly than 
statutory obligations because few were offered, see 8.4, but the annual 
reported costs have been apportioned to give the per capita cost for each 
benefiting group. Thus, the small but varying costs of group fringe 
benefits (B) reflect both status and the low level of benefit generally 
available. 
9.2.2(c) 'Sunk' Costs (S) 
Sunk costs comprise the fixed costs of employment and investment in 
human capital. The sunk cost function is: 
S = f(recruitment, selection and training) 
Sunk costs should be calculated by summing total annual recruitment, 
selection and training costs, apportioning them relative to group benefit, 
and then computing the per capita cost, per week, per group. 
Average annual replacement recruits have been calculated from turnover 
data to give: Sm=31; Fm=22; Fw=124; Pw=95; Tw=3; Hw=23. The levels for 
female secondary.groups make no allowance for temporary recruitment (see 
9.4.2), as thi s stems from thei r manner of ut il i zat i on rather than bei ng 
imposed by group characteristics. Recruitment costs have been calculated 
by summing the 1980 advertising, estimated administrative and communication 
costs for all recruits to each group, and then averaging these to per 
capita weekly amounts. Selection, which incorporates interviewing and 
selection testing costs, has been evaluated using supervisory pay rates 
multiplied by the time taken, assuming a half-hour test period. Training 
has been similarly assessed from data and assumptions reported in 9.4.1 and 
Tables 9.8 and 9.9. Training method costs have been based on the number of 
group recruits, assuming skill levels to be as shown in Table 8.4. These 
calculations show that while the per capita costs of recruitment and 
selection were low, training was relatively expensive for the employer. 
9.2.2(d) Capital Non-utilization Costs (K) 
The capital non-utilization cost function is: 
K = f(the hourly cost of capital x i dl e hours) 
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Capital equipment can be regarded as imposing a cost per unit of time 
because the purchase price. plus a replacement charge to allow for improved 
design and inflation. should be recouped over its life-span. These costs 
arise whether the machinery is in use or idle. but for the purpose of 
inter-group comparisons. they can be conveniently treated as occurring only 
when idle. it being assumed that saleable output produced during use will 
cover·this part of the capital cost. The hourly cost of capital is computed 
from the total outlay for its purchase and the hours in its expected life-
span. Individual employers could incorporate interest payments. inflation 
and replacement costs in their calculations. but only the purchase price 
was available to the author. It is contended that this is not too serious 
a fl a w since the purpose of the exerci se was the cos t i ng of workgroups; 
omission woul d have widened differentials which are sufficiently large 
without depreciation to give a clear picture. see Table 9.1. 
Capital non-util ization arises directly from the 'number of hours' 
constraint and the work-week pattern. The workgroups' different work-
patterns cause equipment to stand idle for varying lengths of time. and 
therefore they impose different non-util ization costs. For example. a 
part-timer working 25-hours per week creates 15 hours more idle-time than a 
40-hours per week full-timer. but shift working reduces machine idle-time. 
It is recognized that two part-timers working successively can be the 
equivalent of one full-timer and in these cases should be regarded as such 
and treated similarly to twil ight workers below. but this was not a common 
practice in the H&K industry; indeed. most part-timers worked more than 
half-time hours. Twil ight workers. who followed daytime workers on the 
same machines as in other shift systems. have had their working hours 
added to the working hours of full-timers to reflect the idle-time savings 
that their utilization represented. Shift workers using the same machinery 
continuously should similarly have their annual hours summed to reflect 
savings of idle-time. Hence. a 3-shift. 7-days per week. 52-weeks per year 
shift system imposes no idle time costs at all provided there is no 
absenteeism. 
The average weekly non-util i zation cost is found by subtracting the 
employee's actual annual working hours from yearly hours. the remaining 
non-working hours are then multiplied by the hourly cost of capital and 
divided by the number of working weeks. This method allows for lost 
product i on time a ri sing from absenteei sm. unpunctual i ty and differenti al 
holiday periods. 
To compute the values shown in Table 9.1. each knitting operative's 
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machinery has been taken at £18,000 per machine and 7 machines per person; 
that of finishing operatives has been taken at £1,000 and one machine per 
person. Respondents assessed 1 ife spans to be 10 years for each type of 
machinery at current intensity of operation. Hence, the hourly costs of 
capital equipment were: 
__ ~£",1.::.8"",0:-.::0:.:0c..:..:.x....:7,--_ = £1.44 per hour per knitting operative 
10 x 365 days x 24 hours 
___ --'=£"'1...,,0:.:0,::.0 __ = £0.01 per hour per finishing operative 
10 x 365 days x 24 hours 
There is clearly a large difference between the capital non-
utilization costs of knitting and finishing machinery and consequently 
these are important influences on demands for males and females given 
employers' perceptions, see 10.4.1. Capital utilization is also considered 
in chapter 12. 
9.2.2 (e) Time Constraint Costs (T) 
This element of the cost calculation allows for factory operating 
overheads that are especially incurred by the timing of daily work. The 
daily time cost function is: 
T = f(heating and lighting) 
Anomal ies can arise, because different groups can be present in the 
factory at the same time, but when a standardized work-week length prevails 
(in this case 40 hours) it allows normal daily operating costs to be 
overlooked for workgroup compari son purposes si nce these are basi c 
expenditures. When 8-hours of operation per day is ignored, a double-day 
shift imposes only 8-hours of extra operating costs daily and a 3-shift 
system imposes 16-hours. Twil i ght shifts, whi ch are ti med to take pl ace 
after normal daily times, impose 4 or 5-hours additional operating costs. 
However, when these overheads are already occasioned at those same times of 
day by a permanent shift they can be ignored because no expense is incurred 
specifically by twilight workers unless their different work areas are 
separately heated and 1 i ghted. Savi ngs of overhead expenses can be 
occasioned by the use of part-timers when they are the only workgroup 
employed, but when operating alongside full-timers, no overhead savings are 
made. 
The time constraint cost calculation is a relatively straightforward 
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matter for individual employers with electricity and other data to hand, 
but problematical in this context since factories of different size and 
layout were to be included to arrive at the average figure. However, it is 
accurate to 'ignore the normal 8-hour daily operation since sample 
establishments used full- and part-timers alongside each other and no 
savings of factory overheads were made by using homeworkers, all being 
factory producers. Thus, for true comparabil ity, only the 4 - 5 hours of 
twilight shift operation, and the 8 - 16 hours of overhead expenditure on 
double and treble-shift operations are missing from Table 9.1 due to 
difficulties in comparisons and insufficient data. 
9.2.2 (f) Place Constraint Costs (P) 
Transport assistance and factory overheads are the 'placE. of work' 
expenditures for factory workers, whi ch have al ready been accounted for 
under (B) fringe benefits (transport assistance},and (T) time constraints 
(factory overheads). Outstanding place constraint costs are those 
associated with homeworking. Thus, the place constraint cost function is: 
P = f(Work delivery. loss of product control} 
Inabil ity to attend factory premi ses means that work must be 
transported between factory and home. Where homeworkers perform this 
service themselves no cost is incurred by the employer, but in sample 
establishments the employers undertook. and absorbed the cost of, 
deliveries. Assessments of work delivery should include the driver's time 
and expenditure on the vehicle. Loss of control over the product could 
arise from lack of supervision and could manifest itself in two important 
ways: i.e. late return of work and repeat errors. However the effective 
wage has already allowed for performance aspects. and also, section 9.6 
shows there to be little overall difference in female performance levels. 
A notional 'employer anxiety cost' could arise from loss of control when 
order deadlines are looming, but estimation of this is fraught with 
difficulties and quantification in money terms is unrealistic. However. 
only one respondent considered there to be a consistent and serious loss of 
control over the product as a consequence of homeworking. probably because 
unsatisfactory persons had been used. 
Del ivery of work is therefore the outstanding expenditure item to be 
computed under the el ement (P). Del i very was normally by company van, 
typically a Ford Transit 1600. Most employers perceived deliveries to be 
"very expensi ve", yet none had exact knowl edge of costs or kept accurate, 
regul ar records. probably because vans were rarely wholly engaged in thi 5 
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service. Only 4 respondents were prepared to estimate the weekly cost per 
homeworker, and these are suppl ied in the extreme right column of Table 
9.2. To enable the author to undertake costings, respondents were asked to 
state the driver's wage, the time expended on collection and delivery each 
week,and weekly petrol consumption costs. Vehicle depreciation charges 
were too complex to assess without accurate data, and so have been 
deliberately overlooked, but individual employers could include these in 
their own calculations. For companies for which the respondents did not 
know the petrol consumption, it has been estimated from the residential 
distances of homeworkers from those factories, assuming return journeys and 
2 deliveries per week. Also embodied in the calculations of Table 9.2 are 
the following assessments: 
driver's wages at .£80 per 40-hour/week (the average of quoted rates); 
petrol at ,£1.27 per gallon, a typical charge for March 1980; 
vehicle mileage at 20 mpg, being the Ford Agent's assessment of a Transit's 
performance on short urban journeys. 
Table 9.2 details the calculations for each establishment from which 
data was available. It is seen that the computed average weekly 
homeworker del i very costs was .£3.71 (sd=1.61), although of course, 
"economies could be made by fewer deliveries. Respondent estimates averaged 
.£5.30 (sd=1.33) per homeworker. The author's own calculations for the same 
establishments averaged ,£4.91 (not shown in Table 9.2) which confirmed that 
the 4 respondents were 'more or less' accurate (i.e.8% higher) in their 
estimates. Work deliveries could therefore demand substantial weekly 
outlays if numerous homeworkers were used. 
9.2.3 Conclusions Regarding the Costs of Group Employment 
The. cost of labour calculation summarized in Table 9.1 represents the 
author's laborious attempt to compare the relative costs of widely varying 
workgroups when numerous cost incurring items are incorporated along with 
each group's performance characteristics and treatment received. Although 
itemized to the apparent precision of one pence, those sums are not 
intended to convey such accuracy but merely to show that the item under 
consideration imposed very small weekly per capita amounts as far as sample 
workers were concerned. The exercise was valuable in that it revealed the 
items of greatest co"~"~, and showed how thei r impact created workgroup cost 
differentials. It indicates that the employers' national insurance 
contribution was an important additional cost which overwhelmed the limited 
fringe benefit and training costs, but the most influential element in the 
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costing structure was the non-utilization of expensive capital equipment. 
Clearly it was much more costly to employ knitters on a full-time day, 
rather than a shift, basis. It should be remembered that most full-time day 
knitters worked substantial amounts of overtime, no doubt to reduce idle-
time as well as to increase earnings •. Overtime earnings are reflected in 
the effective wage, but overtime hours have not been deducted from non-
util ization hours because fai r comparisons demanded a stan~ar~!zed 40-hour 
week. The cost of non-util ization is therefore somewhat overstated for 
full-time knitters. Capital non-utilization costs caused knitters, 
regardless of their work-pattern, to be more costly than finishing 
operatives, and this was further exaggerated by higher male pay rates. 
Withi n the female segment, full-and part-timers were al most equally 
expensive to employ since they received the same pay rates; the slightly 
higher fringe benefits of full-timers largely offsetting the higher 
capital non-utilization cost of part-timers. Although twilight workers 
received the same pay rates they were comparatively less costly because no 
supervision charges were incurred and savings were made in capital non-
utilization and benefit costs. However, this may be a misleading impression 
because their time constraint cost element (T) was missing and this 
understated their expense. Homeworkers were the cheapest group, because low 
rates were often paid, few benefits offered, and no national insurance 
contributions made. These savings more than offset the cost of work 
delivery. The exercise has therefore demonstrated that homeworkers are a 
form of cheap labour. 
9.2.4 Conclusions Regarding Cost-minimizatfon 
Employers' choice of shift-workers for high-cost equipment provides 
strong evidence to support the cost-minimization assumption. Furthermore, 
if employers' cl ai ms were correct that most women were unable to work 
either shifts or regular overtime, then the exclusive use of males for 
knitting operations was an economically rational response, but as stated 
previously, the author is sceptical about this. However. confining women to 
the much more numerous, lower-paid, labour-intensive jobs is held to be an 
important cost-minimizing strategy because by doing so, different standards 
for setting skill grades and wage rates can be adopted and severence costs, 
influenced by wages, are contained. Indeed, employers are judged to be 
cost-minimisers with regard to other aspects of the employment 
relationship, such as recruitment via the EILM (7.1.2) and selection for 
redundancy (9.4.2). 
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Nevertheless, judging preference solely on the basis of workgroup 
costs, the rank implied was: 1 = homeworkers; 2 = twilight workers; equal 4 
= full- and part-timers, which might suggest that cost-minimization was 
unimportant because had it been, secondary workers could have been used in 
larger numbers than was the case. However, it should be remembered that 
variables other than costs requi re consideration for secondary groups (e.g. 
order deadlines, administration, supervision and the unsuitability of 
operations, see 12.5) and these can explain observed patterns of usage. 
Thus, when taking such a wider, long-term view, cost-minimization was seen 
to be a major employer objective, see also 10.3.1. 
9.3 STATED EMPLOYER PREFERENCE 
It had been anticipated that employers would prefer to select full-
timers at the expense of part-timers due to economies in capital 
utilization (see 1.5.4), but in some cases their first preference might be 
homeworkers shoul d they prove to be cheaper. Twi 1 i ght workers mi ght be 
preferred to a 'proper' shift system which wou1 d di srupt the daytime work 
pattern. Consequently. employers were asked to declare both their 
employee and their group preferences. 
9.3.1 Employer Preference Relating to Worker Characteristics 
9.3.1 (a) Selection Criteria 
In order not to 'lead' respondents, selection. questions were among the 
few open-ended in the interview schedule. It was anticipated that due to 
open-endedness there might be difficulties in analysing the generated data. 
It was also anticipated that. because of equal opportunity law. respondents 
might not be frank with respect to gender in selection processes. In the 
event. these difficulties did not materialize as clear 'understandings' 
.. . 
existed on the behalf of both employers and, apparently. employees 
regarding the. 'approprfate' gender for jobs. Oiscrfmfnator,y chofces on the 
basfs of sex durfng the selectfon intervfew did not arfse sfnce only 
members of the 'rfght' sex presented themselves. see 8.2.1(a): is simf1ar 
situation had been discovered in the pf10t study. 
Replies fell into three subject areas. these being: 
(n previous experience. or possession of a high degree of skill; 
(ff) the hours of verk being offered; and 
(:Hf). pers().Oal attributes which related to the physical and 
temperamental characteristics of the applicant. 
Table 9.3 lists all the characteristics that respondents said they 
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looked for in order to obtain "suitable" workers, and shows the number 
(percentage) of respondents who mentioned each characteristic. It shows 
that a heavy emphasis was placed on full-time hours, or on the need for 
part-timers to offer the maximum nUllber of hours that they could. All 
except 2 respondents said they had initially searched for full-timers, and 
only later modified the 40-hour per week requirement when full-timers could 
not be obtained. In all other respects the selection criteria for full-
and part-timers were identical and are therefore jointly indicated in Table 
9.3. In stark contrast, the secondary groups were required to be flexible 
in their offered hours, but in a downward direc"tfon. For both groups this 
took the form of temporary employment (Tables 9.6, 9.16) and additionally 
for homeworkers, variable and intermittent workloads, see Table 9.17. 
Homeworkers were also expected to be flexible upwards, particularly those 
who were engaged on skilled operations using machinery; they were often 
required to produce a given volume of work when it was available (see 
4.2.2 d) which meant that they too needed to offer a considerable number of 
hours per week, "in order to justify the retention of the machine and 
delivery of the work". 
Previous eX[lerience (incorporating notions of high levels of· skill and 
speed), was the most important selection criterion for daytime groups, and 
also for homeworkers on skilled operations. Less emphasis was generally 
placed on experience for selection to the secondary groups, because as 
explained, "operations performed are so simple that they can be learnt in a 
few hours and there is 1 ittl e 1 i ke 1 i hood of spoil age". To compl ement thi s, 
more emphasis was generally placed on trustworthiness, commitment, ability 
to work unsupervised, motivation and the maturity of workers. Many 
employers regarded age, marital status and financial pressure as indicators 
of motivation and application; chapter 10 considers the implications. 
The most important personal attribute for selection as a daytime factory 
worker was the Nabil1ty to fit inN with existing teams so as not to upset 
congenial relationships. This criterion was particularly prevalent in 
small companies where personal relations and pleasant atmospheres were 
considered to be of great importance to the throughput of work. Abilities 
to 'fit in' were also considered important for twilight workers, but not 
for homeworkers who had no personal contacts with establishments. 
Employers' assessments of existing workers' acceptance of appl icants were 
ultimately the bases of decisions to appoint. Appearances, applicants' 
bearing and good employment records were commonly the foundations of this 
assessment, but in companies located in the small settlements, respondents 
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and exi sti ng personnel were frequently acquai nted wi th appl i cants gi vi ng 
firmer grounds for judgements. Noteworthy was the practice at one small 
establishment where the manager, on the pretext of showing applicants the 
layout, conducted them around the factory in order to later eavesdrop 
before making the appointment decision. In small companies particularly, 
the selection process could be arbitrary; trained workers could be rejected 
in favour of the untrained. Nevertheless, these actions were motivated by 
a desire for productivity since shopfloor disagreements could ,lose output. 
Willingness to switch jobs during bottlenecks or lulls in activity was 
a characteristic looked for by small companies particularly in relation to 
male knitters. By relocation (i.e. job flexibility) small companies were 
given production flexibility to adapt to minor fluctuations. 
Regarding male selection, required characteristics were very similar 
to those for indoor females, although 'the number of hours' were not an 
issue since 98% of the male sample worked the basic weekly hours, and often 
more. Previous experience was emphasised as was a good employment record, 
by which respondents meant long periods with each employer. They wished to 
avoid appointing habitual job-changers, a characteristic associated with 
youths. Respondents commonly' stated a preference for married men with 
families because. they "tended to be more stable", "needed the money", and 
were "happy to work extra hours". 
In summary; regardless of workgroup, employers always looked for 
previous experience for all operations, particularly those requiring high 
skill. The number of hours offered was important when selecting for the 
part-time group; ability to achieve a 'high' (e.g. 35 hours) lower limit 
being a requirement for appointment in several companies. Less emphasis 
was placed on twilight hours because these workers were considered to have 
no difficulty in meeting the low hours requirement. Homeworkers' hours 
were not an issue since they were unknown; provided they returned their 
work on time it appeared to be of no concern to employers how many hours 
they had worked. However, they were expected to accept fl exi bi 1 i ty at the 
discretion of employers in the amounts of work done, (see 9.3.2(b)) 
which by implication meant flexibility of hours. Most emphasis was placed 
on the personal attributes of twilighters and homeworkers, particularly on 
commitment to work, motivation to be productive, and the ability to work 
unsupervised. The anticipated ability to maintain harmonious 
relationships was a highly important selection criterion for all indoor 
workers. 
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9.3.1 (b) Order of Importance of Selection Criteria 
Table 9.4 shows the relative order of importance attached to three 
dimensions of selection criteria. The order was derived by counting the 
number of respondents mentioning characteristics under each topic heading. 
It has been assumed that since respondents were being probed, the greater 
the number of different respondents referri ng to a characteri sti c the more 
important that characteri sti c was. For exampl e, with respect to dayt i me 
females, previous experience and high levels of skill were mentioned by 79% 
of the respondents' sample whereas both hours and various aspects of 
personal attributes were cited by 75% of respondents. Although very close, 
previous experience has been ranked as slightly more important than hours 
and personal attributes for daytime females. This ranking is consistent 
with employers' willingness to modify demands for 40 hours in order to 
acqui re employees wi th appropri ate abil iti es, but the closeness of hours 
and personal attribute criteria suggest that appointed part-timers would be 
persuaded to offer maximum hours since these were indicators of the volume· 
of work that coul d be produced, especi ally when supervi sors coul d exert 
control over the efforts applied. It is likely that applicants without the 
prescri bed characteri st i cs woul d not be consi dered seri ously judgi ng from 
the importance attached to personal attributes. 
The most important selection criteria' for twilighters and homeworkers 
were personal attri butes. Thi s demonstrated employers' bel i efs that personal 
characteristics indicating self-application were important determinants of 
product i vity when workers were unsupervi sed. Age, maturity, fi nanci al need 
(see 10.5),previous associations with the firm, and even appearance were 
regarded as important indicators. Twilight workers had to be particularly 
trustworthy since it was imperative that they should not steal output nor 
damage expensive machinery when unsupervised. Hours were therefore of 
lesser importance in the selection of twilight workers. 
An association appeared to prevail between the order of selection 
characteristics and the levels of supply (Figure 5:2). Employees in short 
supply were searched for more widely (Section 7.1) and their skill levels 
were the most important criterion; in these ci rcumstances personal 
attributes had to be sacrificed in order to acquire personnel with 
satisfactory abilities. When appl icants were sufficiently numerous to 
permit greater discernment, employers could select on the basis of personal 
attributes since skills which were more readily available became less of an 
issue, although not less important. This suggests that if full-timers had 
been in excess, their personal attributes would then have become a more 
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important selection criterion. This hypothesis is illustrated by the lower 
importance attached to the previous experience of the secondary groups, for 
as the training analysis shows (9.4.1), most homeworkers were already 
experienced when appointed. 
9.3.2 Employer Preferences 
9.3.2 (a) Stated Workgroup Preference 
Respondents overwhelmingly indicated that they preferred full-time to 
part-time workers (23 out of 25), see Table 9.5. They claimed that they 
always searched for full-timers first, and then selected part-timers if no 
full-timers were attracted. Only one employer deliberately sought part-
timers from preference, and the one remaining respondent had no preferences 
because his company and workloads were so small that he did not desire any 
factory females at all. However, 3 respondents stated that they 
occasionally wanted part-timers for operations for which there was little 
overall demand, but this was relatively rare. 
With respect to preference between factory employees and homeworkers, 
the outcome was again quite decisive. All (except the one respondent 
without factory females) preferred indoor daytime groups to secondary 
groups, but there were mit i gat i ng ci rcumstances that resulted in 
qual ifi cat ions to thi s general statement. For instance, whi 1 e some 
establishments resorted to twilight and homeworkers intermittently. 
others. for a variety of reasons, maintained either the twilight or the 
homeworker group as a permanent feature. see Table 9.6. Consequently. 
'effective' demands for the twilight workers and homeworkers were more 
complex than a simple statement of preference could indicate. Table 9.6 
shows more responses for homeworkers than respondents because contradictory 
answers were obtained referring to different market conditions and 
homeworker operations. There were a variety of influences affecting 
demand for the secondary groups: a detailed analysis of these is reserved 
until 13.5.2. Homeworkers were apparently preferred to twilight workers 
since 50% of respondents regarded some. or all. of their homeworkers as 
permanent relative to 33% who so regarded twilight workers. Furthermore. 
11 (44%) establ ishments had never used a twilight shift in comparison to 
only 2 (8%) that had never used homeworkers. The stated preferred order 
was therefore: Fw=l; Pw=2; Hw=3; Tw=4. 
9.3.2(b) Stated Preference for Work Allocation 
Respondents were asked to rank the workgroups in the order of their 
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desire to supply work when it was in short supply, see Table 9.7. As H&K 
industries were subjected to seasonal fluctuations such work allocation 
decisions were taken in practice, but only female groups were ranked since 
male workgroups were complements rather than substitutes. Rankings ranged 
from most preferred (rank 1) to least preferred (rank 4). A least (or 
joint least) preferred rank has been assigned to workgroup(s) that were not 
used by particular establishments. The mean rank, which gives the rank 
order of preference with respect to work allocation, has been calculated 
from these stated and assigned ranks: standard deviations indicate the 
levels of disagreement regarding each group's ranking. Results show that 
full-timers were the most preferred workgroup, but were closely followed by 
part-timers (1.12 versus 1.16). Homeworkers were more preferable than 
twilight workers, but there was more disagreement with respect to the 
homeworker ranking. The stated preference rank for work allocation was 
thus: 1 = ful)-timers; 2 = part-timers; 3 = homeworkers; and 4 = twilight 
workers. 
9.3.3 Conclusions on Stated Preference 
The preference rank order for the allocation of work confirmed and 
expanded the stated group preference fi ndi ngs of Table 9.S whi ch i mpl i ed 
that generally only full-time workers would have been employed had they 
been available. Supply of full-time females was lower than demand 
(S.2.1(b», and hence employers resorted to part-t i mers as thei r second-
best alternative. The over supply of part-timers, who were preferred to 
the twilight workers and homeworkers, indicated that use of these secondary 
groups had not resulted from an inability to satisfy preference for part-
timers. Influences other than supply must therefore have encouraged the 
use of twilight workers and homeworkers. Further evidence for such 
influences was provided by patterns of temporary demand and by the downward 
flexibility of hours which was in sharp contrast to the permanency of 
employment offered to daytime groups, and by the setting of 'high' lower 
limits to the number of hours acceptable from part-timers. Nevertheless, 
the relatively low number of twilight workers and homeworkers used 
indicated that their numbers were deliberately limited because excesses 
existed which would have premitted a larger number to be recruited had 
employers so desired. This provided evidence to confirm the stated 
preference for indoor workers, and suggested that the 'cheap labour' motive 
was not the overriding feature of demand for either twilight workers or 
homeworkers. 
9 - 17 
9.4 GROUP PREFERENCE IMPLIED BY EMPLOYER'S ACTIONS 
The author believes there is much truth in the statement, "actions 
speak louder than words". Thus, to avoid naivety it was considered 
important to check stated preferences against employer actions to test 
whether words and actions complied or conflicted. Examining conditions of 
service had the additional advantage of establishing relative workgroup 
treatment which was useful for identifying any discriminatory practices, 
but it was recognised that discrepancies between stated and implied 
preference could arise as employers were constrained in their ability to 
exercise preferential choices. Consequently, lack of choice has been 
addressed throughout the text as appropriate. It was anticipated that 
employers would provide training, and would hoard labour as first discussed 
by Oi 185, but that these strategies, and the provision of facilities, would 
be adopted only for preferred 1 abour. Consequently, di fferent transport 
provision, and training, redundancies, and workload levels would be 
expected. Sub-sections 9.4.1 to 9.4.6 consider these conditions of 
service and 9.4.7 draws conclusions regarding implied preference. 
9.4.1 Training 
9.4.1 Ca) Methods and Levels of Training 
It was envisaged that to attract recruits with the preferred 
attributes and work patterns, employers would be willing to invest in 
training and it was expected that the training costs would be lower for the 
less preferred workers and workgroups because employers were seen as cost-
minimizers who would avoid costs wherever possible and reduce training to a 
minimum. Absolute levels of training would therefore be affected by the 
supply of potenti al workers. If an employer was indifferent among 
workgroups he woul d select experienced workers from any group rather than 
provide training. Thus differential training levels could be indicators of 
group preference, particularly if the jobs performed required generalized 
transferable skill. 
It was also recognised that types of training would be affected by the 
nature of the operation, with lower skilled operations requiring shorter 
periods; differential training levels could therefore indicate skill 
differences and for this see 8.2.2(a)(i). Employers were asked to detail 
their methods training (classified as methods A to D below) and the number 
of workers trained by these methods. Results are given in Tables 9.8 for 
males and 9.9 for females, while the intensiveness of training has been 
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shown in Table 9.10. 
Key to Methods of Training 
Method A ~ No Training 
EMPLOYER PREFERENCE 
The personnel recruited were previously experienced. 
Method 8 ~ Demonstration Only 
Short demonstrations cou1 d be used to train previously experienced 
personnel who needed only slight revision for proficiency, or for 
training inexperienced workers to be employed on simple operations. 
To distinguish between these two reasons for demonstration only, the 
former is classed as Method B1 and the latter as Method 82. 
Method 81: experienced operatives needed only intermittent attention 
over a period of time, equivalent to approximately 1 day of cont-
inuous undivided attention. 
Method 82: used for inexperienced operatives recruited to semi-
skilled operations such as drawthreading, trimming of loose ends, sock 
turning, labelling, folding and bagging. Total training approximated 
to the equivalent of 2 days continuous undivided attention. 
Method C ~ On-the-Job Training 
Method C inyo1ved other operatives or supervisors teaching recruits 
over substantial periods in the production environment. This method 
was used for both skilled and semi-skilled jobs. 
Method 0 ~ Factory School 
Factory schools, present only in large establishment, were used as an 
alternative to method C to train for skilled and semi-skilled jobs. 
Methods C and 0 were appropriate for knitting and all other male 
operations, and for female operations such as 10ckstitching, over10cking, 
pressing, examining, linking, toe-closing and mending. The duration of 
training varied according to operation, see 9.4.1(b) for assessments by 
type of job. 
Data were missing for 62 (18%) 40-hour/week males (Sm+Fm), this being 
due to lack of knowledge regarding the training of long-standing 
employees, the exclusion of 3 self-employed proprietors who performed the 
knitting operations themselves and shortages of time during interviews. 
Shift and full-time knitters were aggregated because it was done on both 
work patterns, but knitters regardless of work pattern, have been shown 
separately from males on other operations to show the different training 
patterns. Table 9.9 indicates a full response rate for females and 3 
respondents additionally answered for a further 4 homeworkers who, though 
receiving no work during the interview week, were "still on the books"; 
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this increased the homeworker sample to 131. 
Male operations other than knitting had functions that were largely 
firm-specific, $ince distinctive factory layouts and methods necessitated 
on-the-job training to become familiar with the peculiarities of each 
establishment. Table 9.8 therefore shows a high level of training (93%) for 
these male operations. Qualitative data indicated that this did not 
indicate a preference for male full-timers over knitters since they were 
not substitutes. 
Comparison of Table 9.8 with 9.9 shows that a slightly higher 
percentage of knitters than full-time female operatives had been trained 
(67% versus 62%). Again this did not indicate preference since these 
groups were not sUbstitutes and both were equally necessary, but higher 
levels of training for men could reflect less employer resistance due to 
the ability to retain them longer than females, see 9.6.6. 
All female groups were directly comparable, and thus differential 
training investment could indicate a preference ranking. FUll-timers were 
apparently preferred to part-timers and twil i ght workers to homeworkers. 
The lower level of training for part-timers relative to full-timers was 
influenced by their over supply which gave employers opportunity to recruit 
previ ously experienced personnel; ita 1 so supported the stated preference 
for full-timers because employers could have saved some training 
expenditure by recruiting part-timers. Nevertheless, 110 (23%) part-
timers had been trained on-the-job and 77 (16%) had been trained in factory 
schools. These statistics are higher than could be expected for a second-
best alternative and might indicate some indifference between full- and 
part-timers. 
Qualitative data showed that the higher training of twilight workers 
relative to homeworkers arose because twllighter selection criteria (Table 
9.3) were more heavily biased towards personal characteristics than 
previous experience. Trustworthiness was particularly important since 
twilight workers had to be trusted not to steal finished garments or damage 
expensive machinery while present in the factories during the absence of 
supervisors and other workers. Employers' willingness to train a 
relatively high proportion (albeit a small number) in order to obtain "the 
right kind of person" could be seen as economically rational given the 
peculiar circumstances of their employment and the opportunities they had 
for theft. The only trai ni ng given to homeworkers was a demonstration of 
the operation, and this for simple operations only. Two thirds of 
homeworkers had been previously experienced when recruited which reflects 
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both mobility through the female groups and restrictive recruitment 
stipulations relating to skill/experience. Consequently, the rank order of 
preference implied by the proportion of workers trained was: l=males; 2=Fw; 
3=Tw; 4=Pw; 5=Hw. 
9.4.1 (b) Training Investment per Workgroup 
Total investment per group, summarized in Table 9.10, has been 
calculated by multiplying the number of workers trained by each method 
(Tables 9.8 and 9.9) by the assessed duration of each method, and by 
assuming that the skill composition of each sub-group was in the proportion 
shown in Tabl e 8.4. 
Employers stated that training for the knitting operations could take, 
for proficiency, between 6 months and 2 years, the longer period being 
either a safeguard to protect expensive machinery from damage by immature 
youths, or because the establishment's product demand necessitated re-
setting machinery for different gauge products at various times of the year 
which meant that a whole year was worked before the full range was 
encountered. It could take up to 4 months to train finishing operatives. 
However, in each case these periods reflected the practice required to 
" achieve proficiency rather than learn the job, so some of the time did not 
require the attention of a trainer. To derive the training investment it 
has been assumed that on-the-job and factory school training took the same 
lengths of time. The following training durations for methods C and 0 
formed the basis of the calculations of training investment and of the 
costs of training, and reflect the accumulated periods of organized 
instruction involving the undivided attention of a trainer. They do· not 
reflect the subsequent acquisition of dexterity deriving from prolonged 
practice which was more appropriately regarded as the gaining of 
experience. 
Knitters: 2 weeks continuous attention, plus 5 further weeks at 201 
attention, plus further intermittent attention for 6 months, equivalent to 
4 weeks continuous undivided attention. 
Skilled full-tfme males: 2 weeks continuous attention, plus a further 5 
weeks at 201, equalling 3 weeks continuous undivided attention. 
Semf-skilled males: the equivalent of 1 week of continuous attention. 
Skilled females: as for males, i.e. 2 weeks continuous undivided attention 
plus 5 weeks at 201, equalling 3 weeks continuous undivided attention. 
Semf-skilled females: the equivalent of 1 week of continuous attentfon. 
Table 9.10 clearly illustrates the variation in employer willingness 
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to invest in the training of inexperienced workers. It supplements Tables 
9.8 and 9.9 by showing that almost twice the total investment had been sunk 
into. full-time compared to part-time females, and that, per capita, 
training was 50% higher (Fw=1.5 weeks; Pw=1.0 week). Twil ight and 
homeworkers received negl i gible total amounts, al though twil i ght workers 
ranked only slightly less than full-timers in the per capita levels. Male 
knitters received almost twice the per capita investment of full-time 
females. Thus, the rank order of preference implied by levels of training 
investment was: l=Sm+Fm; 2=Fw; 3=Tw; 4=Pw; and 5=Hw. 
9.4.2 Redundancy levels and Procedures 
9.4.2 (a) Redundancy levels 
Redundancy figures quoted were complicated by responses received from 
2 establ ishments which operated within larger Company Groups that 
manufacturing in several locations. These companies were only able to 
quote the Group rather than establishment statistics, but many 
redundancies had occurred outside the LLM. One of these had made a 50% 
reduction in its workforce over the previous 7 year period, mainly outside 
the LLM (i.e. an ~verage of 7.14% p.a.) The other had reduced by 6% over a 
10 year period (i.e. 0.6% p.a.). Establ ishments belonging to these Company 
Groups have been eliminated from Table 9.11, but had they been included it 
woul d have yi el ded an average percentage redundancy 1 evel of 1.97% 
(sd=2.31) per annum for daytime females. 
No establishment was able to quote separate figures for full- and 
part-timers, but all claimed there to be an equal incidence. However, 3 
companies stated that retirement age workers were severed first, and since 
the over-60s were more heavily present in the part-time group, that group 
would sustain a higher impact. Mean percentage redundancy levels, shown in 
Table 9.11, tend to conceal actual practices. Redundancies tended to occur 
spasmodically, and it was usual for establishments to experience no 
redundancies for several years and then to have a spate of them. In fact, 
17 of the 24 establishments that employed daytime females (71%) had 
incurred no redundancies over a 10 year period. Nevertheless, the mean 
percentage redundancy level is intended to provide a basis for workgroup 
comparisons. Taking the lowest redundancy level as an indication of most 
preferred status (i.e.rank I), stated group redundancy levels suggest that 
the rank order for redundancy was: 1 = twi 1 i ght workers; 2 = homeworkers; 3 
= full- and part-timers, but this ranking is in direct opposition to 
stated group preferences (section 9.3). 
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However, stated redundancy figures conceal more than they reveal. It 
was frequently remarked that twilight workers were "seasonal workers" and 
in several companies it was usual to engage them on a temporary basis (see 
Table 9.6). By definition therefore, they were not made redundant; thefr 
contract of employment merely expired. A definitfonal problem also arose 
with respect to homeworkers who were always regarded as self-employed; 
employers therefore did not regarded them as 'redundant'. In thfs 
research, redundancy has been regarded as the non-availability of work, and 
the '1 aying-off' of workers. 
A more accurate reflection was obtained by asking whether 
establishments had employed any twilight workers or homeworkers durfng the 
previous 5 year period, and if so, how many. They were also asked the 
maximum number they would be willing to employ. Considerable redundancy 
levels were indicated by the results, see Table 9.12, but there were no 
such 'implied' redundancies of daytime workers who were never regarded as 
either temporary or self employed. If the 'implied redundancy levels for 
twilight and homeworkers are ranked with the stated redundancy levels of 
daytime workers, then the rank order of redundancies is as shown in Table 
9.13, which broadly coincides with the stated preferences of 9.3. 
All establishments that had previously employed either twilight 
workers and homeworkers had made some of these workers redundant whereas 
daytime females (in 17 establishments) had not been subjected to 
redundancies during the previous 10 years (Table 9.11). This situation 
clearly revealed a wide divergence in the redundancy treatment of the 
daytime and the secondary workgroups. 
There was a clear distinction between twilight workers and homeworkers 
regarding the maximum number that respondents would be willing to use. No !--- - - --- ---- ----. ----- -- - --- --- -- - -'" 
respondent was prepared to employ more than 10 twilighters simultaneously.l-
Si x was the desi red maxi mum, whi 1 e 12 establ i shments had no previ ous I 
J 
experience of twil ight workers. Five establishments usually used 6 
twilight workers, one employed 4, while 6 others normally had only 3 
workers. In sharp contrast, 11 establishments had no upper limit to the 
number of homeworkers they would use should the throughput of work require 
them. One small company had employed 90 homeworkers in the pos't second 
world war era on domestic-type, hand-knitting machines making specialized 
high quality socks. With respect to redundancy, it is noteworthy that at 
the time of interview, this number had dwindled to 10 because the fashion 
for such socks had largely passed. The company appeared willing to allow 
this output range to die, since they experienced great -difficulty fn 
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getting younger workers who would persevere to obtain the required 
painstaking precision for this type of manufacture. It was suspected by the 
author however, that another influence was that pay rates were too low to 
attract other than the elderly to this work; the respondent avoided 
revealing these particular pay rates. Despite this lack of an absolute 
upper 1 imit to homeworker employment. most establishments preferred not to 
employ more than 30 (due to delivery problems associated with vehicle 
capacity); 6 aimed to keep numbers below ten. The low maximum for 
twilight workers, contrasted with lack of an upper limit for homeworkers 
further confirms the stated preference for work allocation to homeworkers 
(Table 9.71. 
9.4.2 Cb) Procedure to Determine Specific Redundancies 
Redundancy could stem from a variety of causes. It could result from 
poor sales of a particular line of goods, or range of products, which 
incorporated operations that were exclusive to the product styles; in such 
circumstances the personnel performing these operations would be 
particularly pinpointed for redundancy and their group memberships would be 
of no significance. Alternatively. it coul d arise from rational ization. 
or from cycl ical 'or seasonal fluctuations that caused an overall drop in 
product demand, and this could lead to a general shedding of labour; this 
section addresses itself to these general redundancy situations. 
Redundancy procedures have been termed either formal or informal. 
When a regular routine was followed, or an agreed. or clearly understood, 
wri tten or oral formul a was adopted. the procedure was cl assed as 
formal ized. Arbitrary choices or discretionary patterns of selection 
with no agreed or understood procedures were those termed informal. If, 
as suggested185, preferred 1 abour was hoarded, then redundancy procedures 
applying to preferred groups would be carefully structured while those for 
less preferred would be informal. FUll-time females would be expected to 
have formal procedures whil e the 1 ess-than-full-t ime groups woul d face 
arbitrary ones. 
Table 9.14 itemizes methods and data relating to redundancy 
procedures. Approximately 50% of the core male and female groups had 
formal redundancy procedures, the remaining workers facing informal 
procedures because, it was claimed. redundancies had not arisen in their 
factories. In antithesis, informal procedures were adopted for all workers 
in the secondary groups. Method (b) was the most highly structured formal 
procedure in which the selection pattern was to first remove the over-
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reti rement age workers and then the shorter servi ce workers. However, 
replies often carried the rider that personal performances regarding 
absenteeism, quality of work and commitment to work were considered 
alongside this selection pattern. Persons over state-retirement age did 
not qual ify for statutory redundancy payments, and neither did teenagers 
who were 1 ikely to be among the "1 ast in", so such redundancy selection 
served cost-minimizing objectives by avoiding redundancy payments. 
Redundancy payment levels were dependent on age and length of service (see 
page 2-24) and thus the common practice of selecting "last in, first out", 
in addition to being a cost-minimizing strategy, was also a method of 
hoardi ng persons wi th most on-the-j ob experi ence and 1 oya lty. Method (b) 
protected the full-time, middle-aged employees who were normally in 
particularly short supply by ensuring that they generally fell outside the 
cri teri a adopted. Although "1 ast in, fi rst out" pract ices di sadvantaged 
young employees, this was further reinforced by the poor performance 
criteri a for redundancy sel ecti on, see young person performances in 10.5. 
Figure 6:1 shows that over-retirement age females were more numerous in the 
part-time group and consequently redundancies would have a disproportionate 
impact on part-timers relative to other groups. 
Establishments quoting methods (c) and (e) for twilight workers and 
homeworkers were among those claiming to provide permanent employment 
(Table 9.6), but 7 others claiming permanency used them only for overspill 
reasons and had not experienced general redundancy situations in the recent 
past. Method (e) cushioned the secondary workgroups more than did method 
(f) and therefore preferential treatment of twilight workers was implied by 
the greater proportion who were subject to method (e). Twil ight workers 
have thus been ranked third in the implied preference ranking of females 
in Tabl e 9.14. 
This review of redundancy procedures demonstrates that twilight 
workers and homeworkers were used to cushion the employment of female 
daytime factory workers. 
9.4.2 (c) Redundancy Pay 
The legal framework of redundancy was established by the EPCA, and the 
RPA set a payment scale depending on age and length of service. Collective 
agreements could be exempted provided that negotiated payments were in 
excess of the statutory minimum. Respondents were asked whether ability to 
negot i ate enhanced payments va ri ed by workgroup and Tabl e 9.15 indi cates 
that no establishment had paid, or was willing to pay, more than the 
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statutory minimum payment to any worker. Thus, the core male and female 
groups received only the statutory minima, but particular individuals might 
not qual ify for these, such as the elderly part-time men. Confusion arose 
respecting twilight workers: one respondent claiming that the EPCA did not 
apply, another that twilight workers did not work the qual ifying periods, 
while 3 were uncertain because redundancy had not arisen. All 22 
respondents were fully aware that the EPCA exempted self-employed persons, 
and thus their home workers. Technically, as self-employed, homeworkers 
could not be made redundant and were thus ineligible for redundancy pay. 
-Differential redundancy payments were therefore determined entirely by 
1 aw, see 11.4.2. 
9.4.3 Variability of Work 
Workloads could vary intermittently such that employees had seasons, 
weeks or days without any work. Alternatively regular work could vary in 
intensity because the amounts supplied were variable. 
9.4.3 (a) Intermittency of Work 
The rank order of redundancies (Table 9.13) and the stated employment 
patterns (Table 9.6) revealed that the work supp1 ied to twil ight workers 
and homeworkers was substantially more intermittent than that given to the 
other workgroups. Of the 12 establishments that had employed twilight 
workers, only 5 were employing them in the interview week. The duration 
of twilight shifts is shown in Table 9.16 and reveals that the average 
period for which twil ight workers had been employed was only 17.5 months. 
Indeed, the maximum period over which a twilight shift had been in 
operation was only 36 months and this included companies claiming them to 
be "permanent" features. The respondent claiming permanency after only one 
month had just experi mentally switched from homeworkers, whom he found 
unre1 iab1e, to twilight workers. 
Five different establishments had a total of at least 12 regular 
homeworkers who had received no work during the interview week, and it was 
observed that when 3 further establishments referred to their records only 
about half of those 1 isted had received work that week. Several 
respondents volunteered that twil ight workers and homeworkers were 
deliberately used intermittently and the terms, "casual labour", ."not 
permanent", "a buffer", "for bottlenecks", "an overflow", "top-up labour" 
were used to descri be both groups. The practi ce of ha vi ng "a hardcore" of 
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favourite "good" homeworkers, who were retained and supplied with work when 
the"less favoured"were not, indicated that individuals employed by the same 
establishment could have different workload patterns. 
The H&K industry is prone to short-time working situations; 8 
establishments (32%) indicating that short-time wor.king had occurred in 
the recent past. To alleviate its obvious disadvantages the union had 
negoti ated an enhanced guaranteed weekly payment system, see 1l.2.l(a) and 
short-time working was widely perceived as a strategy preferable to 
redundancy. Cl early, the intermittency of work suppl ied to the secondary 
workgroups protected the employment of daytime factory workers by evening-
out thei r supp 1 i es of work. The common pract i ce of us i ng each of the 
secondary workgroups to produce the 'peak' of output helped employers to 
contain the number of core workers since additional recruits during gluts 
of work could be avoided. Such limitation of core worker numbers 
effectively delayed the necessity for short-time working because fewer 
persons needed to share the available work. 
In sUllmary, the core workgroups occasionally had intermittency in 
their work supplies, but the guaranteed payments scheme cushioned them from 
the worst effects. Employers further cushioned core work groups by using 
.. 
the secondary workgroups to produce 'top of the peak' output which reduced 
the need for additional workers whose employment would subsequently be 
unstable. This strategy minimized the intermittency of work supplied to 
core workers and maximized its effect on twilighters and homeworkers. see 
al so 9.4.3(b) below. 
9.4.3 (b) Variability in the Amounts of Work Supplied 
Employers were asked to grade the variability in the amounts of work 
supplied to the different workgroups in order to test the stated 
preference for work supply (Table 9.7) and indicate whether employers were 
able to exercise their preferences. If the secondary groups were utilized 
to cushion factory employment, then the volume of work supplied to them 
woul d be the most irregular. 
Company demand varied according to the product; for instance, one 
establishment producing infant knitwear had no fluctuation since babies 
were born at all times of year, whereas the demand for fashion knitted 
outerwear (ladies' jumpers, cardigans and dresses etc.) exhibited high 
degrees of seasonability. Table 9.17 has been arranged so that the least 
variable pattern appears in the left hand column and most variable on the 
right. All establishments that varied seasonally also experienced cyclical 
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variations. 
The workloads of full- and part-timers were identical and this 
contrasted with the stated desire to supply full-timers in preference to 
part-timers (9.3.2(b». Identical treatment arose because full- and part-
timers could not be differentiated in practice since they were interspersed 
along the production line. This way of organizing production (4.4 \ meant 
that employers were prevented from exercising their stated preference, but 
willingness to so organize it suggests preference to be slighL 
Table 9.17 shows that daytime factory workers and twilight workers had 
very similar workload patterns. Twelve (50%) establishments provided 296 
(28%) daytime females with regular workloads which suggests that the 
smaller companies were more easily able to adapt to changing product 
markets as ICC169 suggest. Medium sized companies 12% gave daytime women 
workloads that varied only annually. However, workloads varied seasonally 
for 620 (60%) daytime females in 9 (37.5%) establishments which suggests 
that larger establishments had more variable demand patterns. For none of 
the daytime or twilight women did workloads vary weekly. By comparison, 
homeworkers had very variable workloads. Weekly variations were the usual 
patterns for 96 (69%) homeworkers who were employed by 17 (77%) 
establishments, the intermittency of breaks often being of short duration. 
A further 14 (10%) had workloads that varied seasonally, while only 29 
(21%) homeworkers, who were engaged on operations not performed inside 
their 3 factories, had regular amounts of work suppl ied to them because 
thei r output was rel i ed upon. 
These workload variation patterns suggest that the smaller 
establ ishments which employed proportionately more homeworkers (see 4.5) 
and provided daytime women with regular workloads were transferring the 
variability onto homeworkers to cushion the indoor component as suggested 
in 1.9. Some of the smaller employers remarked that they were "unable to 
carry the slack" to the same extent as larger companies due to their lower 
resource levels; thus they tended to under- rather than over-man and resort 
to the secondary workgroups which were easily laid off. These practices 
help to indicate why there were greater proportions of homeworkers attached 
to smaller companies and they had higher redundancy figures and weekly 
workload variations. 
Regarding twilight workers, even though claimed as an "overflow 
workforce" because extra factory expenses were incurred by their presence, 
it was economically rational to keep them fully occupied whilst in use. 
This explains the similarity of their workload patterns to those of the 
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daytime females. This pattern of twilight worker usage meant that breaks 
in work supplied were of fairly long duration (i.e. several months or 
years). Consequently, homeworkers were often attached to one company for 
many years, whereas twi1 ight workers were frequently lost to their 
employing estab1 ishments. It is concluded therefore that the rank 
order implied by workloads supplied was: =1 = full-timers and part-timers; 
3 = twilight workers and 4 = homeworkers with rank 1 being the least 
variable. 
Employers' stated preferences for daytime rather than secondary groups 
was demonstrated by the intermittency in employment and the variability of 
workloads. Data analysed in this section therefore confirms the 
preliminary hypothesis that secondary workers were used to cushion the 
employment of daytime factory workers. 
9.4.4 Dismissal Procedures 
Table 9.18 details the dismissal procedures that were in operation in 
sample establishments. Standard procedures were as laid down in the EPCA, 
but 5 establishments claimed to be prepared to give more warnings and be 
more 1 eni ent than was requi red by the Act but only with respect to core 
employees. Lack of formalism was apparent in several establishments this 
being demonstrated by 4 respondents who "did not know" what the procedures 
were. Of the 19 stati ng that the EPCA "does not apply" to homeworkers. only 
2 estab1 ishments (employing 13 homeworkers) were prepared to give written 
warnings before dismissals; 17 merely told homeworkers that there was "no 
more work". The implied preference rank as assessed by dismissal procedures 
was as shown at the foot of Table 9.18. 
9.4.5 Transport Provision 
Sub-section 5.3.1 showed that all the private bus schemes were 
primarily aimed at attracting full-time women, and that only 3 part-timers 
were able to benefit by a one di rectiona1 journey per day. This showed 
that only a few employers transmitted their stated preferences into 
actions, but its apparently limited success (see Figure 5:3) probably 
dissuaded most employers from adopting it. Twilight workers had never 
been offered any transport assistance by any establishment, but in 
contrast, all except 5 homeworkers had their work delivered and paid for by 
their employer, this being the equivalent of transport assistance for 
factory labour. This work delivery meant that a higher proportion of 
homeworkers than factory workers were able to benefit at the employer's 
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expense, and consequently homeworkers have been ranked first with respect 
to preference imp1 i ed by transport assi stance. The preference ranki ng was: 
1 = homeworkers; 2 = full-timers; 3 = part-timers: and 4 = twilight 
workers. 
9.4.6 Numbers Employed 
Temporarily disregarding stated 1 eve1 s of supply, workgroup preference 
cou1 d a1 so be indicated by the number of workers actually used. A rank 
order was implied by overall group percentages, but these gave little 
indication of the differences in usage by establishments. Differences were 
reflected by assigning a rank to each group, relative to its percentage in 
each estab1 ishment's workforce, and then calculating the mean and standard 
deviation of these assigned ranks, see Table 9.19 for both measures. 
Whereas the secondary groups were ranked similarly by both measures, fu11-
and part-timers were reversed. This cou1 d indicate that some employers were 
unable to exercise their preferences for full-timers (which supply data 
tended to confirm, section 5.2), or it could indicate only a slight 
preference for full-timers (which analysis of employer perceptions also 
tended to confirm, section 10.4). It is contended therefore that both these 
inferences are correct and that although employers preferred full-timers, 
should they not get them they were not particularly daunted by selecting 
part-timers, especially if their choice was between young, immature full-
timers and mature, committed part-timers. 
9.4.7 Conclusions Regarding Preference Implied by Actions 
An overall rank order for imp1 ied female group preference as derived 
from employers' actions has been calculated in Table 9.20 by averaging the 
ranks derived by the foregoing analyses. This overall rank indicates that 
full-timers were preferred to part-timers although there was merely a half 
mean rank between them. Daytime factory workers, the core of each 
workforce, were clearly preferred to the secondary workgroups when judged 
by the treatment they received, as was revealed by at least 1.5. mean rank 
gaps between them. Twilight workers and homeworkers were shown to be, on 
average, almost equally ranked with respect to preference judged by 
actions; they both received equally poor treatment when compared with to 
daytime females, but on balance, homeworkers were slightly more favoured 
and marginally preferred to twi1 ight workers. 
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9.S CONSISTENCY OF mE STATED AND IMPLIED GROUP PREFERENCES 
VIm mE COSTING ANAlYSIS 
A comparison of the stated and implied female group preferences leads 
to the general conclusion that employers were as good as their words and 
translated stated preferences into actions whenever practicable. The 
daytime group was clearly preferred to the secondary groups, as is 
evidenced by full- and part-timers rarely ranking either 3rd or 4th. There 
appeared to be some indifference between the full- and part-timers, 
particularly in the variability of workloads, and some further indifference 
was apparent between the twilight and homeworkers. 
However, stated and impli ed preference ranki ngs raise questions 
regarding the effective demands for the secondary workgroups because an 
excess supply of potenti al part-t imers woul d have enab led employers to 
exercise their preferences for part-timers by avoiding twilight workers 
and homeworkers altogether. That 141 secondary workers had been recruited 
suggests peculiar influences on secondary workgroup usage. Qual itative 
data were helpful in interpreting preference results and were particularly 
useful in the clarification of such influences in chapter 12. 
The cost of labour analysis proffered completely opposing conclusions 
to those from stated and implied preference rankings. Although, employers 
appeared to be cost-minimizers with respect to male and female labour 
choices, they apparently did not practice cost-minimization in their 
selection of the female workgroups. Had they been more cost-conscious they 
woul d have recruited fi rstly homeworkers, then twil i ght workers, followed 
lastly by the daytime groups since that was the order of least cost. 
However, as section 9.2 concludes, there were circumstances such as 
administrative difficulties and the unsuitability of operations which 
mil i tated agai nst the use of the secondary workgroups. Furthermore, if 
secondary group performances were worse than those of the daytime groups, 
then these lower costs of employment could be outweighed. Consequently, 
various dimensions of performance are analysed in section 9.6. 
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9.6 GROUP PERFORMANCE 
Employer preference will obviously be influenced by performance 
levels, poor performances helping to explain low preference rankings. It 
was therefore considered imperative to make assessments of relative 
performances to put stated and implied preferences into context. 
Performance is an elusive quality which has many dimensions. In attempting 
to assess performance it is often unclear which elements are the most 
relevant to the circumstances, but those aspects analysed below were 
considered as the most pertinent to demands for female labour, particularly 
the secondary workgroups. 
Clearly, efficiency and speed of work (i.e.productivity) will be very 
important to manufacturers concerned with meeting deadlines. It is also 
pertinent to earnings comparisons in piecework industries. The ability to 
work unsupervised and take satisfactory decisions about work in hand (i.e. 
competence) are important dimensions of performance when supervision is 
either limited or non-existent. The level of work spoil age (i .e.qua1 ity of 
workmanship) is also important in price-competitive conditions. Late return 
of work from homeworkers and its subsequent re-delivery for correction 
could imply low ability, so relative quality 6f workmanship needs to be 
clarified. Absenteeism, an important dimension of performance when 
manufacturers face deadline pressure,and illness, a particular form of 
absenteeism, have been included, it being anticipated that twilight workers 
and homeworkers might be under great stress from long active days and 
isolation. Reliability, explained to mean an ability to 'pull out the 
stops' in difficult deadline situations, is an important dimension in 
seasonally fluctuating industries where intermittency requires production 
at, beyond or below full capacity; variations in dependability can be 
expected to coincide with stated preferences. High turnover is important 
and could indicate either dissatisfaction or lack of alternative employment 
opportunity. Disputes and work stoppages have been assessed because of 
their obvious importance to production plans; these occurrences could also 
reveal the workgroups' perceptions of their own bargaining strengths, a 
topic relevant to power relationships, see 11.2. Homeworkers, commonly 
regarded as in a weak bargaining position, might not participate in normal 
dispute procedures, but rather adopt other . practices to further their own 
causes. Thus, an open-ended question was asked relating to the measures 
used by homeworkers to further their interests. Weekly working hours, an 
influential determinant of the work performed, ha.s also been included. 
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Wherever possible, actual values for these dimensions of performance 
were extracted, but accurate statistics were often unavailable and in many 
cases values were not comparable across establishments. When this occurred, 
and because respondents could unhesitatingly answer regarding group 
similarities and differences, they were asked to rank the groups from "best 
to worst" (ranks 1 to 4 respectively). Whi 1 st this approach coul d embody an 
element of prejudice, employer perceptions are important to employment 
policy and thus to workgroup usage. Employer assigned ranks were processed 
as demonstrated in Table 9.20. Calculated mean ranks indicate the concensus 
of experiences and opinions and standard deviations assess levels of 
discrepancy in respondent answers, i.e. disagreement regarding the 
appropriate ranks to assign. The topic of workgroup preference prompted 
employers to discuss at length the high variation in individual a~titude 
and application which they generally associated with age and maturity, see 
10.5. Male performances were not investigated because job-segregation made 
irrelevant direct comparisons with women. 
9.6.1 Productivity 
Meaningful answers in terms of hourly units were impractical due to 
the operations performed and divisions of labour varying by establishment, 
see 4.2; time input per unit depended upon the operation and its complexity 
so causing units per hour to vary when working with the same effort. Thus, 
relative rankings have been adopted as the productivity measure (see Table 
9.21); although actual values were sometimes available they were useless 
for comparison purposes. 
Both part-timers and twil i ghters were ranked as more productive (i.e. 
they worked faster) than full-timers; part-timers were fastest and there 
was least divergence of opinion about their ranking. Twilight workers were 
a close second, but generated more divergence of opinion. Employers 
explained that the generally high productivity of these groups emanated 
from their composition of mature persons who had with greater financial 
commi tments than the contingent of young women in the full-time group. 
Financial need, which was particularly spotlighted by several respondents 
with respect to twilight workers, encouraged rapid work to increase 
earnings. Part-time and twilight workers were perceived as maintaining 
faster speeds over their shorter working periods than the full-timers were 
judged either willing or able to sustain. 
Homeworker answers were notable for the lack of knowledge and 
divergence of opinion they displayed. Thirteen respondents did "not know 
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about the productivity of homeworkers". Of the 9 who assigned ranks, 4 
assessed them to be best or joint best, and 5, worst or joint worst; there 
was no middle ground. This produced a rank order of 4 and a relatively 
1 arge standard devi ation. Confl icting rankings can be put into context 
by reference to qualitative information relating to recruitment methods 
(Tab 1 e 7.1) and emp 1 oyer pe rcept ions (lO.4). Of the homeworkers 12% had 
been selected from among ex-employees who had been highly productive when 
inside the factories (Table 7.1). High levels of homeworker job-
competition ensured that, of the previously skilled unknown operatives 
attracted, only those with high skill, productivity and the desired 
personal attributes were selected and retained. Respondents with these 
experiences ranked homeworkers firs~ Low rankings of homeworker 
productivity (and other aspects of performance) were given by those 
respondents who perceived homeworkers to be undisciplined, taking frequent 
coffee breaks and often interrupted by visitors and telephone calls. This 
perception was common, but no employer had been sufficiently curious to 
check whether this was indeed the case. Comments suggested that this 
perception was prompted because most homeworkers produced less weekly 
output than the 'average' part-timer, although there were individual 
exceptions; one homeworker regularly earned more than £60 per week, but her 
employer suspected that she enlisted the help of others, see 10.4. 
Interesting features were employers' general lack of knowledge and 
obvious lack of concern about hOllleworker productfvity, see also 9.6.8. 
Overriding interests concerned weekly output, rather than pace in terms of 
units per hour, but in contrast, productivity was the focus of interest 
with respect to the indoor componen~ Internally, productivity and weekly 
output amounted to the same thing because speed of work determined output 
when hours were fixed by contract. However, 'fast' and 'slow' homeworkers 
coul d process the same output between del fverfes by expe nding vari abl e 
amounts of productive time. 
Lack of concern about homeworker productivity and working hours arose 
from piecerates (4.2.2(c» which required payment per unit of output 
rather than time taken. Piecerates ensured that employers were neither 
penal ized by slow, nor benefitted by fast, homeworker speeds but they were 
both penalized and benefitted by the corresponding speeds of indoor 
workers. These differing effects had dual causes: (a) the contractual 
circumstances, under which the indoor component had agreed work hours while 
homeworkers had not; and (b) the nature of work supply (4.2.2( d» whereby 
indoor workers received a continuous flow and homeworkers had intermittent 
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small batches. The fixed hours of the indoor component meant slow workers 
produced less weekly output rather than worked more hours and this reduced 
price-competitiveness because machine and factory overhe.ads had to be 
spread over fewer units. With hi gh productivity. overheads compri sed a 
lower proportion of unit costs. so high indoor productivity was 
imperative. Discreet. small batch deliveries to homeworkers meant that 
employers were unaffected by pace. both in terms of wage costs and weekly 
output. provided that all work was punctually returned at the next 
scheduled collection. 
Homeworkers themselves benefitted from their own fast speeds in terms 
of more weekly hours free of market work and from higher hourly earnings. 
but not in terms of increased weekly earnings since they were productively 
idle after work completion until re-delivery. Penalties for slow speeds or 
frequent interruptions were fewer weekly hours free of market work and low 
hourly earnings. but weekly earnings were unaffected. these varying with 
the items per delivery. Ability to secure this change was usually beyond 
individual homeworker's control; she had to accept the amounts of work 
delivered. but a frequent employer complaint was that few homeworkers would 
undertake satisfactorily large amounts. Several employers insisted on 
" 
minimum del iveries. see 9.6.8. 
In contrast. fast indoor workers benefitted from both higher hourly 
earnings and higher weekly earnings because the continuous flow of work 
enab 1 ed them to· increase their weekly output; slow workers were 
correspondingly penalized by both lowered hourly and weekly earnings. 
Hours free of market work were unaffected. working hours being fixed. 
In summa~. individuals varied greatly in their productivity levels. but in 
workgroup terms. part-timers and twilighters were judged to be more 
productive than full-timers. There was a general lack of knowledge, and 
concern regarding the productive pace of homeworkers. although 4 
respondents with close contacts ranked them to be better than. or equal to. 
all other groups. In fact. if homeworkers were not sufficiently productive 
they were usually quickly severed. 
9.6.2 Competence 
Respondents were told that 'competence' referred to the general 
ability to perform operations satisfactorily and to take appropriate 
decisions regarding work in hand. Table 9.22 shows there was only a half 
rank between the most competent (part-timers) and the least competent 
(twilight workers). A concensus of opinion that part-timers were the most 
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competent is shown by their standard deviation being lowest. Full-timers 
were second, but with more disagreement about rankings. Homeworkers 
averaged only 1/3 of a rank below full-timers despite lack of supervision, 
and twilight workers were fourth. The relative closeness of this ranking 
indicates that respondents judged there to be only slight competence 
variation among the workgroups regardless of varying supervision levels 
(8.2.2.(a,if»; in fact, 10 respondents ranked all groups equally. 
Respondents who were using twilight workers and homeworkers for machining 
stated that they had to be ~ competent than comparable indoor workers 
since they must settle their own queries. This characteristic caused some 
respondents to regard the secondary workgroups as suitable only for very 
simple jobs, and indeed, the extreme simplicity of 'many 'homeworker 
operations' appeared to unfairly stigmatize homeworkers as generally less 
able. Consequently, there was more disagreement with respect to twilight 
worker and homeworker rankings, but overall, they were judged to be only 
sl i ghtly 1 ess competent than indoor daytime workers. 
9.6.3 Quality of Workmanship 
With respect to work spoilage, recourse again had to be made to 
rankings because of product and job dffferenti.,ation. Table 9.23 shows 
there were only sl i ght dffferences between part-timers, full-timers and 
homeworkers, and each had similar levels of disagreement about rankings. 
Twilight workers however, were judged to be worst for work spoilage. It 
was commented that twilight workers caused many errors because they rushed 
in order to increase earnings to meet financial needs (see 9.6.1); a 
similar comment was obtained during the pre-pilot stu!\Y. One respondent 
thought that higher spoilage arose from lack of supervision. Homeworkers 
performing simple jobs were considered to have "nothing to spoil", but most 
respondents said that if the homeworkers' work quality was unsatisfactory 
thei r work supply woul d be "phased out". 
9.6.4 Absenteeism 
9.6.4 Ca) Absenteeism Rates 
Surprisingly. few establishments troubled to calculate their 
absenteeism rates and this resulted in a low response rate. In total, only 
8 respondents could quote statistics, and in each instance this was a 
blanket value covering both full- and part-timers. The daytime workgroup 
rate ranged from 0% to 8% of contracted hours, wi th a mean of 2.58%, see 
Table 9.24. Statistics offered were usually regarded as lower than the 
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industry average which respondents perceived as being between 8 to 10%; 5 
to 15% was the range encountered by NED0192. Only two confl icting 
responses were obtained for twilight workers; one a 0% rate, the other 
claiming twilight absenteeism to be "very high" but without furnishing 
statistics. 
Homeworkers could not be absent in the same sense as the indoor 
component, but they could be away from home when deliveries arrived, refuse 
work, or request temporary reductions in the amounts supplied. These 
strategies have been taken as proxies for absenteeism. Table 9.25 
indicates that more than half of the homeworker sample (working in 13 
establishments) never unilaterally refused or adjusted workloads; only 16% 
of the sample refused or adjusted workloads at fairly regular intervals. 
Respondents did not maintain records of these refusals so they were 
impossible to quantify, but one described them as "quite often" while 
another commented that there was "an arbitrary return of work". Both these 
respondents employed relatively 1 arge numbers of homeworkers. Between 
these apparent extremes of absenteeism were 6 establishments, employing 24% 
of the homeworker sample, in which workloads were reduced "only rarely". 
In 3 establishments (18% Hw sample) the frequency averaged one refusal per 
homeworkers in every two years and these were considered to be justified on 
the grounds of illness or annual holidays. 
9.6.4 (b) Relative Absenteeism 
Values quoted in Tables 9.24 and 9.25 are not directly comparable and 
so respondents were additionally requested to rank the workgroups according 
to rel ative absenteeism, with lowest absenteei srn ranked 1 and highest 4, 
again taking refusal or late return as homeworker proxies. Table 9.26 shows 
that homeworkers were ranked first, with slightly less disagreement about 
the rank to assign than for other groups. While experiments with flexitime 
have had mixed results193, the Knitting Sector Working Party192 recommend 
flexitime as a strategy for reducing absenteeism and it is relevant that 
only homeworkers coul d have dovetailed production with personal 
commitments. However as A llen140 poi nts out, homeworker autonomy in 
choosing when to work is a myth due to their role of servicing others on an 
unwaged basis. Homeworkers nevertheless had the best absenteeism record 
for as respondents explained: 
"They adjust their work times rather than refuse work." 
It is commonly understood that homeworkers are afraid to refuse work in 
case their supply dries up. In this context, one respondent stated: 
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"They refuse once only. Then they are finished." 
Full-timers were ranked better than part-timers for absenteeism 
whereas in productivity, competence and quality they had been ranked worse. 
In several establishments with high part-time absenteeism this was 
percei ved as a ri sing "not only from thei r own, but also from fam i ly 
illnesses" since many were mothers. With respect to full-time absenteeism, 
it was frequently noted that: 
" ••• younger workers are more frequently absent than 01 der ones". 
The younger element were seen as pulling that group's rating down for 
several dimensions of performance including absenteeism. This point was 
al so noted in the NEDO surveyl92. 
At the time of interview the onset of the recession was being 
experienced and there were rumours of redundancies in 2 establishments. In 
these, it had been observed that the absenteeism rates of both full- and 
part-timers had: 
" ••• dramatically fallen since the threat of redundancies had been 
announced". 
Twilight workers were ranked last, but with a greater divergence of 
experiences. Two establishments (not currently employing twilight workers 
and thus not in the statistics of Table 9.26) had previously experienced 
unreliable twilight worker attendances, this being due either to childrens' 
ill nesses, or because husbands compl ai ned about the wife's absence from 
home in the eveni ngs. It shoul d be remembered that twil i ght shifts were at 
a low level in March 1980, and it is reasonable to assume that only where 
satisfactory attendances had been experienced would there be a willingness 
to retain when business was generally low. Consequently, results for 
twilight workers might be higher than they would otherwise have been. 
Three respondents commented that the males were better than all the 
female workgroups with respect to absenteeism, and this was also noted by 
the NEOO studyl40. However, ttie employer of 9 female, and 3 male, hand-
machine knitters who admitted the work to be particularly monotonous had 
experienced otherwise. This suggests that absenteeism could be affected by 
the variety, interest and perhaps the pay of the job as well as by the 
servicing of others, and that gender segregation into superior and inferior 
jobs could create gender performance differentials. 
9.6.4 (c) Personal Illness 
Resea rchers have found that homeworkers often experience feel i ngs of 
isolation and suffer from strain and depression. The author suspected 
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that twilight workers might also face similar circumstances and therefore 
an attempt was made to ascertain comparative illness levels, this being a 
specific form of absenteeism. However, no respondent had knowledge of the 
health of homeworkers and this again underlined their general lack of 
integration and frequent lack of personal contact. 
No respondent had noticed any differences in the personal health of 
indoor workers, except in one company where part-timers and twilight 
workers were absent more frequently for ill ness than full-timers. These 
results could imply that no appreciable differences occurred and that 
twilight working imposed no undue stress, but caution should be exercised 
with this conclusion. Despite their weak market position (11.2.2), and the 
few jobs even in busy times, their relative absenteeism and voluntary 
turnover was worst (Tables 9.26, 9.29). Possibly twil i ght workers rel i eved 
stress by these means, or perhaps the short duration of most jobs gave 
strain illnesses insufficient time to develop. However, similar to 
homeworkers, twil i ght workers were not well integrated into workforces, 
and low contact with employers (4.4.2(c)) coul d have caused personal 
illnesses to pass unnoticed. Thus, the findings on personal illness are 
open to different interpretations and are inconclusive other than that 
employers were unaware of workgroup differences. 
9.6.5 Reliability 
There was general agreement that full-timers were most reliable for 
producing output in 'tight' situations, although 4 respondents remarked 
that younger gi rl s were not as rel i ab le as the 01 der, more mature women, 
see Table 9.27. Possibly for this reason, 14 respondents ranked part-
timers as equally reliable. However, the full-timers' longer working day 
provided greater productive possibilities which, combined with insistent 
supervision and exhortation, could increase output from the youthful sub-
group when completion dates were imminent. Despite this, part-timers were 
a relatively close second-best. Homeworkers, ranked third, were generally 
considered to be less reliable than the daytime workers, although there was 
divergence of opinion, since 6 of the 17 respondents assigned first or 
equal first ranks. There was slightly less disagreement about twilight 
worker ranks, with only one of the 6 respondents ranking them equal to 
daytime labour. 
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9.6.6 Yolunta~ Turnover 
9.6.6 (a) Voluntary Turnover Rates 
Voluntary turnover in textile industries is reputedly high; i.e. 
between 27% and 45%192, and between 14% and 50%194 with female rates 
reputedly higher than those of males. Voluntary turnover is also regarded 
as costly; an industry rule of thumb being £150 per quit and 
rep1acement192, but this figure is doubted by the author since costs depend 
on methods of recruitment. NED0195 proffer advice on how to calculate 
turnover figures and then reduce i~ Despite this, only 2 respondents could 
provide percentage turnover figures; the others merely stated numbers 
quitting over a given period from which percentage rates shown in Table 
9.28 have been calculated for each establishment and then averaged. Only 
two respondents could distinguish between fu11- and part-time operatives. 
Table 9.28 indicates that homeworkers had lower turnover rates than 
the indoor component, but several employers remarked that newly recruited 
homeworkers, "frequently pack it in within one to six weeks", see 10.4.2. 
Employers did not regard such short-stay workers as 'thei r homeworkers', so 
they were not included in the statistics provided. Neither were indoor 
workers included unless they had completed the trial ·period (usually one 
month). Consequently, percentages should be regarded as representing 
turnover rates after a minimum stay of one month. 
In one estab1 i shment there had been no homeworker turnover duri ng the 
previous 8 years; in another, none in the last 6 years; and in four further 
establishments, no turnover during the previous year. In contrast, only 
one establishment reported no turnover of fu11- and part-timers. The mean 
rate for the daytime group was more than double that of homeworkers and the 
21% is within the industry's range, although high standard deviations show 
variability among establishments. Only one establishment could provide 
twilight worker figures which makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions, 
although general comments confirmed turnover to be high. Disregarding 
twilight workers therefore, reported rates reveal a similar picture to rank 
order of relative turnover as shown in Table 9.29. 
9.6.6 (b) Relative Voluntary Turnover 
A full response rate was achieved for relative rankings because 
respondents had clear perceptions of the groups' relative performances. 
Tab 1 e 9.29 a1 so shows that homeworkers had the lowest re1 ative turnover, 
followed closely by part-timers who had the lowest standard deviation. 
Twilight workers were the worst for voluntary turnover. Section 5.2.l{a) 
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shows that 50% of establishments employing knitters, and accounting for 74 
(22%) of the sample, had not tested the LLM because they had experienced no 
turnover. By contrast, only one establishment had experienced no turnover 
of daytime females. It can therefore be concluded that the turnover of 
males was generally lower than that of females as shown by CAPITB194, and 
that it was lowest in small establishments. 
9.6.7 Disputes 
9.6.7 (a) Number of Disputes 
Table 9.30 gives the numbers and types of dispute that had occurred 
during the previous year. In total, 11 establishments had experienced 13 
disputes involving daytime females. Full- and part-timers had identical 
dispute patterns arising from their interpolation in manufacturing 
processes; disputes generally affected worker grades or factory 
departments, and were mainly concerned with earnings and holidays, see 
1l.2.2(c). No twilight worker or homeworker had staged any kind of dispute 
and the suggestion that they might do so caused wry amusement. Two 
comments serve to summarize the situation: 
"Twil i ght workers are more docil e" (than daytime workers); 
and, about the number of homeworker di sputes, 
"None. They are so expendabl e". 
The occurrence of disputes could indicate perceived bargaining 
strength on the part of persons involved, and may therefore be regarded as 
'employee perceived market power'. From this viewpoint, Table 9.30 
suggests that twilight workers and homeworkers had perceived a total lack 
of bargaining power for it is unlikely that they were more satisfied with 
their jobs than were daytime workers, even though twilight workers were 
paid the same rates. Thus, a revision of rates or holidays would 
automatically be received by twilight workers who had little need to stage 
disputes on their own accounts. This situation did not apply to all 
homeworkers, many of whom performed operations not· undertaken inside their 
factories, or were paid discriminatory rates, see 8.2.l(d) and 8.9.2 
respectively. 
9.6.7 Cb) Relative Quiescence 
Relative quiescence (Table 9.31) confirms the findings of quoted 
values in that respondents unanimously ranked twilight workers and 
homeworkers first, or equal first, and this resulted in a zero standard 
deviation. Employers were therefore clearly aware that the secondary 
9 - 41 
CHAPTER NINE EMPLOYER PREFERENCE 
work groups had very little 'muscle' when desiring to affect their own 
conditions of employment. The daytime workers' mean rank was reduced to 
only 1.58 because 13 establishments had not been involved in disputes 
causing all groups to be ranked equal first. 
9.6.7 (c) Homeworkers' Measures To Influence Their Work Sftuation 
It was hoped that the open-ended question relating to homeworkers' 
strategies would elicit a variety of responses such as the practice, 
suspected by the pre-pilot employer, of using loaned machines to 
manufacture for competitors. In fact, these activities did not emerge, the 
only devious practice being one homeworker: who "tried to sell both machine 
and output". Responses centred around homeworkers' abil ities to conduct 
person-to-person negotiations with their employers. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, these negotiations were most successful in 7 small companies 
where homeworkers were relatively numerous, averaging 34% of the work force. 
Negotiations in 6 establ ishments whose respondents admitted, "homeworkers 
usually compl ain about pi ecerates", often fail ed whereupon the homeworkers 
either "accepted the rates", "went el sewhere", or "ceased homeworking" 
altogether. Homeworkers had no measures at all in a further 6 
establishments. Consequently, only 41 (34%) homeworkers were in a position 
• to influence their own conditions of service. 
Small companies relying quite heavily on homeworker production 
maintained better communicatio~s than did larger establishments to which 
homeworker output contributed little. Indeed, several proprietors of small 
companies paid regular visits to their homeworkers, whereas homeworkers had 
to make contact with larger establishments either directly by telephone, or 
indirectly via delivery van drivers~ Good communications worked to the 
advantage of homeworkers whose only option was i ndivi dual negoti ati on. 
9.6.S Hours Worked 
Working hours comprise· two elements: 
Ca) the basfcweek. i.e. the hours that the employee has agreed to work in 
a given time span, and which form part of the written or implied 
contract of employment or service; 
(b) the extra hours worked. either regularly or occasionally. over and 
above the contracted hours. i.e. overtime. 
9.6.S(a) The Basfc Week 
Respondents were asked to state the average basic weekly hours of 
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workers in each of their workgroups; results are given in Table 9.33. 
All full-time and shift workers worked a basic week of 40 hours. 
part-timers ranged between 24 and 34 hours, but averaged almost 30 hours 
per week. Most employers fixed a lower limit to the hours that they would 
accept from part-timers, but as discussed in 12.5.l(d) some were willing to 
modify this limit in the light LM conditions. The most usual limit was 20 
hours per week, although one employer had set 32 hours as the minimum. 
Twilight worker hours varied: those working 15 and 16 hours per week 
attended for 4 hours per eveni ng, 4 days per week; those working 22.5 
hours worked for 4.5 hours per eveni ng, 5 days per week. 
As discussed in section 2.3, homeworkers hours are generally unknown. 
No estab 1 i shment kept records, and none had an accurate idea of occupi ed 
time. Consequently, respondents were asked to estimate how long it would 
take an average indoor full-timer to perform the average amount of work 
given to homeworkers; 13 were able to supply this information. This method 
of estimation, although the only option, was likely to understate expended 
time due to less conveniently arranged work environments and possibly more 
interruptions than would be the case for indoor workers. Nine respondents 
estimated them to be usually supplied with less than 25 hours' of work per 
. week, and in every establishment they averaged less output than 40-hr/wk 
full-timers. (although one homew.orker produced more than comparable full-
timers).. Consequently, all' respondents regarded their homeworkers as the 
equivalent of part-timers. 
Studies on the supply side of the LM have shown some homeworkers to 
be occupied for a large number of weekly hours, and that they sometimes use 
the labour of other members of their families69• It is the contentiousness 
of the topic of homeworker hours that accounts for discrepancy between what 
employers claim they pay and the hourly earnings that researchers have 
found homeworkers to receive. It should be noted however, that while the 
estimated homeworker hours shown in Table 9.33 could be an understatement 
of actual hours worked, they are ver,y useful for comparison purposes since 
they circumvent interruption time and lower productivity stemming from poor 
work surroundings. The average was 20 hours of work, but the 8.57 standard 
deviation indicates that there was a fairly wide dispersion of values. 
Eight respondents stressed that every homeworker received a minimum weekly 
delivery and this was sometimes considerable. From one establishment it 
represented the equivalent of 30. hours work by a full-timer; from another, 
the respondent described the volumetric capacity as occupying 18 cubic 
metres, and weighing about 1/2 ton! These statistics show the amount of 
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free accommodation provided by homeworkers, but it should be noted that the 
latter company used only a few homeworkers occasionally which suggests that 
free accommodation was not the overriding motive of demand. 
Even allowing for considerable variations in individual productivity, 
it is unlikely that twil i ght workers or homeworkers coul d cons istently 
produce the same number of items per week as full-timers given that they 
averaged only about half of the full-timers' hours, but the relatively 
small differences between these secondary workers' hours coul d be 
compensated for by productivity differences thereby causing twilight and 
homeworkers to be viewed as equivalents in productivity terms. However, 
part-timers averaged 75$ of full-timers' hours, so highly productive 
individuals might have achieved comparable production targets. 
9.6.8 (b) Overtime 
Regardless of gender, the number of overtime hours varied among 
individuals, and not all members of each group worked overtime. 
Consequently, respondents indicated the average hours worked by each 
workgroup when overtime was being worked, and also stated the proportion of 
workers involved. Data and comments showed that a much greater proportion 
of men than women worked overtime; that male overtime was usually 
associated with knitting, although shift workers worked it only when under 
deadline pressure while full-time day knitters worked it on a regular 
basis; and that femal e overtime was often worked by young women without 
family responsibil ities. 
Actual computed statistics were generally unavailable, but those 
presented in Table 9.34 have been calculated by the author from raw data. 
It shows that shift worker overtime varied seasonally and averaged 3.7 
hours per week, but that overtime was a permanent feature of the full-time 
day knitters' work-pattern and averaged 7.4 hours weekly. In no 
establishment did females (or males associated with the finishing stage of 
production) work overtime on a regular basis, but a few of them seasonally 
averaged 2.7 hours weekly. Three respondents estimated the duration of 
overtime working to be between 12 and 20 weeks per year. In 9 (36$) 
establishments, females never worked any overtime. 
Data are insufficient to distinguish between full- and part-timers, but 
it was commented that: 
"Few part-timers work overtime because they are unwilling to work 
full-time hours anyway". 
According to the national agreement, no premium was payable to part-
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timers until after 40 hours had been worked, a factor which could have 
discouraged part-time overtime, but limited overtime was worked by part-
timers in 3 establishments that relied heavily on them and paid them an 
overtime premium. 
The 22.5 hrs/wk twilight workers also occasionally worked an extra 
hour or half hour per day 'when requested. These same twilight workers 
never took their allowable tea breaks because, it was explained, they were 
"eager to increase their earnings". In no establ ishment were homeworkers 
considered to work overtime, although 6 respondents said their homeworkers 
would take more than their usyal work to "help get over particular 
difficulties". Very good relationships between homeworker and employer 
were claimed to exist in these establishments. 
In summary: Table 9.34 clearly shows that males generally worked more 
overtime than did females. This patterns of overtime working was 
consistent with the general shortage of women able to work 40 hours per 
week, and with the reported difficulties of getting part-timers to work 
almost full-time hours. As discussed in 12.5 an inability or unwillingness 
of women to work overtime was influential in structuring demands for 
secondary labour and consequently, on the characteristics of market 
operati on. 
9.6.9 Conclusions Regarding Performance 
An overall assessment of performance should preferably have each 
dimension of performance weighted according to its relative importance. 
Collected data coul d not provide such a weighting, and in the absence of 
this knowledge, an equal weighting has been adopted. Unweighted ranks have 
been calculated for each workgroup in Table 9.35 by averaging the 
calculated rank orders of each performance dimension. 
The general conclusion to be drawn regarding overall performance (with 
the exception of twilight workers) is that there was little differentiation 
among the groups. The closeness of the full-time, part-time and homeworker 
mean overall performance ranks (which have only 0.5 of a rank between them) 
show that, although slight differences have been revealed for each aspect, 
no one workgroup was persistently better or worse than the others. Had 
there been clear differences with all respondents ranking the groups 
similarly, then standard deviations would have been zero and intege.-, ranks 
of 1.0 to 4.0 woul d have resulted, as was the case for twil i ght workers and 
homeworkers in Table 9.31. The greatest di screpancies were for twit i ght 
workers who received worst assessments in 6 performance dimensions. Hence, 
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twilight workers' performances could additfonally indfcate why so few 
establishments were using them at the tfme of survey. Greater levels of" 
disagreement about the secondary groups, as shown by larger standard 
devfations, might be attrfbutable to individual variations, small numbers 
of twilight workers and homeworkers generally befng used and probably 
causing indfvidual performances to be more noticeable. As one respondent 
who used a comparatively large number of homeworkers commented: 
"Homeworkers are 75% good, 25% poor and unreliable". 
Thus an employer using, say one or two homeworkers who fell into the poor 
category woul d hold a completely different vfew from an employer whose 
homeworkers fell into the good category. Nevertheless the almost 
consistently better ranking of homeworkers relative to twilight workers 
helps to explain why homeworkers were utilized more heavily. 
The slightly better overall performance, and in particular, the better 
productivity of part-timers relative to full-tfmers, helps to put into 
context why employers actions on redundancy and variations in workload 
indicate some indifference between these groups, and further, why some 
employers were apparently content to have part-timers comprising the 
majority of their female segments when they almost unanimously said they 
preferred full-timers. 
9.7 CONCLUSIONS ON PREFERENCE 
The unweighted overall preference ranking calculated in Table 9.36 
shows that when taking many pertinent factors into consideration, such as 
the costs of employment, stated preferences, employer actions and workgroup 
performances, the order of female workgroup preference was: 
1 = full-timers; 2 = part-timers; 3 = homeworkers; 4 = twilfghters 
As anticipated in section 9.5, the slfghtly better overall performances of 
the daytfme workgroups might have partially offset the higher costs of 
their usage, even though on certain dimensions of performance either one or 
other of the secondary work groups was judged to perform better. 
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Respondents were always encouraged to discuss the schedule's topics at 
length when interview time permitted. This strategy yielded valuable 
qualitative information which was carefully documented and processed. The 
data proved to be extremely useful because it yielded illuminating 
insights into employer preferences and choices. Recurrent themes evident 
from these discussions form the basis of this chapter which clearly 
underl i nes the need to cons i der wider, non-employment factors when 
analysing LM behaviour. 
10.1 EMPLOYER ORIENTATIONS 
Irrespective of whether respondents were owner/managers or employees 
wi thin organizati ons, they all displ ayed a producti on-centred ori entati on 
rather than a person-centred orientation towards their styles of 
management. For example, worker characteristics that frustrated the 
achievement of production objectives were strongly condemned; few attempts 
were made to help women overcome the obstacles they faced in combining 
their domestic and market work other than the acceptance of part-time 
hours, and when these were allowed, the maximum possible number was 
usually insisted upon. The varying emphases placed on selection criteria 
for di fferent workgroups and under changi ng ci rcumstances (secti on 9.3.1a) 
also demonstrated this production orientation. It is noteworthy that 
propri etors who were manually worki ng on the shopfloor were more 
appreciative of efforts made by their employees, but even so, the main 
thrust of thei r labour market objecti ves was_ product ori ented. In short, 
emp 1 oyers' production ori entati ons elevated product ma rket goals above 
those of the LM, see sections 10.2 and 10.3. Nevertheless, employers 
generally recognised that the achievement of production targets was 
contingent on factory harmony (see LM goal 3), and therefore if disquiet 
threatened to jeopardize shopfloor relations employers would actively 
involved themselves in resolving difficulties, hence the search for the 
person who would fit in. However, the motive behind these activities was 
al ways producti on centred. Labour market objecti ves were therefore 
dependent on product market dynamics and production targets. Indeed, 
employer perceptions of employee groups were moulded and conditioned by the 
contribution that each could make towards the achievement of output 
targets, see 12.7.3. Strategies for mai ntai ni ng a congenial en vi ronment 
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were therefore sound economic policies. 
10.2 EMPLOYERS' PRODUCT MARKET OBJECTIVES 
Employers in this sample had many objectives. There were those 
relating to the product market and others to the LM. Some were major in 
that they underscored those with lower priorities. Objective could also be 
conceptualized as arranged along a time-scale continuum where the major 
aims were at the long-term end while the objectives of emergency responses 
were positioned at the short-term end of the continuum. Although there 
were strong general patterns, some diversity existed among employers, this 
being more particularly related to product rather than labour market goals. 
The desire for expansion was clearly a major goal for many, but not 
all respondents, although this was generally implicit rather than 
expressed. Employers were more expressly concerned with retaini ng their 
market shares or even with survival in the deepening recession, than to be 
actually planning expansion at the time of interview. A minority were 
content with their peak production levels, either·because to expand further 
would create space problems, or because they were pleased to have so well 
withstood the industry's diffi culti es. 
A more immediate product market goal was to retain satisfied 
customers, and this was to be achieved by the linked objectives of 
maintaining high quality and meeting order deadlines. Late deliveries could 
mean customers were left with stocks of unsold garments that had missed a 
fashion fad or had to be marketed in the wrong season (e.g. autumn instead 
of summer) and were thus of the wrong weight for the weather. Anxiety was 
openly displayed that to deliver orders after deadline dates would mean 
loss of future custom, and that the retention of sati sfi ed customers was 
important for future prospects. Consequently, the ti mi ng of inputs was 
seen as critical, and in this the punctual delivery of yarn ·and the return 
of garments from subcontract dyers were as essential as having the 
appropri ate workers avai labl e; compl ai nts were therefore frequently voi ced 
about the lateness of material deliveries and the short-term unavailability 
of suitable labou~ The latter had important implications for LM actions. 
10.3 EMPLOYERS' LABOUR MARKET OBJECTIVES 
The research was desi gned to establi sh whether employers were cost-
minimisers in their demands for labour and if they were, to determine how 
thi s objecti ve affected the demand for each work group; secti on 9.2.4 
concludes that cost-minimization was a major employer objective. Cost-
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minimization is a ramification of employer production-centred orientations 
and it can also be seen to affect their other objectives. 
Employers' labour market goals can be summarized as follows: 
(1) cost minimization; 
(2) the retention of 'preferred' core employees; and 
(3) the achievement of harmonious inter-personal relationships. 
10.3.1 Cost-minimization 
Establ ishments operated in highly price-competitive product markets, 
and cost-minimization enabled them to compete more easily. Job-segregation 
was a cost-minimizing strategy that allowed lower payments to the majority 
of the work force (women on labour-intensive work, see sections 8.2 & 8.3) 
because equal pay claims became complex. Labour-intensiveness is influen-
cial since high marginal costs accrue from increases in pay. As commented: 
" ••• we get no appl ications from men, but I'm sure that they wouldn't 
accept the low wages earned by women ••• "; and 
" ••• to employ men on finishing, we'd have to put the rates up". 
It could be argued that a removal of gender entry barriers would not 
increase overall wage costs since rises and falls in rates would be count-
erbalanced, but an equivalent reduction in men's rates caused by women's 
penetration would need to be very substantial to offset even a small rise 
in finishing rates due to the ratio of finishing to knitting jobs (at least 
3:1). Furthermore in recessions, more redunandancy occurs on labour-
intensive jobs, so low pay contains redundancy payments by being a factor 
in their levels. Thus, job-segregation was an effective means of minim-
izing costs. Cost-minimization is further illustrated by: (i) more inten-
sive use of costly machinery; (ii) setting substantial lower limits for 
acceptable part-time hours; (iii) recruitment via the EILM; (iv) redundancy 
selection procedures; (v) the structuring of tem iporary/permanent redund-
ancy practices; (vi) the retention of core personnel to save training and 
re-recruitment costs; and (vii) in the patterns of secondary labour usage. 
10.3.2 Retention of Preferred Core Personnel 
The preferred employee can be conveniently characteri zed as:A person 
with a high level of competence (i.e.ability and experience) in a requ1red 
expertise (i.e.a particular skill) who possessed the des1red personal 
characteristics (e.g.gender and marital status) and was able to attend the 
premises (i.e.a factory worker) for the desired weekly hours (i.e.4D-hours) 
at the appropriate times of day (i.e.single or multiple shift times). 
10 - 3 
CHAPTER 10 EMPLOYER ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTIVES AND PERCEPTIONS 
From this general ization it can be seen that several elements 
contributed to the notion of 'preference'. Consequently, it was difficult 
to obtain personnel with all the desired attributes, especially in tight 
LMs. Recurrent recrui tment diffi cul ti es had caused employers to desi re 
retention of their core workforces, even in production troughs, since by 
doing so they were prepared for the upturn in production when it came~ 
The three most influential elements affecting this desire for 
retenti on were: 
(i) the difficulties of obtaining persons with the 'preferred' 
characteristics;, 
(if) the costs of obtaini ng persons with the 'preferred' characteri sti cs 
(i.e. (a) recruitment and screening costs, and (b) Instrument S costs 
(14.2.4) such as poor quality and low levels of output from new 
recruits which imposed timing costs~ and 
(iii)unpredictability in the product market. 
Lack of workers with appropriate skills meant unacceptably poor 
quality output which strongly conflicted with production-centred 
orientations and product market goal s. Core worker retention was thus a 
means of achi evi ng product market and cost-mini mi zing objecti ves because 
poor quality goods, were very costly in terms of the firm's future 
prospects. An alternative strategy would have been to 'hire and,fire', 
but this was deemed to be more costly. In addition to the actual costs of 
training, the recruitment and training of inexperienced workers carried 
heavy costs in terms of timing when production loads were high; this was 
due to the lower volume and quality of output produced by part-trained 
personnel who occupied machinery that could otherwise have been used more 
effectively. Hence, having obtained skilled core workers, employers avoided 
redundanci es (and vol untary turnover where possibl e) to: 
(i) hoard skills that would be difficult to replace; 
('if) avoid redundancy payments, although the 'last in, first out' practice 
ensured such payments were either avoided or reduced to a minimum; 
(iii)bolster confidence of existing workers who could otherwise fear 
redundancy and react by seeking employment at companies they perceived 
as offering more stable employment; 
(iv) maintain the firm's status and prestige in the neighbourhood; 
(v) maintain the confidence of potential recruits in the stability of the 
firm's employment so as to assi st possible future recruitment. 
In order to minimize hoarding costs employers aimed to employ only 
sufficient labour to produce average output when working moderately fast, 
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and then to apply a variety of instruments to achieve the necessary boosts 
and cut-backs in producti on. Illustrative comments of thi s strategy 
were; 
" ••• we have no slack"; and 
" ••• we have no back-up personne1 ••• we can't afford to have them 
standing around doing nothing in between times"; and 
"... we keep manni ng ti ght to keep wages hi gh:' 
Piece-rate payments were chosen whenever practicable and this ensured 
that retention costs were minimized since only the output produced was paid 
for. The popular practice of appointing as homeworkers only those people 
with previous experience with the company was yet another tactic for 
hoarding skills and reducing screening, training and spoilage costs. 
These features demonstrated the long-term attachments existing 
between H&K employers and their core personnel and they accord well with 
the long-term employment contracts predicted by both ILM and cost-
minimizing IC theories. Indeed, the use of secondary twilight workers and 
homeworkers as adjustment instruments (see chapters 13 and 14 for a typical 
adjustment mechani srn) all owed these employers to operate without "sl ack". 
In this context, a plentiful supply (i.e. a reserve army231) of capable 
twili ght workers and homeworkers (Beardsworth's200 'unestab1 i shed workers') 
who could be easily introduced and discarded (i.e. marginalized, see 
Allen l40 ) was crucial to these employers who wanted to adjust to market 
uncertainty without radical modifications of established customs and 
practi ces that woul d de-stabi 1 ize such long-term re1 ati ons, see 12.7.3. 
10.3.3 Harmonious Inter-personal Relations 
Achievement of harmonious relationships between employers and 
employees, and among employees themselves, was a goal that was important, 
especially in small establishments. This objective stemmed from a desire 
to avoid the costs of voluntary turnover and disputes which could cause 
disruptions to production, especially during periods of peak demand. This 
objecti ve was condi tioned by producti on-centred ori entations and the cost-
minimizing motive, and although somewhat less central than the other goals, 
it was closely allied to the hoarding of personnel insofar as failure to 
retain them imposed similar costs. To achieve harmony, emphasis was given 
to obtaining personnel who would, "fit in with rest of the workforce". 
This objective resulted in personal attri butes fi guri ng prominently as a 
selection criterion, for example, in the search for "the 'right' sort of 
person". Nevertheless, this objective was rarely sufficiently important to 
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persuade employers to grant flexible working times to mothers with children 
who had to be absent from school. Thus, the 'right' sort of person was 
someone who could make private arrangements for such eventual ities (or 
preferably didn't have the responsibilities at all) without inconveniencing 
the employer. 
10.4 EMPLOYERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE WORKFORCE GROUPS 
10.4.1 Perceived Male/Female Differences 
Out of the 25 respondents, only 5 (3 females and 2 males) displayed an 
appreciation of the efforts made by women to combine the domestic'ro1e with 
that of employee. Rather than take a sympathetic stance, most respondents 
displayed irritation especially during questioning on the topics of schoo1-
ho1 i day arrangements and chil dren's illnesses. Flexi bil ity of hou rs duri ng 
these times was sometimes agreed to reluctantly, apparently because 
employers perceived they had little choice but to agree. No concessions 
were vo1 untarily made to ease women's di ffi culti es other than the 
organization of work time in two establishments to permit early closure on 
Fridays to assist shopping (it being assumed as the woman's responsibility) 
and provide long weekends. Five respondents demonstrated anger when the 
topic of maternity pay was broached, and a typical comment was; 
-1 didn't ask her to have a baby". 
The widely adopted practice of persuading part-timers to offer the 
maximum number of hours possible was indicative of an often openly 
displayed attitude that the family responsibilities of female workers were 
a nuisance. Although mothers were perceived as proficient workers, their 
divided loyalties between home and work conflicted with the employers' 
aspirations for a fast and uninterrupted production flow. In short, there 
was widespread disapproval, and in some cases resentment, of the perceived 
importance that mature females attached to their families. 
Respondents generally gave the impression that male workers were 
superior precisely because they did not leave to have babies, or absent 
themselves because it was school holidays or to take children to the 
doctor. On the contrary, comparably ci rcumstanced males were perceived as 
seeking ~ work in the form of overtime or by moonlighting as a 
consequence of family responsibil ities, whereas women aimed for ~. 
Thus, family responsibilities and financial commitments were perceived as 
bei ng assets for men but 1 i abi lit i es for women. Moreover, these percepti ons 
clearly acknowledged the inter-dependence of men's and women's orientations 
to work, and illustrate their instability in changing circumstances, p2-36. 
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10.4.2 Perceived Differences Between the Female Groups 
A dichotomY in performance according to the youthfulness/maturity of 
full-ti me workers was often the subject of comment (see 10.5). The 
dichotomous character of the full-time group created some apparent 
indifference between part-ti mers and full-timers when the 1 atter group was 
regarded as an entity. Respondents reacted as though the poorer 
performance of the younger cohort of full-timers cancelled out the better 
performance of the older cohort to make them, on balance, equivalent to 
part-timers. Hence, part-timers were accepted as an important core group 
although they were consi dered as 'second-best' and somewhat 1 ess rel i able 
in the sense that over half of them (56%) were mothers with divided 
1 oya 1 ti es, see Tabl e 6.2. Joi ntl y, the full-ti mers and part-ti mers were 
perceived as being the mainstay of the female segment which was entirely 
responsible for the finishing of garments and thus of great productive 
importance. 
Although twilight workers were an in-factory group, they were viewed 
entirely differently from all others. They were regarded as a temporary 
feature by all but two of the 12 establishments previously using them (see 
9.4.3) and thus respondents generally showed little if any concern, or even 
patience, with twilight workers. Employers did not know whether they were 
union members, they were not included in any blanket statistics; it had 
been suggested that few establishments provided written contracts, see 
3.2. Some twil ight workers in both the pre-pil ot and main samples were 
perceived to be particularly financially pressed. Respondents gave the 
overall impression that a twil i ght shift was occasionally an unfortunate 
necessity to get over a particularly large bottleneck and that the workers 
themselves were a small, unimportant, inconvenient, temporary addition to 
the permanent core of the labour force of which they were not a part. 
Perceptions of homeworkers varied considerably. In some 
establishments, usually small ones, they were completely responsible for an 
operati on or range of operati ons on total output, see 4.4.1C d), and were 
viewed as permanent features of the firm's labour force. A similar 
situation existed when employers had failed to recruit on-site workers with 
appropri ate ski 11 s and had resorted to home workers as an a 1 ternati ve but 
necessary form of labour. In both these circumstances, employers relied on 
homework er output so they often insi sted on minimum del iveries; mutual 
trust, understanding and two-way communications were therefore important 
elements in the relationships between homeworker and factory personnel. 
Respondents considered that homeworkers accepted the arrangements as 
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"mutually beneficial"; the validity of this claim being evidenced by the 
long associ a ti ons of some homeworkers with the i r employers, see 9.6.6. 
Homeworkers in these situations more often received rates that were 
comparable to those of factory workers, particularly the skilled 
machinists. However, 3 respondents perceived certain individual homeworkers 
to be unreliable and uncommitted to work, often returning it late. This 
they attributed it to lack of self-discipline and "frequent interruptions 
for coffee breaks". It was for these reasons that they adopted rigorous 
selection criteria, and phased out work to such individuals. 
In other, often larger establishments, where homeworkers were a very 
small percentage of the workforce, they were used, similarly to twil ight 
workers, for temporary convenience to get over both short- and long-term 
bottlenecks. Such employers had lists of experienced personnel 
encompassing all the operations considered to be suitable for domestic 
product ion. Individual homeworkers were used only as and when necessary 
to meet weekly-production plans, with favourite 'compl iant' homeworkers 
used most frequently. In such establishments, homeworkers were perceived 
as weak, but useful, instruments who should be thankful for the work they 
got and should accept without question the conditions imposed. It was usual 
for these homeworkers to be pa i d lower than factory rates; some had to 
accept very 1 arge vol umes of work. A 'take it, or 1 eave it' employer 
attitude pervaded thi s type of arrangement. 
Regardless of establishment size and criteria of homeworkers use, 
respondents perceived that homeworking required self-discipline and strong 
motivation if homeworkers were not to tire and quit. There was an 
appreciation that earnings would be lowest during the first few weeks when 
work was strange265• There was a general belief that if new recruits 
survived this early period they would to be satisfactory. A very high 
early drop-out rate was stated by several respondents, but no stati stics 
were provided to quantify this claim. 
Three conclusions can be drawn with respect to abortive attempts at 
homeworking: 
(i) employers knew from experi ence tha t although some homeworkers woul d 
quit, suffi ci ent numbers' to meet requi rements woul d preva i 1, 
i.e."there were plenty others where they came from". Thus employers 
could still achieve objectives while adopting the 'take it, or leave 
it' stance; 
(iil the 'take it, or leave it' stance resulted in a scarcity of good 
homeworking jobs. 
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(iii)better homeworking jobs would be offered by companies relying on 
homeworker output. 
It was suggested by respondents that the least 1 ikely persons to drop out 
during the early stages of homeworking were: 
(i) those who were very "short of money"; and 
(ii) ex-employees who were well-known to the employer and with whom there 
existed good relationships built on previous associations. 
No respondent had any clear notion of homeworker productivity, and 
none displayed concern about it. see 9.6.1, although they recalled that 
production performances of ex-employees was the prime reason why they had 
been approached or accepted as home workers. Concern was expressed about 
the rel atively small amounts of work that homeworkers were will ing to 
accept because it meant more numerous deliveries, batch breaking and 
administrative work for a given amount of output. Out of 25 respondents, 
only one, a manually working proprietor. expressed an appreciative 
understanding of the difficulties encountered by mothers of young children 
attempting to earn by working at home, and this again underlined employers' 
production-centred orientations. 
10.5 EMPLOYERS' PERCEPTIONS OF EMPLOYEE ORIENTATIONS TO WORK 
A consistent theme throughout interviews, regardless of the question 
being posed, was the influence that 'age' (or rather mature responsibility) 
had upon performance. If employers raised the topic and time permitted, the 
relationships between age, performance and group demand was explored. The 
following sub-sections have been based on the views voluntarily offered by 
12 (48%) respondents. Table 10.1 shows the number of respondents who 
commented, wi thout bei ng bei ng prompted that young workers generally 
performed less well than all other workers with respect to the tabulated 
aspects of performance. These val ues must be regarded as the 'ab sol ute 
minimum' since respondents took the initiative in offering the information. 
It would therefore be inaccurate to assume that respondents who did not 
comment had not observed these, or indeed had observed confl icting 
associations. Approximately half of the respondents commented on their 
experi ences of poor performances from young workers. see Tabl e 10.1. and 
additionally they usually asserted that this was a widespread feature of 
youth employment. Furthermore. a high voluntary turnover rate of young 
workers has been documented260 • and thi s coul d be con si stent with lower 
performance 1 evel s. It was cl aimed that young workers had rel atively low 
commi tments to thei r work. 
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10.5.1 The Relationship Between Age and Financial Commitments 
Several respondents observed that the process of maturi ng as 
employees was linked to the individual's gradually increasing financial-
commitments, and further, that the magnitude of private responsibil ities 
created variations in employees' approaches to their work. Observations 
referred to both men and women, although the example below illustrates 
only the female case. Changing orientations as young employees passed 
through the critical life-stage of become financially responsible and 
totally independent of parents created variations in performance. Although 
there were exceptions, the general pattern of development was for financial 
commi tments to increase as the younger worker met a partner, saved for 
marriage or partnership, and possibly purchased a home and raised a family. 
Comments revealed that, although this process involved the passage of time 
which permitted the observed rel ationships to be regarded as age-rel ated, 
it was the move to complete independence and the maturing process itself 
that brought about the changes, making the critical 1 ife-stage the 
dependent vari ab 1 e rather than age. 
10.5.2 The Effect of Financial Commitments on Orientations to Work 
Respondents noted that as financial commitments increased, the young 
person's ori entati on to work gradua lly changed; a parti cul arly eloquent 
respondent described the following general pattern of development as 
observed by him while managing a large establishment for over 14 years. It 
accurately summarises the discussions with the other respondents. 
From age 16 when recruited from school until sometime in the 20s, 
young workers were generally content with the modest earnings that 
resulted from fairly low average level s of productivity. The non-
automatic nature of 'female' machinery meant that slow speeds resulted 
when attenti on wandered even though the work operati on coul d become 
spontaneous. Slow speeds meant low weekly output which in turn 
yielded lower earnings since the majority were paid by productivity-
based piece-rates. It was not unusual for young employees to achieve 
only 75% of the average earnings of mature workers on the same 
operati ons. Duri ng these years, the focus of attenti on was observed 
as mainly directed toward social lives, both inside and outside of the 
factory. They were regarded as, "more fl i ghty", and, "1 acki ng 
concentration"; features that were used by several respondents to 
explain low productivity levels. It was claimed that financial 
aspirations were directed towards the satisfaction of pleasure 
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activities; earnings were devoted to social events and clothing, 
wbi l@ sal'i AgS \/ere uti 1 i zed FOr Irol i days. 
(This description of the work orientation at the outset of the person's 
work-l ife can be characterized as 'social itistic' (see Appendix II), since 
the focus of attention is social life (both inside and outside the factory) 
and pleasure activities that are mainly external to the workplace. It 
emphasises the importance of examining extrinsic factors in relation to 
work performance and experience as is argued by labour process theorists.) 
At some ti me "duri ng thei r 20s", it was normal for young persons' 
circumstances to change. Many embarked on serious relationships which 
captured their focus of attention and switched it from concentration 
on socializing to centring on the accumulation of wealth to permit 
marriage or partnership, and the establishment of themselves as units 
independent of parents. This new outlook produced, 
" ••• a dramatic increase in productivity". 
Heavier financial commitments accompanied by higher productivity than 
formerly conti nued after ma rri age wi th the accumul ati on of domesti c 
equipment and furnishings and the advent of a family. 
Another respondent recalled how some individuals so paced their work that 
they would exactly predict when a specific item would be bought. This 
revised orientation, probably indicative of a revised orientation to 1 ife 
in general, can be characterized as 'economistic', since it focuses princi-
pally upon the financial rewards with which to satisfy revised aspirations. 
This account clearly illustrates the perceived instability of orientations. 
10.5.3 The Implications of Work Orientations 
A 'socialitistic' orientation caused low productivity because speeds 
reduced, or work stopped altogether, when young workers "chattered" or were 
otherwise distracted from their productive activity. It was possible that 
such orientation in the early stages of work-life encouraged young workers 
to gravitate towards larger establishments where colleagues were more 
numerous and where they would find more friends of similar age. To choose 
employment in small factories would yield fewer people with whom they could 
mix SOCially and such a motivation could explain why larger establishments 
had been able to attract more full-time females than smaller ones, see 4.5. 
The new economistic work orientation caused by the desire for savings 
created the dramatic increase in productivity, and it was concluded 
therefore that financial need was the most influencial factor in the 
observed relationship between this critical life-stage and the enhanced 
10 - 11 
CHAPTER 10 EMPLOYER ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTIVES AND PERCEPTIONS 
performances observed. Incentive payment methods and a general 1 ack of 
promotion and up-grading opportunities meant that the only ways of 
increasing earnings were to work at faster speeds or increase the number of 
hours worked. In addition, maturing workers became willing to work 
overtime (see 9.6.8.(b», and many young women were as keen as young men to 
have this opportunity. This fact illustrates how differences 
and similarities in workplace behaviour between men and women, might be 
linked to both the intrinsic features of employment and the extrinsic 
factors that determine their employment orientations. 
10.5.4 The Implications of Productivi!y for Employer Preference 
Whether or not the above percepti ons were accurate assessments of 
youth behaviour, they represented the attitudes of at least half of the 
respondent sample. Employers' production-centered orientations caused them 
to view productivity and weekly output as of paramount importance and 
unsurprisingly they preferred those workers who were capable of and willing 
to consistently achieve high levels of weekly output since achievement of 
production targets was determined by productivity levels and hours worked. 
FUll-ti me work patterns and hi gh producti vity were therefore the 
characteristics searched for, but these two attributes would rarely 
coincide, since many full-timers would be viewed either as young, flighty 
and without commitment, or as mature and shouldering responsibilities that 
vied with factory loyalty. Data shows employers overwhelmingly" preferred 
full-time workers (9.3.3), but that they impl ied some indifference between 
full- and part-timers by their actions (Table 9.20). Certainly, respondents 
from· establishments that had difficulty in obtaining full-timers were 
apparently unconcerned about it and thi s was further demonstrated by the 
frequent lack of separate statistics, and by part-timers comprising over 
50% of the female segments in 9 (36%) establ ishments. 
However, when this anomaly is viewed in the context of perceived 
emp 1 oyee ori enta ti ons it no longer appea rs contradi ctory. Sta ted 
preference did not conflict with actions because the preference doubtlessly 
referred to 'mature' full-timers without family ties who were in 
particularly short supply. Indifference probably stemmed from employers' 
experiences of comparing young full-timers with mature part-timers, both of 
whom were substantial cohorts in their groups, hence the comment, 
"A good part-timer can produce as much as a young full-timer". 
Indeed, part-time economism was further illustrated by reports of 
acrimony between full- and part-ti mers over the part-timers' "greediness 
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for work", while twilight workers' ecol'lomistic oriel'ltatiol'lS were 
demonstrated by twil ight workers choosing not take their permitted breaks. 
It was concl uded therefore that an apparent lack of concern about a 
shortage of full-timers stemmed from beliefs in the socialitistic 
orientations of many full-timers and the economistic orientations of many 
part-ti mers. An inabil ay to recruit preferred full-timers had merely 
small detrimental effects providing employers had plentiful supplies of 
experienced mature part-timers with economistic orientations, since weekly 
output woul d be largely unaffected by this compromise. Recrui tment 
practices for core workers were therefore designed to compensate for 
shortages of ideal workers. For instance, respondents actively searched 
for persons who, "needed to work for the money", i.e. the economistic 
orientation. Thus; the indifference between full- and part-time workers 
is explicable in terms of a complex inter-relationship between age, 
financial need, work orientations and productivity. 
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11.1 DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF POWER 
Power has dffferent meanings in different contexts. In an essay on 
power and structure, Lukes187 examines the concept of power and claims that 
although it, 
" •• looks so simple and innocent ••• (it) actually carries considerable 
theoretical and ideological loads". 
8ertrand Russell 188, taking a general view defined power as, 
" ••• the production of intended effects", 
and Wrong189 said, 
"I do not see how we can avoid restricting the term 'power' to 
i ntenti onal and effecti ve control by parti cul ar agents". 
For Max Weber190, power was signified by, 
"The chance of a man, or a number of men, to real ize their own will in 
a communal action even against the resistance of others who are 
participating in the act". 
The definition adopted for this thesis is similar to the latter. lIere, 
the word 'power' means, the ability of the parties to favourably influence 
the terms and conditions under which they work. 
Lukes187 sees individuals as possessing a set of expanding and 
contracting abilities, and being faced with expanding and contracting 
opportunities. Together these constitute the structured possibilities that 
permit actions to be taken to influence events. A web of possibilities 
exists for each individual, the nature of which is both active and struc-
tured and sets the limits within which choices can be made and strategies 
pursued. Lukes claims that any methodology which looks at individuals 
without examining the structural limits within which they function will not 
address the problem of these interactions. The structural 1 imits within 
which the work groups of the study operated are considered in the following 
sections which examine national collective agreements, effective repre-
sentation by trade union officials at local level, the availability of 
ample alternative employment opportunities and the impact of law. These are 
seen as the individual and structural limits, or sources of power, capable 
of producing differential LM status and bargaining strength~ 
11.2 RELATIVE POWER EMANATING FROM COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Institutions in the collective bargaining arena of the H&K industry 
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were the trade union, the employers' associations and the National Joint 
Industrial Council (NJIC). The NUHKW was the only trade union to 
represent workers in interviewed establishments and consequently all 
references to 'the union' signify the NUHKW. Local branches of the 
manufacturers' associations, each being affiliated to the Knitting Industry 
Federation (KIF), were situated in Leicester and Nottingham. Table 11.1 
shows union recognition by sample establishments and Table 11.2 shows 
levels of establishment affiliation to employers' associations. 
11.2.1 Trade Union Activity at National level 
Interviews with national union officials generated the following data 
and perceptions. The NUHKW, with its Head Office in Leicester, was 
organized into 12 local district branches, each having members on the 
executive committee. Sub-committees relating to various branches of the 
industry (i.e. (f) socks, (ii) tights, (ii1) underwear, (iv) outerwear, and 
(v) knitting) considered topics relevant to these specific products and 
formulated policy. 
Negotiations for the National Agreement were undertaken by the NJIC 
which included representatives from the NUHKW, the KIF, and an independent 
person. Only one national agreement was produced annually, being effective 
from the beginning of each year. The agreement which related solely to 
direct producti on workers appl ied to affi 1 i ated establf shments whi ch the 
union's research officer estimated to comprise 80% of local industry. 
NJIC meetings occurred 4 times yearly to discuss industrial matters and 
produce the written document for signing by employer and union officials. 
Agreement was achieved by consensus after discussion since legislation did 
not speci fy voti ng arrangements. 
11.2.1 (a) The National Agreement and its Impacts 
The national agreement in force in March 1980 is outlined below 
together with the impacts of its provisions. Twil i ght workers were not 
referred to specifically except to exclude them, but they came under the 
general 'umbrella' of part-time workers. The KIF refused to recognize 
homeworkers as employees, but rather as self-employed workers and 
consequently they were excl uded from the agreement's provi si ons. 
The pay agreement took the form of a percentage increase on existing 
rates, which until the late 1960s was tied to the retail price index. 
Unsuccessful attempts had been made to reintroduce this relationship. 
There was no target wage to be attained by the average employee, but the 
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local union representatives had "notions", or "concepts of reasonable rates 
for the job". This fair wage concept was founded in the pay of similar 
factories and the topic was always on the agenda of each industry-sector 
sub-committee. Product differentiation created wage-setting complications 
because of the variations in product sizes, varying complexities in the 
operations performed and differences in the divisions of labour, hence the 
comment, "It is the variety that causes the complications". The agreement 
recommended that homeworkers be paid "reasonable rates". 
Enhanced terms to supplement the statutory short-time working 
agreement had been achi eved. Employees thrown onto short-ti me work i ng 
received their normal piece rates for the hours actually worked, but were 
paid guaranteed weekly payments at the rate of 90 pence per hour for 
'average' workers on single shifts (i.e. mainly women), or .£1.20 for those 
on 2 and 3 shifts. These rates were payable for the remainder of their 
contracted hours, mi nus four. Thus, a full-timer recei ved payment for 36 
hours and a part-timer contracted for 32 hours would be paid for 28. The 
guaranteed payment was due whether the worker was idle in the factory or 
stayed at home, but it could be waived for circumstances beyond the 
employer's control al though not for shortage of orders. The agreement 
could be suspended for 4 days in each calendar month. There was a cut-off 
point at 20 contracted hours which caused all but the 2 x 22.5 hour 
twilight workers to fall outside the scope of the agreement. 
Overtime payments at the rate of 36 pence per hour were payable for 
time over and above 40 hours. The national agreement did not extend premia 
to part-timers until after they had worked the full 40 hours. Saturday 
afternoons and Sundays attracted a further 26.5 pence, but union officials 
claimed that the union was, "theoretically opposed to Sunday working". 
Due to the characteristics of their employment, twil ight workers would find 
it impossible, and low hour hour part-timers difficult. to achieve overtime 
payments unless their employers went beyond the national agreement. 
There were 27 paid days of holiday per year which had been increased 
by 1 day for 1980. The Holiday pay rate was 11.5% of the average annual 
earnings, payable in a lump sum and taxable. A clause in the agreement 
specifically excluded homeworkers and those part-timers working fewer than 
20 hours weekly which excluded 12 of the twilight worker sample. 
During the 1970s various flat-rate increases had been awarded under 
state incomes pol i ci es, these bei ng ti me-based payments. Employers 
generally wi shed to consoli date these payments into thei r piece rates, but 
this brought a mixed response from employees. Above average workers stood 
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to gain higher earnings by the consol idation of all payments into piece 
rates, but below average workers would sustain drops in earnings. The 
national agreement therefore permitted companies to introduce consolidation 
provided all affected parties agreed to it. The union had agreed to 
encourage its members to accept consolidation. Consolidated rates applied 
equally to all in-factory groups and were benefici.al to comparably paid 
homeworkers who had rarely received the flat-rate payments. 
Shift premia, or 'unsocial hours' premia; were payable for hours 
worked outside the period 7.0,a.m, to 7.0 p.m at a flat-rate of 46 pence 
per hour. Twil ight workers were specifically, "excluded from this provision 
even though they work some of these unsocial hours". Presumably employer 
negoti ators were aware of the purpose of the Eveni ng Employment Order86, 
see Sect ion 2.2. 
The power structure suggested by the impact of the national agreement, 
as judged from the order of greatest benefit, was: equal first = males and 
full-time females since they received all the provisions; third = part-time 
females, most of whom received most of the provisions; fourth = twilight 
workers because they received a few provisions such as holidays and holiday 
pay; and fifth = homeworkers who were excluded from all provisions. 
11.2.1(b) Unsuccessful Negotiations 
The following topics regularly appeared on the NJIC agenda, but 
agreement had proved unachievable. Hours reduction to below the basic 40 
weekly hours, sickness pay and a pension scheme had all been persi stently 
refused by employer representatives. The union's aim was to negotiate a 
"topping-up" of the state graduated pension scheme. Had this proved 
successful, males would generally have benefitted most since many females 
broke LM activity during child-rearing years, while flat-rate contributions 
would have taken a larger proportion of the females' lower earnings. 
Attempts to introduce an "insurance scheme whereby deaths while in work 
would have resulted in a topping-up of the state scheme to give 'widows' 
extra income" had been unsuccessful. No mention was made of widowers. 
HOllleworkers' holf day pay was strongly resi sted; it was cl aimed that, "the 
employers stand firmly against it", so the union had always to give way on 
this point even when they gained concessions for the core membership. "The 
trouble is, so few homeworkers are members of the union". To remedy this 
situation, the union had offered concessionary union membership fees to 
homeworkers. The twilight workers' shift premium was a regular topic, but 
it had been impossible to negotiate its extension to twilight workers. 
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11.2.1(c) Perspectives at the National Level of the Union 
National officials of , the NUHKW were in the forefront of the campaign 
to improve homeworkers' condi ti ons and the un i on's offi ci a 1 vi ew, in a 
slightly diluted form, were set out in a code of practice prepared for The 
Development Board of Rural Walesl30• Suggested as a minimum, were holiday 
payments at 10% of annual earnings, reimbursement of overheads, agreement 
on tax and insurance contributions, maintenance of registers for Factory 
and Wages Inspectorates, warnings on fluctuations in workloads, access to 
concessionary goods and social activities; these topics to be formalized 
in a written statement. 
The General Secretary of the NUHKW was a member of the Advisory 
Committee on Homeworking for the DE and of the TUC's. Homeworking Working 
Party which prepared "Homeworking, A TUC Statement,,129. Despite thi stop 
level activity, or perhaps because of it, the union had experienced 
difficulties in extracting information from companies about their 
homeworkers. Offi ci al s estimated homeworker earni ngs to be £25 to £30 for 
a 40 hour week, which they considered to be "very low for skilled 
operatives". Although many homeworkers were aware of current rates through 
their previous work inside the factories, union officials believed they 
accepted less for "the convenience, or more usually the necessity, of 
working at home". The Homeworkers' major compl aint was perceived as being 
the lack of holiday pay, but annual attempts to remedy this failed since, 
"little can be achieved because homeworkers are not in a collective 
bargaining situation, being so dispersed". 
Twil ight workers were assessed as few in number ("500 in the Leicester 
area", June, 1979), 50% of whom were thought to be union members. It was 
thought that the limiting of hours to fewer than 16 to avoid legislative 
provisions was not a widespread practice. The most controversial issue for 
twil ight workers was perceived as the lack of unsocial hours' premium, 
which was widely resisted because, "employers claim to provide work at 
times convenient to the workers". It was perceived that twil ight workers 
were the most vulnerable to a reduction in demand and consequently, "they 
should be told on appointment of the flexibil ity of their position". 
Officials had knowledge of "employers actually bargaining continuity of 
employment for lower piece rates; for example, 30 pence per dozen instead 
of 50 pence". Some twilight workers they knew of had accepted such terms, 
and "therefore union officials needled) to be alert to prevent such 
practices". 
Union officials perceived antipathy between daytime factory workers 
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and homeworkers due to the anticipated threat posed to factory jobs and it 
was thought that in redundancy situations daytime workers would pressurize 
employers to sever homeworkers fi rst. Jealousy by dayti me workers, many of 
whom had to work more weekly hours than they preferred, was perceived as 
arising against both homeworkers and twilight workers because the employer 
was considered to be accommodating these groups' wishes in contrast to 
refusing their own. It was stated, "the only bargaining strength that 
twil ight workers and homeworkers possess is their skill whi ch most of them 
underestimate as a lever". 
11.2.l(d) Employer Awareness of National Activity and Agreements 
Respondents for all unionized factories were acutely aware of the 
annual percentage increase in pay and the existence of "union rates" for 
overtime and shift premia, although there were slight confusions about 
their current levels and about the detail s of the guaranteed week 
agreement. Anxiety was expressed about the guaranteed week's effect: one 
respondent referred to the Union's mani pul ati on of the employers' desi res 
for con sol idation, while another claimed, " ••• they used consol idation as a 
'big stick' to get the guaranteed week". All were aware of an agreed 
holiday period, most realizing its extension by one day for 1980, but there 
was diversity of opinion about the current holiday pay rate. level s of 
employer awareness of national agreements dropped dramatically for all 
other topics. Employers perceived the union as "trying it on each year", 
but that, "normally there's a reasonable settlement". Efforts to improve 
the secondary groups' conditions were considered "unl ikely to succeed", and 
indeed, "unwise", since they would, "backfire in loss of jobs". 
11.2.l(e) Spill-over of National Agreements to Non-unionized Companies 
Table 11.3 shows that 10 of the 11 non-unionized establ ishments were 
influenced by the national agreement on pay. Two compan;e~occasionally gave 
less than the agreed percentage, whereas 3 offered more. The spill-over 
effect of the pay agreement was thus great, since all except 39 of the 
factory workers in the study received it. As in the unionized sector, all 
respondents were aware of "union rates for overtime and shift premia", but 
not all adhered to them. All knew of the holiday periods, many being aware 
of the one day increase for that year, but there was diversity in the 
percentage used to cal cul ate hol iday pay. No respondent referred to the 
guaranteed weekly agreement. Thus, as with the uni oni zed sector, concern 
centred around earnings and holidays for there was little interest in other 
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conditions of service. The institutional impact on non-unionized establi-
shments can be summari zed by the comment; 
"in this area, lower rates won't work because they can go next door 
and get 'uni on' rates ". J 
However, since the national agreement excluded homeworkers, less than 
factory rates could be paid in non-unionized establishments, whereas in 
unionized establishments union officials could theoretically evoke the 
clause referring to reasonable rates. It might be expected therefore that 
non-un1 oni zed managements would take advantage of uni on absence b.y payi ng 
low rates to thei r homeworkers. Tabl e 11.4 compares homeworker/factory 
rates by unionized and non-unionized establishments. It shows that a 
higher proportion of homeworkers were paid lower than factory rates by the 
unionized sector (39% relative to 13%). However, a high level of non-
comparability in the non-unionized sector conceals the total amount of low 
payment, but such non-comparabi 1 i ty support s the observat i on that many 
small companies hived-off enti re secti ons of thei r producti on process to 
homeworking in phase-one type rationalization (see 4.4.1(d)). Neverthe-
less, such underpayment in the unionized sector underlines the ineffective-
ness of unions for improving homeworker conditions and pOints to the neces-
sity for State intervention to guarantee a fair deal for homeworkers. 
11.2.2 Trade union Activity at Local Level 
As Boraston et al 176 show, it is important to examine union activity 
at the workplace in order to accurately determine differential group 
benefits from collective bargaining; this is reported below. 
11.2.2(a) Institutional Representation 
An important duty of any local union official is to secure the union's 
recognition. Table 11.1 details the level of recognition in the 
establishment sample and the number of workers in the unionized and non-
unionized sectors. Although only 56% of the establishment sample was 
unionized, 87% of the worker sample was employed in it. Hence, unionized 
factories had larger workforces which enabled the union to have a wide 
influence for a given effort. An examination of group utilization by 
unionized and non-unionized establishments (Table 11.5 and Figure 11:1), 
shows that the overwhelming majority of males (92%), female full-timers 
(94%), part-timers (87%) and twilight workers (86%) were employed in the 
unionized sector in comparison to only 43% of homeworkers. This 
differential union coverage was caused by homeworkers being concentrated in 
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small establishments where the union was not recognized. Thus, a greater 
proportion of males and full-time females than of the other groups were 
directly affected by the National Agreement. Had the NJIC agreed an 
improvement in homeworker conditions, it would have benefitted only 43% of 
the homeworker sample unless non-unionized factories also adopted it. 
Tabl e 11.5, whi ch i ndi cates average group si ze per establ i shment in 
each sector, shows that there were numeri cally more full-ti me than part-
time females in unionized establishments, whereas the reverse was the case 
in non-unionized companies. 
A similar situation emerged with respect to establishment affiliation 
to the KIF. Table 11.2 shows that 72% of establishments were affiliated, 
and that they employed 92% of the worker sample. Thus, both collective 
bargaining institutions represented the larger establishments. 
An indication of the bargaining strength of employers relative to 
employees is implied by Table 11.6 which shows that 70 workers were 
employed by affil iated establ ishments that did not recognize the union, 
whereas all establishments that recognized the union were also members of 
employer associations. This suggests that employers were strong in the 
bargaining arena relative to these 70 workers, but it also helps to 
illuminate why there was such a large spill-over of the National Pay Award. 
11.2.2(b) Trade Union Membership 
Respondents suppl ied data on thei r employees' trade uni on membershi p 
since most collected union dues, but only a sI ight discrepancy in female 
full- and part-time membership is revealed in Table 11.7. Approximately 
75% of all core factory workers were uni on members. There was a low 1 evel 
of awareness about twilight worker membership, but a high degree of 
awareness about the non-membership of homeworkers: no homeworker was known 
to be a trade uni on member. A rank order for uni on membershi p has been 
assigned to the female segment at the foot of Table 11.7. 
11.2.2(c) Trade Union Activity At Factory Level 
A subjectively assessed index, representing shopfloor activity across 
establishments, has been compiled for each group to illustrate their 
relative representation at grass roots level. Respondents stated the 
number of ti mes over a 5 year peri od that each topi c had been the subject 
of union activity. Questions were posed on each condition of service as 
they were investigated in the i ntervi ew; respondents thereby bei ng 
persistently prompted to reveal union influence. 
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invaluable in revealing the impact of national agreements on non-unionized 
establishments. but nevertheless. only the 14 unionized establishments have 
been reported in this sub-section. 
Table 11.8 summarizes the number of establishments where various 
conditions of service had been the subject of union.involvement. and shows 
the assessed workgroup impact of the union's activities. An index has been 
compiled by examining the union's activity and ascertaining for which group 
it was its intention to benefit. A direct beneficial involvement received 
a positive rating of plus 1; an act or omission considered to have a 
detrimental impact scored a minus 1; wh:re no direct intentional involvement 
occurred for a workgroup. a zero rating was recorded. even though there 
could have been an unintentional beneficial spin-off for them. Positive 
and negative scores were summed to produce an unweighted index. Figure 
11:2 illustrates this index to reveal the power structure as it arose from 
workpl ace bargai ni ng. 
Local union activity about pay rates had occurred in 11 establishments 
on behalf of the males and daytime females. One firm had paid part-timers 
6% less than full-time rates. but the union had negotiated equality. Plus 
one scores have been awarded for these core groups. There had been no 
direct negotiations for twilight workers. but this was not detrimental 
because they always received identical rates: zero was thus scored. 
Homeworkers received lower than factory rates in 7 establishments, but no 
action had occurred to stop it: this omission was detrimental and so a 
minus 1 rating was given. The National Agreement excluded twilight workers 
from shift premium benefit, but there had been no local action to obtain 
it. All shift males received premia. Thus,. negative and positive ratings 
were awarded accordingly. 
Twelve companies had dismissed workers and union officials had been 
involved on behalf of male·s and daytime females; 2 full-timers had been 
represented in industrial tribunals. No action for twil ight workers or 
homeworkers had occurred despite 2 twilight workers having been dismissed. 
Homeworkers. "tend not to be dismissed". but. "laid off on the pretext of 
no more work". There had been no activity to stop this practice. Positive 
ratings were given to core groups and negative ratings to secondary groups. 
Six establ i shments had effected redundanc; eSt and mal es and dayti me femal es 
had been the subject of consultations. Letters of intent had been sent to 
over retirement age workers. and this had a greater part-time impact since 
most were part-timers. There had been no representation for twil ight or 
homeworkers despi te thei r hi gh 1 eve 1 s of actual and impl i ed redundanc1 es 
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(9.4.2 and 9.4.3). A few respondents stated that twil ight and homeworkers 
were pinpointed by local union officials for severance before redundancies 
were consi dered for core workers. Posi tive rati ngs have been recorded for 
core workers and negati ve scores for the secondary groups as a resul t of 
these acts and omissions. There had been no activity on redundancy pay 
for any workgroup. but severed core workers received the statutory 
payments. Secondary groups were denied these payments because they were 
either unlikely to qualify. or were specifically excluded. No local 
efforts had been made to obtain payments for them. so negative ratings have 
been given. 
Only two establi shments reported any acti vity about hol i day times. 
Positive scores were allocating to the core workgroups and zero to the 
secondary groups who were absent from these factories. No local 
negotiations had occurred to obtain holiday pay for homeworkers. This 
omission is detrimental to homeworker interests. so a negative rating has 
been recorded. No negotiations had taken place to agree a strategy for 
mothers during school holidays despite its importance to both employers and 
employees. Mothers had to negotiate on personal rather than collective 
bases and consequently a minus rating has been recorded for daytime 
females. Union assistance in recruitment had been provided to 2 
establishments for attracting female daytime labour and thus positive 
ratings have been allocated to the full- and part-time groups. 
Table 11.8 shows that the greatest efforts had been concentrated on 
negotiating piece rates and with involvement in dismissals and redundancy 
procedures. little activity had occurred regarding other aspects of 
service. The power structure suggested by these data is considered in sub-
section 11.2.2(e). 
11.2.2(d) Areas of Trade Union Inactivity at Facto~ Level 
The National Agreement provided that the overtime premium was 
applicable only after 40 hours. Although several non-union companies 
offered the premium to part-timers working more than their contracted 
hours. no such attempts to negotiate this for part-time and twilight 
workers was reported by unionized establ ishments. and therefore negative 
ratings have been recorded in Table 11.8. Neither had any attempts been 
made to negotiate a contract of emplgyment for home workers even though the 
absence of a contract placed them outside legal protection. Omission of 
such activity was deemed to be very detrimental. so a negative rating was 
awarded. Tacit approval can be imputed to local union officials in the 
11 - 10 
CHAPTER 11 THE POWER STRUCTURE 
light of no union activity regarding the job-segregation of the industry. 
Lack of activity is therefore beneficial to males who obtain the highest 
paid jobs. A posi tive rati ng has therefore been allocated to males. 
11.2.2(e) The Power Structure Suggested by Workplace Bargaining 
Table 11.8 indicates that, males and daytime females benefitted most 
from the actions and omissions of their local union officials, but that 
secondary groups were, overall, penali zed by thei r acti ons on selection 
for redundancy and by their lack of action to remedy inferior treatment. 
The totalled ratings of Table 11.8 are plotted in Figure 11:2 to illustrate 
the power structure deriving from workplace bargaining. This clearly 
depicts the degree of secondary group weakness relative to the core of the 
workforce which was recognized by employers who claimed that: 
"Local representatives prefer indoor workers." And that: 
"They do not represent twil i ght or homeworkers at factory 1 evel." 
Clearly, there is a discrepancy in the perspectives and attitudes of 
national and local officials if these employer claims are well-founded. 
Redundancy strategies were considered by the author to be the best 
indicator of union preference and thereby of group bargaining strength, 
because the ability to retain jobs is of crucial importance to any workers. 
Respondents were asked to rank, on the basis of their experience of local 
union representatives, the order in which their representative would expect 
workgroups and/or worker categories, to be severed. Table 11.9, which 
omits the men who were not substitutes for women, presents these results; 
rank 1 represents the fi rst to be made redundant. The mean rank shows a 
clear-cut distinction between the anticipated treatment of core and 
secondary labour, but only slight differences towards the workgroups 
forming them. Employers assessed the union's strategy as complying with 
their own (Table 9.14) and the resultant power position accords with that 
depicted in Figure 11:2. 
There is little doubt from evidence presented here that secondary 
workers had very weak bargaining strength, as had been recognized by 
national officials. Secondary workers were indeed at the bottom of the 
power structure. Within the core section of each workforce, part-timers 
were weaker than full-timers who were in turn weaker than the male shift 
operatives. Consequently it was to be expected that national attempts to 
secure improvements for the secondary groups failed, because employers, 
daily observing these weaknesses, reinforced their own resistance to 
change. In summary, the power structure suggested by trade union activity 
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was: 1 = males; 2 = full-time females; 3 = part-time females; 4 = twilight 
workers; and 5 = homeworkers, where 1 is the most powerful. 
11~ RELATIVE POWER DERIVING FROM THE AVAILABILITY OF CHOICE 
Considerable bargaining strength can derive ·from the opportunity to 
exercise choice of employment, so that a power structure can still exist 
when bargaining institutions are absent. Such power derives from the 
employees' ability to obtain suitable alternative employment, and the 
employers' ability to introduce appropriate substitutes for labour. There 
are supply (and demand) side options; voluntary turnover (or worker 
substitution) can either actually take place, or merely be threatened, in 
order to resist detrimental changes or remedy unsatisfactory circumstances. 
11.3.1 Employee Choice 
Employee choice hinges on the availability of suitable vacancies and 
the supply of competitors; the more vacancies and the fewer competitors, 
the greater will be bargaining strength. Levels of supply analyses of 
section 5.2 show generally that males were in adequacy and full-time 
females were in shortage, but that all other female groups were in excess. 
The relative importance of selection criteria (9.3.1) confirms that 
employers sought full-time operatives from preference, so the 477 jobs 
occupied by part-timers gives an indication of the degree of shortage of 
full-time females. Full-timers therefore had greater choice 
possibilities since they were always able to transfer to other employers, 
but part-timer excess meant job-competition from both full- and part-
timers, causing part-timers to be substantially weaker. The scarcity of 
secondary worker vacancies, particularly of the twil ight type, and the 
great excess of potent i al secondary workers gave homeworkers and twil i ght 
workers respectively very limited, even non-existent, choice possibilities. 
In a broader context but within the confines of the surveyed LLM, males had 
more varied and numerically more job opportunities outside the H&K 
industry (see 2.4) than their female counterparts, and their choice 
possibil Hies· were therefore enhanced. In certain nearby LLMs a shortage 
of knitting skills existed179 which further increased their choices. 
Consequently, the choice power ranking is assessed to be: 1 = males; 2 = 
full-time females; 3 = part-time females; 4 = homeworkers; and 5 = twilight 
workers, where 1 is the most powerful. 
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11.3.2 Employer Choice 
Employer choice hinges on the relative importance of the need and want 
elements of intended demand and the supply of suitable potential workers, 
see chapter 13. In general terms therefore, the employer was weak relative 
to full-timers and strong relative to part-timers who were in excess, and 
stronger still relative to twilight and homeworkers whose large over supply 
permitted selection of especially weak individuals strongly needing to 
retain jobs for financial or other reasons. However, want modification 
can result in the substitution of less preferred workers and when 
substitutions are made, the bargaining power of the preferred group is 
weakened and that of the employer and substitute worker enhanced. Due to 
the substitution of part-timers for full-timers, the apparently high 
bargaining strength of full-timers and weakness of part-timers could have 
been somewhat modified. Examining those operations using either high-cost 
capital or short-supply skills in greater detail, the operatives concerned 
were .in stronger positions than their lower-skilled and labour-intensively-
used colleagues regardless of their workgroups. 
11.4 POWER DERIVING FROM LEGISLATION 
The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 provided the 
framework for the control of LM behaviour and formalized employment rights 
(sect ion 2.2), but certai n cl asses of person fell outs i de the scope of the 
Act's provisions. Consequently, to determine the impact of this enactment 
it is necessary to examine the qualifying conditions and interpret them in 
the light of each workgroup's employment pattern. Individuals or 
workgroups denied provisions are in weaker bargaining positions than those 
qualifying for entitlement. 
11.4.1 The Scope of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 
The following discussion of the Act's provisions does not purport to 
be a complete interpretation. for this can only be given by the Courts and 
Industrial Tribunals. For brevity, the qualifying conditions discussed in 
this section have been confined to those relevant to the study. 
Consequently, categories of employee frequently excluded from entitlement, 
such as members of the po1 ice force, crews of vessels engaged in share 
fishing, House of Lords staff, are ignored, as are employees married to the 
employer since no such workers were encountered. 
Table 11.10 column. headings utilize the same numbering system as that 
used on page 2-22 to identify each provision and provide quick reference to 
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the qualifying conditions which are in turn numbered i to xii, (see row 
headings). The symbol X indicates that the specified groups were barred 
from entitlement; where no X appears in a group's column. then rights to 
the provision did exist. 
Continuous employment of the stipulated length was the basic:. 
qualification for the provisions under the Act and this was termed 
'continuous reckonable employment' (c.r.e.). The continuity of service was 
calculated in weeks ending on the Saturday of the week of termination. 
Weeks during which employees were on strike did not count as reckonable 
se rvi ce, even though employees were st i 11 under thei r cont racts of 
employment, but weeks of lock-out did count. Under the Act, a part-time 
worker was an employee who worked between 8 and 16 hours per week, but for 
this study a part-timer has been defined as an employee who worked fewer 
than the 'normal weekly hours', see glossary. Consequently, part-timers (as 
defined for this study) and full-timers received identical treatment under 
the Act's provisions, unless they were contracted for fewer than 16 weekly 
hours which was rare. The EPCA did not distinguish between men and women, 
but a differential impact could arise because the different retirement ages 
of men and women. Persons over the State retirement ages of 60 and 65 for 
women and men respectively, and young persons below the age of 18, were 
treated less favourably than other employees for certain provisions, see 
rows (ix), (x) and (xi) of Table 11.10. 
Twilight workers straddled the distinction between full- and part-time 
workers as defined by the Act. In theory, being employed for slightly less 
than 16 hours placed twilight workers in substantially inferior positions 
under law as can be seen from a comparison of row (v) with rows (ii), (iii) 
and (iv). In practice it made little difference, as will be discussed in 
the next section. Persons working fewer than 8 hours fell outside the 
scope of legislation. Some twil ight workers coul d have been engaged on 
fixed term contracts whereupon they were subjected to speci al excl usi on .. 
clauses, see rows (vi), (vii) and (viii). 
An employee was defined as, 'a person who is, or has been, engaged 
under a contract of employment'. Self-employed persons were therefore not 
employees, but they may be engaged under a contract for services as 
distinct from a contract of employment. The distinction between these two 
types of contract is often difficult to establ ish, see section 2.2. All 
employers treated homeworkers as though they were self-employed, which thus 
caused them to fall outside the scope of the Act's provisions, except 
apparently, Provision 5, the recovery of debts on the employer's 
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i nso 1 vency , see row (il. 
11.4.2 The Differential Impact of the Legislation 
Table 11.10 clearly shows that the weakest workers under law were the 
homeworkers. For this reason homeworker pressure groups had unsuccessfully 
lobbied to have homeworkers written into LM law by means of the-
Homeworkers' (Protection) Bill, 1979, see section 2.2. The next weakest 
group were twilight workers with fewer than 16 weekly hours of employment, 
who also, in effect, fell outside certain provisions due to their 
intermittent employment pattern. The empirical work has shown that 
twilight workers were unl ikely to retain their employment continually for 5 
yea rs. Hence they were in almost a s weak a pos it i on as the homeworke rs, 
having additionally only the rights to trade uni on membership and 
activities and trade union consultation rights on redundancy. However, as 
considered in Section 11.2.2 (e), these rights had no real value because 
local trade union representatives rarely pursued twilight worker interests. 
Part-time day and twil ight workers with fewer than 16 hours were in an 
identical position under law, but part-timers were more likely to qualify 
for the provision requiring 5 years' c.r.e. than were twil ight workers 
because employer demands for daytime labour was more consistent. 
Part-timers with more than 16 hours' service, shift workers and both 
male and female full-~imers were treated identically under the EPCA. These 
groups. had merely to satisfy the c.r.e. clauses for the following 
provisions: (6) the guaranteed weekly scheme; (7) redundancy provision; (8) 
dismissal provision; and (9) maternity rights (where appropriate). These 
groups have therefore been awarded an equal one ranki ng. Part-timers have 
been included in this equal ranking because almost all were employed for 
more than 16 hours. Twil i ght workers have been ranked fourth because they 
were always regarded as employees with contracts of employment, and 
homeworkers have been ranked fifth since they were specifically excluded 
from the Act. 
11.5 THE OVERALL POWER STRUCTURE 
Table 11.11 which summarizes the conclusions of the previous sections 
and shows that whichever measure of power or bargaining strength was 
appl ied, men were stronger or equal to women, and daytime females were 
stronger than twilighters and homeworkers. Full-timers usually had more 
bargaining strength than the part-time group, and twil ight workers usually 
had more than homeworkers. Relative to employers, males were the most 
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powerful of all the workgroups not least because each individual knitter 
operated several automatic machines which caused them to be highly 
productive. Collective action, or the threat of it, could therefore be 
very influential. 
Thus, the overall power ranki ng derived by cons idering all the major 
aspects contributing towards the workgroups' relative bargaining strength. 
has been judged as follows: 1 = male knitters; 2 = full-time females; 3 = 
part-time females; 4 = twilight workers; and 5 = homeworkers, where rank 1 
is the strongest. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE - IMPLICATIONS OF TIlE EMPIRICAL !lOA( 
This chapter aims to explain demands for workgroups, in particular how 
twilight workers and homeworkers fit into an overall demand pattern. It 
attempts to clarify many of the issues raised in chapter 1 and to present 
an overview based on the quantitative and qualitative data, supplemented by 
the author's personal observations of workers at their work stations. It 
shoul d provide a base of knowledge regarding secondary workers which wi 11· 
be useful to future researchers in secondary LMs. 
12.1 SEGMENTATION 
For the hosiery and knitwear LM, the author maintains that: 
(i) segmentation occurs between men and women; and 
(ii) segmentation also occurs among the various female workgroups. 
Segmentation occurring among the female workgroups is distinguished 
from that occurring between men and women in that it is possible, even 
probable, that particular individuals will be able to cross the boundaries 
between one group and another. However, such mobility rarely takes the 
form of direct group switching; rather it takes place at different stages 
in the life-cycle, and when it occurs it does not erode the characteristic 
differences among the groups. Segmentation between men and women is upheld 
by workforce segregation whereby it is almost impossible for women to climb 
to the hi gher segments retai ned for men. 
Why is this so? What purpose do these forms of segmentation serve? 
Why do they persist in the face of equal opportunity legislation? The 
general answer must certainly be that both forms of segmentation offer 
sa vi ngs for the employer who is operati ng in hi ghly competi tive markets, 
but there are subsidiary reasons for the existence and persistence of 
segmentation. 
12.1.1 Male/Female Segmentation 
With respect to the persistence of male/female segmentation it is 
contended that this is strongly influenced by the differences perceived 
by employers in male/female LM activity which results in different 
male/female work patterns. These employer perceptions are: 
(i) the young of both sexes tend to be unreliable; but 
(ii) the young male's reaction to marriage and family is to fncrease his LM 
attachment vl'a a willingness to increase the number of hours worked, 
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either basic or overtime hours; 
(iiilthe young female's reaction to marriage and family is to decrease LM 
attachment as demonstrated by the fewer hours she is willing to work 
at those particul ar stages of her 1 i fe-cycl e; 
(iv) most men have little difficulty in working full-time hours at any 
time, of day and therefore can work shifts reliably; 
(v) many mature women have severe restrictions on their weekly hours and 
the daily times available for pai d employment, and therefore are 
generally unsuitable for shift-work due to low hour inputs which 
causes high idle-time costs; 
(vi) many women with domestic commitments are more unreliable relative to 
men in terms of absenteeism and voluntary turnover and therefore are 
unsuitable for shift-work because these characteristics cause unviable 
machine idle-time. 
Further research is required to test the validity of these perceptions 
thoroughly. It could be that blue-collar women exhibit decreased LM 
attachment after marriage and family only because their employment options 
are within the present unfavourable job-segregated structure; i.e. if they 
were in the high paid jobs they could exhibit the same reactions to 
marriage and family as do men. Even if verified for some individuals, it 
does not follow that a majority of women cannot work shifts, and therefore 
these employer perceptions should not be accepted as justifications of 
segregatory or segmentary practices. Nevertheless, it is contended that 
such perceptions had strong influences on employer tactics. 
It is a rational response to require the running of costly machinery 
only on a fUll-time hours basis. Consequently, employers consider it 
sufficiently worthwhile to give training to young men to operate such 
machinery because of the continuous nature of life-time employment and 
their ability to work shifts; however, they do not offer the same training 
to young women due to expected future intermittency in full-time 
employment. Their perceptions stigmatize all women as being unsuitable for 
shift-work which inevitably leads to the use of men only for costly 
machinery, and ensures a lack of supply of females with knitting machine 
experience. This perpetuates the job-segregation on capital-
intensive/labour-intensive lines. 
As illustrated in Figure 12:1 a vicious circle, or positive feedback 
situation, can arise whereby perceived characteristics positively influence 
job-segregation, and the desire for cost-minimization also reinforces job-
segregation since different wage *etting standards can be adopted when 
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workgroups do not perform 'like work' as specified in law. The resultant 
LM segmentation produces different LM behaviour by gender which permits 
employer observations to reinforce their perceptions and this completes the 
cycle. It is contended that such a positive feedback is the motive force 
in the persistence of job-segregation in the H&K industry despite equal 
opportunity legislation. 
Male/female segmentation in the H&K industry is judged to exist on the 
basis of lower female earnings; it is contended that this arises from job 
segregation because women are confined to lower paying jobs. Lower pay 
appears to stem from the inferior wage rates that are paid to women with 
standards of skill similar to those possessed by men. Certainly, many 
perform work that is equally demanding, if not more so, in terms of the 
manipulation, dexterity and concentration required. In this respect, it is 
contended that e.ployers, whether intentionally or by custom. practice 
divide and 'benefit' rather than divided and 'conquer' tactics. and that 
the 'cheap labour hypothesis of de.and' can be extended to wo.en in 
relation to men in the H&K industry. 
12.1.2 Segmentation Among Female Workgroups 
Assuming that employers' perceptions of female workers are well-
founded for a substantial number of women, then strong influences on 
work group formation are also supply imposed via the constraints to paid-
work-available time and insufficient less-than-full-time employment 
opportunities. These pre-entry lM influences during the child-bearing and 
reari ng years are therefore fundamentally responsible for segmentation 
among female workgroups, but post-entry influences arising from shortages 
of skill and factory space also have impacts. Insufficient part-time 
vacancies encourage the consideration of twilight and homeworking jobs, but 
for some potential workers these forms of activity are doubtlessly the only 
o,ptions. Thus, the hours, time and pl ace constr-aints create an over-
supply of potential workers for the part-time and secondary groups and this 
causes high levels of competition for these jobs and weakens the market 
positions of individuals seeking them. "Take it or leave it" attitudes 
pervade many el1)ployers' approaches to secondary group appl i cants and thi s 
is illustrated as the restrictive specification barrier in Figure 12:2. 
The exclusion of homeworkers from equal '~, pay legislation leaves the 
door open for employers to adopt discriminatory pay rates, although some do 
not do so, and the high level of job competition, coupled with employer 
attitudes, no doubt places p'otential homeworkers in the invidious situation 
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of having either to accept discriminatory rates, or to have no paid work. 
Part-time and twilight workers are in slightly better positions in that, as 
employees, they are better protected by LM law and collective bargains, and 
the fact that none perform exclusive operations. Again, the '1 He work' 
loophole would have enabled employers to adopt inferior wage rates for 
these groups, but collective action had removed or prevented the 
implementation of these company policies in the surveyed LLM. 
The impossibil ity of providing supervision for homeworkers influences 
many employers towards allocating higher skilled jobs to daytim,e workers 
whose quality of workmanship can be hierarchically monitored by 
supervisors, and the lower skilled jobs to homeworkers to reduce risks of 
spoil age, see Fi gure 12:2. The over supply of potenti al 1 ess-than-full-
time workers facilitates this selection strategy by allowing the 
recruitment of skilled part-timers. While this form of skill segregation 
is a rati onal response to manageri al control probl ems, the non-
comparabil ity of operations performed by homeworkers again enables 
different rate setting standards to be adopted. The differential pay rates 
so caused result in a degree of segmentation within the female segment. 
Thus, the earnings of homeworkers can reflect both a degree of confinement 
to lower skilled jobs and the payment of discriminatory rates. However, 
the greatest discrepancy between secondary and core worker experience is in 
the lack of permanency of twilight and homeworking jobs and the variability 
of homeworker workloads. Both full- and part-timers have much greater 
degrees of permanency and constancy than do the two secondary groups. 
Whether or not secondary workers are confined to lower skilled jobs is 
1 argely determi ned by the reasons for thei r use; these are di scussed in 
section 12.3. Obviously, secondary workers introduced to supply rare 
skills and being used because of bottlenecks on skilled operations, or 
twilight workers employed to intensify the use of specialized machines, are 
not being given low skilled jobs but rather have access to skilled jobs via 
the back door, see Figure 12:2. Thus, the skill profiles of the 
secondary groups are not uniformly semi-skilled. 
12.2 THE RATIONAlE BEHIND WORKGROUP DEMAND 
The prime objective of all labour demands, given a production-centred 
orientation, is to tailor labour inputs to production requirements. 
Within the context of the above suggested segmentation, three fundamental 
reasons explain the complex inter-related demand patterns of the various"-· 
workgroups. These are: 
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Reason Vhf Demand Arises 
1. To produce the steaqy bulk 
of output. 
2. To provide services for the 
rest of the work force. 
3. To provide production flex-
ibility to adapt to variable 
product demand. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
Workgroups Involved 
Male shift workers; female 
full-and part-timers; a sub-
group of the male full-
timers, i.e. qyehouse workers; 
and a homeworker sub-group 
demanded to provide additi on-
all space, or rare skills. 
Part-time men and the remain-
der of the male full-time 
group, i.e. warehouseand 
internal del ivery men; machine 
mechanics. 
The twilight and homeworker 
groups; demands for overtime 
and short-time hours from 
the core workgroups. 
The inter-play of these fundamental reasons for demanding workers 
produces the observed employment pa tterns and workloads for workgroup 
members. For instance, workers demanded for reasons 1 and 2 enjoy 
conti nuous employment and rel atively regul ar workloads; workers used for 
reason 3 experience irregular workloads and employment. However, the 
reasons for demanding twilight and homeworkers vary more than for all the 
other groups, and although it is contended that generally they are used for 
reason 3, a substanti al number of indivi dual s compri sing these workgroups 
are used for reason 1 (i.e. to produce part of the stable bulk of output) 
due to the following two subsidiary reasons: 
4. Shortage of daytime workers Twilight workers and home-
with the desired skills. 
5. A shortage of factory 
space. 
workers. 
Homeworkers to provide dom-
estic space; twilight work-
ers to intensify factory/equip-
ment utilization. 
Reason 4 results in secondary workers being given skilled jobs 
(Tw=71%; Hw=52%). Reason 5 is an important factor in the allocation of 
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semi-skilled jobs to secondary workers, since by adopting this policy there 
tends to be less risk of spoilage due to lack of supervision which is 
particularly difficult to arrange on a permanent basis for twilight 
workers, and impossible for homeworkers. Labour demands arising from 
reasons 4 and 5 provide relatively stable employment for a hardcore of 
secondary group members, but as product demand fluctuates, a less permanent 
supply of extra secondary workers are introduced and severed to cope with 
twilight worker and homeworker bottlenecks. Hence, 'core' and 'secondary' 
el ements can be conceptualized within the, secondary groups themselves. 
Notwithstanding that these reasons encompass demands for both core and 
secondary 1 abour, the external condi ti ons under whi ch demands ari se and the 
choice processes associated with them require clearer exposition. 
12.3 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WORKGROUP DEMANDS ARISE 
As implied by the reasons for demanding labour, group utilization 
springs directly from prevai ling conditions in product and 1 abour markets. 
Matching labour input to product output is no doubt a relatively simple 
matter in industries facing constant product demand, for having recruited 
sufficient numbers to produce the necessary output, the most that remains 
is to replace leavers. For industries such as H&K that face substantial, 
short-term, irregular variations in product demand, the matching process 
can necessitate considerable short-run flexibility, such as alternating 
recruitment and severance policies with their attendant costs, unless 
alternative adjustment strategies are devised. Sub-section 10.3.2 cl aims 
that retention of experienced workers was a major goal of interviewed 
employers, but thi s objecti ve conflicted wi th a recruitment/severance 
policy. Consequently, employers utilize the secondary workers as a 
strategy for providing necessary adjustments to production requirements 
whilst retaining intact the experienced core of the workforce. 
It is concluded therefore that twilight workers and hOlleworkers are 
used to provide employers operating in variable product markets with short-
term flexibility. They are demanded to 'cushion' the employment of core 
workers as was hypothesized in 1.5. It is held however, that short-run 
fluctuations in product markets are not the only conditions that motivate 
the use of secondary workers. Bottlenecks of work in progress can develop 
from m ach i nery breakages and short- or long-run stoppages, or from 
shortages of appropriate labour in both stable and unstable product 
markets. These bottlenecks also create the need for variable production 
capacity, but they have their origins either in the organizational problems 
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of the fi rm itself, or within the dynamics of the 1 abour market. 
Consequently, employers operating in stable product markets may also demand 
secondary labour intermittently. 
Nevertheless, it is contended that in general, short-run fluctuations 
in the product market are characteristic features of secondary group 
employment. Reasons 1 and 2 (page 12-5) typify core labour demands while 
reasons 3, 4 and 5 typify secondary labour demands. 
12.4 STRATIFICATION IN THE HOSIERY AND KNITWEAR LABOUR MARKET 
Clearly, workers demanded for reasons 1 and 2 are placed in higher LM 
strata than those demanded for reasons 3 by virtue of having more stable 
workloads and lower chances of redundancy. The criteria of demand as 
outlined above, considered in conjunction with remuneration and other terms 
and conditions of service, lead to the ordering of strata as shown in 
Figure 12:3. Mechanics are ranked higher than shift knitters because they 
are generally classed as "staff", are paid monthly salaries rather than 
weekly wages, and have more benefits such as pensions schemes and bonuses 
(8.4). Skilled workers have been placed above the semi-skilled, and full-
timers above part-timers following the rank orders of Part B. Full-
timers have sl ight1y better promotion and trai ni ng opportuniti es (8.2.2(a) 
& 9.4.1), and probably less chance of redundancy. Part-timers face more 
stringent selection and some do not obtain certain rest periods. Part-
timers, have been ranked above twi1 ight workers due to the twil ight 
redundancy conditions, while twilight workers have been placed above 
homeworkers because none are paid the discriminatory pay rates of 
homeworkers and they do have the legal status of employees. However, the 
core homeworkers of stratum 10 have been ranked higher than the twil ight 
workers of stratum 11 because of the greater permanency of employment for 
these particu1 ar homeworkers. 
The stratification depicted in Figure 12:3 illustrates how men 
generally held superior ~itions in the H&K LM, but that the top strata 
within the female segment were in pOSitions superior to the sub-groups 
occupying the lower strata within the male segment. In this respect it is 
consistent with Ashton & Magui re's75 finding that market segments overlap 
without boundaries being eroded. 
12.5 CHOICE PROCESSES 
Choice of a particular workgroup is considerably more complex than 
appears from the simplified characterization of a workforce comprised of a 
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hardcore of experienced daytime and shift workers to whi ch vari abl e numbers 
of twilight and homeworkers are periodically added and deducted to furnish 
the necessary production flexibility. A number of pervasive influences 
affect the work group sel ecti on process.es, 
12.5.1 Factors Influencing Workgroup Choice 
12.5.1 (a) The Limitation of Core Worker Numbers 
A policy of retaining workers during demand troughs (see, 10.3.2) 
conflicts with the objective of cost-minimization because it is costly to 
retain workers who are under-employed, although it is usually more costly 
to sever them when redundancy payments are incurred. To lower the costs of 
employment stability, worker numbers are limited to those required to 
achieve less than peak output when producing at moderately fast speeds; 
median output is used for illustration purposes in chapter 13. By limiting 
core worker numbers, employers reduce the costs of retention during 
production troughs, but by retaining them they: 
(a) save the training costs of subsequent replacements; 
(b) save training time which is crucial when order deadlines loom; 
(c) maintain stable relations within the firm and avoid disruptions; and 
(d) reduce voluntary turnover by protecting piecework earnings. 
Operatives rewarded by incentive methods cannot achieve high earnings 
if over-manning occurs and shared workloads force efforts to be below 
normal levels. Good operatives having their pay eroded in this manner are 
1 ikely to be tempted to transfer to other establ i shments that can offer 
heavier and more consistent workloads. Rather than risk the loss of 'good' 
employees, an employer will attempt to minimize basic numbers and make 
adjustments via temporary top-ups of labour input. It is thus rational to 
under-man rather than over-man, especi ally in small establishments where 
low voluntary turnover is particularly important since each operative 
processes a consi derabl e proportion of total output. Thi s strategy 
provi des another expl anati on why the small er sector used more homework 
1 abour. 
12.5.1 (b) Choice of Work Pattern 
The cost of equipment is an important factor affecting work group 
choice because high-cost machinery has high idle-time costs and vice versa, 
see element (K) in the cost of labour calculation, Table 9.1. cost-
minimizing employers initially select the .achfnery·s work pattern by 
minimizing the per capita hourly cost of factory operating overheads, 
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unsocial hours premia and machinery idle-time, and then recruit workers 
with the appropriate work pattern. Figure 12:4 illustrates this work 
pattern decision where the hourly cost of machine idle-time per operative 
is plotted vertically,and hourly cost of factory overheads proportional to 
the amount of space consumed by the operative's machinery is plotted 
horizontally. A line of equality termed a 'decision Hne' denotes the 
breakeven points where the costs of operation equate to the costs of idle-
time. If unsocial hours premia are paid for shifts or overtime, new 
decision lines are created by moving the line of equality upwards by the 
total value of premia to compensate for addition~expenditure. The 
position that each point assumes in relation to the appropriate decision 
line determines the work pattern for that type of machinery. Equipment 
having points above the decision line will be selected for multiple shift 
operation, while equipment having points below it will be used only on the 
single shift. Consequently, different work patterns can coexist side by 
side within establishments, but factory space must be apportioned to 
bal ance the throughput of work at each stage of production. 
Points F and K depicted in Figure 12:4 have been calculated for an 
establishment that provided all the necessary details. This company used 
its knitting machinery on a shift system and its finishi ng machinery on 
daywork only. Point F, denoting a 16 pence per person hour overhead cost, 
shows that it would have been uneconomic to operate the finishing machines 
on a shift basis because the nationally agreed shift premia at 55 pence per 
person per hour (1l.2.1) overwhel ms the one pence per person per hour i dle-
time cost (9.2). A 36 pence per hour nationally agreed overtime premium 
similarly makes overtime working uneconomic, although anxious employers 
will produce by such expensive means for short periods because the long-
term costs of lost custom are usually greater. Similarly, the point K 
shows that despite the 55 pence shift premium it would have been uneconomic 
to operate knitting machinery on a single shift basis because the 65 pence 
per person per hour operating cost was considerably less than the .£1.44 
pence per hour idle-time cost. Even though different makes and models of 
machine and overhead expendi tures will vary among estab 1 i shments, these 
cost-effective work patterns for knitting and finishing machinery are 
unlikely to vary due to the wide discrepanies between the per person value 
of the mach i nes, see 4.2..1. 
Thus, the costs of equipment are highly influential in the selection 
of either shift or day time, core groups. The lower the idle-time cost, the 
greater the 1 ikel i hood that it wi 11 be operated on a 1 ess-than-full-ti me 
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basis. However, after the initial purchase and allocation of factory space 
it is possible to operate machines less intensively when there is a large 
fall in product demand, the rationale behind this action being; 
"it is better for the machines to stand idle than for them to produce 
unsaleable products". 
In fact, when a point falls near to the appropriate decision line an 
employer may select a less than optimally intensive work pattern in order 
to build in considerable flexibil ity; e.g. for a pOint fall ing between 
overtime and shift premia lines, single shift plus overtime ope\ation may 
be chosen to build in shift working potential by providing a subsequent 
doubling or trebling of output (depending on the shift pattern) and simul-
taneously safeguarding against redundancies should a fall in demand ensue. 
12.5.1 (c) Choice of Males and Females 
For the reasons outlined above, less-than-full-time work patterns are 
uneconomic for operating high-cost machinery since they create long-idle 
time periods. This is the economic backdrop to the recruitment of females 
to labour-intensive tasks and males to capital-intensive tasks. Employers 
perceive that a substantial proportion of young female full-timers, when 
they reach their mid-thirties, will prefer part-time employment if they 
wish to continue LM participation. Since it is impossible to pinpoint who 
those particular individuals will be, it is a 'safer' cost-minimizing 
strategy with respect to capital utilization and training to recruit only 
males for capital intensive operations. 
12.5.1 Cd) Choice of Full- and Part-time Females 
The fi rm's choice of core female workers 1's both externally imposed 
and internally determined. Employers either cannot (because "males will 
not accept the low pay involved") or will not (because it would erode wage 
differentials) recruit males for the more numerous manipulative labour-
intensive jobs that remain the woman's preserve. Hence, female full-timers 
are the preferred choice to fill core finishing jobs for general production 
purposes. When demands exceed supply, as in the surveyed LLM where 
concentrations of H&K and footwear manufacturers draw upon similar pools of 
blue-collar full-timers, employers have the following options: 
(i) to recruit males to female jobs, but this could erode pay 
differentials which would have a large marginal impact due to labour-
intensiveness requiring large numbers of workers. 
(ii) to recruit part-timers; this strategy results in more machine idle-
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time, but many part-timers are highly productive and this offsets the 
1 pence per person per hour idle-time cost; or 
(iii)to recruit the secondary groups, but this means lower supervision and 
possibly less control over the timing of work completion; batch 
breaking, delivery and collection impose costs and can be time 
consuming; therefore if timing is an important parameter of the 
selection decision, secondary workers with part~time inputs can rarely 
produce sufficient output in the available time. 
Faced with these alternatives, option (ifl, the recruitment of part-
ti mers, is the most cost-effect! ve sol uti on. As indfvi dua 1 productfviti es 
are more clearly visible in small factories where employers and workers are 
in close proximity, the better performances of part-timers might partly 
expl ain why they outnumbered full-timers in the small sector, Table 4.2(b). 
An additional reason for accepting part-timers with little objection 
is illustrated by Figure 13:2 (b) which shows that, as time-rate workers 
producing as much as full-timers, they are cheaper to employ, a 
particularly important feature at low output levels when equality of output 
is most likely to occur. A desire for flexibility can be another minor 
motive for accepting part-timers since they are usually adaptable in a 
downward di recti on when persuaded to work more hours per week than they 
desire,· although this flexibility is offset by less adaptability in an 
upward di recti on. However, recruitment of part-ti mers at peak producti on 
times will build-in downward flexibi lity in readiness for a forthcoming 
trough. Furthermore, if seasonal 1 ull s coi nci de with school hol i day 
periods, part-timers can ease the dearth of work at no expense to the 
employer by "tak i ng ti me-off wi thout pay". Moreover, part-ti mers are 
sometimes demanded by fashion manufacturers to produce special, short-lived 
fashion features on a limited number of items and in these instances they 
are the preferred choice because the output required is insufficient to 
warrant the employment of a full-timer. Nevertheless, in general, part-
timers are chosen as a second-best alternative. 
12.5.2 Factors Influencing the Choice of Secondary Groups 
Secondary groups are generally recruited by factory producers when 
circumstances or mishaps threaten to undermine intended production pl ans 
that rely on core labour. Both twilight workers and homeworkers are 
demanded to provide flexibility to changing production schedules and to 
cushion the employment of core workers. Each can be accurately described 
as bottleneck labour and each is demanded to fine tune labour input by 
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provi di ng necessa ry "top-ups" to core 1 abour inputs and absorbi ng 
subsequent fall-backs in demand. However, the secondary groups are often 
only used on a limited number of operations and although they serve the 
same purposes, factors influencing the choice of secondary groups are more 
numerous than those affecting core worker choice and this makes selection 
more complex. 
12.5.2 (a) The Nature of Production Bottlenecks 
Selection complexity arises because bottlenecks can be general or 
specific, foreseen or unforeseen, large or small. For instance: 
(I) general undercapacity exists when there are shortages of labour or 
capital equipment on all operations. 
(i) general undercapacity will be foreseen when more orders have been 
accepted than can be produced on premises, and as such the degree 
will be calculable so that prior arrangements can be made to sub-
contract the work to other fi rms. 
(ii) unforeseen general undercapacity can result from labour disputes, 
bouts of absenteeism arising from local epidemics or service 
breakdowns such as power cuts. 
(II) Specific undercapacity arises from lack of particular expertise or 
specialized capital equipment for selected operations. 
(f) speci fic undercapaci ty can predictably result from deli berate 
first-phase rationalization as described in 4.2.l(d). 
(if) specific undercapacity will more usually arise unpredictably from 
machinery breakages and/or employee absence or voluntary 
turnover. 
(III)large bottlenecks of all four types described above usually stem from 
high production schedules and therefore most frequently occur in large 
establishments. 
(IV) small bottlenecks of all four types will often arise from the lower 
production schedules of small companies, but naturally they can al so 
occur from short stoppages in large factories. 
Several common situations that produce bottlenecks and give rise to 
secondary demands can be identified. these are: 
(1) shortages of core personnel with the required skills; 
(2) shortages of factory space; 
(3) unbalanced and varying productivity levels at different stages of 
production; 
(4) under-manningj 
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(5) pace of work variations on different operations; and 
(6) absenteeism and turnover. 
(1) Shortages of Core Operatives with the Required Skills 
Shortages of daytime core personnel with specific skills can arise 
during either high or low product demand due to general shortages of such 
labour in the ELLM, or from voluntary quits and illnesses coupled with 
short-term irreplaceability. Deadline pressures often allow insufficient 
time to train inexperienced replacements, or even for re-recruitment and 
i nducti on of experienced workers, whi ch thereby prevents the sol vi ng of 
bottlenecks by core personnel themselves. Secondary workers who owe their 
employment to general shortages of specific skills in the ELLM, 
particularly those with skills that are being technologically superceded 
and for which employers are reluctant to train, are the elite of the 
secondary groups and can fi nd thei r work supply regul arly and constantly 
heavy because they are demanded for reason 1 of section 12.2. 
(2) Shortages of Facto~ Space 
Companies that expand over time as is frequently the case (see, 
4.3.2.) can experience shortages of factory space. This constraint is 
particul arly prevalent in small, entrepreneuri al companies commencing 
trading from low financial bases and which are thereby unable to procure 
large or extendable premises. Reorganization as described in 4.'2.1 (d) is 
a rational response, with the first phase provi ding secondary group 
employment of a continuous nature, and the second phase often withdrawing 
it, except for intermittent, short-term, unpredictable bottleneck demands. 
(3) Unbalanced and Varying Productivity Levels 
Different operations in the productive process with unmatched 
productivity level s can lead to backlogs of work when workers with 
different LM acti vi ty cha racteri sti cs man them. Outputs can become 
unmatched, even though manning and outputs were initially balanced, due to 
varying levels of overtime input or increases in effort. Figure 12:5 
illustrates output flexibility for differently productive operations having 
heterogeneous 1 abour input. Low-output operatives produce only half (say 5 
batches per person per hour) of the production possible on high-output 
operations (10 batches per person per hour) when working with the same 
degree of effort. Consequently, twice the number of low-operatives are 
used to bal ance the throughput of work and ensure a conti nuous flow from 
one operative to the next. If labour input flexibility varies, as when 
different amounts of overtime are offered, frequently claimed to be the 
case with male and ,female labour, the previously balanced output becomes 
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unbalanced. For example, when 7 hours of overtime per person per week are 
worked on the high-output male operation (Table 9.34), and 4 hours each 
(i.e. 8 hours total at a ratio of 2:1) on the low-output female operations, 
the result is as follows: 
Hi gh-output opn. 7 hrs x 10 batches x 1 opv. = 70 extra batches/wlc 
Low-output opn. 4 hrs x 5 batches x 2 opvs. = 40 extra batches/wlc 
A bottleneck of 30 batches per week is produced on the low output 
operation. In this situation the employer has several options: 
(f) he can set his employee ratio permanently higher than 2:1, but this 
forces him to carry a greater excess capacity than necessary during 
low activity which confl icts with the cost-minimizing objective and 
erodes piecework earnings.so risking voluntary turnover of experienced 
core personnel; 
(ii) he can allow the ratio to vary with activity, but this conflicts with 
the goal of retaining intact a stable internal workforce; 
(iii)if deadlines are imminent he can introduce temporary secondary workers 
for the bottleneck period and this ·does not adversely affect the core 
element of his work force; 
(iv) he can limit the amount of overtime worked on the high-output 
operations so as to maintain equilibrium, but this produces less than 
the possible output of option (ili); or 
(v) he can allow the snarl-up of work to accumulate in the knowledge that 
as producti on schedules fall, the bottleneck wi.ll di sappear as hi gh-
output operatives cease overtime and fast pace, while low-output 
operatives continue overtime and fast pace until the bottl~eck is 
removed. 
Of these options, (iii) and (v) are the least disruptive and most 
cost-effective, but there may be insufficient time before deadlines to 
adopt option (v). Hence option (fii) is the most common solution. 
(4) Under-manning 
Many companies under- rather than over-man since this strategy offers 
savings in fixed labour costs and provides the opportunity for piece-
workers to reach high earnings, which encourages loyalty, see 12.5.l{a). 
However, tight manning policies aggravate bottlenecks during periods of 
high activity but prumptfast work pace si nce small amounts of absenteeism, 
unpunctuality or voluntary turnover result in relatively quick snarl-ups. 
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Overtime introduction and the temporary recruitment of secondary labour are 
the usual short-run expedient solutions. 
(5) Pace of Work Variation on Different Operations 
Payment-by-results schemes encourage high productivity by permitting 
workers to reach high earnings and this is particularly advantageous to 
employers duri ng periods of high activi ty. However, time-paid employees 
are penalized for fast work since they achieve lower remuneration per unit 
produced when earnings remain constant, see Figure 13:2(a & b). Employers 
can find that time-paid personnel are unwill ing to increase pace to the 
same extent· as incentive-paid personnel and consequently bottlenecks occur 
on the time-paid jobs. If overtime and bonus payments fail to induce 
incumbent workers to cl ear the backlog, temporarily introduced secondary 
workers are commonly resorted to. 
(6) Absenteeism and Turnover 
Even without a tight manning policy, bottlenecks can occur in both 
expansionary and contractionary times as work flows from one operation to 
another when positions are unmanned. Empty positions can arise from 
absenteeism or quits and the short-term i rrepl aceabili ty of personnel. 
When reliance is placed on mothers with dependents, the risk of absenteeism 
is claimed to be relatively high because those with no background support 
for dependents will be absent for family commitments as well as personal 
illnesses. 
* * * 
These general situations lead to the accumulation of bottlenecks of 
varying sizes and characteristics. Selection of the appropriate group to 
remove them is, like core labour, subjected to pervasive underlying 
influences, some of which encourage, and others that discourage, specific 
group use. 
12.5.2 (b) Choice of Twilight Workers 
Factors influencing the choice of twilight workers are: 
Encouraging Factors 
(i) a large backlog of work; 
(ii) large-sized, or costly capital equipment; and 
(iii)a shift-system already in existence. 
Discouraging Factors 
(iv) additional costs of factory overheads and qual ity control; 
(v) the need to comply with statutory regulations. 
12 - 15 
CHAPTER 12 IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
In general, substantial bottlenecks are necessary before twilight 
working becomes viable because a minimum of 2 persons are required for 
factory work by the Factories Acts. A wise employer will therefore recruit 
a mi n i mum of 3 twil i ght workers to buil d- i n some 1 i mi ted but automati c 
cover for absenteeism. Large bottlenecks are likely to occur in large 
establ i shments and thus twil ight worki ng is more associated wi th large 
establishments than small, and also with factories where a shift system is 
in use because existing shift workers can provide supervision and first-aid 
cover at no additional cost. Twilight working is the only in-house option 
for solving bottlenecks on machines that are too large for domestic 
premises, and it is a convenient means of intensifying the use of the 
relatively costly equipment manned by females. A twilight shift is a 
useful means of re-attracting, at practical times of day for them, 
experienced personnel temporarily withdrawn from the LM due to family 
commitments. 
However, si nce twil i ght worki ng usually additi onally commi ts the baby-
sitting services of assi stants, twil ight workers are perceived as being 
unreliable and with high turnover rates and they are sometimes avoided for 
these reasons. Shortages of factory space can discourage the use of 
twilight workers for, when earnings are calculated from completed batches, 
one operative cannot take over another worker's work without compl icating 
the calculation of wages, a circumstance that is strongly resented by 
employees. Provi sion of 'speci al' twi 1 i ght supervi si on, quali ty control 
and first aid personnel, and the incurring of factory overhead expenses by 
opening the premises especially for them, makes twilight workers relatively 
expensive alternatives to homeworkers, even though greater influence can be 
exerted over them by the bureaucratic mechanism. These extra costs, plus 
the employers' statutory obl igations arising from their status as 
employees, can make twilight workers a less attractive proposition for 
cost-minimizing employers than the homeworker group which is excluded from 
protective legislation. These important factors were probably responsible 
for the larger number of homeworkers than twilight workers in the work force 
sample of surveyed establishments. 
In summary, twilight workers are essentially the large .achine, 
large bottleneck alternative to homeworker.k Obviously, after a twilight 
shift has been introduced, additional workers can be inexpensively 
introduced on any operation. As a result, side-by-side with large or 
costly machi nery, or in the presence of an exi sti ng shift system, it is 
possible to observe small-sized, low-cost machines operated on a twilight 
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shift basis. When bottlenecks accumulate on large machines and are the 
reason for the introduction of a twilight shift, other existing shift 
systems may not be present alongside it. 
12.5.2 (c) Choice of the Homeworker Group 
Homeworkers are recruited for any type of bottleneck situation 
provided that the necessary capital equipment can be fitted into domestic 
premises. More numerous factors encourage the choice of homeworkers than 
twilight workers, and these are: 
Encouraging Factors 
(i) small-sized bottlenecks; 
(ii) short-lived bottlenecks; 
(i i i)a shortage of factory space; 
(iv) a shortage of in-factory workers with the appropriate skills; 
(v) a shortage of time to train inexperienced in-factory applicants; and 
(vi) exclusion from protective legislation. 
Discouraging Factors 
(vii)the impossibility of providing supervision; 
(viii)the time and costs involved in batch-breaking, quality control, 
delivery and collection; and 
(ix) the labour-input-to-bulk ratio. 
From the employer's viewpoint, homework is most useful for small-
sized, short-l ived bottlenecks that can be cleared within a few days or 
weeks, since severance of homeworkers is less noticeable than redundancies 
of the more visible twilight workers, and thus is less likely to unsettle 
the core factory workforce. Shortage of factory space that results in 
first phase rationalization particularly encourages homeworking. In first 
phase rational ized situations a hardcore of well-respected homeworkers 
benefit from a continuous 'work-flow because their jobs are essential and 
not internally undertaken, while other homeworkers are introduced and 
discarded to accommodate the seasonal cycles. Thus, a simple stratif-
ication of homeworkers produces markedly different income and employment 
sensitivities for homeworkers employed by the same establishment; employers 
use both core and secondary homeworkers for these exclusive jobs. In 
addition, homeworkers are frequently introduced to provide the short-supply 
skills that are internally unavailable, either in the short- or long-run, 
and again such homeworkers have continuity of employment and income until 
internal workers can be procured. The time factor is normally very 
influential in seasonal fashion industries because to deliver orders late 
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can mean that customers are left with unsaleable stocks when a fashion fad 
has passed its peak, and thus loss of customers will probably result. A 
shortage of time to train in-factory workers encourages the use of 
experienced personnel who are temporarily withdrawn from factory 
emp 1 oyment. Exclusion from the EPCA and Equal Pay Act provisions furnish 
the opportunity for employers to pay discriminatory rates and this is 
doubtlessly a strong encouraging influence on unscrupulous employers who 
are willing to take advantage of the weak market positions of home workers. 
However, an important drawback to the employment of homeworkers is 
that each individual has to work unsupervised. Lack of supervision can 
mean that the less able individuals will provide work of lower quality than 
could be obtained from the same persons when closely supervised internally. 
A common response is therefore to put-out only the simple, unskilled/semi-
skilled jobs. Another shortcoming is that each individual homeworker can 
take only a relatively small quantity of work, and consequently the 
organizational problems, the time and costs involved in batch-breaking, the 
recording of work out and in, quality control, and delivery and collection 
can make this a cumbersome form of production for busy factory producers. 
Hence, a common response is to sub-contract to an agent who will shoulder 
these responsibilities. Unfortunately, supplying companies rarely insist 
that agents are accountable to them for conditions of service and payments 
given to homeworkers, and it is in this context that the worst deprivations 
of the homeworking arrangement are to be found. Respectable factory 
employers who distribute the work themselves and pay identical to factory 
rates, claim to find homeworkers as costly as factory labour. 
An important constrai nt on homeworker demand is the 1 abour-i nput-to-
bulk ratio, i.e. an interaction of the amount of work, or length of time, 
to be expended on each item, relative to its size. If the ratio is low, 
because the work input is' small relative to its bulk, then high transport 
and handli ng costs result and these, together with the commandeeri ng of 
large areas of valuable domestic living spaces militate against domestic 
production. If the ratio is high, the task might be suitable for 
homeworking provided that small quantities of the necessarily small bulk 
product can be economi cally del i vered and coll ected to obvi ate the 
possibility of large material stocks lying as idle capital in homes. 
Thus, a compromise must be reached between high and low labour-ta-bulk 
ratios for homeworking to be economically viable. An employer strategy for 
low ratios is to transfer the time and costs of delivery to the homeworker 
herself, whereas for high ratios homeworkers can be recruited from the same 
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small locality to economize on frequent deliveries. 
12.6 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SECONDARY LABOUR 
As can be deduced from section 12.5, the desire for flexibility is 
judged to be the prime motive for the employment of both twilight and 
homework labour. Employers are also judged to be cost-minimizers, but the 
desire for flexibility does not prevent employers from taking advantage of 
groups that prove cheaper to employ. In thi s respect, both secondary 
groups are excellent solutions to variable production problems since they 
provide short-run flexibility at low cost and thereby satisfy two major 
objecti ves. 
12.6.1 Conclusions on the Cheap Labour ~pothesis of Demand 
Table 9.1 showed that sample homeworkers were cheaper to employ that 
twilight workers, who in turn were cheaper than the female daytime groups. 
A desire to minimize costs is often an important criterion for selecting 
homeworkers in preference to twi 1 i ght workers, or for se1 ecti ng twil ight 
workers in preference to paying in-factory core workers overtime premi a, 
which Figure 12:4 shows to be uneconomic, especially on a protracted basis. 
The cheapness of secondary labour springs from their exclusion from 
the premia and fringe benefits, from avoidance of supervision costs, 
redundancy pay and the payment of discriminatory rates. For only 49 (35%) 
homeworkers (Tab1 e 8.8) was equal ity of payment confi rmed. These fi ndi ngs 
are evidence to support the conclusion that in these establishments at 
1 east, homeworkers were not pri.arfly se1 ected from a cheap 1 abour moti ve. 
A similar conclusion can also be drawn from establishments that did pay 
di scri mi natory rates si nce these tended to be the 1 arger companies. Had 
the cheap labour motive been paramount, many more homeworkers would have 
been employed by them in order to make greater savings, because like their 
smaller counterparts, with higher levels of worker use, these 
estab1 ishments had many tasks eminently suitab1 e for homeworking. It is 
therefore concluded that the relative cheapness of secondary group 
employment makes these groups very attractfve adjustment mechanisms, or 
'reserve armies', for fluctuating female operatfons fn job-segregated 
labour markets, rather than providfng the sole reason of demand. 
A distinction must be drawn at this juncture between 'factory' and 
'non-factory' employers. A non-factory producer can be defined as an 
individual or organization not manufacturing in factory premises, but who 
may have warehousi ng of other storage facil iti es, and who purchases basi c 
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materials (e.g. fabric, shaped pieces or other goods) and then distributes 
these to homeworkers for conversion into partly or wholly finished goods 
before resale. While for factory producers the cheap labour motive is 
important, it is generally subsidiary to the objective of providing a form 
of flexibility that satisfies all the product and labour market objectives 
and is painless to core workers. The cheap labour motive however, may be 
paramount to, and even explain the existence of, non-factory employers who 
only demand homework 1 abour. 
12.7 PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVES ON SECONDARY LABOUR 
12.7.1 COnclusions on the Life-cycle Qypothesis of SUpply 
It was envisaged in 1.6.3 that there would be, for a sUbstanti al 
number of women in paid employment, a chronological progression through the 
workgroups. It has been suggested that entry is made into the full-time 
group from school. After a break from LM activity to have or raise 
children some women, temporarily withdrawn from LM participation, attempt 
to enter the twilight or homeworker groups, and this is later followed by a 
return to one of the daytime groups when family commitments permi t. As 
retirement approaches, a return is made to the part-time group, and after 
retirement from factory employment, the homeworker group is re-entered. It 
is acknowledged that this description refers to a general overall pattern 
of female workgroup progression and that at each stage there will be those 
who drop out of labour market activity altogether. 
Data collected from the demand side of the LM are not ideal for 
i nvesti gati ng the 1 He-cycl e hypothesi s, but neverthel ess, some general 
conclusions can be drawn. The female groups' age profiles are consistent 
with the life-cycle hypothesis. Very low levels of straightforward 
transfers from one group to another reveal that mobility was not direct, 
but separated by periods of inactivity or alternatively also accompanied by 
inter-establishment mobility. Nevertheless, some inter-group mobility did 
occur. Employers al ways searched for tra i ned/experi enced workers 
regardless of the workgroup and this indicated that the same pool of 
individuals was being drawn upon. Consequently, it is concluded that there 
is some substance in the suggestion of a chronological group progression 
tied to the female life-cycle. 
12.7.2 Why Are Vfrtually All Twilfght Workers and Homeworkers Women? 
The reason why all, or virtually all, workers comprising the twilight 
and homeworker groups are women is concerned with the chain of reactions 
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that find their origin in the initial decision to job-segregate men and 
women into capital- and labour-intensive jobs respectively, see 12.5.l(c). 
For instance, 1 abour-i ntens ive, or more accurately low-productive, 
jobs require a greater increase in worker numbers to produce a given 
increase in output than do capital-intensive (highly-productive) jobs. 
Allocation of low-productive jobs to women means that a larger number of 
women than men will have to be found periodically if, as is usual in 
garment manufacture, business cycles occur. At certain stages many women 
opt for less-than-full-time employment if they wish to continue LM 
participation and many part-timers are unwilling to increase weekly hours 
by offering overtime. Other than the overtime offered by a cohort of 
mainly childless women, there is little upward, although possibly 
considerable downward, flexibility in the core of the female segment. In 
contrast, there is considerable upward flexibility in the form of offered 
overtime hours in the core of the male segment, and the highly productive 
nature of male jobs means that the increased overtime input, coupled with 
men's ability to work full basically weekly hours, is sufficient to clear 
most major bottlenecks. Not so with women; bottlenecks arise that cannot 
,be cl eared by the core workforce's overtime input, so secondary workers are 
resorted to. Employers always hope to recruit trained/experienced 
personnel, but men have not had experience of finishing operations. Women 
are searched for and found because many previous factory workers are tied 
to family commitments, the woman still being the main provider of free 
domestic services. literature suggests that the few men who undertake 
homework are members of LM minority groups (e.g.the disabled, senior 
citizens, or ethnic minorities) who find themselves in similar weak market 
positions to housebound women and therefore take 'women's' jobs. It is 
thought that twilight working men are mainly young moonlighters trying to 
increase the family budget. Thus, the fe.ale secondary worlcgroups are the 
equivalent of male overtime. 
This phenomenon can be explained by drawing the distinction between 
conventional male and female contributions to the nuclear family. 
Traditionally the woman's contribution has been the input of time and 
effort, whereas the man's contribution has been the provision of finance. 
Time is necessary to provide personal household care and maintenance; money 
is necessary to purchase food, clothing, domestic equipment and leisure. 
Particularly when budgets are tight. as is often the case during the child-
rearing phase, each partner may contribute to both of these inputs; for 
exampl e, the husband gives some domestic assistance, and the wife 
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undertakes some market work. Due to existing time demands, a less-than-
full-time work pattern with no overtime is preferred by the wife, while the 
husband seeks extra overtime hours to increase his financial input since 
his wife can contribute relatively little from less-than-full-time 
employment. The outcome of these attempts produces the observed LM 
characteristics; the man has increased, and the woman decreased, LM 
activity rates during the early child-rearing phases of their life-cycles. 
In conclusion, it is contended that this general scenario will not 
change substantially until such time as the division of labour within the 
home, including child-rearing and the provision of free caring services, is 
more evenly distributed between the sexes. Only when employers are 
convinced that women are not the sole providers of free domestic services 
will they consider women to be suitable for highly-productive, capital-
intensive manual jobs, but even then, a breakdown in the job-segregated 
structure of their ILMs will impose high marginal costs and probably be 
strongly resi sted. 
12.7.3 How Marginal are the Seconda~ Groups? 
When judging marginality by numbers used (Table 4.2) it is clear that 
the twilight workers were marginal in all establishments, and homeworkers 
in some establishments, in the sense of making only small contributions to 
total output by virtue of their very few jobs which were generally part-
time equivalents. In other establishments homeworkers were not marginal in 
that they made significant contributions by being present in comparable or 
even greater numbers than daytime workers. When judging the secondary 
workers' contribution in aggregate across the company sample (Figure 4:3) 
it is seen that homeworkers were almost as numerous as the full-time males. 
Thus, the homeworkers' contribution to their own firms varied considerably, 
but in aggregate they cannot be regarded as 'marginal' workgroup. 
Part C describes in detail how these secondary groups are used to give 
flexibility to the employer who can thereby cushion the income and 
employment of core workers. In this context, a plentiful supply (i.e. a 
reserve army231) of capable twilight workers and homeworkers 
(Beardsworth's200 'unestablished' workers) who could be introduced and 
discarded with ease (i.e. marginalized, see Allen140) was crucial to these 
employers who wanted to adjust to market uncertainty without radical 
modifications of existing work patterns, customs and practices that would 
destabilize long-term relations and break implicit contracts. In this 
respect therefore, the unestabl ished workers can not be justifably 
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conceptualized as providing a marginal function for the employer. 
12.7.4 Would the Acquisition of Employee Status Put An End To Homeworking? 
Researchers, including the author, recommend that traditional 
homeworkers should be legally designated as employees, but it has been 
argued (mainly by employers) that this would cause the loss of homeworking 
jobs. The author considers that this reaction to employee status wou1 d 
indeed occur in the most extreme cases of exploitation of self-employment, 
but that the majority of employers would still continue to use homeworkers, 
as they now use twi 1i ght workers who are employees, because the need for 
flexibility of the type absorbed by homeworkers would still be present. 
Firms terminating homeworker demand would require greater adaptability from 
the female daytime workgroups and this has often presented difficulties. As 
argued in 12.7.2, women with home and family responsibilities will be able 
to behave as men now do only when domestic work is equally shared. Thus it 
is contended that even though employers might intend to phase out 
homeworker use, they will be placed in situations to which they are likely 
to respond by resorting to homeworkers. These projections visualize that 
homeworkers will continue to have unstable employment in the future, but 
even so, the acquisition of employee status will afford them valuable 
protection and benefits from which they are now excluded. 
12.7.5 Do Twilight Workers and Homeworkers Undercut Daytime Workers? 
It is shown Part C that twilight workers and homeworkers are often 
used to manufacture 'top of the peak' output and to provide flexibility. In 
this respect therefore, they reduce core worker numbers somewhat and could 
be seen as undercutting the employment of daytime factory women in peak 
conditions. There was no evidence to suggest that homeworkers were used by 
sample establishments to undercut the wages of core employees. However, as 
part of the deal in implicit contracts these workgroups are severed first 
(see 16.1), thereby being used as a mechanism for honouring implicit 
contracts with core workers. They therefore serve a valuable function for 
core employees who have employment cushioned to the point where 
redundanci es mi ght be avoi ded. Thus, rather than havi ng employment and 
wages permanently undercut by the presence of twilight workers and 
homeworkers, core workers benefit by greater employment and income 
stability. 
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Chapter 12 implies that the demand for twilight workers and 
homeworkers by the H&K industry is an integral part of a wide and complex 
adjustment process, and thus the central aspect of thi s chapter concerns 
the variety of responses that employers can make to shortages and surpluses 
of labour. The range of instruments that can be used by employers is 
outlined in 13.2, and evaluation of their relative merits and shortcomings 
implicitly indicates that an appropriate sequence for their use will vary 
in differently fluctuating environments. It is contended therefore, that 
many of the adjustments are universally appl icable and that they can be 
used in a variety of combinations to suit different industries (section 
13.4). The assumptions embodied in the suggested adjustment sequence are 
based on the evidence presented in Part B, but ultimate testing of these by 
specially constructed empirical work must be 1 eft to future researchers. 
This chapter examines labour input strategies that precede or even pre-empt 
approaches to either the ELM or EILM, and the adjustment process described 
demonstrates the large amount of flexibility that is often built into an 
existing workforce. This in-built flexibility may be sufficient for wage 
adjustments to attract additional labour to be unnecessary, even in widely 
fluctuating product markets. It also helps to explain why neo-classical 
economists who have focused on wages as the LM's major adjustment have 
found unsatisfactory empirical evidence to support their theories. 
Understanding adjustment processes is important from several 
viewpoints: chosen instruments can affect both the allocation of workers to 
jobs and thereby the apparent effi ci ency of LM operation; the indivi dual 
worker can be emoti vely concerned about the stabil ity of employment and 
income; and the employer can benefit from a clear understanding on which to 
base his choices. These issues are of pivotal interest to both academic 
theorists and policy makers because market operation has implications both 
for LM theory (secti on 16.1) and consequently, further research (secti on 
16.3), and for poli cy prescripti ons (secti on 16.2). 
13.1 THE NEED FOR A LABOUR INPUT ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM 
The decision to confine empirical work to Footwear and H&K industries 
allowed concentration on establishments that had high product demand 
fluctuations. Although surveyed companies experienced slightly different 
market conditions depending on their product(s), most needed to adjust to 
13 - 1 
CHAPTER 13 LABOUR INPUT ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
"substantial variations in output throughout each trading year". 
Respondents explained that even with years of experience of their companies 
and the industry it was impossible to accurately predict future production 
requirements, although naturally, they had expectations about them. It was 
quite usual for output and consequently the need for labour inputs, 
to double as trading passed from trough to peak. Nevertheless, wages were 
raised only once yearly following the national agreement (11.2.1), and 17 
of the 24 establishments employing 71% of daytime females had incurred no 
redundancies over a 10 year period (9.4.2a). A labour input adjustment 
mechanism, other than wage manipulation and hiring and firing was clearly 
being used. Explanations and discussions revealed that a wide range of 
strategies were adopted according to labour and product market goals and 
expectations about the extent and direction of product market changes. 
13.2 THE RANGE AND VALUE OF POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENT INSTRUMENTS 
It is important in any consideration of LM adjustment to distinguish 
between stocks and flows of workers. Internal stocks compri se workers 
already in jobs, and external stocks, those in the ELM searching for 
employment. When existing workers leave their jobs, either voluntarily or 
invol untarily, and when recrui tment occurs, outward and inward flows are 
generated respectively. As Thomas & Deaton196 have pointed out, employers 
seek to influence both these elements as part of the adjustment mechanism, 
but the firm is primarily interested in the stock position, i.e. whether it 
has the desi red quantity of 1 abour. 
Adjustments instruments can be cl assified into 5 basic strategi es, see 
Tab 1 e 13.1. These are those that: 
(1) limit the degree of variation in business activity; 
(2) vary labour input from a fixed number of established workers; 
(3) va~ worker numbers without changing hiring standards; 
(4) va~ hiring standards to modify labour supply; 
(5) ya~ workers' earning potential to modify labour supply. 
Thus, strategy 1 attempts to limit the need for worker stock variation, and 
strategy 2 aims to influence output from the existing stock of workers, 
while strategies 3 to 5 attempt to influence labour flows, each in 
di fferent ways. 
Emp 1 oyer eval uati on of instrument advantages and di sadvantages is 
influenced by his product and labour market goals; e.g. employers concerned 
with: (11, obtaining and retaining an experienced labour force, and (2), 
obtaining and retaining congenial inter-personal and inter-group relations 
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will disfavour instruments that precipitate inconvenient voluntary 
turnover or create di scontent; cost minimizers will di sl ike costly 
instruments. Several instruments have unpleasant images because they 
incorporate important di sadvantages for employers and/or employees, and 
consequently they are generally unpopular and avoided whenever possible. 
Others are even agreeable, or at least 'painless' in that they have no ill-
effects for either party. Some instruments have different impacts on 
workgroups and categories of worker so causing mixed responses which 
undermine a contented workforce. For example, workers' desires for hours of 
work vary considerably depending on domestic circumstances and instrumental 
orientations to employment; overtime, while pleasing many men and young 
women who are often freely serviced by wives and mothers, will displease 
mature females who combine paid employment with domestic work. Thus, 
complicated trade-off situations arise that require complex, balanced 
decision making with respect to the choice of instruments, particularly 
when employers find their favoured instrument unusable due to prevail ing 
conditions or imposed constraints such as trade union resistance. 
The relative terms 'high', 'moderate' and 'low' product demand levels 
have been used in this chapter since variations in size of establ ishment 
precluded the used of values. A moderate output level encompasses that 
mid-range of values between the seasonal highs and lows, i.e. it centres 
around median output. A range of outputs is therefore included within each 
term, but the extent of this range will vary among establishments relative 
to thei r degrees of vari ati on from trough to peak. The amount of 
flexibility provided by each instrument will also vary among establ ishments 
and be governed largely by the characteristics of individual workers. 
Establishments with fairly constant product demand could require only one 
instrument, say pace variation, while those with wide fluctuations will 
require several. It has been assumed, according to observations, that 
employers set their labour force numbers such that a moderately fast pace 
of work from each employee woul d produce median output. 
Thi s chapter reviews the adjustment mechanism from the employers' 
standpoint and evaluates the economic advantages of each of the 
instruments shown in Table 13.1. To save thesis space and confine topics 
to demand side issues, supply implications of instrument usage have been 
deliberately omitted except where likely employee reactions could have 
impli cati ons for instrument effectiveness or alternative strategi es. The 
adjustment instruments considered are those that were used by H&K 
employers; the postulated sequence is offered as being relevant to, indeed 
13 - 3 
CHAPTER 13 LABOUR INPUT ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
typical of, general practices within that industry. Described strategies 
are not intended to imply the author's uncritical approval, nor are they to 
be read as recommendations, but rather as a description of manoeuvres 
within a hypothetical company. 
13.2.1 An Evaluation of Strategies to Limit the Degree of Variation in 
Business Activity 
As section 4.2.1 suggests, the order/product relationship varies 
across establishments and consequently, Instrument A (the option for 
varying .product stocks) is precluded for companies producing only to meet 
existing orders unless order/product strategies are revised. Stock 
manipulation can be beneficial to both employer and employee; it 
eliminates low spots by manipulating short-term demand, ensures that 
equipment is operational, and encourages skilled workers to remain rather 
than move elsewhere for more stable earnings. A wise choice of stock item 
enables subsequent stock withdrawal which permits acceptance of more orders 
in peak times than would otherwise be possible. Stock withdrawal can thus 
lay the foundations for future expansion, reduce undercapacity and save 
overtime expenditure. However, stock manipulation carries grave risks; it 
can cause the demise of companIes wIth circulating capital tied up in 
unsold stocks. Instrument B Is therefore a less risky instrument for 
stabil i zi ng acti vi ty. 
Instru.ent B (varIation of the product range) is a diversification 
into additional products with the aim of evening-out seasonality. 
Companies with wide activity fluctuations can attempt to introduce new 
product lines having demand peaks coinciding with existing troughs and/or 
phase out sel ected products with simil arly ti med peaks. Unfortunately in 
seasonal industries It is diffIcult to devise perfectly integratable 
products, so that failure to find a suitable product, or a slight 
mismatching of demand peaks are likely outcomes. Whilst militating 
against the worst effect of seasonal lows, integrating seasonally different 
products can produce otherwi se avoi dab 1 e bottl enecks. Neverthel ess, these 
represent beneficial increases in trade. 
13.2.2 An Evaluation of Strategies to Vary the Input from a Fixed 
Number of Established Workers 
Instru.ent C (the selection of a payment system) is probably the most 
important adjustment deci sion because each of the two basic systems have 
mixed side-effects for the employer. These arise because automatic 
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adjustment of labour input occurs by variations in pace when workloads vary 
while factory attendance remains unchanged. 
When workloads are light, each worker produces less than normal as 
avail able work is shared thinly. Under productivity based payment systems 
this yiel ds lower earni ngs (see Fi gure 13:2a), and employees 
cushion their employer~ against the worst effects of fewer orders by 
allowing labour costs to fall relative to output. Variable wage costs can 
obviate the employer's need to reduce over-capacity in the short-run 
because it costs little to retain it. This facility is a particularly 
convenient cost-minimizing strategy when future demand is unpredictable or 
expected to rise in the short-term. Employers who have inadvertently 
engaged 'below average' workers are similarly compensated for their low 
output by paying a constant price for what is produced rather t~an the time 
taken to produce it, see Figure 13:2(b). When workloads are heavy, high 
productivity is encouraged by the workers' abil ity to increase earnings. 
This is particularly advantageous to employers who save overtime payments 
when the faster pace can cl ear the extra work, but even when it can not, 
overti me costs are mi ni mi zed. 
Notwithstanding these benefits, there are attendant disadvantages to 
productivity-based schemes. Employees are usually unwill ing to switch to 
tasks at which they have no proficiency or to those with lower pay rates 
because earnings are reduced. Resistance to re-deployment prevents the 
internal remedying of simultaneous under- and over-loading, produces low 
intra-firm mobility and production inflexibil ity. Inflexibil ity is also 
caused when wages are cal cul ated from full batches, because an employee 
cannot complete another's part-batch without complicating wage 
calculations, a situation strongly resented by most employees. The major 
disadvantage however, is that employees rush to push earnings high and this 
impairs performance qual ity. Payment-by-results schemes are therefore 
generally unsuitable for highly detailed tasks in which precision is very 
important, or for one-off, complex, or non-repetitive jobs in which the 
recording of operations is inappropriate. Piece rates are most valuable 
for encouraging dexterity and speed on repetitive jobs where numerical 
recording of produced units and the monitoring of performance is 
practicable. 
Tille-based paYllent schemes are the antithesis of incentive schemes; 
they overcome payment-by-results disadvantages, but also incorporate 
shortcomings. There are two major advantages to time-based schemes: 
(1) earnings remain constant, so employees do not spoil by rushing; and 
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(2) aworkforceis job-flexiblewhennotpenal izedbylowered pay. 
The major disadvantage for the employer is that the same hourly rate 
is paid irrespective of output, see Figure 13:2(a). Unit labour costs 
therefore ri se rel ative to fall ing output (Fi gure 13:b», and thi s causes 
employers ei ther to raise product prices and be less competitive, or to 
absorb the extra costs and erode profits. Variations in competitiveness 
and profits are particularly damaging in price-competitive industries 
because they can undermine company stabil ity. However, time rates are 
useful for remunerating employees under training since they maintain 
goodwill by providing acceptable earnings until proficiency is gained, and 
this can ensure a sufficiency of trainees. Unit labour costs fall as 
productivity rises, but employees' constant wages give them no incentive to 
work faster. Thus, strong exhortations and strict supervi si on might be 
necessary to prevent bottlenecks occurring between piece- and time-rate 
operati ons when workloads are heavy. 
Interactions can occur when the two schemes are used side-by-side in a 
production sequence. Payment-by-results clearly benefit fast and penalize 
slow workers, whereas time-based schemes have the opposite effects. This 
can cause jealousies within and between these worker categories, 
particularly on the part of slow piece-workers. Workforce tensions can 
become acute when acti vi ty fall s and fast piece-workers take a 
disproportionate share of available work, but all piece-rate employees are 
disadvantaged by falling incomes when workloads reduce to very low levels. 
Time-rate workers benefit from constant incomes when workloads are low. 
Congenial factory relations require employees with comparable skills to be 
similarly rewarded, but this is difficult to achieve in factories with wide 
business fluctuations causing the above effects. Figures 13:2a & b depict 
equil ibrium as occurring at median output (i.e.hourly earnings of results-
paid and time-paid workers are identical at median output), but at whatever 
level equilibrium occurs, changes in business activity from that point are 
problematical from an equity viewpoint. Nevertheless, surveyed employers 
generally chose to trade harmony for cost-minimization since all used both 
systems; most had unpredictable product demand and few (20%) paid 
productivity bonuses to time workers (8.4.5). Cl early, each system has its 
merits and it is of advantage to employers to swi tch between systems in 
order to adapt to dynamic environments, but in practice, payment switching 
is difficult to achieve due to collective actions and union resistance. 
* * * 
An important labour input adjustment is to vary workweek length and 
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this can be achieved by instruments D to H of Table 13.1. 
Instru.ent 0 (alteration of the number of hours comprising the basic 
work-week) has usually taken place after social pressures or collective 
negot i ati ons succeeded in reduci ng hours, rather than as employer 
manipulations to solve short-term fluctuations. This instrument, although 
capable of substantial adjustments, is therefore more appropriate to long-
term falling demand trends than to short-term labour input adjustments. 
Instru.ent E (short-time working) is a short-run alternative to 
instrument D, whereby hours worked are temporarily reduced to fewer than 
those in the employment contract. Short-time working is an unpopular 
instrument; it is 'painful' for employees who loose their earnings and it 
risks voluntary turnover, thereby undermining goal 3 (section 10.3). Its 
introduction in low demand periods has the same effect as reducing overtime 
when demand falls from high levels. Both short-time and overtime working 
can be successively increased and decreased by increments of a few weekly 
hours to provi de a more-or-l ess conti nuous adjustments to output in both 
upward and downward directions. Increases or decreases in the number of 
workers involved in short- or overtime working make both instruments even 
more responsive to both large and small changes. The greatest employer 
benefi t from short-time working stems from savings of time-paid wages 
(assuming that only attendance time is paid for), but no payment-by-results 
savings accrue since these workers cannot earn even though they attend the 
factory when work is unavailable. Hence, determined cost-minimizers might 
attempt to place only time-rate workers on short-time. Time-off increases 
opportunities for non-market activity for the employee and this can act as 
a trade-off against frustrations over wasted factory time. Guaranteed 
weekly payments provide a threshold below which earnings will not fall 
(Figures 13:2a & b). This curtails wage savings and limits the economic 
advantages of short-time working, but in turn can also help a trade-off by 
discouraging voluntary turnover and maintaining workforce stability. 
Instrument F, overtime working, is similarly a highly sensitive 
instrument and it is popular with employers, some full-time women and many 
men workers particularly those with heavy financial commitments, but 
generally unpopular with the other female groups. Thus, the inbuil t upward 
flexibility of each workforce is governed by the individuals comprising it 
so that the amount of adjustment available can vary substantially across 
establ ishments and by time periods. Generally, overtime flexibility is 
lower the higher the proportion of working mothers. When only overtime 
volunteers are used, an uneven impact can result that may not coincide with 
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existing bottlenecks and even exacerbate or create them. Requiring overtime 
from unwillf ng workers can under,n i ne workforce stabil ity by preci pita ting 
vol untary turnover which becomes eas i er for employees duri ng industry 
booms. There are thus limits to the usefulness of overtime. 
* * * 
;~any surveyed employers stated that they varied toleration of less-
than-ful1-tille workers as the seasonal position changed. Such adaptions 
can be mani fested through instruments G, H, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V and W. 
Instrument G (workgroup switching), often a mutually beneficial 
downward adjustment during over-capacity, is achieved by granting requests 
for transfers from the full-time to the part-time, twilight or homeworker 
groups especially when employees previously have been persuaded to work 
more hours than they wished. It may, depending on the individuals, be 
capable of substanti al adjustment. When workloads increase, a gradual 
hardening of attitudes to less-than-full-time hours is adopted which 
ultimately leads to strong exhortations for inter-group mobil ity in the 
opposite direction. However, over-pressurization might endanger loyalty and 
thi s pl aces limits on the instrument's useful ness in an upward direction. 
Instrument H (variation of less-than-full-time weekly hours) can 
provide considerable flexibil ay when concepts relating to acceptable 
weekly hours are modified. More, or fewer, hours can be recruitment 
stipulations as market conditions change, while increases or decreases in 
hours worked can be requested from exi sti ng employees, and more or 1 ess 
work can be del ivered to homeworkers. Again, employee loyalty can be 
jeopardized by over-use, making this instrument counter-productive. 
Instru.ent I (redeployment of personnel) can be precipitated, even at· 
low output, by employee and machinery mishaps that result in simultaneous 
under- and over-loading. When high and low productive operations are 
combined in a manufacturing sequence, changes in production schedules have 
an uneven impact if labour input flexibility varies by operation, see 
12.5.2a(3). It is advantageous to redeploy under-employed persons to over-
loaded jobs, but this can be difficult if over-loaded operations require a 
skill not possessed by those under-employed. Unwillingness to be relocated 
is considered under instrument C, but potenti al transferees can become 
less resistant if earnings are maintained. Maintenance of ea.rnings is not 
simply achieved however, for it can lead to disputes when switching 
involves di fferently skilled operations. Employees will see it as 
inequitable if the switched normally high-skilled worker receives more wage 
than the incumbent low-skilled, but more proficient worker. To be 
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successful, the full co-operation of all employees is necessary, and this 
can limit the use of instrument I. It was for this reason that certain 
surveyed compani es retai ned a few speci ali st "all-rounders" who received 
individual rates and were able and willing to switch to any job. 
Instrument J (changing attitudes to absenteeism and unpunctuality) is 
a convenient and unobtrusive means of adapting labour, and furnishing 
adjustments suitable for 'fine tuning'. The granting of requests for time-
off without pay dUring low activity is mutually beneficial to the employer 
and both absent and attendi ng employees. The employer temporarily reduces 
capacity; earnings of attending results-paid workers are boosted by access 
to more work, while absent workers are able to perform external activities. 
Wage expenditure under time-based schemes is reduced by time-off, when 
attendance-only is remunerated, but not under piece-rate schemes. 
Unc ri ti cal acceptance of unpunctua 1 i ty further reduces overcapacity, but 
compl i ance can generate habi ts that 'backfire' duri ng hi gh activity when 
successful eradication of absenteeism and unpunctuality is important for 
minimizing the personnel and equipment used. However, employees themselves 
sometimes make adjustments because identical weekly earnings can be 
generated by taki ng time-off for part of the week and then worki ng fast for 
the remainder, or by working at slow pace during the whole of the week. 
When each employee attends numerous automatic machines, Instrument K, 
the number minded can be varied to provide substantial manufacturing 
flexibility in an upward direction. Reducing the number merely 
accommodates fall i ng demand, but does not curb resul ts-paid wage costs 
since earnings are proportional to the short supply of work. It does, 
however, permit equitable work-sharing and the retention of experienced 
employees by avoiding redundancies and redundancy payments, while idle 
machines facilitate general overhaul and maintenance. If workers are 
time-paid, retention is costly, but the savi ng of redundancy payments can 
offset the cost of retaining workers. Machines can be reallocated when 
demand revives, but the number that can be adequately attended without 
impairing quality limits expansion by this instrumen~ While instrument K 
avoids redundancy for some employees, retention of surplus personnel 
reduces results-paid earnings and may precipitate voluntary turnover, 
although this is generally more acceptable than redundancy. 
The subcontracting of work, Instruments L and M stem from two slightly 
different conditions; general and specific undercapac1ty, see 12.5.2(a). 
I nstrullent L (the subcontract i ng of work to other fi rm s to adapt to 
general undercapacity) can also take two forms; (1) subcontracting to other 
13 - 9 
CHAPTER 13 LABOUR INPUT ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
factory producers, and (2) subcontracting to non-factory producers. 
Factory producers are useful for substantial, predictable general 
undercapacity created by the acceptance of more orders than can be met and 
for very large bottlenecks. This is a popular adjustment for expanding 
companies. Unforeseen undercapacity subcontracted to other manufacturers 
can squeeze profit margins since emergency costs of subcontract work can be 
greater than allowances made in quoted product prices, but retention of 
satisfied customers by delivering orders punctually can justify the use of 
short-term, high-cost alternative production methods. However, subcontract 
firms are 1 ikely to want substantial orders, and so this instrument is 
generally unsuitable for small-scale unforeseen bottlenecks. 
Non-factory producers (i.e.homeworker subcontractors or agents) can be 
used to save the company from the administration of handl ing the 
substantial work generated by general undercapacity. Thi s form of 
subcontracting is often be organized on a tender basis with cost-minimizing 
employers opting for the lowest tender. 
Instrument M (the sub-contracting of work to individual homeworkers) 
is more suitable for small-scale bottlenecks, whether specific or general, 
predictable or unforeseen, because small amounts of work can be delivered 
to homeworkers. Where several different operations must be dovetailed, or 
where bottlenecks are so large as to require numerous individuals on 
different operati ons, admi ni st rat i on can be cumbe rsome on an i ndi vi dua 1 
homeworker basis, given the stretched nature of company resources which 
in it i a 11 y eau sed the bottleneck. Fi rst phase reorgan i zat ion (4.2.1d) is a 
common response when this type of bottleneck is regularly experienced. 
The demand for homeworkers is prompted by a variety of different 
cons i derati ons and cl rcumstances, see 12.5.2(c) and thi s has caused 
homeworker use to appear as different instruments. For instance, 
Instrument R, additional recruitment, identifies shortages of accommodation 
followed by first phase rational ization as a reason for homeworker 
'preference'; instrument W, modification of hiring stipulations, pinpoints 
shortages of skilled core personnel as the reason for demand of homeworkers 
as second- or even third-best labour. 
* * * 
All the above instruments keep constant the number of internal workers 
employed directly by each establishment. None is mutually exclusive so, by 
judicious blending, managements can adapt labour input to considerable var-
iations in output while still maintaining the three LM objectives (10.3). 
As indicated however, most instruments have constraints on thei r use so 
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that worker number variation might become inevitable in large fluctuations. 
13.2.3 Evaluation of Strategies that Ya~ Preferred Worker Numbers Without 
Changing Hiring Standards 
It is contended that a reduction in core worker numbers is not a 
vi able short-term sol uti on when operati ng payment-by-resul ts schemes that 
cushion the employer, or when an upturn in trade is expected. While number 
reductions save the wage costs of time-paid workers, only statutory 
contributions, shift premia, and guaranteed weekly payments are saved for 
results-paid workers because wage/output adjustments are automatic. Even 
mi ni mum redundancy payments, that depend on age and tenure, can be hi gh 
enough to offset these savings, while subsequent re-recruitment costs also 
reduce them further especi ally if there are labour shortages in the ELLM. 
Thus, reducing numbers can be a costly short-term exercise. 
Results-paid workers retained after redundancies have occurred benefit 
from boosted earnings by sharing the work that was formerly done by the 
severed workers. These enhanced earnings can encourage loyalty and help to 
achieve goals 2 and 3 (10.3). Labour retention depresses earnings, can lead 
to discontentment and precipitate voluntarY turnover thereby defeating the 
objective of retention. Thus, retai ni ng underemployed workers can be an 
automatic mechanism for reducing worker numbers relatively painlessly and 
cheaply by natural wastage (i nstrument 0). The 1 atter sequence of events 
has· been called 'the results-paid retention trade-off' and the former, 
'the results-paid severance trade-off' for brevity since these situations 
arise with several of the instruments evaluated below. 
Instrument N (variation in the number of shifts worked) can give large 
upward adjustments; increasing shifts from 2 to 3 increases capacity by 
50%. Smaller adjustments can be made by involving only part of the shift 
workgroup. Reduci ng sh ifts, If ke reduci ng the numbe r of mach i nes per 
operative, does not lower results-paid wage costs which are proportional to 
output, but it does imply some redundancy which reduces capacity. Moving 
from 3 shifts to 1 is synonymous with workgroup switching, but it has been 
defi ned as Instrument N because it involves the sheddi ng (recruitment as an 
upward adjustment) of labour, whereas Instrument G does no~ Recruitment 
costs caused by increasing the number of shifts, might be sufficiently high 
to offset the savings obtained by the reduction of idle-time on inexpensive 
equipment, particul arly when a large number of workers are required, thus 
making the introduction of a multiple shift system uneconomic (12.5.1b). 
Employees, particularly those with outside commitments, are 1 ikely to 
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resent disruption of established routines by alteration of work patterns. 
Thus, because it could be counter-productive, instrument N is more 
appropriate for adjusting to long-term trends or protracted business cycles 
rather than short-term seasonal fl uctuati ons. 
Instrument 0 (voluntary turnover, i.e.the non-replacement of quits in 
the short-term) is an easy and inexpensive way of reducing employee numbers 
and avoiding difficult, disruptive or embarrassing selection for 
redundancy. Establishments with high turnover, either throughout the 
workforce or in sections of it, can obtain substantial downward 
flexibility from natural wastage while maintaining harmonious rela-
tionships and bolstering employee confidence by lack of redundancy. Thus, 
high turnover, a characteristic that surveyed employers associ ated 
particularly with young women, is a very convenient adjustment mechanism. 
It is especially beneficial on labour-intensive operations where the large 
numbers cause more under-employment during troughs than on capital-
intensive operations. Hence, the perceived high turnover of women is yet 
another reason why job-segregation by gender has been persistently 
practiced. NED0192, while addressing the reduction of turnover, also 
recognizes its usefulness. 
Relying on falling earnings to prompt natural wastage with its 
results-paid retention trade-off, can lead to retention of the less able 
since 'better' workers can more easily obtain jobs elsewhere. Natural 
wastage has further 1 imits in that an automatic reduction of voluntary 
turnover often occurs when lMs are slack. Moreover, randomness, leading to 
workforce imbal ance or unmanned operati ons, often forces early repl acement. 
Instrument P (replacement recruitment) can be undertaken after various time 
lags. Delay during high, but falling, output can prevent future over-
capacity, while delay during low activity produces the results-paid 
severance trade-off effects. Whatever the time lag between quit and 
recruitment, replacement can serve different functions; it can be used to 
rationalize the workforce (e.g. by replaci ng part-timers by full-timers), 
or it can be used to re-recruit workers who were previously made redundant, 
thereby honouri ng implf cit contracts (section 2.1). The implf cati on of long 
time lags have been considered as natural wastage under instrument 0, but 
employers might find it expedient to re-recruit before absolutely necessary 
in order to obtain previously severed workers or short-supply labour when 
specific skill shortages exist in the ELM. Early replacement is usually 
vital, but often difficult, at peak times and this can persuade employers 
to opt for one of the modifications to hiring standards reviewed below. 
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Instrument Q (redundancy) is the most unpleasant of all instruments 
from a supply viewpoint, and can be costly for employers who give priority 
to goals 2 and 3. It is thus usually delayed to a late stage of the 
downward adjustment for core workgroups. Redundancy offers the employer 
the possibility of removing particular individuals, such as trouble-
makers, poor performers or few-hour employees; reasons given for selection 
must withstand examination at an industrial tribunal. but motives are not 
always reflected in stated reasons. Rationalization of the workforce is 
often deemed desirable when past compromises and second-best workers 
remain. However. redundancy costs can offset wage bill savings, and 
redundancies can make subsequent re-recruitment difficult when confidence 
in the stability of employment at the company has been undermined. 
In contrast, twilight and homework redundancies are often considered 
to be expedient at an early stage in downward adjustments and both groups 
are easy and inexpensive to sever because they are largely invisible to 
uni ons and core workers and exempt from statutory benefi ts. 
Instrument R (additional recruitment of preferred labour by the 
creation of new posts) provides an immediate boost to productive capacity, 
but when undertaken before a sizable backlog of work has accumulated it can 
produce the resul ts-paid retention trade-off. Statutory contributions, 
recruitment and training costs increase expenditure, so cost-minimizers 
have additional reasons for delaying. Delay in the introduction of extra 
workers is particularly advisable until an upturn in trade is well-
established since an unexpected reversal would quickly make them 
superfluous and create the redundancy dilemma. Additional recruitment 
reduces overtime costs, but this will displease workers seeking overtime. 
It also provides opportunity for changing the workgroup mix and 
rationalizing the labour force, but accommodation constraints might limit 
the amount of additional labour that can be introduced. Consequently, ea~­
to-remove twil ight and homework labour is often 'preferred' to additional 
core recruitment in uncertain environments unless high core voluntary 
turnover rates can be relied on to provide automatic downward adjustment in 
the short-term by natural wastage. Chronic shortages of accommodation 
whi ch resul t in fi rst-phase reorgani zati on cause added homeworkers to be 
retai ned as preferred workers rather than bei ng resorted to occasionally. 
but where expansion is prevented twilight workers may be preferred to 
homeworkers for operati ng the more expensive and/or 1 arge-si zed machi nes 
since they permit intensive use of existing equipment. However, twil ight 
workers can create disharmony by causing loss of earnings for daytime 
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workers whose machinery they share if breakdowns occur from failure to 
operate it carefully. 
* * * 
Only when the aforementioned instruments have been unsuccessful in 
provi di ng suffi ci ent upward 1 ab our input adju stment will downward 
modifications of hiring standards be contemplated. 
13.2.4 Evaluation of Strategies that Ya~ Hiring Standards to Obtain 
Additional Labour 
Instrument S (modi fication of stipulations about a recruit's 
skill/experience), by accepting responsibility for training,can be a means 
of attracting workers to the core workgroups. Attitudes to instrument S 
can be varied: in slackening markets skill/experience stipulations can be 
progressively enforced; in tighteni ng LMs they can be relaxed, but with 
short-term fluctuations there is often insufficient time to train raw 
recruits before order deadlines. Hence, when training is seen as the 
solution to skill shortage, sufficient time has to be allowed prior to peak 
production for recruits to become assets rather than liabilities by needing 
supervision from experienced workers. Cost-conscious employers might prefer 
to modify the stipulations relating to worker attributes, or time and place 
of work, rather than skill stipulations that impose training costs. 
Instrument T (modification of stipulations about a recruit's personal 
attributes) is the most economical hiring standard adjustment when the 
specified attributes are poor predictors of performance. Preferences 
relating to age, race, gender, family status and other rule-of-thumb 
assessments can be relaxed and enforced at will to recruit to desired work 
patterns, but training (instrument S) may also be involved where such 
workers have been previously excluded by all local employers. 
Instrument U (modifications to a recruit's weekly hours) proved to be 
the most popular hiring standard adjustment in surveyed establishments. 
Successive downward revisions of acceptable hours during tight LMs, and 
upward modifications during slack LMs, is a recruitment response that 
clearly reflects market conditions. Slight reductions below basic weekly 
hours can be less costly than training individuals who might ultimately 
exhibit low aptitude or soon quit, especially when recruited part-timers 
have much experience and above average ability. 
Instrument V (a modification relating to a recruit's daily work times) 
permits attendance in the eveni ng or early morni ng and can attract people 
with the desired skills and personal attributes. When factories are 
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already operating at these times of day, this instrument is less costly to 
introduce because existing shift workers can provide supervision and first-
aid cover while overheads are alreaqy incurred. Instrument R, which views 
twilight workers as a preference for large-sized, high-cost machinery has 
eval uated twfl i ght worki ng, but the use of twfl i ght workers as a second-
best alternative during skill shortages can result in small machines being 
u sed or hand opera ti ons bei ng performed. Thu s twi li ght workers a re not 
exclusively large-machine operators, and those introduced from a skill 
shortage will have more permanent employment since they will be retai ned 
until additional suitably qualified core workers can be obtained. 
Nevertheless, second-best twilight workers are the first to have workloads 
reduced when activity falls. 
Instrument W (modifications of the stipulation relating to work inside 
the factory) produces the homeworker group as a second-best alternative and 
is a common response in establishments without shift working. Weekly hours 
and daily time stipulations also fall by default under this compromise, but 
provi ded work is returned punctually thi s does not usually concern the 
employer. Strongest constraints on domestic production stem from the large 
si ze of equipment and the 1 abour input to bul k ratio, see 12.5.2{c). 
13.2.5 Evaluation of Strategies that Vary Workers' Earning Potential 
The foregoing evaluations show that a great amount of labour input 
flexibility can be provided before it becomes necessary to attract further 
workers via earnings adjustments. Earnings variations may be inappropriate 
responses in seasonal industries except for long-term trends, but even when 
appropriate, these strategies could precipitate disapproval within local 
industry. Should earnings adjustments prove necessary, three different 
approaches can be adopted either singly or in conjunction because earni ngs 
comprise basic pay, additional premia/bonuses and fringe benefits. 
It may be possible to restrict Instru.ent X (variation in basic pay 
rates) to specific sections of a workforce by altering selected rates only, 
This will distort customary grade differentials and this can lead to 
strife, but non-comparability of operations confounds comparisons of 
earnings and makes selected increases more likely to succeed without 
objections. To increase all rates imposes a large marginal cost for a few 
extra workers. Cost-minimizing employers therefore use increased earnings 
only as a last resort, and then pay the smallest necessary increases. The 
time taken for information about increased rates to filter through 
information networks could also jeopardize success and make instrument X 
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inappropriate for adapting to short-term fluctuations. Difficulties in 
determining potential earnings from quoted piece-rates (see 7.3) can 
further limit success in attracti ng extra workers, and merely cause hi gher 
costs. Reductions of basic pay by as much and as soon as possible is often 
desired, but this can be difficult due to collective reactions. Freezing 
rates and allowing pay to decline in real terms as'other prices rise with 
inflation can often be a preferable option. Thus, instrument X can be both 
costly and ineffective, which probably explains why surveyed employers so 
.rarely used it. 
The above comments relate to factory workers who have employee status, 
but homeworkers, who have no legal protection often face variable wage 
rates, even in institutionally organized LLMs largely because they are 
'invisible' and dispersed. Thus, the downward use of instrument X is 
frequently confi ned to the collectively weak groups. 
Instrument Y (variations in premia and bonuses) is more popular than 
changes to basic rates because increases in overtime and shift premia are 
restricted to individuals working those patterns and this minimizes 
marginal cost effects. Raising overtime premia encourages more input from 
existing employees and also serves to attract recruits with a taste for 
overtime which increases the in-built flexibfl ity of the workforce. 
Raising shift premia attracts only shift wor..kers and this is convenient 
when these are needed. Higher overtime and shift-premi a widen earni ngs 
differentials, but the weak comparability of non-shift, non-overtime 
workers undermines collective action. Modifications to these components 
are therefore less likely to prompt stoppages than changes in basic pay. 
The introduction/removal of ex-gratia bonuses are similarly less 
likely to be disruptive, but because these are often confined to selected 
individuals and comprise only a small element of earnings expenditure 
savings from their removal are small. 
Instrument Z (provision of fringe benefits) can be varied for new or 
replacement recruits. Either a greater number or more costly benefits can 
be offered as LMs tighten, but few savings will be made in slack LMs 
because these can be difficult to remove when written into collective 
agreements or contracts of employment. Types of benefit can be adapted to 
worker grades. Whereas cars, mortgages, private health insurance and 
private education are more associated with executives, the blue-collar 
manual workers of the studied LLM were fortunate to receive pre-Christmas 
celebrations such as hampers or dinners, extra holiday pay, good canteen 
and social clubs, subsidized transport or creche facilities. Other than a 
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creche, it is doubtful whether these benefits would provide sufficient pull 
to resolve worker shortages. 
13.3 SUGGESTED SEQUEM:E OF INSTRUMENT USAGE IN SEASONALLY FLUCTUATING 
INDUSTRIES 
While probably not a complete catalogue, the foregoing evaluations 
show how numerous possible adjustment Instruments can be and thus how 
rarely it may be necessary to resort to earnings variations. However, it 
will be observed that many instruments are subject to constraints which can 
affect, not only their choice, but also their effectiveness when chosen. 
Constraints can arise from a variety of sources. They may be: 
budgetary constraints, especi ally if the employer Is an avid cost-
minimizer; time constraints for example when a production deadline is so 
pressing that certain instruments have insufficient time to operate; 
collective action constraints for instance fear of a stoppage caused by 
wage reduction; 'fairness' constraints which deter differential treatment 
of sections of the workforce; reliability constraints which Influence 
choices where the firm's reputation might be Involved; contractual 
constraints, when explicit or implicit wage or employment contracts limit 
choice of an instrument without breaking faith with the employees; 
technical contraints, where adjustment decisions are conditioned by the 
technology used; and constraints imposed by either product orl abour 
markets. Thomas & Deaton196 found similar constraints, but they also noted 
organi sati onal constrai nts where di fferent departments of 1 arge fi rms had 
opposing goals that affected instrument choice. In the sample firms 
comprising this research, however, no differential departmental influences 
were evi dent, but thi s was probably due to many of the fl rms bei ng of very 
small size relative to companies in other Industries. 
Labour input flexibility can be very sensitive to small changes in 
activity since several Instruments can be progressively appl ied in both 
upward and downward directions, I.e. they are reversible. It Is contended 
that instrument preference is particularly conditioned by employer 
objectives and anticipations of employee reactions to instrument usage. 
Conveniently, the goal of obtaining a contented, experienced internal core 
(lO.3) of the workforce coincides well with the desires of employees for 
employment, but cost-minimizing/high earnings aspirations are in total 
opposition. Consequently, instruments that vary core worker numbers, are 
costly, or risk disputes, voluntary turnover or disharmony are less 
favoured. Instruments B, C, F to M, 0, P, Rand U, which do not have these 
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characteristics, are therefore more favoured, opted for when possible, and 
thus most frequently used. Instruments A, D, E, N, Q, S, T and V to Z tend 
to be held in abeyance until the less costly, 'painless' instruments have 
yielded all the adjustment they can. 
Clearly, instruments vary considerably in the amount of adjustment 
they can provide: some give much flexibility (e.g. recruitment and 
redundancy), but this will depend on the extent to which employers are 
prepared to use them; others are capable merely of furnishing small 
adjustments suitable only for 'fine tuning' (e.g. punctuality 
manipulation). Relative amounts of flexibility are suggested below; where 
these are dependent upon an individual's characteristics, the instruments 
appear under more than one heading as appropriate. 
SMALL AMOUNTS MEDIUM AMOUNTS LARGE AMOUNTS 
* F , G, H, I, *** A, B, C, D, E, F , F** M , , 0, S, 
J,X,Y,Z. V, X. K, L, N, 0, P, Q, 
R,T,U,X. 
* 
** 
*** 
= from persons with external tilDe cOlDmitments, such as 
mothers of dependent chil dren. 
= from persons with few commitments, such as young persons without 
domestic responsibilities. 
= from persons with heavy financial commitments,such as 
'major bread-winners' with dependent families. 
The labour input flexibility provided by certain instruments will vary 
by gender due to different work patterns, but combinations and instrument 
sequence are likely to be similar since choices are governed by employer 
goals. Instruments that are particularly appropriate to each sex are: 
MAlES FEMAlES 
F##, K, N. F#, G, H, M, U, V, W. 
# = small amounts. 
## = substantial amounts. 
Instruments A to D, I, J, L, 0 to T, X to Z are generally appropriate 
to both sexes. It is important to note that instruments appropriate to 
male labour can all provide substantially large amounts of flexibility, 
whereas the effectively useful female instruments furnish comparatively 
small labour input adjustments. 
The usefulness of an instrument can vary over time, for example 
vol untary turnover and recruitment can depend on changes in the LM. 
Furthermore, the degree of constraint on an instrument's use can also vary 
over time. For instance, whereas an employer might consider redundancy to 
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be a costly instrument at an early stage in demand reducti on, he mi ght deem 
it the only alternative in very bad states when the costs of hoarding are 
perceived as exorbitant. This example illustrates therefore how instrument 
costs change via their 1 inks to the product and external labour markets, 
and hence the importance accorded to them can also change. Thus, 
constraints can be thought of as prohibitive or persuasive, in that the 
importance attached to them either prevents or merely delays an 
instrument's choice. These examples give an indication of why employers can 
seem to act differently in apparently similar situations. An instrument's 
useful ness will therefore depend upon the current position in the trading 
cycle and the instruments already in use. However, it should be remembered 
that instrument costs are perceived in conditions of imperfect information 
so that faulty judgements and 'trial and error' strategies can result. 
Caution is paramount and this gives employers a preference for numerous 
reversible or temporary instruments rather than a single permanent 
adjustment unless the future can be predicted with certainty. 
Intervi ews revealed that several instruments were used simul taneously 
and it is contended that, in effect, employers grade instruments according 
to their perceived merits (see section 13.2): those having equal merit are 
introduced more-or-l ess simul taneously asa set, .and only after that set's 
flexibility has been exhausted will the next combination be introduced. 
In order to postulate an appropriate sequence, a hypothetical 
company's average output is taken as the locus from which downward and 
upward adjustments move because that was how interviewed employers 
apparently visualized activity. It is also assumed that competitors for 
labour are simultaneously experiencing similar shortages and surpluses. 
Figure 13:3 illustrates the business cycle divided into quarters, with 
each quarter-cycle, or quadrant, sub-divided into periods during which a 
particular combination of instruments are used to adjust labour input. The 
postulated adjustment process is illustrated in Figure 13:3 by showing, in 
each band of the cycle, the identifying letters of instruments used during 
that period. Chapter 14 uses this adjustment sequence to calculate 
employment and income implications; it was therefore considered more 
appropriate to discuss the reasons for the choice of specific instrument in 
section 14.3. The illustrated sequence is constructed to reflect very wide 
(by a factor of 5), short-term (weeks rather than months) product demand 
variations. It thus represents an extreme case of seasonality. 
Establishments with fairly constant demand will need only those instruments 
shown in bands I, 8, 9, and 16. Even companies with substantial 
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fluctuations (by a factor of 2) will rarely need to adjust through bands 4 
and 5 or 12 and 13, unless industry, national or international business 
cycle troughs (or peaks) coincide with seasonal lows (or highs) and a 
downward (or upward) demand trend. 
Four adjustment bands have been suggested for each quadrant, and in 
each the sequence of instruments will be influenced by individual employer 
preferences. For convenience, the suggested instrument sets are depicted 
as yielding equal amounts of adjustment, but in practice this outcome will 
depend upon the employed individuals and hence the amount of flexibility 
provided by each set of instruments will vary across establishments. For 
example, natural wastage will provide no flexibility for companies with no 
voluntary turnover; overtime will yield little extra output if a small 
proportion of the workforce can work only a few extra hours occasionally. 
Thus, such instruments might be intermittently used during successive bands 
(despite an employer's wish to use them continuously from a specific 
juncture) as personnel change and more, or less, amenable employees are 
employed. Overtime and short-time working can be progressively introduced 
and continue their usefulness throughout several periods of the cycle while 
accompanying instruments become exhausted. Instruments such as the 
subcontracting of work to other firms and variations in shift work patterns 
are discrete adjustments capable only of occasional use. 
The suggested sequence omits product range variation (instrument B) 
because, by changing the nature of business activity itself, it falls 
outside the scope of responses to observed activity. Alteration of the 
hours in the basic workweek (instrument D) has also been excluded because 
it is more appropriate to long-tenn trends. The redeployment of employees 
(instrument 0, which is relevant to unexpected, short-term bottlenecks on 
particular operations that coincide with over-capacity on others, is al so 
omitted because it is impossible to anticipate whether and at what stage of 
the cycle it would be required. In practice, employers will superimpose 
redeployment on existing strategies as necessary whatever the cycle band. 
The sequence also illustrates how workforce flexibil ity will usually 
be sufficiently great to permit accommodation to wide variations in 
production schedules without resorting to earnings manipulation. 
13.4 APPLICABILITY OF THE ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM TO OTHER INDUSTRIES 
Figures 13:4(a) to (d) depict how employers of females in seasonally 
fluctuating companies with the illustrated product demand characteristics 
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use the twilight worker and homeworker groups to provide blocks of upward 
flexibility in the short-term. They depict how companies with constant or 
even falling demand patterns may still need to use secondary labour 
occasionally to meet short-term bottlenecks during peak activity, although 
this situation arises more frequently in companies· with erratic demand or 
expanding trends. These illustrations are not intended to depict the 
emergency demands that arise, even during low activity, when mishaps occur 
to machines or employees, nor do they show the more constant demands that 
.arise from establishments that have undertaken first-phase rationalization. 
Thus, in a LLM containing firms with each of these demand patterns, the 
local demand for twilight and homework labour will be intermittent but 
frequent. 
The author considers that the incremental levels of labour supply 
that are characteristic of female workgroups make them particularly 
attractive to employers facing unstable demand, because by manipulating the 
hours of less-than-full-time workers and by varying numbers they can 
continually respond to product market dynamics. This characteristic 
feature of women's LM participation contributes to the sex-segregated 
nature of many industrial LMs. Males can usually offer so much flexibility 
via overtime and different shift patterns that employers have little need 
for male unestabl ished workers, given existing segregated LM structures. 
Many of the evaluated instruments are rel evant to any industry, but 
customer demand strongly influences what is appropriate. The complex 
sequence of adjustments suggested in 13.3 is appropriate for high, short-
term fluctuations typical of seasonal fashion industries and is thus 
rel evant to the rag trade generally, to boot, shoe and box manufacture. 
The construction industry, while very different from the rag trade, 
can offer some interesting parallels because construction companies also 
have unstabl e, unpredictabl e customer demand. It is. however, male 
dominated, perhaps because traditionally it has been associated with 
unpleasant working conditions and masculine-type strength. Instruments 
appropriate to female labour supply are therefore generally inappropriate; 
part-time work patterns are not adopted, but Bresnen et a1 30 show that 
construction employers provided flexibility and spread risks almost 
entirely by the use of instrument L, the subcontracting of work to other 
·firms. Subcontracting had been carried to such an extent that few 
companies (responsible for contracts of more than £2 million) had their own 
directly employed tradesmen. Agency labour and sub-contractors were 
introduced and removed at short notice, thereby offering the same kind of 
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flexibility provided by the twilight and homework groups of the H&K 
i ndu s try. Con sequent1 y, some of the ins truments li s ted in 13.2 a re 
inappropriate to the construction industry, either because they are 
associated with shift, female or direct labour. 
Manufacturing industries facing more constant demand than as shown in 
Figure 13:4(a) can obtain sufficient adjustment from instruments C (where 
appropriate), F, J, K, 0 and P. It is suspected that such industries could 
also be characterized by male employment because there would be little use 
for the graded amounts of labour provided by female workgroups. In 
contrast, service companies (e.g. shops, bars, restaurants and sports 
facilfties) that have markedly differently demand patterns from those of 
surveyed establishments often face peaks of activity at certain times of 
each day and on specific days of each week such as local market days and 
Saturdays. Figures 13:4 (a) and (b) illustrate how labour input can be 
adapted in these circumstances; viz., by superimposing regular, additional 
amounts of relevant length part-time or twilight labour onto a small core 
of full-time day or shift workers to cover for busy periods. Overtime will 
be appropriate merely for stock-taking and peaks that are more protracted 
than usual such as 1 ate shopping hours at Christmas. Part-time and 
twilight labour will thus be demanded from preference by many service 
industries rather than as second-best choices, and hence hour stipulations 
will be active positive requirements rather than reactive hiring standard 
adaptions. Many part-time and twilight employees will benefit from 
stability of employment. However, part-time work patterns will differ from 
those out1 i ned for the H&K industry: for instance, some part-timers wi 11 
work early mornings plus evenings on a sp1 it work pattern (e.g. office 
cleaners, supermarket shelf packers); some will work for a few busy peak 
hours each day (e.g. sales assistants, bar assistants, waiters); others 
wi 11 work only on certai n days each week such as Saturdays, or on a full-
time basis but only during certain seasons such as Christmas (e.g. 
department store assistants, although such persons will not have the 
stability of employment enjoyed by other service sector part-timers). 
Twilight workers in bars and restaurants will have more stable employment 
than do those in seasonally fluctuating manufacturing industries such as 
the H&K industry. Homeworkers will generally be i nappropri ate where the 
service has to be provided on site; exceptions being specialist services 
that can be provided at distance. such as clerical work or garment 
alteration for which demand is sporadic making on the spot employment 
wasteful due to intermittent under-employment. 
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13.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT. UNDER-EMPLOYMENT AND INTERMITTENT 
EMPLOYMENT 
The recession of the early 1980's illustrates that a major influence 
on levels of employment, unemployment, under-employment and intermittent 
employment is the nati onal economic cl imate. Further important impacts are 
imposed by technological changes that alter the labour/capital balance of 
industry as is being illustrated by the use of computer-aided equipment and 
robots. However, when considering short-term changes at the micro 1 evel, 
these influences can be regarded as fixed since changes occur slowly; thus, 
the 1 abour/capital status of the LM can be taken as given. 
13.5.1 The Implication of Preference for Local Unemployment 
The major local factor to influence comparative levels of group 
employment is the mix of industry determining the character of the LLM, and 
the sizes of potential labour pools within its boundaries. These factors 
are also relatively fixed in the short-term, but can change with 
demographic movements and entry and exit of businesses. 
It has been concluded (13.4) that less-than-full-time LM participation 
has an important influence on women's allocation to labour-intensive 
operations in unstable environments because employers can continually adapt 
to product market dynamics. The implications of this conclusion are that 
capital-intensively and labour-intensively dominated LLMs will have 
different employment and unemployment patterns: labour-intensively 
dominated LLMs will result in comparatively high female participation; 
capital-intensively dominated LLMs will cause low female participation and 
hi gh non-cl aimant unemployment; mixed LLMs will have correspondi ngly hi gher 
and lower rates of female employment and unemployment respectively. 
Notwithstanding the usefulness of less-than-full-time workers, full-timers 
were shown to be the preferred core labour choice for female manual 
operations which will generally cause full-timers to be the first group to 
be fully absorbed. Thi s 1 eaves only limited opportuniti es for 1 ess-than-
full-time groups when the overall demand for female labour is low due to 
either low economic activity in labour-intensive LLMs, or to LLM capital-
intensiveness. When female activity rates are high, employers searching 
for full-timers will experience shortages and will frequently have to 
resort to compromise recruitment strategies (instruments U to W) that 
provide employment for the less-than-full-time groups. This circumstance 
implies that hidden (i.e. non-claimant) unemployment of less-than-full-time 
workgroups will occur in capital-intensively dominated LLMs, and when 
13 - 23 
CHAPTER 13 LABOUR INPUT ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
economic activity is low, since many workers know that insufficient 
employment opportunities exist and cease to search. In capital-intensively 
dominated LLMs therefore, less-than-full-time employment will be confined 
to the service sector in the manner suggested by Figure 13:~. Thus, 
capital-intensively dominated LLMs will be characterized not only by lower 
female activity rates, but also by much higher levels of less-than-full-
time unemployment. 
As suggested in 13.4, because male employment is not characterized by 
less-than-full-time activity, men experience greater stability of 
employment than do females in fluctuating industries since they themselves 
are capable of large compensatory adjustments to thei r 1 abour supplies. 
This has implications however, for their income variation, see 14.5. 
13.5.2 The Implications of Adjustment mechanisms for Under-employment and 
Intermittent Employment 
The adjustment process described in 13.3 suggests that substanti al 
amounts of downward flexibility can be provided by successive relaxations 
in the speed of work 'as output schedul es fall; the costs of such pace 
reductions being transferred to employees via payment-by-results schemes. 
This implies that the workforce will be progressively under-employed unless 
or until natural wastage or redundancies reduce over-capacity. Under-
employment arises for core workers whom employers generally aim to retain, 
whereas the the twilight and homework workgroups are discarded with falling 
trends. Only the permanent el ements of the twili ght and homework groups 
(12.5.2c) are retai ned and they too wi 11 experience under-employment. 
Intermittent employment is experienced by the twil i ght workers and 
homeworkers who are marginalized, or casualized, for the employer's 
convenience by being recruited and discarded to provide flexibility. Since 
these workers do not register as unemployed when they are terminated, they 
are not officially recorded and hence they form another source of non-
cl aimant unemployment. Twil i ght workers join homeworkers as the hi dden 
reserve army of the nation's labour force91• 
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14.1 ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING A WORKED EXAMPLE OF ADJUSTMENT DECISIONS 
Chapter 13 has demonstrated that adjustment instruments used by 
employers affect the workgroups di fferently. Consequently, the 
workgroups' employment and income levels exhibit differential 
sensitivities in dynamic environments. Based on the previous exposition of 
employer responses, this chapter aims to demonstrate how aggregate 
employments of workgroups and the incomes of individually retained workers 
vary if the adjustment sequence postulated in Figure 13:3 is followed. 
Several assumptions were necessary in order to calculate the mechanism's 
effects, but it is believed that these are realistic and appropriate to the 
circumstances of a sample establishment. 
It has been assumed that a hypothetical company, after starting at its 
median output (6000 batches per week), passes through extremely wide 
ranging trough and peak conditions. For demonstration purposes the business 
cycle has been divided into 16 bands over time as in Figure 13:3, with each 
band representing changes in production of 1,000 batches per week. The 
median output of 6,000 batches per week has been assumed for convenience in 
calcul ati ng the effects of production ri ses or fall s, but this figure is 
irrelevant of itself being only for demonstration purposes. Naturally, in 
practice, the time period for production requirements to rise or fall 
varies across companies and for different product market conditions; it 
usually follows an irregular path, but for this worked example a sinusoidal 
curve is assumed. Although an over-simplification, this example adequately 
simUlates the realistic conditions of variable time bands where in trough 
and peak regions, the times between adjacent bands are extended. For 
instance, the time interval to achieve the gradual increase of 2,000 
batches across bands 11 and 12 is identical to .that required earl ier for 
the rapid 4,000 batch increase through bands 7 to 10 inclusive. 
Although this firm regularly faces amplitude fluctuations of 2000 
batches representing a doubling of output between trough and peak (see 
section 13.1), in this example to illustrated extreme as well as normal 
conditions, it is assumed that a national business cycle is coinciding with 
the usual seasonal fluctuation to produce variations of twice that 
magnitude. As a result of past experience, normal levels of activity would 
be expected to reverse direction when outputs of 4000 and 8000 batches are 
approached, i.e at time bands 3 and 11 respectively. Hence, reactive rather 
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than positive responses are adopted until the eventual reversals at bands 4 
and 12 are well established. 
The initial workforce of the hypothetical company was averaged from 
similarly sized knitwear companies in the sample in which the ratio of 
part-time to full-time women approximated to 1:1.3; therefore 30 part-
timers and 40 full-timers were chosen. The shift men to dayti me women 
ratio of 1:4.7 was also chosen as being representative of such companies. 
Homeworkers performing work exclusive to themselves (XHw), as well as non-
exclusive homeworkers (NHw) who do the same work as factory employees, are 
included to illustrate the different employment conditions of these two 
homeworking groups, even though it would be unusual for such a company to 
use excl usi ve homeworkers to the extent shown, thi s bei ng more a 
characteristic of small companies. That only 20 XHW could completely 
process the 6000 batches is explicable because their work would apply to a 
1 imited number of items per batch (e.g.hand mending of faults) or because a 
small input per batch would be required (e.g. putting into large cartons). 
Assumptions regarding employer responses, together with levels of 
voluntary turnover, absenteeism and incomes, have been based on the 
findings of Parts A and B. Skill differentials have been eliminated by 
taking the pooled skill average income of £60 for 40 hrs/wk. Non-exclusive 
homeworkers have been paid equally to factory workers; homeworkers 
performing exclusive work have been paid at £20 per week when producing 
medi an output, a real i stic assumpti on based on the evi dence of Tabl es 8.8 
and 8.9. Part-timers are initially assumed to input 75%, and twilight 
workers 50%, of a full-timers weekly hours, although these vary as 
Instrument H (hours variation) is progressively applied. 
From the assumed numbers of core workers employed in each band, it was 
possible to calculate the speed of work relative to the median; it was 
assumed to be impossible to work faster than 10% above median levels and 
that employees would be unwilling to absorb a pace slower than 10% below 
the median, preferring instead to work fairly quickly for part of the week 
and then to adopt short-time working at guaranteed rates for the remainder. 
Given that production objectives and core worker numbers are known and 
that speeds of work can be calculated, the accumulation of bottlenecks or 
shortfalls can be determined, and these respectively dictate the number of 
non-exclusive secondary workers to be introduced, or the hours of short-
time necessary. In turn, the numbers of homeworkers determine their hourly 
input relative to the median, although it has been assumed, following 
observed employer practice, that when hourly requirements are low some 
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individuals will be severed rather than the company having to incur 
unnecessary del i very expenses. 
The resulting schedules are shown in Figures 14:1 and 14:2 for 
employment and income respectively. The discrete values plotted are those 
occurring at the successive 1,000 batch production changes which determined 
the time bands in Figure 13:3; these points are linearly joined so that 
the graph appears to slope smoothly between adjacent bands whereas in the 
real company situation they would probably vary discontinuously on a weekly 
basis as discussed in section 14.S. These calculated values, each based on 
the illustrated adjustment decisions of Figure 10:3, are summarised below. 
14.2 A WORKED EXAMPLE Of AN ADJUSTMENT SEQUENCE* 
BAND ONE 
(INITIAL WORKFORCE: Sm=lS; Fm=8; Fw=40; Pw=30; XHw=10; assume Pw=0.7SFw) 
Q, REDUNDANCY, XHw 10-2=8 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Srn lS-1=14; Fm 8-1=7; Fw 40-1=39; Pw 30-2=28 
C, PACE REDUCTION (% of MEDIAN), Sm=89%; Fm=9S%; Dw=87% 
H, HOURS INCREASE (% of MEDIAN), XHw=104% 
J, UNPUNCTUALITY/ABSENTEEISM, Sm+Fm=2%; Dw=l.S% 
Production requirements = SOOO batches/week 
Srn = 14 workers manning IS machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = SOOO/14 = 357.142 batches per week 
Fastest possible pace with IS machines is 440 batches per week; thus 
absenteei srn at 2% x 357.142 = 7.142 batches per week can be readily 
absorbed by Srn 
Wages Srn = 3S7.142 x £0.2S = £89.29 
Output requirements per Fm = SOOO/7 = 714.29 batches per week 
Fastest possible pace is 825 batches per week; thus absenteeism at 2% x 
714.19 = 14.29 batches per week can be readily absorbed by Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x £1.95 per hour = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 39 + (O.75 x 28) = 60 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 5000/60 = 83.333 batches per week 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week; thus absenteeism at 
1.S% x 83.333 = 1.24 batches can be readily absorbed by Dw 
Wages Fw = 83.333 x £0.625 
Pw = £52.08 x 0.75 
XHw = (5000/8) x £0.0333 
BAND TWO 
G, WORKGROUP SWITCH, Fw 39-1=38; Pw 28+1=29 
H, HOURS REDUCTION Pw = 0.72SFw; XHw=83% of median 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Srn+Fm=l%; Dw=l% 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Fw 38-1=37; Pw 29-1=28 
C, PACE REDUCTION (% of MEDIAN), Sm=71%; Fm=76%; Dw=73% 
= £S2.08 
= £39.06 
= £20.83 
E, SHORT-TIME WORKING, Sm=8hrs; Fm=6hrs; Fw=8 hrs; Pw=8 hrs equivalent 
Production requirements = 4000 batches/week 
Srn = 14 workers mannjng IS machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 4000/14= 285.714 batchesperweek 
* Tables 14.1 and 14.2 were used in the calculations 
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Output at slow pace wi th short ti me of 8 hours is 288 batches per week; 
thus. 1% absenteeism is absorbable by each Sm 
Wages Sm = 285.714 x £0.25 +(8-4)hrs @ £1.20 
= £71.43(piecerates) + £4.80(guaranteed) = £76.23 
Output requirements per Fm = 4000/7 = 571.429 batches per week 
Output at slow pace with short time of 6 hours is 574 batches per week; 
thus. 1% absenteeism is absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 34 x £1.95 + (6-4) x £0.90 
= £66.30(time rates) + £1.80(guaranteed) = £68.10 
Fw equivalent = 37 + (0.725 x 28) = 57.3 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 4000/57.3 = 69.81 batches per week 
Thi s can be produced at slow pace with short-time of 8 hours with 
1% absenteeism absorbed 
Wages: Fw = 69.81 x £0.625 + (8-4) hours @ £0.90 
BAND THREE 
= £43.63(piecerates) + £3.60(guaranteed) 
Pw = £47.23 x 0.725 
XHw = (4000/8) x £0.0333 
Q. REDUNDANCY. XHw 8-2=6 
O. VOLUNTARY TURNOVER. Fw 37-1=36 
A. STOCK ACCUMULATION. 1000 BATCHES per week 
H. HOURS INCREASE (% of MEDIAN). XHw=lll% 
C. PACE VARIATION (% of MEDIAN). Sm=71%; Fm=76%; Dw=74% 
= £47.23 
= £34.24 
= £16.67 
E. SHORT-TIME WORKING, Sm=8hrsj Fm=6hrs; Fw=7 hrs; Pw=7 hrs equivalent 
Production requirements = 3000 batches/week + 1000 stock accumUlation 
Sm = 14 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 4000/14 = 285.714 batchesperweek 
Output at slow pace wi th short ti me of 8 hours is 288 batches per week 
Wages Sm = 285.714 x £0.25 +(8-4)hrs @ £1.20 
= £71.43(piecerates) + 4.80(guaranteed) = £76.23 
Output requirements per Fm = 4000/7 = 571.429 batches per week 
Output at slow pace with short time of 6 hours is 574 batches per week 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 34 x £1.95 + (6-4) x £0.90 
= £66.30(time rates) + £1.80(guaranteed) = £68.10 
Fw equivalent = 36 + (0.725 x 28) = 56.3 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 4000/56.3 = 71.05 batches per week 
This can be produced at slow pace with short-time of 7 hours 
Wages: Fw = 71.05 x £0.625 + (7-4) hours @ £0.90 
= £44.41(piecerates) + £2.70(guaranteed) 
Pw = £47.11 x 0.725 
XHw = (4000/6) x £0.0333 
BAND FOUR (first half of band) 
= £47.11 
= £34.15 
= £22.22 
A. STOCK ACCUMULATION. 500 BATCHES per week for the first half of the band 
H. HOURS REDUCTION (% of MEDIAN) XHw=83% 
C. PACE REDUCTION (% of MEDIAN). Sm=54%; Fm=57%j Dw=56% 
E, SHORT-TIME WORKING. Sm+Fm=16hrsj Fw=16hrs; Pw=16hrs equivalent 
Production requirements = 2500 batches/week + 500 stock accumulation 
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Srn = 14 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 3000/14 = 214.286 batchesperweek 
Output at slow pace with short time of 16 hours is 216 batches per week 
Wages Srn = 214.286 x £0.25 +(16-4)hrs @ £1.20 
= £53.57(piecerates) + £14.40(guaranteed) = £67.97 
Output requirements per Fm = 3000/7 = 428.571 batches per week 
Output at slow pace with short ti me of 16 hours is 405 batches per week; 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 24 x .fl.95 + (16-4) x £0.90 
= £46.80(time rates) + £10.80(guaranteed) = £57.60 
Fw equivalent = 36 + (0.725 x 28) = 56.3 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 3000/56.3 = 53.29 batches 
which can be produced at slow pace with short-time of 16 hours 
Wages: Fw = 53.29 x £0.625 + (16-4) hours @ £0.90 
= £33.31 (piecerates) + £10.80 (guaranteed) 
Pw = £44.11 x 0.725 
XHw = (3000/6) x £0.0333 
BAND FOUR (second half of band) 
A, TERMINATION OF STOCK ACCUMULATION OF 500 BATCHES per week 
per week 
= £44.11 
= £31.98 
= £16.67 
N, SHIFT-WORK PATTERN VARIATION, Srn, double day shift to single shift 
K, MACHINE/WORKER RATIO VARIATION, 15 machines to 12 machines x 10 Srn Q, REDUNDANCIES, Srn 14-4=10; Fm 7-3=4; Fw 36-4=32; Pw 28-8=20; XHw 6-3=3 
H, HOURS VARIATION, Pw=0.70Fw (reduction); XHw=lllt of median (increase) 
C, PACE VARIATION (t of MEDIAN), Sm=63t; Fm=67t; Dw=45t 
E, SHORT-TIME WORKING, Sm=12hrs; Fm=10hrs; Fw=20hrs; Pw=20hrs equivalent 
Production requirements = 2000 batches/week (stock accumulation ceases) 
Srn = 10 workers manning 12 machines each over one shift per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 2000/10 = 200 batchesperweek 
Output at slow pace with short time of 12 hours is 202 batches per week 
Wages Srn = 200 x £0.204 + (12-4)hrs @ £0.90 (no shift premia) 
= £40.80(piecerates) + .f7.20(guaranteed) = £48.00 
Output requirements per Fm = 2000/4 = 500 batches per week 
Output at slow pace with short time of 10 hours is 506 batches per week; 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 30 x £1.95 + (10-4) x £0.90 
= £58.50(time rates) + £5.40(guaranteed) = £63.90 
Fw equivalent = 32 + (0.70 x 20) = 46 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 2000/46 = 43.48 batches per week 
which can be produced at slow pace with short-time of 20 hours 
Wages: Fw = 43.48 x £0.625 + (20-4) hours @ £0.90 
BAND FIVE 
= £27.18 (piecerates) + £14.40 (guaranteed) 
Pw = £41.58 x 0.70 
XHw = (2000/3) x £0.0333 
C, PACE INCREASE (t of MEDIAN) Sm=94t; Fm=100t; Dw=68t 
= £41.58 
= £29.10 
= £22.22 
E, REDUCTION OF SHORT-TIME WORKING, Sm+Fm=nil; Fw=10 hrs; Pw=10 hrs equiv. 
M, SUBCONTRACT TO XHw, XHw=3+1=4 
H, HOURS INCREASE (t of MEDIAN), XHw=125t 
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Production requirements = 3000 batches/week 
Sm = 10 workers manning 12 machines each over one shift per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 3000/10 = 300 batchesperweek 
Output at median pace with 12 machines and no short time is 320 batches/wk 
Wages Sm = 300 x £0.204 (no shift premia) . = £61.20 
Output requirements per Fm = 3000/4 = 750 batches per week 
Output atmedian pace with no short time is 750 batches perweek 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x £1.95 = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 32 + (0.70 x 20) = 46 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 3000/46 = 65.22 batches per week 
which can be produced at slow pace with short-time of 10 hours 
Wages: . Fw = 65.22 x £0.625 + (10-4) hours @ £0.90 
BAND SIX 
= £40.76 (piecerates) + £5.40 (guaranteed) 
Pw = £46.16 x 0.70 
XHw = (3000/4) x £0.0333 
= £46.16 
= £32.31 
= £25.00 
N, SHIFT-WORK PATTERN VARIATION, single shift to double shift x 13 Srn 
P, REPLACEMENT RECRUITMENT, Sm=10+3=13; Fm=4+1=5 
M, SUBCONTRACT TO XHw, XHw 4+6=10 
E, SHORT-TIME WORKING, removed 
C, PACE INCREASE (X of MEDIAN), Sm=96X; Fm=107X; Dw=91X 
H, HOURS REDUCTION (X of MEDIAN), XHw=67X 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=lX; Dw=2X 
Production requirements = 4000 batches/week 
Sm = 13 workers manning 12 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 4000/13 = 307.692 batchesperweek 
Output atmedian pace with 12 machines is 320 batches per week 
Wages Sm = 307.692 x £0.25 (with shift premia) = £76.92 
Output requirements per Fm = 4000/5 = 800 batches'per week 
Output atfast pace is 825 batches per week 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x £1.95 = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 32 + (0.70 x 20) = 46 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 4000/46 = 86.96 batches per week 
which can be produced at slow pace (no short-time working) 
Absenteeism at 2X is absorbed by the daytime workers 
Wages: Fw = 86.96 x £0.625 
Pw = £54.35 x 0.70 
XHw = (4000/10) x £0.0333 
BAND SEVEN 
P, RE-RECRUITMENT, Sm=13+2=15; Fm=5+2=7; Fw 32+4=36; Pw 20+2=22 
R, AODITIONAL RECRUITMENT, Sm=15+1=16; Fw 36+7=43 
C, PACE VARIATION (X of MEDIAN), Sm=98X; Fm=95X; Dw=89X 
H, HOURS INCREASE (X of MEDIAN), XHw=83X 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=1.5X; Dw=2X 
Production requirements = 5000 batches/week 
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Srn = 16 workers manning 12 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 5000/16 = 312.5 batchesperweek 
Output a1medi an pace wi th 12 machi nes is 320 batches per week; thus 
1.5',1', absenteeism is absorbable by each Srn 
Wages Srn = 312.5 x .£0.25 = .£78.13 
Output requirements per Fm = 5000/7 = 714.286 batches per week 
Output at median pace is 750 batches per week; thus, 1.5',1', absenteeism is 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x ,£1.95 = .£78.00 
Fw equivalent = 43 + (0.70 x 22) = 58.4 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 5000/58.4 = 85.62 
can be produced at slow pace (no short-time worki ng) 
Absenteeism at 2',1', is absorbed by the daytime workers 
batches/wk whi ch 
Wages: Fw = 85.62 x .£0.625 
Pw = .£53.51 x 0.70 
XHw = (5000/10) x .£0.0333 
BAND EIGHT 
= .£53.51 
= £37.46 
= ,£16.67 
K, MACHINE/WORKER RATIO VARIATION, 12 machines to 15 machines x 16 Srn 
S, SKILL COMPROMISE, RECRUITMENT OF SCHOOL LEAVERS, 10 @ 10',l',Fw efficiency 
H, HOURS INCREASE (',I', of MEDIAN), XHw=100',l', 
C, PACE VARIATION (',I', of MEDIAN), Sm=94',1',; Fm=100',l',; Dw=102',1', 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Srn 16-2=14; Fm 7-1=6; Fw 43-2=41; Pw 22-3=19 
P, RE-RECRUITMENT, Fm=6+1=7; Pw 19+1=20 
R, ADDITIONAL RECRUITMENT, Srn 14+2=16: Fm=7+1=8: Fw 41+5=46 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2',1',: Dw=2.5',1', 
Production requirements = 6000 batches/week 
Srn ~ 16 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 6000/16 = 375 batchesperweek 
Output a1median pace with 15 machines is 400 batches per week: thus 
2% absenteeism is absorbable by each Srn 
Wages Srn = 375 x .£0.25 = .£93.75 
Output requirements per Fm = 6000/8 = 750 batches per week 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week: thus 2',1', absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x ,£1.95 = .£78.00 
Fw equivalent = 46 + (10 x 0.10) + (0.70 x 20) = 61 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 6000/61 = 98.36 batches per week 
whichcanbeproducedat slightly above median pace 
Absenteeism at 2.5',1', is absorbed by the daytime workers 
Wages: Fw = 98.36 x .£0.625 
Pw = £61.47 x 0.70 
XHw = (6000/10) x .£0.0333 
BAND NINE 
= .£61.47 
= ,£43.03 
= .£20.00 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Sm 16-1=15: Fw trainees 10-5=5: Fw 46-2=44: Pw 20-1-19 
S, SKILL IMPROVEMENT, Fw trainees, 5 @ 50',1', efficiency (i.e. 2.5 Fw equiv) 
U, MODIFICATION OF HOURS STIPULATION, Pw=Fw x 75',1', 
R, ADDITIONAL RECRUITMENT, Srn 15+1=16: Fm=8+1=9: Fw 44+3=47: Pw 19+5=24 
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M, SUBCONTRACTING TO XHw, XHw 10+2=12 
C, PACE INCREASE (% of MEDIAN), Sm=110%; Fm=104%; Dw=110% 
H, HOURS REDUCTION (% of MEDIAN), XHw=97% 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Dw=3% 
F, OVERTIME INCREASE TO COVER ABSENTEEISM, 1hr x 16 Srn; 0.5 hr x 1 Fw 
Production requirements = 7000 batches/week 
Srn = 16 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 7000/16 = 437.5 batchesperweek 
Output atfast pace with 15 machines is 440 batches per week; thus 
2% absenteeism (8.8 batches)is not absorbable by each Srn 
Overtime of 1 hr per Sm required to cover for absenteeism (i.e.6.3 batches 
shortfall (bottleneck) per Sm) 
Wages Sm = 431.2 x £0.25 (weekly piecerate earni ngs) 
+ 6.3 x £0.25 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 1hr x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Total weekly earnings 
Output requirements per Fm = 7000/9 = 777.78 batches per week 
= £107.80 
= £1.58 
= £0.36 
= £109.74 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x £1.95 = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 47 + (5 x 0.5) + (0.75 x 24) = 67.5 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 7000/67.5 = 103.70 batches per week 
The fastest possible pace is 10~60 batches per week; thus absenteeism 
(3% x 103.70 = 3.11 batches) is largely absorbed by the daytime 
workers 
Bottleneck = 103.70 + 3.11 - 105.60 = 1.21 batcres 
Bottleneck is removed by 0.5 hour overtime by 1 person 
Wages: Fw = 103.70 x £0.625 (weekly piecerate earni n9s) 
BAND TEN 
+ 1.21 x £0.625 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 0.5 x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Total weekly Fw earnings 
Pw = £64.81 x 0.75 
XHw = (7000/12) x £0.0333 
R, ADDITIONAL RECRUITMENT, Fm 9+2=11; Fw 47+2=49; Pw 24+10=34 
U, RESTIPULATION OF PART-TIME HOURS. Pw = Fw x 76% 
M. SUBCONTRACTING TO XHw. XHw 12+6=18 
= £64,81 
= £0.76 
= £0.18 
= £65.75 
= £48.61 
= £19.44 
O. VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Fw trainees5-1=4; Fw49-2=47; Pw34-2=32; XHw18-3=15 
S. SKILL IMPROVEMENT. Fw trainees,4 @ 80% Fw efficiency(i.e. 3.2 Fw equiv) 
G, WORKGROUP SWITCH, Fw 47+1=48; Pw 32-1=31 
H. HOURS VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), NHw=117%; XHw=89% 
C, PACE VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), Sm+Dm=110% maximum pace; Fm=97%; 
F, OVERTIME, 6.5hrs x 16Sm; 2 hours x 8Fw=16hrs 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Dw = 3% 
W, PLACE OF WORK RE-STIPULATION, NHw 0+8=8 and NHw=fW x 45.5% 
Production requirements = 8000 batches/week 
Sm = 16 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 8000/16 = 500 batchesperweek 
Output atfast pace with 15 machines is 440 batches per week; thus 
2% absenteeism (8.8 batches)is not absorbable by each Srn 
14 - 8 
CHAPTER 14- EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME STABILITIES 
Overtime of 6.5 hrs per Sm required to clear the bottleneck (i.e.68.8 
batches per Sm) 
Wages Sm = 431.2 x £0.25 (weekly piecerate earni ngs) 
+ 68.8 x £0.25 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 6.5 x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Total weeklyearni ngs 
Output requirements per Fm = 8000/11 = 727.273 batches per week 
= £107.80 
= £17.20 
= £2.34 
= £127.34 
Output at median pace is 750 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time pai d) = 40 x £1.95 = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 48 + (4 x 0.8) + (0.76 x 31) = 74.76 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 8000/74.76 =107.01 batches per week 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week: thus absenteeism 
(3% x 105.60 = 3.17 batches) adds to the bottleneck 
Actual production per Fw equivalent = (105.60 - 3.17) = 102.43 
Total bottleneck = 8000 - (102.43 x 74.76) = 342.33 batches 
Bottleneck is partially removed by 2 hours overtime by 8 Fw 
i.e. 2'hours x 2.64 batches per hour = 5.28 batches (for 8 Fw) 
Remaining bottleneck = 342.33 - 42.24 = 299.98 batches: removed by NHw 
i.e. NHw = 299.98/8 = 37.50 batches per NHw 
Wages: Fw = 102.43 x £0.625 (weekly pi ecerate earni ngs) 
BAND ELEVEN 
+ 5.28 x £0.625 (overtime piecerateearnings) 
+ 2 x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Total weekly Fwearnings 
Pw = £64.02 x 0.76 
NHw = (299.98/8) x £0.625 
XHw = (8000/15) x £0.0333 
F, OVERTIME, 6.5hrs x 16 Sm; ceased for Fw 
R, ADDITIONAL RECRUITMENT, Pw 31+6=37 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Fw 48-5=43: Pw 37-3=34; XHw 15-2=13 
= £64.02 
= £3.30 
= £0.72 
= £68.04 
= £48.66 
= £23.44 
= £17.78 
S, SKILL IMPROVEMENT, Fw trai nees 4 @ 100% effi ci ency(i .e.4Fw equiv+43=471 
A, STOCK CONSUMPTION, 1,000 BATCHES per week 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Dw=3% 
W, PLACE OF WORK RE-STIPULATION, NHw 8+2=10 
V, TIME OF WORK RE-STIPULATION, Tw 0+6=6 and Tw=Fwx50% 
H,HOURSVARIATION (% of MEDIAN),NHw=72% (reduction);XHw=103% (increase) 
C, PACE VARIATION (%.of MEDIAN), Sm+Iw=110% maximum pace; Fm=97% unchanged 
Production requirements = 9000 batches/week - 1000 stock consumption = 8000 
Sm = 16 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 8000/16 = 500 batchesperweek 
Output atfast pace wi th 15 machi nes is 440 batches per week; thus 
2% absenteeism (8.8 batches)is not absorbable by each Sm 
Overtime of 6.5 hrs per Sm required to clear the bottleneck (i .e.68.8 
batches per Sm) 
Wages Sm = 431.2 x £0.25 (weekly piecerate earnings) 
+ 68.8 x £0.25 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 6.5 x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Totalweeklyearnings 
Output requirements per Fm = 8000/11 = 727.273 batches per week 
= £107.80 
= £17.20 
= .£2.34 
= £127.34 
Output at median pace is 750 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
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absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time pai d) = 40 x £1.95 = '£7B.00 
Fw equivalent = 43 + (4 x 1.0) + (0.76 x 34) + (6 x 0.5) = 75.84 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 8000/75.84=105.49 batches per week 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week, but absenteeism at 
3% x 105.60 = 3.17 batches adds to the bottleneck 
Actual production per Fw equivalent = (105.60 - 3.17) = 102.43 
Total bottleneck = 8000 - (102.43 x 75.84) = 231.71 batches; removed by NHw 
wages: 
i.e. NHw = 231.71/10 = 23.17 batches per NHw 
Fw = 102.43 x .£0.625 
Pw = .£64.02 x 0.76 
Tw = .£64.02 x 0.50 
NHw = (231.71/10) x .£0.625 
XHw = (BOOO/13) x .£0.0333 
BAND TWELVE (first half of band) 
A, STOCK CONSUMPTION, 500 BATCHES per week 
'" .£64.02 
'" '£4B.66 
'" .£32.01 
'" .f14.48 
'" ,£20.51 
K, MACHINE/WORKER RATIO VARIATION, 15 machines to 18 machines x 16 Srn 
N, SHIFT WORK PATTERN VARIATION, 2 shifts to 3 shifts x 16 Srn 
F, OVERTIME, 4hrs X 16 Srn 
L, SUBCONTRACTING TO HOMEWORKER AGENT, 500 BATCHES per week 
U, HOURS RE-STIPULATION, Tw=Fw x 60% 
V, TIME OF WORK RE-STIPULATION, Tw 6+6=12 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Fw 47-2=45; Pw 34-4=30; Tw 12-2=10 
M, SUBCONTRACT TO XHw, XHw 13+7=20 
H, HOURS VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), NHw=137% (increase); XHw=75% (reduction) 
R, ADDITIONAL RECRUITMENT, Fm=11+1=12; Pw 30+7=37 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Iw=3.5% 
C, PACE VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), Sm+Iw=110% maximum pace; Fm=100% 
Production requirements = 9500 batches/week - 500 stock consumption = 9000 
Srn = 16 workers manning 18 machines each over three shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 9000/16 = 562.5 batchesperweek 
Output atfast pace wi th 18 mac hi nes is 528 batches per week; thus 
2% absenteeism (10.56 batches)is not absorbable by each Srn 
Overtime of 4 hrs per Srn required to clear the bottleneck (i.e.45.06 
batches per Srn) 
Wages Srn = 517.44 x .£0.25 (weekly piecerate earnings) 
+ 45.06 x .£0.25 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 4 x .£0.36 (overtime premium) 
Totalweeklyearnings 
Output requirements per Fm = 9000/12 = 750 batches per week 
= ,£129.36 
= ,£11.27 
= ,£1.44 
= .f142.07 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time pai d) = 40 x £1.95 = '£7B.00 
Fw equivalent = 45 + (0.76 x 37) + (10 x 0.6) = 79.12 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 9000/79.12=113.75 batches per week 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week, but absenteeism at 
3.5% x 105.60 = 3.70 batches adds to the bottleneck 
Actual production per Fw equivalent = (105.60 - 3.70) = 101.904 batches 
Total bottleneck = 9000 - (101.904 x 79.12) = 937.36 batches 
Bottleneck after subcontracting 500 batches to Hw agent = 437.36 batches 
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Therefore NHw = 437.36/10 = 43.736 batches per NHw 
Wages: Fw = 101.904 x £0.625 
Pw = £63.69 x 0.76 
Tw = £63.69 x 0.60 
NHw = (437.36/10) x £0.625 
XHw = (9000/20) x £0.0333 
BAND TWELVE (second half of band) 
= £63.69 
= £48.40. 
= £38.21 
= £27.33 
= £15.00 
L, SUBCONTRACTING; TO FIRM,1000 BATCHES p.w; TO Hw AGENT,1000 BATCHES p.wk 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Srn 16-1=15; Fw 45-2=43; Pw 37-2=35; Tw 10-1=9 
R, ADDITIONAL RECRUITMENT, Sm=15+1=16 
F, OVERTIME, 4hrs x 16 Srn 
V, TIME OF WORK RE-STIPULATION, Tw 9+1=10 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Iw=3.5% 
H, HOURS VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), NHw=93% (reduction); XHw=75% (unchanged) 
C, PACE VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), Sm+Iw=110% (maximum); Fm=100% (unchanged) 
Production requirements =10000 batches/wk - 1000 subcontracted = 9000 
Srn = 16 workers manning 18 machines each over three shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 9000/16 = 562.5 batchesperweek 
Output atfast pace wi th 18 machi nes is 528 batches per week; thus 
2% absenteeism (10.56 batches)is not absorbable by each Srn 
Overtime of 4 hrs per Srn required to clear the bottleneck (i.e.45.06 
batches per Srn) 
Wages Srn = 517.44 x £0.25 (weekly piecerate earnings) 
+ 45.06 x £0.25 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 4 x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Totalweeklyearnings 
Output requirements per Fm = 9000/12 = 750 batches per week 
= £129.36 
= £11.27 
= £1.44 
= £142.07 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x £1.95 = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 43 + (0.76 x 35) + (10 x 0.6) = 75.60 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 9000/75.60=119.05 batches per week 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week, but absenteeism at 
3.5% x 105.60 = 3.70 batches adds to the bottleneck 
Actual production per Fw equivalent = (105.60 - 3.70) = 101.904 batches 
Total bottleneck = 9000 - (101.904 x 75.60) = 1296.06 batches 
Bottleneckaftersubcontracting1000 batches to aHwagent=296.06 
Therefore NHw = 296.06/10 = 29.606 batches per NHw 
Wages: Fw = 101.904 x £0.625 
Pw = £63.69 x 0.76 
BAND THIRTEEN 
Tw = £63.69 x 0.60 
NHw = (296.06/10) x £0.625 
XHw = (9000/20) x £0.0333 
L, SUBCONTRACTING TO OTHER FIRMS, 1500 BATCHES p.w. 
= £63.69 
= £48.40 
= £38.21 
= £18.50 
= £15.00 
0, VOL TURNOVER, Fm 12-2=10; Fw 43-2=41; Pw 35-4=31; Tw 10-2=8; NHw 10-1=9 
W, PLACE OF WORK RE-STIPULATION, NHw 9+1=10 
H, HOURS VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), NHw=135% (increase); XHw=75% (unchanged) 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Iw=3.5% 
C, PACE VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), Iw=110% (maximum); Sm=98%; Fm=100% 
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Production requirements = 9000 batches/wk - 1500 subcontracted = 7500 
Sm = 16 workers manning 18 machines each over three shifts per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 7500/16 = 468.75 batchesperweek 
Output at fast pace with 18 machines is 528 batches per week;thus2% 
absenteeism (9.38 batches)is absorbable without overtime 
Wages Sm = 468.76 x £0.25 (weekly piecerate earnings) = £117.19 
Output requirements per Fm = 7500/10 = 750 batches per week 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x fl.95 = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 41 + (0.76 x 31) + (8 x 0.6) = 69.36 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 7500/69.36 = 108.13 batches per wk 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week, but absenteeism at 
3.5% x 105.60 = 3.70 batches adds to the bottl eneck 
Actual production per Fw equivalent = (105.60 - 3.70) = 101.904 batches 
Total bottl eneck = 7500 - (101.904 x 69.36) = 431.94 batches 
Therefore NHw = 431.94/10 = 43.194 batches per NHw 
Wages: Fw = 101.904 x £0.625 
Pw = £63.69 x 0.76 
BAND FOURTEEN 
Tw = £63.69 x 0.60 
NHw = (431.94/10) x £0.625 
XHw = (9000/20) x £0.0333 
L, SUBCONTRACTING TO OTHER FIRMS, 1000 BATCHES per week 
= £63.69 
= £48.40 
= £38.21 
= £27.00 
= £15.00 
K, MACHINE/WORKER RATIO VARIATION, 18 machines to 15 machines x 15 Sm 
N, SHIFT WORK PATTERN VARIATION, three shifts to two shifts x 15 Srn 
0, VOL TURNOVER, Srn 16-1=15; Fm 10-1=9; Fw 41-4=37; Pw 31-2=29; Tw 8-2=6 
F, OVERTIME, 10hrs x 15 Sm Q, REDUNDANCIES, XHw 20-8=12 
P, REPLACEMENT, Fw 37+2=39; Pw 29+2=31 
H, HOURS VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), NHw=81% (reduction); XHw=97% (increase) 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Iw=3.5% 
C, PACE VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), Sm+Iw=110% maximum pace; Fm=104% 
Production requirements = 8000 batches/wk - 1000 subcontracted = 7000 
Sm = 15 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 8000/15 = 533.33 batchesperweek 
Output atfast pace with 15 machi nes is 440 batches per week; thus 
2% absenteeism (8.8 batches) is not absorbable by each Srn 
Overtime of 10 hrs per Srn required to clear the bottleneck (i.e.102.13 
batches per Sm) 
Wages Srn = 431.2 x fO.25 (weekly piecerate earnings) 
+ 102.13 x £0.25 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 10 x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Totalweeklyearnings 
Output requirements per Fm = 7000/9 = 777.78 batches per week 
= £107.80 
= £25.53 
= £3.60 
= £133.33 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week; thus 2% absenteei srn is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x fl.95 = £78.00 
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Fw equivalent = 39 + (0.76 x 31) + (6 x 0.6) = 66.16 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 7000/66.16 = 105.804 batches per wk 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week, but absenteeism at 
3.5% x 105.60 = 3.70 batches adds to the bottleneck 
Actual production per Fw equivalent = (105.60 - 3.70) = 101.904 batches 
Total bottleneck = 7000 - (101.904 x 66.16) = 258.03 batches 
Therefore NHw = 258.03/10 = 25.803 batches per NHw 
Wages: Fw = 101.904 x £0.625 
Pw = £63.69 x 0.76 
BAND FIFTEEN 
Tw = £63.69 x 0.60 
NHw = (258.03/10) x £0.625 
XHw = (7000/12) x £0.0333 
F, OVERTIME, 4 hrs X 15 Srn 
= £63.69 
= £48.40 
= £38.21 
= £16.13 
= £19.44 
C, PACE VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), Sm+Iw=110% maximum; Fm=104% unchanged 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Fm 9-1=8; Fw 39-1=38; Pw 31-1=30; Tw 6-2=4 
P, REPLACEMENT, Fm 8+1=9; Fw 38+1=39; Pw 30+2=32 
U, HOURS RE-STIPULATION, Pw=Fw x 75%; Tw=Fw x 50% 
H, HOURS VARIATION (% of MEDIAN), NHw=118% (increase); XHw=97% (unchanged) 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Iw=3.5% 
Production requirements = 7000 batches per week (no subcontracting) 
Srn = 15 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Sm = 7000/15 = 466.67 batchesperweek 
Output atfast pace with 15 machines is 440 batches per week; thus 
2% absenteeism (8.8 batches) is not absorbable by each Sm 
Overtime of 4 hrs per Srn required to clear the bottleneck (i.e.35.47 
batches per Srn) 
Wages Srn = 431.2 x £0.25 (weekly piecerate earnings) 
+ 35.47 x £0.25 (overtime piecerate earnings) 
+ 4 x £0.36 (overtime premium) 
Totalweeklyearnings 
Output requirements per Fm = 7000/9 = 777.78 batches per week 
= £107.80 
= £8.87 
= £1.44 
= £118.11 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
~ages Fm (time paid) = 40 x .fl.95 
w equivalent = 39 + (0.75 x 32) + (4 x 0.5) = 65.00 
= £78.00 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 7000/65 = 107.692 batches per week 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week, but absenteeism at 
3.5% x 105.60 = 3.70 batches adds to the bottleneck 
Actual production per Fw equivalent = (105.60 - 3.70) = 101.904 batches 
Total bottl eneck = 7000 - (101.904 x 65) = 376.24 batches 
Therefore NHw = 376.24/10 = 37.624 batches per NHw 
Wages: Fw = 101.904 x £0.625 
Pw = £63.69 x 0.75 
BAND SIXTEEN 
Tw = £63.69 x 0.50 
NHw = (376.24/10) x £0.625 
XHw = (7000/12) x £0.0333 
F, OVERTIME WORKING, ceased for Srn 
Q, REDUNDANCIES, Tw 4-4=0; NHw 10-10=0 
= £63.69 
= £47.77 
= £31.84 
= £23.52 
= £19.44 
0, VOLUNTARY TURNOVER, Srn 15-1=14; Fm 9-1=8; Fw 39-1=38; Pw 32-1=31 
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P, REPLACEMENT, Pw 31+2=33 
H, HOURS REDUCTION (% of MEDIAN), XHw=83% 
C, PACE REDUCTION (% of MEDIAN), Sm=107%; Fm=100%; Dw=100% 
J, ABSENTEEISM/UNPUNCTUALITY, Sm+Fm=2%; Dw=2.5% 
Production requirements = 6000 batches per week 
Srn = 14 workers manning 15 machines each over two shifts per day 
Output requirements per Srn = 6000/14 = 428.57 batchesperweek 
Output at fast pace with 15 machines is 440 batches per week;thus2% 
absenteeism (8.8 batches) is absorbable without overtime 
Wages Srn = 428.57 x £0.25 (weekly piecerate earnings) = £107.14 
Output requirements per Fm = 6000/8 = 750 batches per week 
Output at fast pace is 825 batches per week; thus 2% absenteeism is readily 
absorbable by each Fm 
Wages Fm (time paid) = 40 x £1.95 = £78.00 
Fw equivalent = 38 + (0.75 x 33) = 62.75 
Output requirements per Fw equivalent = 6000/62.75 = 95.618 batches per wk 
The fastest possible pace is 105.60 batches per week; thus absenteeism at 
2.5% x 95.618 = 2.390 batches per Fw equivalent can be absorbed by Dw 
Actual production/Fw equivalent = 95.618 batches; therefore no bottleneck 
Wages: Fw = 95.6184 x £0.625 = £59.76 
Pw = £59.76 x 0.75 = £44.82 
XHw = (6000/12) x £0.0333 = £16.67 
STATISTICAl SUMMARY 
EMPLOYMENT 
Srn Fm Fw Pw Tw NHw XHw 
s.d. 1.87 2.39 5.75 5.51 3.73 4.83 5.01 
Mean 14.53 8.16 40.35 28.00 2.32 3.58 11.11 
CV % 12.85 29.26 14.25 19.67 160.96 135.07 45.11 
I NCIX>IE 
Srn Fm Fw Pw Tw NHw XHw 
s.d. 28.33 6.04 8.39 6.97 3.25 5.15 3.02 
Mean 99.58 75.14 57.03 41.92 36.12 21.49 18.52 
CV % 28.44 8.03 14.70 16.63 8.99 23.97 . 16.29 
14 - 14 
CHAPTER 14 EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME STABILITIES 
14.3 COMMENTARY ON TIlE ADJUSTMENT DECISIONS 
In the first quadrant, starting at band 1 with output continuing to 
fall from the median level of 6,000 batches per week, voluntary turnover, 
absenteeism and unpunctuality still occur since a time lag is assumed in 
employees' awareness of the oncoming recession. The employer being more 
conscious of order books conveniently uses this occurence as natural 
wastage. At moderately low levels of output, it is possible for employees 
to take advantage of absenteeism without affecting income by working faster 
while at the factory for only part of the week, but as production levels 
fall further, fear of redundancy and possible severance of unreliable 
workers produces lower absenteeism rates. In band 1, no non-exclusive 
homeworkers are employed and two exclusive homeworkers are made redundant 
which increases the hourly requirement from those retained. Pace slow-
down is an effective adjustment at this level of activity. In band 2, one 
full-timer switches to the part-time group, and other part-timers are 
permitted to reduce their weekly hours input which reduces the groups' 
average to 72.5% of full-time hours. Absenteeism and unpuctual i ty receive 
less criticism and pace slow down continues, but 8 hours of short-time 
working are nevertheless required from which, according to the scheme 
operating in sample firms, 4 hours guaranteed payment will accrue. In band 
3 output is falling below the usually expected levels; there is less 
absenteeism, unpunctuality and volunta~ turnover, although full-timers, as 
the preferred workgroup, can occasionally obtain alternative employment 
when competitive employers are rationalizing their workforces. This 
hypothetical employer is assumed to be willing to accumulate stock at the 
rate of 1000 batches per week because, being at the turning point of his 
normally expected cycle, he considers that a reversal will quickly occur. 
Nevertheless, he is unwill ing to hoard exclusive homeworkers, 2 of whom 
are severed. At the onset of band 4 the employer is assumed to accumulate 
stocks, but when he reaches the mi dpoi nt (band 4B) confi dence deserts him 
and as a last resort he makes core employees redundant as well as further 
exclusive homeworkers. The pace of work has reduced throughout the first 
quadrant; pa rt-timers, havi ng previ ously been worki ng more hours than they 
preferred, have been permitted to reduce them, but short-time worki ng is 
still necessary. 
When the upturn begins (band 5), adjustment is primarily via the 
removal of short-time working and faster pace, and work is agai n 
subcontracted to a previously redundant exclusive homeworker. 
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Unpunctuality/absenteeism which disappeared at the bottom of the trough 
start to reappear when the upturn is apparent. This employer adopts a 
'wait and see' attitude towards replacing workers, because to recruit early 
woul d depress wages. Not until band 6 does he adopt forwa rd pl anni ng 
strategies and re-recruit some of his redundant core workers. In band 8 he 
introduces school leavers for training on a full-time basis so that by the 
time the peak is reached those retai ned will have had sufficient time to 
become proficient. Skill improvement occurs in successive bands until 
their abilities are equivalent to those of existing full-timers, but they 
have relatively high turnover rates. In band 11, the employer takes the 
opportunity of stock consumption, but still needs to add non-exclusive 
twilight workers and homeworkers. In the first part of band 12, he 
additionally has to subcontract some work to a homeworker agent, but the 
shortfall is so large between bands 128 and 14, after stocks have been 
cleared, that subcontracting to other firms becomes necessary. 
In the fourth quadrant, after the peak has been passed, downward 
adjustment takes place by some natural wastage, but replacement is 
occasionally necessar,y; the ability to attract full-timers is assumed to be 
unsuccessful because all similar firms in the industry are still working 
at above average levels. Non-exclusive twil ight workers and homeworkers 
are phased out between bands 12 and 16 and exclusive homeworker numbers 
begin to be reduced in band 14. Absenteeism and unpunctuality, which 
reached high levels during the boom, begin to fall as the median output is 
agai n approached. 
14.4 OVER-SIMPLIFICATION IN THE WORKED EXAMPLE 
Whilst depicting an extremely complex, protracted and piecemeal 
decision-making process, the worked example nevertheless represents a ver,y 
simplified version of adjustment as it is actually applied within firms of 
the H&K industry. For instance, the calculations treat output as if it 
comprised uniform operations having identical degrees of shortage and 
surplus simultaneously. In reality there are numerous operations, to each 
of which are attached varying amounts of adaptability. The example treats 
voluntary turnover, absenteeism, recruitment as though these were evenly 
spread across all operations, but within real firms it is more likely that 
such adjustments will have varyi ng i nci dence and success rates. Thus the 
income and employment schedules of each workgroup as depicted in Figures 
14:1 and 14:2 represent the aggregated effects of numerous and different 
adjustment sequences applied to the various operations constituting the 
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manufacturi ng processes. Furthermore, certain instruments such as 
redeployment of personnel have been disregarded because, being an 
aggregation, it was unclear at what stage in the cycle relocation might be 
required. Work creation schemes, such as machinery maintenance, factory 
cleaning, stock-taking, and job or process redesign, might additionally be 
undertaken during periods of 1 abour hoardi ng, especi ally for workers who 
absorb all the adjustment themselves, but these possibfl ities have been 
de 1 i be ra te1y di s regarded in order to concentra te on the income and 
employment implications arising solely from product market changes. Thus 
the worked example, although complex, is a simplified version of an 
operational adjustment sequence. 
14.5 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE WORKED EXAMPLE 
In order to permit comparisons of the effects of adjustment 
ca1cu1 ations on the various workgroups it has been necessary, because of 
the wide differentials between mean values, to examine coefficients of 
variations (CV:t) rather than standard deviations which take no account of 
means. A stat i st i ca 1 summa ry sh owi ng the cn for each work group' s 
employment and income concluded section 14.2. 
In this worked example of adjustments in a hypothetical company it is 
recognised that outcomes will naturally depend on assumptions, but it is 
asserted that both the assumptions and outcomes realistically reflect the 
actual circumstances of H&K employment (albeit simp1 ified) as they were 
i denti fied by the extens ive overvi ew obtai ned from the research project. 
The employment instability discussed below is judged solely by number 
variations including periods of non-use, but excluding periods of short-
time working. The most stable workgroup to emerge at the end of the cycle 
is shift workers, and this arises from the hoarding of specifically skilled 
workers on capital intensive, highly productive operations. This 
employment stability has implications for income stability as will be seen 
below. Daytime women, as the core of the female segment, have the second 
best employment stability. Because fUll-time males are time-paid and often 
semi-skilled, they are less likely to be hoarded during periods of low 
activity and therefore have less stable employment. Although the employment 
of exclusive homeworkers is less stable than is that of the above-mentioned 
workgroups, the employer relies on them for specific operations and 
consequently their employment is substantially more stable than those of 
non-exclusive homeworkers and twilight workers. Thus, even at the bottom 
of the business trough some exclusive homeworkers are retained. The worked 
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example clearly illustrates the instability of employment of non-exclusive 
homeworkers who are comnionly seen as being used to provide production 
flexibility. The size of bottleneck remaining after all core worker 
adjustments have been achieved largely determines the numbers of twilight 
workers and non-exclusive homeworkers used. Therefore their levels of 
employment are affected by the voluntary turnover of core workers and the 
other instruments used to adjust core labour input. Turnover rates typical 
of the H&K industry have been fed into the calculation, see 9.6.6. Figure 
1~1 shows that, taken together, exclusive and non-exclusive homeworkers 
are used more frequently than twil ight workers and this demonstrates the 
extreme employment instability of twilight workers who tend to be 
introduced in bulk, naturally wasted and then terminated abruptly when the 
major part of the work backlog has been cleared. 
Income stabil ity is judged by ea rni ngs whfl e in employment. It takes 
into account the effects of short-time working but excludes periods of 
non-use. Because most workers are paid by piecerates, their income 
stability is affected by the numbers employed. Hence the time-paid full-
time men have the most stable income because it remains unchanged 
regardless of employment changes unless short-time working is introduced. 
Twilight workers have the next best income stability, but this arises from 
their highly unstable employment pattern in which numbers are regulated by 
the amounts of work available. Although non-exclusive homeworkers are used 
in similar circumstances to twilight workers, they have much more 
fluctuating incomes because they are invariably given the residual work 
that cannot be performed by the factory workforce, including twilight 
worke rs. Conversely, excl u s he homeworkers have relatively more stable 
incomes because they are not given residual amounts of work, although as 
production falls their services are not hoarded so that those retained 
receive moderately stable payments. Shift workers, having the most stable 
employment, inevitably have the highest variation in income, and this is 
compounded by the fact that they shoulder the whole of the adjustment 
process by their own efforts, i.e.by short-time and overtime working, see 
dotted sections of their income schedule. In contrast, daytime women work 
1 ittle overtime and have secondary workers to absorb some labour input 
adjustment. Consequently, they have considerably more stable earnings over 
the cycle then do shift workers and non-exclusive homeworkers, and this is 
accentuated because their incomes plateau at that level derived from the 
maximum pace achievable. 
This worked example of adjustment decisions has shown how, starting 
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from the median output, workgroup compositions have changed via a 
combination of positive active stategies and reactive responses, even 
though the employer has attempted to hold together an experienced core of 
his employees. The calculations have illustrated that under piecerate 
payments, earnings of workers in all workgroupsvary positively with 
production and negatively with numbers employed, and that these relations 
act simultaneously. Consequently piecework earnings variations, below the 
fastest paced work rates, depend on both deliberate employment strategies 
and unplanned number variations as well as variations in workloads. Some 
instability of weekly earnings is therefore to be expected for workers in 
all workgroups as is shown in Figure 14:2. The calculations demonstrate 
that work-sharing occurs when labour is hoarded and consequently that 
workers become risk-bearing factors of production as suggested by 
Jonsson243• Impl icit contracts are demonstrated by labour hoarding and by 
secondary workers being progressively discarded during falling production 
schedules as will be discussed in chapter 16. 
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15.1 A MODEL OF THE SUPPLY OF. AND DEMAND FOR. LABOUR IN THE 
EXTERNAL LOCAL LABOUR MARKET 
The foregoing chapters have presented a picture in which women and men 
face different, but linked, family constraints that cause them to have, or 
appear to have, different LM characteristics. Different female workgroups 
are used for the same range of jobs. but are not in competition for male· 
jobs. It is contended that this pattern of labour demand and supply is not 
confined the the H&K LM, but is common to other industries and LLMs that 
have numerous labour-intensive. low-output jobs. The model presented below 
of the workings of the LM is appropriate to such circumstances and is an 
attempt to link together different branches of social science learning into 
a comprehensive overview of a local labour market. 
The terms 'supply' and 'demand' each encompass stock and flow 
elements: stocks are the workers already in employment and the equivalent 
jobs al ready filled; flows are the parties in the market place seeking 
either employment, or workers to fill vacancies. 'rhe paradigm presented 
in this section refers mainly to flow elements, although inferences can be 
drawn about changes in stocks under dynamic market conditions. 
It is contended that the flow elements of labour supplies and demands 
have two components: firstly, initial specifications, or 'preferences'; 
secondly, subsequent observed outcomes, or 'effective' supplies and demands 
that follow from realistic appraisals of LM conditions. Flow elements of 
supplies and demands are perhaps most appropri ately considered as 
requirements stemming from interactions of 'needs' and 'wants'. These 
requirements prompt specifications of preferred jobs, or preferred workers, 
but initial specifications may not be satisfied due to insufficiencies of 
searched-for jobs and workers. Compromise strategies have to be adopted 
and these modify initial specifications and cause subsequent searches for 
jobs or workers which differ from those of original intentions. Second-
best, or even third-best concepts of supplies and demands are thus 
envisaged. 
On the supply side, the initial formulation of the specification for 
the sought-after job (i.e. intended supply) is generated by an interaction 
and balancing of the individual's needs and wants. The needs of each 
potential worker stem from a blend of economic, social and psychic 
pressures that can conflict by simultaneously encouraging and discouraging 
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LM participation and eventually prescribing the possible amount of LM 
activity. Wants are usually a matter of taste for a particular form of LM 
involvement; although these tastes usually have economically rational bases 
they mi ght appear to be i rrati onal. An i ndi vi dua 1 fi rst ba 1 ances hi s/her 
needs and wants to produce a specification of the preferred job, but when 
an approach to the market place reveals that job to be unobtainable, then 
reformulation takes place by a review of needs and wants to develop a 
compromise job specification. Two basic options are left; either further 
forays into the market can take place, or the potential worker becomes 
discouraged and ceases to search. Usually only the want element of a 
specification can be modified because needs tend to be rigid. Success or 
failure in finding employment that complies with the initial specification 
determines whether preferences and effective supplies are identical. 
Similar situations arise on the demand side of the LM. An employer's 
needs stem from technical or production requirements, or they are dictated 
by the nature of capital equi pment. Wants are again rel ated to tastes, in 
this case, for a particular type of worker; although such tastes are 
usually economically rational, they might be prejudiced. Thus, the want 
influences of supplies and demands can lead to segregation and segmentation 
of the labour force. 
Figure 15:1 illustrates a paradigm devised by the author 186 
incorporating the above-mentioned two-component concepts of labour supply 
(upper left) and labour demand (lower right) and their interactions in the 
market place (centre). The arrowed lines serve to exemplify a typical 
decision process undergone by one potential employee and one potential 
employer. The bar charts of work groups (centre left) and vacant jobs 
(centre right) summarize the aggregate of all such decision processes. The 
central bar chart indicates the net supplies and demands which are the 
excesses or shortages that remain after satisfied employees and employers 
have left the external market; such outcomes being depicted as pools of 
potential workers or vacant jobs above or below the equil ibrium 1 ine EE 
respectively. 
It can be seen that there are seven conflict areas, three on each side 
of the LM and one centrally at the interaction of supply and demand in the 
market place. On the supply side, conflict area one arises internally for 
the individual and is concerned with incompatible needs and wants. In a 
typical example, shown by the arrowed lines, economic pressures create a 
need for a young mother to undertake paid market work and she wishes to 
attend the factory for the companionship that it provides, although she is 
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concerned about her chi 1 dren'swe ]fare. However, her deci si on is strongly 
influenced by social and psychic pressures to remain at home with her young 
family. The initial specification is therefore shown to be for a 
homeworking job because it optimizes her achievable needs and wants. 
Conflict area 2 arises upon entering the LM arena where her initial 
intentions are frustrated by insufficient homeworker demand. Conflict area 
3 is a repeat internal conflict regarding the choice of a compromise 
solution. For instance, should she re-enter the market arena in a 
different form, say as a part-timer; and if so, what strategy should she 
adopt to care for her children? Some individuals will successfully make 
suitable compromise arrangements, but others will not; the latter will 
have to decide whether to remain hopefully in the homeworker pool, or to 
move to a different occupation, industry, or sector of the economy, or to 
withdraw from LM participation altogether. 
There are three comparable confl i ct areas on the demand side of the 
market. Conflict area 4 arises internally for the employer between the 
need and want elements of the initial recruitment 'job' and 'man' specif-
ications. A typical example of this internal conflict would be where the 
needs of technology and of equipment conflict with LM goals and the requ-
irements of legislation. For example, shift operations might be necessary 
to make the use of high-cost equipment viable and the employer is tempted 
to employ a woman or a member 
the acceptance of lower pay; 
of a minority group because he anticipates 
however, equal . pay legislation 
forbids lower pay for 'work of equal value', and furthermore he considers 
the legal formality of obtaining an exemption certificate to employ a woman 
at night as tiresome. Conflict area 5 arises from frustrated intentions 
when initial specification cannot be met by the available supply so that a 
compromise strategy becomes necessary; e.g. this illustration depicts a 
shortage of full-time females. Conflict area 6 is again a repeat internal 
conflict which stems from the choice of a suitable compromise strategy. A 
variety of tactics might be possible: for example, the substitute recruit-
ment for full-t i me of part-ti me, twi 1 i ght or homework 1 abour; the sub-
contracting of work to other firms; relocating existing personnel; the 
introduction of overtime working; or combinations of such alternatives. 
The position of each bar in the central chart shows the LM conditions 
facing all employers and each group of potential workers, and gives an 
indication of prospects of their having intentions satisfied. Equilibrium 
line EE denotes the complete clearing of the LM by suitable workers exactly 
matchi ng j ob vacancies. Bars above 1 i ne EE depi ct potent i al worker over-
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supplies, whereas bars below indicate excess demand for workgroup members. 
The height of each bar illustrates that group's market strength relative to 
the employer and every other work group from the vi ewpoi nt of job-
competition, the groups in greatest excess being regarded as having 
comparatively little market strength. Thus, full-time females are depicted 
in strong positions vis-a-vis the employer and all' other male and female 
workgroups. However, in LLMs segregated by gender, females are not in job-
competition with males and so the male and female segments can be 
considered as two distinct LMs. Part-timers although slightly stronger 
than the twilight workers and homeworkers are shown as weak vis-a-vis the 
employer since there is a surplus supply of potential part-timers. 
The final conflict area 7 arises from the meeting of effective 
supplies and demands and is concerned with the impacts of employment law 
and the negotiation of terms and conditions for the contract of employmen~ 
In institutionally organized LLMs, the line EE itself represents the roles 
played by law, trade unions and employers' associations in 'coming between' 
employees and employers by setting the cl imate for collective bargaining 
and the clearing process. 
When product markets change and output levels need to be varied, the 
model shows that each employer could select from the varied pools of 
potential workers those who will provide appropriate amounts of labour 
input. For large increases in output he coul d seek to recruit shift or 
full-time employees, but only when slight increments are called for, part-
time, twilight or homeworkers might be more appropriately selected. 
Suggestions of second and third-best choices indicate that a dynamic 
environment will favour employees and employers alternately. As shortages 
and excesses of potenti al workers accumul ate, rel ative bargai ni ng 
strengths will vary and existing workforces will be in a state of flux as 
one side of the market, and then the other, compromises in the processes of 
repl acement and new recruitment. In worker over-supply situations employers 
will not need to make compromises because intended demands will be 
achievable; relative proportions of the workgroups in each employer's 
labour force will thus change to more closely resemble preferences, and 
this will be observable over time as modifications to worker stocks. 
This model thus provides a framework that draws together and shows the 
relationships of many aspects of lM behaviour that have occupied the 
thinking of economists, sociologists, psychologists, organisational 
theorists and lawyers. Not only does the model incorporate notions of the 
internal psychic and external soci al pressures impelling employees and 
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employers as they approach the market, it al so all ows for the impact of 
technology and methods of organization on the choice of workgroup. It 
incorporates unemployment, discouraged workers, allows for discrimination, 
job-segregation, segmentation and provides an arena for the collective 
bargaining process. It thus offers an overview of how the many theories 
developed in the different branches of social science can hang together and 
complement rather than conflict with each other so as to form a 
comprehensive, although complex, picture of labour market operation. 
Indeed, this multi-disciplinary research has demonstrated that without the 
expansion offered by sociological insights into the impact of marriage and 
family and the social relations of the worklace, economic concepts are 
severely limited in their ability to accurately describe labour market 
relations. It is contended that should any researcher attempt to construct 
a testable econometric model of LM operation it would need to include all 
the constituent social and psychological dimensions implied by this 
paradigm in order to approximate to reality and be of any value. 
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16.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Reference has al ready been made to some of the theories outl ined in 
section. 2.1, but this section examines many of them in detail for their 
relevance to the LLM studied, and links them together where possible. 
Studiesl96.197 have found that the wage mechanism, as predicted by the 
neo-classical price/auction model of adjustment to equilibrium, plays an 
insignificant role in the functioning of the LM. Evidence from this socio-
economic study also suggests that overt earnings manipulations form only a 
minute part of a much more complex and varied adjustment process, but that 
is not to say that the price mechanism is unimportant. Indeed, Thomas & 
Deaton196 contend that, with flesh added to the skeletal framework: 
"the cost minimisation model is one of the fundamental building 
blocks of adjustment theory". 
It is concluded that H&K employers are cost-minimisers, and the findings 
further suggest that the price mechanism influences LM functioning less 
directly, but more sensitively, than is possible by the wage mechanism. 
Moreover, it is -contended that wage adjustment is a high cost instrument, 
especially for labour intensive operations. uncertain product-markets, and 
when collective action precludes the downward revision of rates. 
Nevertheless. inter-firm wage differentials exist alongside percep-
tions of high and low paying companies and inter-firm mobility; indeed a 
few companies prided themselves on being high payers and intended to remain 
so. These inter-firm differentials are the residual effects of previous 
wage policies which. given imperfect knowledge of product and LMs. might 
have resulted from errors of judgement. Alternatively. they could have 
arisen from different positive approaches to LM adjustment, or as this 
author would argue. have been deliberate attempts to overcome qualitative 
disadvantages (e.g. poor location. old premises, poor catchment area, or 
bad reputation)~ Whilst the persistence of such differentials might be 
interpreted from a neo-classical viewpoint as a sign of inefficiency. it is 
contended that they are consistent with long-term efficiency, for what 
logic is there in an employer imitating his competitor's wage increases if 
he finds it unnecessary? It is not surprising that such deliberate inter-
firm differentials are not competed away, given the extremely wide range of 
instruments available for adjustment, long-term employment relations, 
downward wage stickiness. and competitor caution about permanent costly 
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responses. In such conditions, inter-firm differentials could be expected. 
Neo-cl ass i cal economi sts concede that wage different i al scan persi st 
due to skill differences because training for general transferable skills 
will be funded by the employee via the acceptance of lower earnings, while 
specific skill will be paid for by the employer when higher earnings will 
result. Oi 185 first realized that labour was hoarded by employers, esp-
I ecially the specifically skilled, because of the 'fixed costs' of training 
investment in the person. That skills are 'general' in character in the H&K 
and Footwear industries is indisputable, and they are widely perceived as 
low wage industries which is consistent with this neo-classical view of 
training. Notwithstanding this, considerable elements of speclficity are 
attached to most jobs since each company has its individual methods of 
manufacture and its products are unique. It is essential to recognize that 
skill is a multi-faceted quality with specificness being generated by 
different elements in the work situation (e.g. by the work performed and by 
company ethos). In the H&K industry, work specificity changes with each new 
style; as designs are superseded those elements of specificity become 
obsolete. Thus, the relative importance of the different elements of skill 
specificity can change over time; it will be crucially necessary to hoard 
individuals with work-specific skills during production bottlenecks, but 
less important to hoard all of them after that design has been terminated. 
Some voluntary turnover when peak production has passed is therefore a 
useful downward adjustment, while the loss of some investment in work 
specific skills can be seen as unimportant because even well established 
workers need new work-speci fi c ski 11 s for the next season's styl es. 
Notwithstanding this loss for adjustment purposes, employers still find it 
advisable to hoard 'good' operatives in periods of low activity who will 
quickly learn specific 'new style' skills because they are well versed in 
the specificity accruing from knowledge of the company and its practices, 
i.e. they are Blackburn & Mann's9 habituated workers. Little wonder there-
fore that attempts to explain wage differences by a simple perception of 
specific skill have proved unsuccessful, because a judiciqus blend ~f 
hoarding, turnover and lay-off are often the preferred mechanisms of adjus-
tment, the hoarding element of this sequence creating the long-term employ-
ment relations highlighted in ILK and le theories. An understanding of this 
sequence links together several LM theories from different schools of 
thought and demonstrates the benefits obtainable from socio-economic 
research combining quantitative and qualitative data. 
An important theme of labour process debate also relates to skill, it 
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being argued that a protracted de-skilling process occurs. Certainly, H&K 
employers have desires for de-skilling particularly on labour intensive 
operations (8.2.2a(i)), although it has been limited by insufficient prog-
ress towards automatic control in finishing machinery design. Such new 
machi nes as have been i nt roduced are costly, thereby offeri ng the operati ve 
more power via the threat of stoppage. This confirms the claim that 
labour cannot be entirely dominated by capital, see 2.1. Neither has the 
total degradation of labour taken place, since personal acquaintances of 
the author clearly enjoyed their work. However, twil ight workers and 
homeworkers approximated more closely than other workgroups to a degraded 
work force by being used as a 'reserve army' often on low-skill operations. 
Will iamson's31 and Ouchl's32 suggestions that employers resort to 
market mechanfsms of control when performance is unambiguous and easily 
supervised, and Bresnen's30, that market and bureaucratic control forms 
overlap in conditions of uncertainty30, have gained support in that 
incentive payment methods (seen as market-type control devices 30) were used 
only for easily monitored, repetitive operations whereas highly skilled, 
easily spoiled work was paid by time rates and closely supervised. 
Critical stages in life-cycles are shown to have important influences 
on aspirations from which spring motivations, instrumental orientations to 
employment, and ultimately, varying levels of productivity. These insights 
underl ine the importance of qual itative data and wider non-work issues, 
particularly the inter-dependence of family members, for obtaining clear 
understandings of the structure and functioning of LMs. 
The ILMs of the H&K industry had ports of entry at each job and so 
were completely open. Thus, functioning markets did not exist, and there 
were generally no job clusters, recruitment often being via the strongly 
developed 1 inks of the . extended internal market. ILM theorists contend 
that institutional rules govern conditions of service and the allocation of 
rewards, while job allocation is seen as being less-competitive than as 
postulated by neo-classical theorists. Certainly, this appeared to be 
true of the H&K industry, ·but as Part B shows, many of these rules had 
cost-mi ni mi si ng overtones, e.g. redundancies based on age and "1 ast in, 
first out" practices; recruitment via the far less-costly and apparently 
more effective informal channel; and workforce segregation by gender into 
capital and labour intensive production elements which permitted different 
skill and wage setting standards and took advantage of women's desires, 
given poor childcare facilities, for a wide range of employment patterns. 
Furthermore, with respect to lay-offs, employers often adopted a dual 
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sequence of strategies: (i) employees were temporarily placed on short-
time working when they received state-subsidized guaranteed payments; and 
(i i) if demand did not recover they were then made redundant and received 
dole payments, although some were later re-recruited. In both instances 
the state picked up the earnings bill and thereby subsidised the employer's 
hoarding strategies. The former (i) was the more popular adjustment, and 
it can be seen as a long-run cost-minimising strategy in that it hoarded 
specifically skilled labour at the State's expense. Employers acted in 
economically rational ways in the~e respects and custom appeared to 
strongly rei nforce such strategi es. Invi s i bl e handshake 222 theori es al so 
place cost-minimising interpretations on empirical observations of ILMs 
previously· seen' as non-economic in origin, i.e. seniority rules and lay-off 
procedures imposed by employers and trade uni ons. 
Beardsworth's20D conceptualization of workers as established, unestab-
lished, less-established and dis-established is an advance on the use of 
terms such as primary, secondary, marginal, casual, fringe or peripheral 
si nee hi s terms incorporate noti ons of change. Establ i shed, unestabl i shed, 
less-established and dis-established workers can be seen to result from the 
operation of 'hybrid' ICs (see below) as employers use twilight, homework 
and subcontract workers (generally the unestabl i shed) and the most recent 
recruits, senior citizens and low-hour part-timers (the less-established) 
as instruments to facilitate the hoarding of long-serving core workers (the 
established) during the adjustment process. Nevertheless Beardsworth's 
terms are still somewhat imprecise since varying degrees of establishment 
and unestablishment exist as is evidenced by the different types of labour; 
present terminology is insufficiently sensitive to permit accurate, 
succinct discussion. Consequently, although difficult, a vocabulary must 
be developed to distinguish between both individual workers and different 
workgroups having varying levels of employment security, thereby permitting 
si multaneous, preci se di scussi on in changi ng circumstances. 
This thesis has carefully documented degrees of segmentation and 
mobility between workgroups; its findings indicate that segmentation 
exists at various levels. The author concludes that cost-minimisation is a 
st ronger moti vati ng force behi nd the creati on of the segmented st ructure 
than is a desire for worker control, although employers will take advantage 
of the enhanced control it offers. Homeworkers in general, and non-
exclusive homeworkers used solely for flexibility in particular, are shown 
to rest at the bottom of the segmented structure. 
Although domestic production is often associated with informal 
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economic sectors, this research has shown homeworking to be a major and 
wide-spread strategy for providing flexibility in the formal manufacturing 
sector of the British economy (see a1s0229 ,245). This is also in line with 
Allen's29,69 observations. Indeed the use of twilight workers and 
homeworkers is judged to be a crucial linkage in the mechanism of 
adjustment in LLMs with high levels of female employment on labour 
intensive operations. It could not be established whether homeworking 
formed part of the irregular sector70 through tax aVOidance, but it is 
thought unlikely since the low average earnings reported revealed that 
wages wou1 d rarely reach tax thresho1 ds. 
H&K employers clearly enter implicit contracts with their workers, and 
of the two basic models, the cost-minimizing model (i.e.Okun's222 invisible 
handshake) is judged to be the most appropriate since employers were cost-
minimizers in many of their actions and demonstrated other features of the 
model. Notions of fairness associated with fixity of wages are an important 
element in such ICs. That H&K employers recognize the importance of fair 
dealings is demonstrated by fixed piecerates, long-term stability in skill 
differentials and by rate reductions to restore skill differentials 
following wage-drift, see 8.3.4a. Whilst the latter can be seen as an 
impingement of market forces, it is nevertheless consistent with 'fai rness' 
as embodied in the cost-minimising IC model. 
Debates cont i nue regardi ng the types of contracts entered, i.e. 
whether they are of the fixed wage or fixed employment type. The long-run 
cost-minimising motive for holding together a core of experienced workers 
suggests that H&K employers mi ght wi sh to enter imp1 i cit employment-type 
contracts to encourage long-term relations rather than fixed wage-type 
contracts. As Thurow198 recogni zed, vari abi 1 ity of the wag~ bi 11 can permit 
a degree of employment fixity since hoarding of specifically trained, 
highly skilled core workers can proceed at little cost. 
In practice, contracts entered vari ed by workgroup, and those for 
core workers were peculiarly different from the rcs of theoretical debate 
which centre around wage fixity, the theory having been specifically 
developed to exp1 ai n downward wage ri gi dity and i nvo 1 untary unemployment. 
Indeed, the characteri st ics of the ICs of the H&K industry can be 
understood within the context of experienced oscillations between labour 
hoarding, turnover and lay-offs (see above). Re-recruitment was necessary 
and was facilitated by a good reputation while labour hoarding within 
limits was desirable to reduce long term fixed costs. By adopting the 
piecerate method of payment H&K employers could offer wage rate fixity in 
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all phases of the cycle to all workgroups to create an aura of fai rness, 
but this nevertheless allowed wage expenditure to vary without breaking the 
contract. The use of numerous adjustment instruments, i ncl udi ng 
unestablished worker shedding, could permit core labour to be hoarded to 
achieve a degree of employment fixity for those workers the employer wished 
to hoard. Strategies that use different sections of the work force to 
bear varyi ng degrees of ri sk are thus adopted because an important 
function of H&K labour is to absorb instability both for employer and core 
employees. Consequently, the, concept of 1 abour as a ri sk-
bearing factor of production is highly pertinent to the findings of this 
research, not only from Jonsson's243 viewpoint of co-determination but also 
with respect to fl exi bil ity. Two separate buffer techni ques can be 
identified: firstly, all employees are used to cushion the employer's 
total wage bill by absorbing many of the costs of falling output. In this 
respect, fixed employment/variable wage ICs are appropriate since weekly 
earnings need to vary. Secondly, unestablished and less-established 
workers are used to cushion the employment of the more established and this 
suggests that for the former categories fixed wage/variable employment ICs 
will be most appropriate. Hence, a combination of the features of the 
two types of contract is the most pragmatic solution and thereby the ICs of 
the H&K industry develop a hybri d cha racter. 
Although it is understood that even the most established worker risks 
redundancy when product market conditions are sufficiently unfavourable, it 
is clearly evident that twilight workers and homeworkers are subjected to 
much more variability than daytime females. This results from the 
structuring of hybrid contracts such that the amplitude of both wage and 
employment fl uctuati ons a re 1 i mited for estab 1 i shed core workers, whereas 
these are exaggerated for un- and less-establ ished workers. Since many 
mature women in the H&K industry show themsel ves to be wi 11 i ng, even to 
prefer, working fewer than full-time hours, employers find they can operate 
within and make the most of existing environments by taking advantage of 
women's domestic role constraints to sustain the ICs of established core 
employees at low cost. Thus twilight workers and homeworkers, who are 
used to absorb instability, are a cost-minimising means of honouring the 
elements of wage and employment fixity embodied in the hybrid ICs of the 
hoarded core employees. Moreover, payment method mobility (8.2.2a (iii)) 
is another specifi c st rategy for stabil i zi ng the wages and employment of 
established core workers. 
The extent of fixity of employment is however, conditioned by product 
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demand variations, for hoarding will occur only to the extent considered 
'safe' from a financial viewpoint. Beyond that limit (which varies 
according to the risk-averseness of the employer) core workers are shed. 
Nevertheless, the shedding process is itself a two-stage temporary/ 
permanent, cost-minimising procedure designed to throw much of the cost 
onto the state. Firstly, short-time working is introduced as a means of 
temporary shedding; although employers actually pay guaranteed rates, some 
of the hoarding expenditure can be recouped from the state via the Short-
time Compensation Scheme. When confidence in product demand recovery is 
lost, redundancy occurs and this reduces the amp1 itude of variations in 
both wages and employment for retained piecerate individual s. Invo1 untary 
unemployment, dol e payments and subsequent re-recruitment of redundant 
employees are overt indications of state-subsidized transacting on the 
basis of identity designed to create long term employment relations. 
Hence it is concluded that H&K employers structure the various implicit 
contracts they offer to thei r estab1 ished, 1ess-estab1 ished and unestab-
1 i shed workers such that they get the 'best of all wor1 ds'. 
The various contracts encountered in the H&K industry can be charact-
erized in a simplified way, similar to Beardsworth's200 characterization of 
estab1ished/unestab1ished workers, by two intersecting continua, see Figure 
16:1. Contracts adopted for core female workers would be situated in quad-
rant A where both employment and wages are stable relative to those of most 
other workgroups. Full-time men would be in quadrant B where wages are 
largely fixed but employment is variable. Shift workers, and the core 
element of the exclusive homeworker group, would be in quadrant C with 
unstable earnings but fairly fixed employment. Non-exclusive twilight and 
homeworkers who are deliberately used as short-term adjustments would be in 
quadrant D which represents variabil ity in both employment and wages and 
highlights the extreme secondariness of these jobs. 
'Equity and fairness' are also seen as important for promoting 
motivation and co-operation, especially where teamwork is required. 
Certainly, teamwork is an essential feature of H&K production due to 
sequencing of operations while skill transference is by on-the-job 
training. Skill transfer is seen as unlikely unless employees feel secure 
in their own employment and hence this strengthens the incentive to offer 
greater employment and wage stabil ity to workers it is hoped to hoa rd. 
Teamwork tends to be an under-researched area of LM behavi our, but these 
findings indicate that reliability and an ability to fit into the team are 
important selection criteria (9.3.1). 
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IC writers suggest that imperfect information coupled with workers' 
ability to vary performance (moral hazard) is a grave risk especially on 
the 'spot' market and that consequently, employers are prompted to transact 
on the basis of identity to secure more predictable performances. While 
this is undoubtedly true, it is nevertheless contended that pace variation 
is a valuable adjustment instrument. Thus, piecerates are the vehicle for 
transferri ng adjustment costs to employees who thereby become vari ab 1 e 
factors of production and risk bearers in the process, see Jonsson 234• 
Moreover, Health and Safety Act protecti on, denied to most homeworkers, 
causes thi s group to become extreme examples of risk-taking factors of 
production, as also perceived by Jonsson. In short, H&K labour is 
manipulated as a risk-bearing, risk-taking, variable factor of production. 
Another important assumpti on of IC theory re1 ates to the va1 ue of 
unemployment as it derives from the utility obtained from leisure. Fi rms 
can offer more attractive contracts to retained workers if they select for 
lay-off those workers with high leisure utility. This issue again 
highlights economic rationality; by segregating women into the 1abour-
intensive operations employers throw the major part of labour reduction 
onto women who, by their dual roles in the home and LM, have higher degrees 
of 'leisure' utility (or rather, utility for non-market-work time) than men 
with generally fewer time commitments in the home. There is a mistaken 
implicit assumption in IC theories that the risk of lay-off is spread 
evenly across all workers, but it is common to have '1 ast in, fi rst out' 
company ILM rules and for workers with more specific skills to be retained 
as suggested by Oi 185• Grossman's214 finding that unreliable workers have 
longer spells of unemployment has been given further support by unreliable 
fu11- and part-timers recognizing the risk of lay-off and varying their 
absenteeism and unpunctua1ity negatively with economic activity. 
Sloan and Wooden 199 indicate that IC models do not exp1 iCit1y 
incorporate aggregate demand and other economic indicators, nor do they 
exp1 ai n why underemployed and unemployed persons are not hi red by other 
firms. In the latter context, it should be noted that although long-term 
employment relations are the norm, there is considerable inter-firm 
mobility in the H&K industry. However, mobility tends to occur during 
seasonal peaks when it is easiest because many firms are experiencing 
labour shortages and it is less common during seasonal troughs when 
transfer is most difficult. Seasonability in demand is thus the most 
likely reason for lack of labour poaching during temporary lay-off. The 
overlooking of aggregate demand is an important flaw, particularly since 
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work-sharing can be predicted as a likely outcome, but Beardsworth's200 
model of work force mix variation is a conceptualization that, whilst being 
consistent with IC theory, remedies this omission. 
The need for flexibility and the adoption of temporary solutions has 
been recognised (see 2.1) but it is not surprising that empl,oyers have a 
propensity for temporary adjustments and react on a day-to-day basis 
rather than adopting long-term manpower planning given a paucity of 
reliable information. In conditions of uncertainty, instrument 
reversibility is an essential feature of sensible adjustment, while long-
term strategic planning is generally inappropriate unless a strong 
indication of future movement is evident. Only in very low economic states 
with demand rising strongly will employers adopt such strategies. As 
Thomas & Deaton 196 point out, reversibility of adjustment is especially 
useful because the efficiency of instruments can change over time and thus 
an adopted strategy might prove more effective than anticipated and create 
the opposite type of disequil ibrium (e.g. a shortage when responding to 
surplus). Hence short-term temporary and reversible responses are 
economically rational long-term strategies, whereas permanent adjustments 
such as the highering of wages (with downward stickiness) or additional 
recruitment (with low or no voluntary turnover) can be very costly. 
Temporary adjustments have important impl ications for theoretical 
debate and for policy prescriptions, see 16.2. As Loveridge & Mok 242 
point out, the implication of neo-classical theory is that a general expa-
nsion of demand will cause employers in the primary sector who have exhaus-
ted their supplies of primary workers to add additional labour by reducing 
hiring standards so as to recruit from previously rejected workers. Sub-
sequently, they wi 11 introduce trai ni ng and upgradi ng schemes to improve 
quality. Inevitably, the secondary sector is the source of this addit-
ional labour, but they argue, when employers prefer temporary solutions, 
this prediction is unfounded because secondary workers will not be 
permanently absorbed into the primary sector. Rather, the increased over-
time payments given to existing workers to keep the marginal costs of 
production down will improve primary workers' earnings relative to those of 
the casualized workers. This research has shown employers use a judicious 
blend of out-sourcing, overtime, subcontract, temporary or casualized 
workers and that the outcome is a widening of differentials between, say, 
shift workers and full-time women who have permanent relations, and non-
exclusive secondary workers who have merely obtained casual employment. 
Consequently, a national expansion of aggregate demand designed to absorb 
16 - 9 
CHAPTER 16 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, POLICY AND RESEARCH 
secondary workers into the primary sector is likely to be counter-
productive in the presence of temporary responses. Thomas & Deaton 
argue that the more precise the coverage of an instrument the less costly 
it will be. Seen from this perspective differentiation of workers into many 
job classifications lowers the marginal costs of piecerate increases and 
this can facilitate piecerate adjustments. Job differentiation is 
therefore another cost minimising strategy. Although Thomas & Deaton's 
model illustrates an adjustment sequence incorporating both permanent and 
temporary instruments, it presents a view of manning equilibrium 
interspersed by periods of disequilibrium. It is contended that this is 
unrealistic with respect to the H&K industry for it is rare for equilibrium 
ever to be achieved because of the constantly changing characters of both 
product and labour markets and the time lags between instrument 
introduction and effectiveness. Indeed as a result of uncertainty about 
product market movements and the efficiency of temporary adjustments 
already in use it is probable that desired labour stocks cannot be 
determined. Thus the author's Figure 14.2 illustrates a totally fluid 
situation in which equilibrium is never reached even though employers are 
continually adopting both reactive and active positive actions. As 
discussed in 14.4, although the worked example offers an insight into the 
complexities of adjustment, the schedules depicted in Figures 14.1 and 14.2 
are indeed over-simplifications. 
By considering the use of twilight workers and homeworkers as a means 
of obtaining flexibility the author has replicated employers' perceptions 
of them as adjustment instruments. In this context, Beardsworth's200 
perception of stocks of established and unestablished workers being varied 
with economic states has much to commend it, but as with Thomas & Deaton's 
model, this is too simplistic in that it presents only a partial view of 
the much more complex and varied sequences used by employers. 
Thus, the simple short-term price/auction model of wage increases/ 
decreases and hire and fire must be rejected for the H&K industry, and 
possibly for other industries also. Nevertheless, the price mechanism 
exerts a powerful influence and it can be concluded that rather than wage 
changes acting directly, openly and in the short-term, the price mechanism 
operates on the adjustment process over the long-term in a hidden and 
indirect way. Male/female segregation and segmentation, further segmenta-
tion among female workgroups, and a propensity to use non-wage instruments 
can all be seen in terms of a complex and varied mechani srn of adjustment 
that is economically viable over the long-term. Long-standing differen-
16 - 10 
CHAPTER 16 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, POLICY AND RESEARCH 
tia1s between workgroups replace 'spot' wage adjustment, while non-wage 
adjustments (i.e. overtime, short-time, voluntary and involuntary turnover, 
hiring and firing of secondary workgroups) are used to avoid both the costs 
and risks of giving primary market status to additional workers. If this 
wide-ranging long-term perspective of the price/auction model is adopted it 
is consi stent with many LM theories, e.g. those for SLM and adjustment. 
Thus the research has demonstrated that labour is heterogeneous and 
that traditional neo-c1assica1 economics has severe limitation in dealing 
with this, particularly the dynamics of LM adjustment. In particular it has 
shown that both twi 1 i ght workers and homeworkers can be a central and 
crucial feature in LM dynamics and Part C has highlighted the manner and 
mechanisms by which twilight workers and homeworkers are used to create the 
flexibility that other writers have ascribed to them. What has also been 
illustrated is an extremely complex picture. Economists and sociologists 
have long examined and theorized about various aspects of this confusing 
jumble, but now is perhaps the time to begin fitting together the various 
pieces of the jigsaw of LM operation. Thi s section has been the author's 
attempt to do just that, but as Sloan and Wooden 199 recognize, by its very 
nature the labour market "is more difficult to analyse than other markets 
because both jobs and workers can be differentiated along a number of 
dimensions': Consequently, it not surprising that socio-economists have 
been un~b1e to develop "a completely robust and comprehensive analytical 
framework for explaining all aspects of labour market behaviour and indeed 
such attempts may be too ambitious" 199, 
16.2 POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS 
5 ._-~-----. . . ... 
, The thesfs has emphasised the ways in which firms organise production i 
I , • . 
'and has provided an account of the ways in which employers respond to 
I 
• constraints at a particular time in a particular labour market. It 
. should not be read as implying approval for particular practices. In fact 
there is currently a series of debates in train about the wider context of: 
the social relationships of employment. In particular there are debates 
about policies which might protect· workers in such markets, with most of 
the discussion being about the protection of homeworkers. The thesis has 
: emphasised the processes of production but it is relevant to the full 
I 
'understanding of such processes to be aware of the framework of social and, 
I contractual relationships within which any production takes place. 
The demand side of the market has been the primary focus of this 
, 
thesis and it has_~een clearly shown that the use. of secondary workers, ! 
16 - 11 
Q 
CHAPTER 16 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY. POLICY AND RESEARCH 
Iilfongside-othe-':'-adjustment -instruments-. -are valuable' to" employers in 
Id' t . i 
, a JUS ment sequences. Supply-onented advocates would argue that. since I 
flexibil ity is so valuable to employers. adjustment costs ought to be borne! 
, by employers rather than by the weakest members of, the work force. Demand- I 
! oriented advocates would argue that any attempts to improve conditions for I 
: secondary workers are likely to influence employers' perceptions of the I 
i advantages of employing them. Thus. supply-oriented pol icies aimed at! 
I c~anging bar~aini~g strengths can be strongly linked to demand side issues';, 
,Slnce they ml ght 1 nfl uence 1 abour demands. i , I 
: However. sub-section 12.7.4 argues that the aquisition of employee: 
:status would not result in the phasing out of homework employment and ,I 
I ~herefore many of the publ ished pol icy suggesti ons that are 1 inked to the I 
,Improvement of status need not be seen as removing labour flexibil ity. ./ 
Many issues emerge from the homeworker protecti on debat'e. e.g. dfff-i 
',i_~~l ~i es in defi ni ng them c a~_,~mp'l~lees. Ewi ng244 consi de,rs the suggestf on 
of a statutory decl arati on about the status of home~orkers i ;-~n excefle;;r-
one. even though there is a difficulty in excluding the genuinely self-
employe? such as those who desi gn and market thei r own produce. but thi s 
should not be an insurmountable problem. As employees. homeworkers would 
then be liable for. and be able to benefit from. class 1 social security 
contributions. However. it might be possible for them to be treated as 
employees for the limited purpose of employment protection and the common 
law remedies arising from it. as was suggested by the Departmental Comm-
ittee on the Position of Outworkers in Relation to Unemployment Insurance. 
1923244• Many problems for determi ni ng employment status are caused by 
homeworkers' flexible and irregular work patterns over which they generally 
have 1 ittle control; they usually have to take the amounts and types of 
work available. Irregularity of employment presents further difficulties 
in proving continuity of employment for most of the provision of the EPCA. 
and there is little point in being employees if they cannot prove they have 
continuity of employment. A contract 'could therefore be inferred if they 
have worked for 16 hours or more in the majority of weeks in whi ch they 
have worked. and penalties for not complying ,could be greatly increased. 
In line with many other researchers and interested organisations therefore. 
the author/~gge-stsl that new legislation in the form of a Homeworkers' 
Protection Act could be specifically designed to cover the traditional 
homeworking situation !without impeding employer flexibility. I Such legis-
lation could be drafted to prevent work irregularity. imposed against 
their wishes. from disqualifying homeworkers from receipt of benefits. 
16 - 12 
CHAPTER 16 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, POLICY AND RESEARCH 
The outcome of such protection might slightly lower total homework 
employment since there are many adjustment instruments to be used as 
alternatives, but it is 1 ikely to be the worst forms of such employment 
that would be removed, and the author cannot recommend that these be 
retai ned. However, because homeworkers provide essential flexibility it 
is predicted that most homeworking jobs would be unaffected. 
_" With respect to homeworker wages. and in view of the 1985 announcement lot the i ntendedwa~es_Council sab~ition, a_p~ssibi lity~xis_~~:~_=~t~~j 
that offered "by the 1981 Select Committee. A Homeworkers' Council could 
now be specially created to set and effectively monitor fair wages in every 
industry for traditional homeworkers. It could also ensure that working 
conditions conform to existing health and safety regulations for employees. 
I This could indeed be a large task-and for this reason it might be 
l_impEact~cab~~f~r ~\'I_il ig~!-",~rke-,,~to_ bea~o_cove_red by_ such a b()d~ 
However, lessons need to be learned from past experience, for it is 
important that the system of regulation should succeed. To proceed 
alongside such a Council there could be widely available publicity so that 
homeworkers themselves are not ignorant of their rights. An efficient 
pol icing system ~ay be needed and to this end a properly maintained 
._ ___ _ ___ - __ '-0 __ - _ , _____ y _____ .___ __ _ __ __~ ___ ., ______ _ 
regi ster with very hi gh penalti es for non-compl i ance mi ght be requi red asa-: 
further safeguard. 
In this respect, original suppliers of work could be required to 
register all homeworkers, whatever thei r, length of service so as to prevent 
circumvention by constantly changing personnel, although clearly an 
adequate number, of inspectors would be required to investigate cases. 
Access to the register's basic information could be unrestricted. Trade 
unions and pressure groups could make further efforts to persuade more 
Local Council s to employ Homeworki ng Offi cers to monitor Equal Pay and 
Hea lth and Safety regul ati ons. 
It would be preferable for the market pOSition of secondary workgroups 
to be improved by collective bargaining, but isolation, dispersion, 
changing personnel and part-time employment militate against incorporation 
regardless of trade union diligence. Thus, statutory regulation appears 
to be thel-mostieffective solution. Raising the level of low wages is an 
important element in removingll~nyJ compulsion to participate iri homework. 
To achieve this, the establishment of a national minimum wage for all 
workers could be of assistance, but given the present government's apparent 
intention to lower the general level of wages this seems extremely 
l-;';-l'ik~l~~-'-'ThUS, reformers repeat persistent demands from the-~1~89-0~-t~h;t-j 
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homeworker earni ngs should be improved, and this could be achieved by a 
minimum wage only for homeworkers. Whil e these suggesti ons may seem 
extremely unrealistic in the present political climate, it should be 
remembered that governments do not remain for ever and that a change of 
economic and political emphasis could place the protection of some of the 
weakest members of society high on the agenda of social reforms. 
It was concl uded on page 12-18 that the worst depri vati ons of {he 
homeworking arrangement are to be found where supplying companies hire 
homeworker agents or middlemen to administer collections and deliyeries and 
set conditions of service and remuneration. Such supplying companies 
c.ould be held legallyresponsible for the remuneration and employment 
conditions of the homeworkers undertaking work originally supplied by them, 
but penalties (which' -~ight-b;--;;--high as several thousands of pounds p~rl 
-
homeworker) for poor standards could be borne by both supplying company 
and agent, thereby imposing a requirement on the supplying company to use 
only reputable agents, and monitor their actions. 
As discussed in 16.1, monetary and fiscal policies aimed at eroding 
primary and secondary employment differentials by being designed to 
stimulate aggregate demand will be doomed to failure because employers' use 
temporary adjustment strategies. There is therefore little use in 
adopting such policies with these objectives; nevertheless, high levels of 
aggregated demand support more primary market jobs, per se, than do low 
1 eve 1 s. Thus, with the appropriate back-up facilities discussed below to 
place women on a more equal footing with men, and the legal modifications 
suggested above to eliminate discriminatory practices, substantial forward 
steps could be taken towards the removal of secondary market status from 
many women. Consequently, expansionary and reflationary measures are now 
urgently needed to stimulate the flagging British economy. 
Widespread availability of nursery schools could significantly improve 
the LM position of those women who prefer employment away from home by 
creating conditions conducive to full-time participation, although it is 
recogni sed that some homeworkers have such strong commitments to thei r 
families that they wish'to work at home. Greater access to nursery 
provision could enable women to compete on a more equal footing by 
rel ieving them of child-minding activities, but to be effective, it would 
need to be widely dispersed and either free or viably priced since both 
travelling time and costs can act as constraints on nursery use. An 
important consideration for effectiveness is the matching of work and 
nursery times; full-time factory working times rarely match nursery or 
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primary school opening times and where this cannot be achieved, an 
additional formal well-ordered child-minding facility [COUld be provided. I 
Another answer lies in employer-provided nurseries but current taxation 
pol i cy pl aces these under threat. A move to stop the Government taxi ng 
workers for their children's use of employer-provided nurseries was made by 
the Labour Party during the report stage of the 1985 Finance Bill, but 
should this legal change materialize, it would penalize mothers desiring 
employment and be a backward step with respect to equal opportunity since 
other perks, often enjoyed by men (i.e. car parks, canteens and social 
cl ubs)., are to remain untaxed278• 
However, such discussion of nursery education implies that the major 
responsibility for child care now falls, and should continue to fall upon 
women rather than men. This situation exists at present, but 
circumstances could change if more enlightened education created less sex-
typing. Although nursery facilities and the other policy prescriptions 
discussed above will immediately help to achieve equality of opportunity, 
it is contended that true equality will only result from an equal division 
of work and responsibility within the home, a condition that cannot be 
regulated or forced if individual liberties are to be honoured. To break 
down LM divisions it is clearly important to raise the esteem of household 
work so that the barrier that dissuades men from voluntarily participating 
in these activities can be penetrated. Women also need to have heightened 
interests in their own careers. Obviously, these aims will not be easily 
achieved, parti cul arly after maturity when attitudes and val ues are well-
established. Nevertheless, an initial step could be taken by more 
frequently teaching the sociology of work and family in schools in order to 
dissipate traditional gender roles. However, the process, discussed by 
Dex281 , of examining economic and sociological theories for sexism and then 
re-evaluating these theories needs to continue apace. Most importantly, 
women need to bring about the basis of their own equality by being more 
assertive in personal relationships with their partners, but even so, 
improved nursery facilities will be needed to allow both partners to have 
equal access to full-time employment. 
16.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has presented a comprehensive overview thereby creating 
much scope for further work by examining in greater depth specific aspects 
of the employment relations outlined. For instance, the use of twilight 
workers and homeworkers needs to be examined further to disentangle the 
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extent to which they are employed deliberately for flexibility, or as 
substi tutes for short-supply core workers. Di vers i ty of usage in other 
outwork industries needs to be examined in order to assess the overall 
economic significance of twilight and homework labour to the British 
economy. Theories of adjustment are still in their infancy such that 
the usage and prevalence of specific adjustment instruments are imperfectly 
understood. Therefor~, more work cou1 d usefully foll ow these 1 i nes of 
enquiry. Specially designed research is needed to test adjustment 
mechanisms such as that outlined in chapter 14, and to determine ya1ues for 
calculating the average degree of flexibility provided by each instrument. 
IC theori sts have poi nted to percepti ons of 'equity and fai rness' as bei ng 
important in promoting motivation and co-operation. These conceptua1-
izations provide a theoretical framework for the study of teamwork, work-
sharing and the transference of firm-specific skills. However, there is a 
widespread idea that women's work is unskilled, and thus the meaning of 
skill classifications needs to be questioned. Women's skills, both in 
the home and in their emp10yments, appear to go unrecognized and under-
valued, and thus the parameters of the social construction of skill 
divisions are only now being formu1ated281• The extent to which women's 
lower pay, and the present job-segregated nature of manual labour markets, 
influence female participation, absenteeism, turnover and other dimensions 
of performance needs further investigation, see page 12-2. Thus, further 
research is needed in all these areas and the findings will need to be 
integrated into labour market analyses. Consequently, there is still a 
long way to go in analysing the whole structure before a thorough dynamic 
understanding of labour markets is obtained. The author agrees with 
Dex's281 recent work which concludes that many more economic and 
sociological concepts will have to be re-evaluated in the light of women's 
participation. The importance of women's part-time work and part-time 
wage rates have received scant theoretical attention prior to this thesis 
even though the growth in women's part-time work has been the most dramatic 
employment change in the post war era. Furthermore, the issues of what 
roles women's participation is playing in industrial change, and in the 
structuring of the British national economy, is another area awaiting 
through analysis. 
Women are therefore at the centre of societa1 and conceptual changes 
as Dex's book illustrates, and the issues raised in this thesis are now at 
the forefront of current research and debates. 
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APPENDIX I 
RESEARCH INSTRU~lENT 
SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION OF THE COMPANY: 
Ql. Name of respondent: Position held: 
Length of time in this position: 
Q2. Name and address of establishment/company: 
Date commenced business: 
Q3. Type of company: Private/Public Ltd/Partnership 
Q4. Principal product: Subsidiary products: 
Q5. Number of other branches: 
Q6. Name of Group of which the company is a part: 
Q7. Membership of employers' association: 
Q8. Names of trade unions representing employees: 
Is it a 'closed shop'? Yes No DK 
SECTION B - IDENTIFICATION OF THE WORKFORCE GROUPS: 
Q9. 
Q10. 
Qll. 
* 
Completion of boxes as shown in Figure 4.3 regarding the number of 
workers in each workgroup. Identification of previous use of twi-
light and homeworkers and the duration of their usage during the 
previous 5 years. 
Question *Typical Answer Column 
Age distribution: No % 
Under 20 years 
Over 20 but under 30 years 
Over 30 but under 40 years 
Over 40 but under 50 years 
Over 50 but under 60 years 
Over 60 but under 70 years 
Over 70 years 
Family commitment: No % 
A; t,larried or. single without A. children 
B. Married, widowed etc. with B. dependent children 
C. Married, widowed, etc. with 
self-reliant, independent C. 
children 
Footnote: In order to save space, questions 10 et seq show only a 
typiaal answer column; in the actual schedule such columns were 
provided for eaah group. 
1-1 
Q12. Ethnic orlgln: 
A. British 
B. Other European 
C. Asian 
D. Other nationalities (specify) 
Q13. Multiple job holder: 
A. Workers with your job only 
B. Workers with a second job 
C. Workers where such details are 
unknown 
Q14. Travelling distance: 
Less than 1 mile 
Over 1 mile but less than 3 miles 
Over 3 miles but less than 5 miles 
Over 5 miles but less than 7 miles 
Over 7 miles but less than 10 miles 
Over 10 mil es 
Q15. Type and location of residence: 
A. Owner-occupier 
B. Rented accommodation 
C. Unknown 
Where were they located? 
SECTION C - CONDITIONS OF SERVICE: 
Recruitment 
Q16. How many workers were recruited by 
each of the following channels? 
A. D.E. Job Centre 
B. Private employment agency 
C. Private advertising agency 
D. Own newspaper advertisements 
E. Ex-employees 
F. Waiting list 
G. Other (specify) 
How was the waiting list compiled? 
Level of Supply 
Q17. What is the level of supply of 
potential workers? 
A. Excess B. Adequate C. Short 
Q18. a) What is the mean number of 
applicants for each vacancy 
advertised? 
b) Number of unsolicited appli-
cations? 
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Typical Answer Column 
No % 
A. 
B. 
No % 
A. 
B. 
C. 
No % 
No % 
A. 
~: 
No % 
A. 
B. 
l._. 
u. 
E. 
~ . 
G. 
No % 
A B C 
(circle as appropriate) 
Mean No._ per __ adverts. 
No._~per week 
Selection and Preference 
Q19. a) What characteristics do you seek 
when selecting workers? 
b) What is your workgroup preference? 
c) Does it vary with circumstances? 
If so, how? 
Q20. Have TUs been involved in the recruit-
ment or selection of workers? 
Please specify for 5 years 
Job Allocation 
Q2l. a) How many operations are performed 
exclusively by males and females? 
(specify) 
b) What are these operations? 
Q22. a) How many operations are performed 
exclusively by each group? (specify) 
b) What are these operations? 
Q23. Have TUs been involved in job alloca-
tion? Please specify for 5 years 
Training 
Q24. How many of your workers were trained 
by each of the following methods? 
A. No training, experienced 
B. Demonstration only 
C. On the job 
D. Factory school 
E. Other (specify) 
Supervision/Inspection 
Q25. How many workers does'l supervisor 
control? 
Q26. Who controls homeworkers? 
Q27. Is there a loss of control over horne-
worker production? If so, what is the 
maximum number you would employ? 
Q28. Do twilight supervisors work only on 
the twilight shift? 
Q29 Do twilight supervisors receive a shift 
premium? If so, how much? 
1-3 
Typical Answer Column 
Yes No OK 
(circle as appropriate) 
I~ales: No Females: No 
Number NoneD (tick) 
Yes No OK 
No % 
A. 
l,. 
u. 
E. 
No. of males" 
, No. offeinale"'"s---_, 
Yes No DK 
Maximum Number: 
---
Yes No DK 
Yes No OK 
Q30. Do you have an inspection of work 
procedure? Please describe it. 
Q31. Are workers.pai d for the work done 
on spoiled items? 
Q32. Have TUs been involved in supervision 
or inspection procedures? Please 
specify for 5 years. 
Promotion 
Q33. How would you describe the promotion 
opportuni ti es? 
A. Very good; B. Good; C. Slight; 
O. None 
Q34. Please describe the promotion and up-
gradi ng procedures~ . 
Q35. Have TUs been involved in the promotion 
or up-grading of your workers? 
P1 ease specify for 5 rears. 
Holiday Benefits 
Q36. How many days holiday per year do your 
workers receive? 
Q37. Do the workers receive holiday pay 
for all the days leave? 
Q38. What form do the holidays take? 
A. Factory c10sedown 
B. Standardised length taken at 
various times 
C. Additional days for long service 
O. Special 'school holiday scheme' 
for mothers (specify) 
E. Other (specify) 
Q39. How is the holiday pay calculated? 
Q40. Have TUs been involved with the 
holidays or holiday pay of your 
workers? Please specify for 5 years 
Sickness Benefit 
Q41. Do you operate a sick pay scheme? 
Q42. Are there special arrangements for 
mothers of sick children? Please 
specify 
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Typical Answer Column 
Yes No OK 
Yes No OK 
Supervision: Yes No OK 
Inspection: Yes No OK 
A. 
Yes 
Yes 
B. 
No 
No 
C. O. 
OK (promotio 
OK (upgradi n 
No. of days __ _ 
Yes No OK 
A. B. C. O. E. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
OK holidays 
OK pay 
OK 
OK 
Q43. Have TUs been involved with sickness 
benefits? Please specify for 5 years 
Maternity Benefit 
Q44. How many times per year do jobs have 
to be held open for maternity reasons? 
Q45. What strategy do you adopt to maintain 
production when jobs have to be held 
open? 
Q46. Have TUs been involved in maternity 
benefits? Please specify for 5 years 
Factory Facilities 
Q47. Do you provide a canteen, and if so, 
what is its cost? 
Q48. Describe Your medical facilities. 
What is the cost? 
Q49. Do you provide transport assistance 
for your workers, and if so, what is 
its cost? 
Q50. Who delivers and collects homeworkers' 
work? 
Q51. Who pays for delivery and collection? 
Q52. What is the cost of delivery? 
Q53. Who provides homeworkers' machinery/ 
equipment? 
Q54. Who pays for machinery or equipment? 
Q55. Who maintains homeworkers' machinery? 
Q56. Who pays for maintenance? 
Q57. Are homeworkers' overheads of heat, 
power, and lighting reimbursed? 
Bonuses 
Q58. How many bonus schemes do you operate? 
Pl ease speci fy. 
Q59. Have TUs been involved with bonus 
schemes? Please specify for 5 years. 
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Typical Answer Column 
Yes No DK 
Average number pe~ year 
Yes No DK 
Yes No DK 
Cost: £ per __ mth/yr 
Cost: £ per __ mth/yr 
Yes No DK 
Cost: £ per __ mth/yr 
Employer Employee 
Employer Employee 
Cost: £ per wk/mth 
Employer Employee 
Employer Employee 
Employer Employee 
Employer Employee 
Yes No OK 
Method: 
Number of schemes: 
Cost: £ __ per=--=--=-""'mTlth/yr 
Yes No DK 
Concessions 
Q60. Are the workers allowed to listen to 
the radio, and if so, who provides it? 
Q61. 00 you operate a concessionary goods 
scheme? 
Q62. Is a loss incurred on spoiled items, 
and if so, what is the cost? 
Q63. Please describe other benefits offered 
to your employees and state their 
cost. 
Q64. Have TUs been involved with the con-
cessions? Please specify for 5 years 
Pension Scheme 
Q65. 00 you operate a private pension 
scheme, and if so, what is its cost? 
Q66. Have TUs been involved with the scheme? 
Please specify for 5 years 
Oi smi ssa 1 s 
Q67. What is the dismissal procedure? 
Q68. What is the average number of dis-
missals per year? 
Q69. Have TUs been involved in the dis-
missal of workers? Please specify 
for 5 years 
Supply of Work/Redundancy 
Q70. How regular is the volume of work 
supplied to the workgroups? 
A. Regular 
B. Varies annually 
C. Varies seasonally 
O. Varies weekly 
Q71. Please rank the groups in the order 
of your desire to supply work when 
it is in short supply. 
Q72. What is the procedure to decide 'WHO' 
Typical Ans~ler Column 
Yes 
Employer 
Yes 
Yes 
Cost: 
Yes 
No OK 
Employees 
No OK 
No OK 
£ 
No OK 
No OK Yes 
Cost: £ per __ mth/yr 
Yes No OK 
Same Less More than EPA 
EPA does not apply 
Mean per year 
Yes No OK 
A. B. C. O. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
(Group abbreviations placed 
in appropriate order) 
should be made redundant? Who? 
Q73. What is the level of redundancy pay? Same Less More than RPA 
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Q74. How many redundancieshave there been in 
10 years? 
Q75. Have TUs been involved in determining 
which group should be made redundant? 
Please specify 
Q76. Please rank the groups in the order 
that the TUs have indicated they should 
be made redundant. 
Q77. Have TUs been involved in negotiating 
redundancy pay? Please specify for 
5 years. 
SECTION 0 - REMUNERATION: 
Tax Deductions 
Q78. For how many of your workers do you 
deduct full, reduced or no national 
insurance contributions? 
Q79. For how many of your workers do you 
deduct PAYE? 
Methods of Payment 
Q80. By what method are your workers paid? 
A. Times rates 
B. Piece rates 
C. A combination of A and B 
D. Other (specify) 
Q81. What is the procedure for the 
revision of pay rates? 
Q82. How frequently are pay rates revised? 
Earnings 
Q83. What are the gross average hourly 
earni ngs of your workers? 
Q84. What are the gross average weekly 
earnings of your workers? 
Q85.Have TUs been involved with workers' 
pay? Please specify for 5 years 
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Typical Answer Column 
No _ per __ years 
Yes No OK 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Yes No OK 
No. % 
Full 
~eaucea 
one 
Number I None CJ (tick) 
A. B. C. D. 
Number per year 
Irregularly 0-.-···- (tick) 
Skilled: £ __ per hour 
Semi-skilled: £ per hour 
Unskilled: £ per hour 
Skilled: £ per week 
Semi -ski 11 ed: £ -- per week 
Unski 11 ed: £ per week 
Yes No OK 
Hours Worked 
Q86. What is the basic 'normal' week at your 
factory? 
Q87. How many hours do your workers work on 
average per week. without overtime? 
Q88. How many hours overtime do your workers 
work on average per week? 
Q89. When do they work the overtime? 
Premia 
Q90. What are the overtime rates? 
Q91. What are the shift premia rates? 
Q92. What are the rates of pay of super-
visors? 
Q93. Have TUs been involved in premia rates? 
SECTION E - PERFORMANCE: 
Typical Answer Column 
Hours: __ per week 
Hours: per week 
--
Hours: __ per week 
__ per week Hours: 
3 shifts: £ per hour 
2 shifts: £ -- per hour 
Twilight: £ per hour 
£ __ per week 
Yes No OK 
KEY: Rank 1 is the superior performance rank when viewed from the 
perspective of the empZoyer. 
Q94. How would you rank the groups in terms 
of units produced per hour? 
Q95. Which are the most competent group of 
workers? 
Q96. Please rank the groups in the order of 
the quality of the work produced. 
Q97. What is the absenteeism rate of your 
workers? 
If unknown. please rank. taking the 
refusal of work by homeworkers as a 
proxy 
Q98. How frequently do homeworkers refuse 
work? 
Q99. Please rank the groups according to 
their personal ill-health. 
Q100. Which group of workers is the most 
reliable for producing the output? 
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1. 2. 
1. 2. 
1. 2. 
Rate: __ 
1. 2. 
No. times 
1. 2. 
1. 2. 
3. 4. 5. 
3. 4. 5. 
3. 4. 5. 
3. 4. 5. 
per year/month 
3. 4. 5. 
3. 4. 5. 
6. 
6. 
6. 
6. 
6. 
6. 
Q101. What is the voluntary turnover rate 
of your workers? 
If unknown please rank in order of 
turnover. 
Q102. How frequently do employees in one 
group switch to another group? 
Q103. How many workers are members of the 
union? 
Q104. How many disputes have you had with 
your workers? 
A. Strikes 
B. Work to rules 
C. Overtime bans 
D. Sit-ins 
E. Other (specify) 
Q105. What was the average length of each 
dispute? 
Q106. What measure do homeworkers adopt to 
further their interests? 
Q107. What is the weekly cost of factory 
overheads? 
Q108. What is the average cost of the 
various types of machinery you use? 
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Typical Answer Column 
Rate: % or No. per ye, 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
Ft to Pt: 
Pt to Ft: 
Pt to Tw: 
Tw to Pt: 
Tw to Hw: 
No 
No. 
A. 
B. 
r .• 
D. 
Length: 
Cost: 
Type: 
Cost: 
Type: 
No per year 
No -- per year 
No -- per year 
No -- per year 
No = per year (e 
% 
% of Workforce 
per year 
£ __ per week 
£_-
Cost: £ __ 
Type: 
Cost: £ __ per week 
Type: 
Cost: £ __ per week 
Type: 
Cost: £ __ per week 
Type: 
Cost: £ __ per week 
Type: 
Cost: £ 
--
per week 
Type: 
Cost: £_- per week 
Type: 
Cost: £ __ per. week 
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APPENDIX II - GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Tenus and Definitions of the Establishment and Worker Samples 
Across the 25 main stuqy establishments, 24 different collections of 
workers were identified and it was therefore imperative that standardized 
terminology for identifying workers and establishments should be adopted to 
facilitate precise exposition throughout text, tables and illustrations. 
The term establishment has been used to avoid confusion where 
companies had more than one set of premises. The term co.pany was 
justified where only one set of premises existed, and then establishment, 
factory, firm, and company were synonymous. Since many sample 
establ i shments were· of the 1 atter type, terms have been generally 
interchangeable although care has been exercised in usage. Subdivisions of 
the establishment sample were made according to membership of employers' 
associations and trade unionization of the workforce. Establishments that 
were employer association members and were thereby affiliated to the 
Knitting Industries Federation (KIF), were termed affiliated, and those 
that were not, non-affiliated; those that recognised the trade union were 
termed unionized, .. and those that di d not, non-unionized, see Chapter 11. 
Establ i shments that undertook the two stages of manufacture were termed 
integrated establishments, and those that performed only one stage, were 
called segregated establishments, see section 4.2. 
The empirical research was concerned with practices related only to 
direct production workers and thus the full workforce sample comprised only 
those workers who were directly engaged in the production process, and 
excluded all clerical workers and managements. As is indicated 
schemati cally in Fi gure II:l, the total di rect production workforce coul d 
be divided into two segments, i.e. men and women. It could also be divided 
into 2 co.ponents, i.e. the indoor,in-factory, or on-site component and the 
outdoor, outworker, or homeworker component. The indoor component was 
subdivided into workgroups, or groups for brevity, which could be male, 
female or both male and female, and which differed according to the times 
of day or number of hours which their members worked. With the benefit of 
hindsight it is known that shift and full-time men, and the full- and part-
time women formed the core of each workforce. Male part-time, and female 
twilight and homework workgroups were composed of relatively few members 
who were often temporarily attached to the workforce; these have 
occaSionally been referred to collectively as the secondary or the 
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unestablished workgroups (see Figure 4:2), although it is recognfsed that 
these terms are somewhat imprecise since different degrees of secondariness 
. or unestablishment were subsequently shown to be attached to workers and 
workgroups. The terms casual, marginal, peripheral and fringe workers were 
largely avoided because it was not wfshed to imply that the workers 
concerned exhibited unstable work habfts, or had Voluntarily 'casual' 
employment patterns or were linked to the informal sector, see 12.7.3. 
Each workgroup could contain sub-groups whose members had 
characteri sti c features, e.g. the manner in which they had been recruited. 
Collections of workers who cut across all workgroups, e.g. senfor citizens, 
were termed categories. A schematic representation of the terminology and 
workforce structure is given in Figure II:l. 
Norllal daily tflles (or normal daytime hours) were usually from 7.30 
a.m. to 4.30 p.m., but of course they coul d vary by estab 1 i shment. Oasf c 
weekly hours were usually 40 hours per week, but again varied slightly. 
Unsocial hours were usually considered to be between 6.0 p.m. and 7.0 a.m. 
Shift premia were usually paid for work during these times. 
To facilitate communication and avoid confusion, workgroup titles were 
chosen to conform to the names used by employers and these were descriptive 
of each group's work pattern. These titles can be misleading: for example, 
shift workers worked the same basic weekly hours as full-timers although 
their title perhaps implies a longer working period, and twilight workers 
could have been classed either as part-timers or shift workers, but each of 
these definitions would have caused the separate group identity of 
twilighters to be lost. Figure II:2 illustrates the constituent parts of 
the full sample of direct production workers. 
The shift worker group comprised workers who replaced each other on 
the same jobs or machines to enable continuous production. Each employee 
worked the basic weekly hours. A double-day shfft comprised a 'crew' of 
two workers, the fi rst usually worki ng from 6.0 a.m. to 2.0 p.m. followed 
immediately by the second who took over machinery at 2.0 p.m. and worked 
until 10.0 p.m. In a three-shift systell a third person took over the 
machinery at 10.0 p.m. and worked until 6.0 a.m. when the cycle 
recommenced. Double-day shifts were the most commonly used in surveyed 
establishments, but a few firms operated a 3-shift system. The full-tille 
day workgroup (or full-t imers or si ngl e shift workers) compri sed those 
workers who were contracted to work the basic weekly hours during normal 
daily times, i.e., 40 hours per week between 7.30 a.m. and 4.30 p.m. daily. 
The part-tille work group (or part-timers) was composed of those workers who 
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were contracted to work fewer than the basic weekly hours of their 
establishment, but whose work times fell within normal daytime hours. 
Part-timers had individually variable start and finish times depending on 
their commitments, preferences and employers' permission. They averaged 30 
hours per week. The daytime workgroup was composed jointly of the full-
time and part-time workgroups who worked during normal dai ly times. The 
in-factory workgroup (indoor workers) worked inside the factory, i.e. all 
the groups except homeworkers. The twf1ight worker worlcgroup (twil ighters) 
worked in the evening on a part-time basis. They could thus be variously 
termed the twflight shift, or the evening shift because employees took 
over machines from daytime workers. Attendance ranged between 3 and 4 
hours at times between 5.0 p.m. and 10.0 p.m. These workers did not 
receive a shift premium although they were employed during unsocial hours. 
The homeworker group (outdoor workers) worked in their own homes at 
variable times of day for variable weekly hours. The terms exclusfve 
homeworkers and exclusive twilight workers are used to denote that all 
other workgroups except the twilight workers and homeworkers were excluded 
from performing the operation of the workers concerned. i.e. it was not 
undertaken by a member of any other workgroup in the same factory. The 
term exclusive certainly does not carry any implications of "up-market" 
workmanship or output. Non-exclusfve homeworkers and non-exclusive 
twilight worlcers are those who perform work that is also done inside their 
factories by members of another workgroup. 
The homemaker role refers to the adoption of all the tasks associated 
with the maintenance of a home, i.e. it includes the performance of all the 
usual houskeepi ng tasks. The family-carer rol e concerns the upbri ngi ng of 
young children and the physical care of the sick, the handicapped and the 
elderly. The latter can thus be the most demanding of these roles in terms 
of time and effort. When the two roles are combined, they are collectively 
defined as the domestic role. 
A socialitistic orientation is used to describe workers with 
instrumental attitudes to employment in which the main approach and focus 
of interest is centred around social relationships, see 10.5.2. The term 
is derived from the noun sociality, meaning the quality or state of being 
social. An economistic orientation is used to describe workers with 
instrumental attitudes to employment that centre around financial rewards. 
For clarity, the technical terms involved in knitting and finishing 
(or making-up) have been defined in the text on pages 4-5 and 4-6. For 
definitions of first- and second-phase rationalisations see page 4-9. 
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APENDIX III - ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviations Relating to the Worker Sample 
Abbreviations, never exceeding two letters, have been adopted to 
identify the worker sample. The first letter of each abbreviation denotes 
the work pattern characteristic, and the second letter, if required, 
denotes the gender of the workers. The full sample is abbrevi ated to DP to 
denote the grand total of all direct production workers. The male segment, 
i.e. all male direct production workers, is abbreviated to M, while the 
women's segment is indicated by V. Abbreviations for work patterns (which 
are always upper case) are as follows: 
Indoor Component: 
I = indoor, in-factory or factory workers; 
F = full-time workers; 
P = part-time workers; 
o = dayti me workers, i.e. full- and part-timers; 
S = shift workers; 
T = twilight workers; 
Outdoor Component: 
H = homeworkers. 
The second letter of each abbreviation (which is always lower case) 
denotes gender, m for men and w for women. Where it is wished to refer to 
men and women collectively, the second letter of the abbreviation is 
omitted. Thus: 
F = all full-timers, both men and women; 
FIR = all men working full-time days; 
Fw = all women working full-time days. 
In practice. it was discovered that certain theoretically possible 
groups were non-existent, and these have been encircled in Figure IlI:1. 
Quotation .arks: a standardized method of using quotation marks has 
been adhered to: double quotation marks indicate a verbatim report of a 
respondent's statement, phrase or word; single quotation marks have been 
used only for emphasis. Abbreviations used in section 9.2 have been 
defined in the text since it was seen as more appropriate. 
I II - 1 
APPENDIX III 
AER 
BJ IR 
CIR 
cre 
DL 
DE 
DLM 
EAT 
EEC 
EILM 
ELLM 
ELM 
EOC 
EPA 
EPCA 
H&K 
IJSE 
ILM 
ILO 
IRJ 
IC 
IS 
JPE 
KIF 
LA 
LLM 
LM 
TUE 
MFA 
NBPI 
NEDO 
NHw 
NJIC 
NUE 
NUHKW 
SL 
SDA 
SLM 
SMR 
TUC 
XHw 
or EP(C)A 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ADDITIONAL ABBREVIATIONS 
American Economic Review 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 
Commission on Industrial Relations 
continuous reckonable service 
demand for labour 
Department of Employment 
Dual 1 abour market 
Employment Appeals Tribunal 
European Economic Community 
Extended internal labour market 
External local 1 abour market 
External labour market 
Equal opportunities commission 
Equal Pay Act 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 
Hosiery and knitwear 
International Journal of Social Economics 
Internal labour market 
International Labour Organization 
Industrial Relations Journal 
Implicit contract 
Informal Sector 
Journal of Political Economy 
Knitting Industries Federation 
Local Authority 
Local labour market 
Labour market 
Trade unionized establishment 
Multi-fibre Agreement 
National Board of Prices and Incomes 
National Economic Development Organisation 
Non-exclusive homeworker 
National Joint Industrial Council 
Non-unionized establishment 
National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers 
Supply of labour 
= Sex Discrimination Act 
= Segmented labour market 
= Statutory minimum remuneration 
= Trades Union Congress 
= Exclusive homeworker 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1.1 Local Industries Believed to be Employing Twilight Workers 
and Homeworkers (by Numbers of Companies) 
Inside the LLM Outside the LMM 
Type of Industry 
Twilighter Homeworker Twilighter Homeworker 
Employer Employer Employer Employer '., 
Seaondary SeatoI' of the Eaono1'1TY 
Box manufacture 0 1 0 0 
Engineering 7 2 1 0 
Leather goods 0 0 0 1 manufacture 
Pharmaceuticals 2 0 0 0 
Publishing 1 0 0 0 
Boot and shoe 0 1 1 0 manufacture 
Textiles 9 14 2 14 
Toy manufacture 0 0 0 2 
Wallpaper manufac- 1 0 0 0 ture 
Tertiary SeatoI' of the Eaonomy 
Cleaning services 16 0 0 0 
Clerical services 5 1 1 0 
Distribution 2 0 0 0 
Enterta i nment 3 0 0 0 
Food and drinks 17 0 0 0 industry 
Automobile servi- 1 0 0 0 
cing 
Sales agencies 0 10 0 9 
Technical services 0 1 0 0 
IV - 1 
, 
TABLE 2.1 Demand Characteristics 
Primary Enterprises 
1. Medium to large public 
companies 
2. Resilient to economic f1uctua-
tions 
3. Good credit facilities 
4. Users of modern technology 
5. In need of a specialized and 
stable workforce 
6. Likely to be multi-product 
firms 
Primary Internal Labour Market 
1. Mobility via long job clusters 
containing hierarchical career 
ladders 
2. Well defined internal wage 
structures 
3. Few entry ports 
4. Organised workforce 
Primary Jobs 
1. Employment stability 
2. High wages 
3. Good fringe benefits 
4. Good working conditions 
5. On-the-job training 
6. Equitable work rules and 
supervision 
7. Needs for high entry 
standards· 
, 
Secondary Enterprises 
1. Many small competitive private 
firms 
2. Prone to economic fluctuations 
3. Poor and expensive credit terms 
4. Users of old-fashioned technology 
5. Single product or on-off manu-
facture 
6. Little or poor capital equipment 
7. Hasdec1 ining or fluctuating 
product demand. 
Secondary Internal Labour Markets 
1. Short or no 'mobility clusters' 
2. Little or no internal wage structure 
3. Many entry ports 
4. Little workforce organisation 
Secondary Jobs 
1. Job insecurity 
2. Low wages 
3. Few fringe benefits 
4. Poor working conditions and 
environments 
5. Little or no training 
6. Arbitrary supervision 
7. Low pre-entry requirements 
8. Repetitive or unpleasant tasks 
9. Low skill requirements 
IV - 2 
TABLE 2.2 Supply Characteristics 
Primary Workers 
1. Good formal education 
2. High level of skill and IQ 
3. Strong LM attachment· 
4. Strong motivation for advance-
ment 
5. Low turnover rates 
6. Punctuality 
7. Low absenteeism 
8. Good residence in popular 
neighbourhood 
9. Well unionised 
10. Good health 
11. Likely to be white, male and 
not belonging to a minority 
group 
12. Well-developed social graces 
and adaption skills 
, 
Secondary Workers 
1. Low level of educational attainment 
2. Low. ~ve1 of skill and IQ 
3. Weak LM attachment 
4. Few career aspirations 
5. High turnover rates 
6. Unpunctua1ity 
7. High levels of absenteeism 
8. Poor residence in a low income 
neighbourhood 
9. Low level of unionisation 
10. Relatively high level of illness 
11. Member of a minority group 
12. Female, particularly young or 
elderly 
13. More likely to pilfer 
14. More likely to cause breakages 
15. Associated with declining indus-
tries, occupations or enter-
prises 
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TABLE 2.3 Limits of Normal Factory Hours for Women and Young Persons 
Factory working a Factory working a 
six-day. week five-day week 
Maximum period of Weekday other than 12 hours 
employment Saturday: 11 hours 
Saturday: 6 hours 
Maximum daily 9 hours 10 hours 
work i ng hours 
(excluding intervals) 
Maximum weekly 4B hours (44 hours for 48 hours (44 hours for 
working hours young persons under 
16) 
young persons under 
16) 
Maximum continuous 4; hours (may be 4; hours (may be 
spell increased to 5 hours increased to 5 hours 
if a lD-minuted break if a lD-minute break 
is allowed) is allowed) 
Earliest starting 7 am (the Secretary of State may under certain 
time conditions make regulations or orders permit-
ting a·startingtime before 7 am but not 
before 6 am) 
Latest finishing Weekday other than Saturday: 8 am for women 
time and young persons of 16 or over; 6 pm for 
young persons under 16 
Saturday: 1 pm 
(Source: . Department of Employment85) 
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TABLE 2.4 Limits of Overtime Employment for Women and Young Persons 
(a) For the whole factory Factory working a . Factory working a 
(b) For individual women six-day week five-day week 
and young persons 
Maximum a~ount of over- 6 hours 6 hours 
(a) time in any week (counted from midnight 
on Saturday night) 
Maximum amount of over- 100 hours during 100 hours during 
(a) time in any.calendar not more than not more than year beginning with 25 weeks 25 weeks 
1 January· 
Maximum.spread of employ- Weekday other than 12 hours 
ment i.e. normal period Saturday: 12 hours 
(b) of employment as shown Saturday: 6 hours 6 hours (provided on form Fll - see para.15 no other overtime 
- as extended by permis- is worked in that 
sible overtime week) 
Maximum daily working Weekday other than 10~ hours (provi-
hours (excluding Saturday: 10 hours ded no Saturday 
intervals) overtime is 
(b) ,. . worked) 
Saturday: 5~ hours 4~ hours (provi-
ded no other 
overtime is 
worked in that 
week) 
Earliest starting time 7 am 
Latest finishing time Weekday other than Saturday: 9 pm for 
women; 8 pm for young persons 
Saturday: 1 pm 
(Source: Department of Employment85) 
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TABLE 2.5: Women as a Percentage of Total Unemployed 
Europe Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands UK 
of 9 
1980 45.0 62.4 45.7 54.6 52.0 23.9 46.1 51.9 35.5 31.3 
1981 42.2 57.9 41.8 51.5 23.5 48.7 47.6 46.8 32.0 28.9 
(Source: EEC255 ) 
TABLE 2.6 Employed UK Population in 1981 by Economic Activity in 1980 (thousands) 
Employed in 1981 ,-
Activity in 1980 Males Females Total 
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Employed 13136 94 8244 88 
. 
21379 92 
Unemployed 189 1 110 1 299 1 
Economically Inactive 448 3 860 9 2308 6 
Total (including non 13962 100 9328 100 23290 100 
responses) 
(Sources: 1981 Labour Force Survey and Manpower Services Commission254 
TABLE 2.7: Women's Employment in the European Economic Community 
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN WHOSE MAIN EMPLOYMENT IS IN AGRICULTURE -.1977 
% of working women It. ot agrlcu I tura I 
. 1 abour 'force 
Belgium 2.6 22.2 
Denmark 4 19.5 
France 8.6 33.9 
Germany 7.7 49,.0 
Ireland 6.9 17.6 
Italy 8.6 33.9 
Luxembourg 5.3 25.2 
Netherl ands 1.7 8.0 
Average for Europe of 9 6.6 31.6 
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN WHOSE HAIN EHPLOYMENT IS IN INDUSTRY - 1977 
%.of.working women Ib ot' 1 noilst.rl a '-1 abour' 'force . 
Belgium 23.6 19.1 
Denmark 18.2 21.8 
France 24.4 25.0 
Germany 29.9 24.2 
Ireland 24.4 19.8 
Italy 31.2 22.7 
Luxembourg 13.9 9.8 
Netherlands 14.8 10.4 
United Ki ngdom .25.7 24.0 ... . . , 
Average for Europe of 9 .26.7 23.4 
PERCENTAGE OF WOHEN WHOSE MAIN EMPLOYMENT IS. IN THE SERVICE SECTOR. -197.7 
.. ,%.of.working.women ;;, OT'serVlce·sect.or 
. laDour' Torce ' .. 
Belgium 73.7 40.2 
Denmark 77.8 52.0 
France 67.0 49.0 
Germany 62.5 46.0 
Ireland 68.7 39.3 
Italy 55.6 33.7 
Luxembourg 80.8 44.1 
Netherlands 83.4 36.2 
United·Kingdom . . ' .73.0 .50.8 . . . . ..... 
Average for Europe of 9 66.7 45.2 
(Source: EEC255 ) 
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TABLE 2.8 Women's Earnings (expressed as percentages of Men's Earnings) 
in Three Sectors of the EEC Economy . 
COMPARISON OF MEN'S AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN AGRICULTURE 
1975 
Women's earnings as a percentage of men's earnings based on 
average hourly waqe for skilled and unskilled workers 
Belgium· , 88.2 
Denmark 106.0 ,. 
France .95.3 
Germany 78.5 
Irel and 87.7 
Italy . 91.8 
Luxembourg 82.7 
Netherlands 77.8 
United Kingdom 87.0 
COMPARISON OF EARNINGS OF MALE AND FEMALE·BLUE~COLLAR 
WORKERS IN INDUSTRY - APRIL 197!i 
Women's earnings as a percentage of men's earnings 
Belgium 70.9 
France 77.4 
Germany 73.4 
Italy 74.1 
Luxembourg 62.4 
Netherlands ~ :. '0. i 73.7 Uni ted Ki ngdom 71.0 
COMPARISON OF EARNINGS OF MALE AND FEMALL OFFICE· WORKERS 
.. IN· INDUSTRY - 1972 
Women's earnings.asa.percentage of men's earnings 
Bel gium 60.5 
France 58.0 
Germany 61.8 
Italy 51.0 
Luxembourg 54.0 
Netherlands . 61.9 . 
(Source: EEC255 ) 
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TABLE 2.9 Average Number of Hours Worked by Women - Breakdown by 
Economic Sector - 1977 
Number of hours worked·by women, based on index of 100 for hours 
worked by male workers 
Country Agriculture Industry Services 
Belgium 76.8 93.9 87.8 
Denmark· 69.7 84.4 75.5 
France 78.9 92.3 86.0 
Germany 84.2 87.1 82.2 
Ireland 73.4 90.7 87.6 
Italy 88.7 95 88.9 
Luxembourg 69.6 95.6 92.7 
Netherlands 66.6 85.4 77.4 
United Kingdom 61.5 77.7 66.7 
Average - 82.0 87.5 79.6 Europe of 9 
(Source: EEC255 ) 
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TABLE 2.10. Part-time Employees in the Service Sector; Great Britain 
(thousands) 
Year Male Female 
June 1978 577.6 3108.6 
Sept 1981 597.0 3294.0 
(Sources: Census of Employment and Manpower Services Commission254 ) 
TABLE 2.11 The Incidence and Reasons for Loss of Pay, All Manual 
Categories 
Fm % Fw % Pw% 
Late arrival/early finish 4.6 7.8 2.6 
Voluntary absence 3.5 7.8 2.6 
Uncertified sickness 1.3 2.6 1.3 
(Source: Compiled from DE260 ) 
TABLE 2.12 Average Hours Lost, all Manual Categories 
Fm % Fw % Pw % 
Late arrival/early finish 1.6 1.7 1 • 1 
Voluntary absence 9.2 9.2 6.1 
Uncertified sickness 10.1 10.0 6.3 
(Source: Compiled from DE260 ) 
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TABLE 2.13: Changes in Shift Working Since 1945: All Manufacturing 
Industries 
Number of Manual. No. and % of Shift ~o ana :0 or Workers Relative to Twilight Workers Workers Source 
of 
Date 
all Manual Workers Relative to 
Year '_~ ____ -r ______ ~ ______ ~r-____ ~a~l~l-=Sh~i~f;t~W~o~r~k=e~rs 
DE data 1954 
DE data 1964 
4946.2 2536.7 
4e~~.0. 3266.2 
IFF data 19784266.2 2811.1 
(Source: IFF79) 
<-
Cl> 
.a 
E 
:::J 
:z: 
66.3 
967.7 
1469.6 
12 
20 
34 
I . 
26.7 
67.6 
80.5 
TABLE 2.14 Numbers of Twilight Workers in Particular Industries 
Industries . . . .. .. Nos •. OOO's 
Food, Drink and Tobacco. 27.5 
Engineering 12.2 
Vehicles 10.2 
Textiles 9.3 
Other manufacturing 6.7 
All others .14.6 
Total 80.5 
(Source: IFF79 ) 
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TABLE 2.15 Use of Twilight Working with Other Shift Systems 
System in Use % of group working twilight shifts 
Continuous rotating 3 shifts 10 
Other continuous 34 
Semi-continuous rotating 3 shifts 24 
. Other semi-continuous 27 
Discontinuous 20 
(Source: IFF79 ) 
TABLE 2.16 Acreages and Electors in the Principal Settlements of the 
Local Labour Market 
Acreages Number of Elf'ctt'lrs 
Loughborough 9211 37,826 
Barrow-upon-Soar 2497 3,424 
Mountsorrel 922 3,143 
Quorndon 2116 2,860 
Shepshed 4479 8,345 
Sileby 2295 4,758 
(Source: Charnwood Borough Council 163) 
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TABLE 2.17 Industrial Production and Employees in Employment, 
Hosiery and Knitwear (MLH 417) (GB) 
Industrial Production Employees in Employment 1975 = 100 
Year Index thousands 
1970 102.0 -
1971 101.4 127 
1975 100.0 115 
1980 .\. 93.2 102 
(Sources: Compiled from Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO, 1974, 1976, 
1981, 1982, Tables 6.2 and 8.2 177) 
TABLE 2.18 Sales and Trade of UK Hosiery and Knitwear Industry 
(at 1975 constant prices) 
1975 1976 1977 
Total sales by UK manufacturers, £mill ion 715.2 749.7 750.8 
Exports, £ million 121.7 162.8 176.3 
Imports, £ million 143.1 158.4 162.6 
Home consumption, £ million 736.6 745.3 737.1 
Home deliveries, £ million 593.5 586.9 574.5 
Imports/home consumption, % 19.4 21.2 22.1 
Exports/total sales, % 17.0 21.7 23.5 
(Source: NE00171) 
TABLE 2.19 Establishment Size in the GB Textile Industry, 1978 
(by Number of Employees) 
1978 
735.9 
164.3 
179.9 
751.5 
571.6 
23.9 
22.3 
HO 11-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000+ 
Textiles 
Order XIII 
Number of 2249 927 1006 731 658 458 90 35 
Units 
(Source: 1982 Edition of Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO 177) 
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TABLE 3.1 Data Collection Programme 
Pre-Pilot Pilot Main Total Study Study Study 
. 
Reference in text Subsection 3.3 Subsections 3.4 Chapter 4 
to 3.7 
Date of Interviews June 1979 October 1979 March 19BO 
No. of companies (. 
where interviews 1 7 35 43 
were completed 
TABLE 3.2 Workforce Composition in Sample Footwear Companies 
Men Women Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Shift 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Full-time day 379 40.23 356 37.79 735 78.03 
Part-time day 12 1.27 140 14.86 152 16.13 
Twilight 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Homeworkers 0 0.0 55 5.84 55 5.84 
Totals 391 41.50 551 58.50 942 100.00 
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TABLE 3.3 Skill Levels of Footwear Workers 
Ski 11 ed 
io or 7, OT 
No. the total 
group workforce 
FULL-TIME 
Males 248 65.44 26.33 
Females 186 52.25 19.75 
PART-TIME 
Males 7 58.33 0.74 
Females 113 80.72 12.00 
HOMEWORKERS 
Females 16 29.09 1.70 
TOTALS 
Males 255 65.22 27.07 
Females 315 57.17 33.44 
No. 
102 
118 
5 
22 
39 
107 
179 
Semi -Skill ed Unskilled Totals 
70 or 7, or 70 ot 70 or 70 ot 
the total No. the total No. total 
group work force group workforce work force 
26.91 10.83 29 7.65 3.08 379 40.23 
33.15 12.53 52 14.60 5.52 356 37.79 
41.67 0.53 0 0.0 0.0 12 1.27 
15.71 2.33 5 3.57 0.53 140 14.86 
70.91 4.14 0 0.0 0.0 55 5.84 
27.36 11 .36 29 7.42 3.08 391 41 .51 
32.49 19.00 57 10.34 .,. 6.05 551 58.49 
TABLE 4.1 The Respondents' Positions and Experience 
Number of Years In l;urrent Posltion 
Respondents Total Average s.d. 
Owner/Manager 9 67 7.44 6.15 
Director 4 56 14.00 4.24 
r1anager (i. e. General. 8 82 10.25 7.27 Factory or Production) 
Office Manager 2 20 10.00 
-
Supervisor (of all 
director production 2 20 10.00 -
, workers) 
All respondents 25 245 9.80 6.22 
TABLE 4.3 Methods of Accommodating the Segments 
Segregated Company Segregated Segregated Integrated 
on Multiple Sites Work force on Area of the Workforce 
same site same Building 
rlrst ::,econCl , 
Stage Stage 
Number of Esta- 1 6 11 6 1 blishments . 
(Sample size =25) 
TABLE 4.4 Payment Methods by Work force Group 
Piece-rate Methods Time-rate Methods 
Workforce 
Group Worker Percentage Worker Percentage 
Numbers of Group Numbers of Group 
Srn 163 81% 38 19% 
Fm . 54 38% 88 62% 
Pm 1 17% 5 83% 
Fw 528 93% 37 7% 
Pw 406 85% 71 15% 
Tw 12 86% 2 14% 
Hw 127 100% 0 0% 
Totals: 1292 84% 240 16% 
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TABLE 4.2 Workforce Composition (by Size of Establishment) 
(a) Large Establishment Sector (Establishments ~ 30 total employees) 
i 
, , 
M ALE S E G MEN T 
DP M Srn Fm 
No. No. No. % No. 
. 236K 48 
- - 47 
Individual 146 144 
28 28 100.0 -
75 58 77 .3 17 
Estab1ish- 136 
ment 129 93** 
28 24 85.7 4 
49 29 59.2 17 
2 
- -
2 
Statistics 86 71 
25 16 64.0 9 
33 27 81.8 6 
61K 19 
- - 19 
(n = 14) 58** 53 2 - - 2 4 4 100.0 
-48** 1 
- - 1 37 4 4 100.0 
-35 1 
- - -
Total Emplo- 319 190 124 
yees % of 1333 
Segment 100 59.5 
Establishments ,using 
group % of 'large' 
14 8 10 
sector 100 57.1 
Key:' K· Knitting on a full-time day work 'pattern 
* ~ Specialisation on 1st stage of products 
** = Specialisation on 2nd stage of products 
% 
98.0 
-
22.7 
14.3 
34.7 
100.0 
36.0 
18.2 
100.0 
100.0 
-100.0 
-
-
38.9 
71.4 
Pm 
No. % 
1 2.0 
- -
- -
- -
3 6.1 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- ' -
- -
1 100.0 
5 
1.6 
3 
21 . .4 
FEMALE S E G MEN T 
W Fw Pw ' Tw Hw 
No. No. % No. % No. % No. % 
188 114 60.7 73 38.8 
- -
1 0.5 
118 80 67.0 32 27.1 
- -
6 5.1 
69 39 56.5 12 17.4 3 4.4 15 21.7 
108 59, 54.6 43 39.8 
- -
6 5.6 
80 49 61.2 24 30.0 3 3.8 4 5.0 
91 42 46.2 49 53.8 - - - -
61 16 26.2 38 62.3 4 6.6 3 4.9 
38 25 65.8 7 18.4 - - 6 15.8 
42 10 23.8 21 50.0 
- -
11 26.2 
56 27 48.2 29 51.8 - - - -
49 13 26.5 34 69.4 2 4.1 - -
47 28 59.6 19 40.4 
- - - -
33 24 72.7 6 18.2 
- -
3 9.1 
34 8 23.5 26 76.5 - - - -
1014 534 413 12 55 
100 52.7 40.7 1.2 5.4 
14 14 14 4 9 
, 
-, . 
100 " 100 'lOO 2&.6 ' ,64.3 
••• continued over 
TABLE 4.2 (continued) 
(b) Small Establishment Sector (Establishments < 30 total employees) 
M ALE S E G M,E N T 
DP M Sm 
No. No. No. % No. 
29 6 4 66.7 2 
Individual 26K 23K 
1 
- -
1 
4 
- -
4 
Establish- 23K 22K ment 21 
3 - - 3 3 
- - 3 4 4 100.0 
-
Stati stics 21K 12 
3 
- -
3 
4 3 75.0 1 
(n = 11) 12** 6** - - - -- - - -4*K 2 
- -
1 
Total Emplo- 199 30 11 18 
yees % of 
segment 100 36.7 
Establishments using 9 3 8 
group % of 'small' 
sector 100 33.3 
~: K = Knitting on a full-time day work pattern 
* = Specialisation on 1st stage of products 
** .'Specialisation on 2nd stag. of products 
Fm 
% 
33.3 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
-
100.0 
25.0 
-
-50.0 
60.0 
88.9 
Pm 
No. % 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 50.0 
1 
3.3 
1 
11 .1' 
F E M ALE SEGMENT 
W Fw Pw Tw Hw 
No. No. % No. % No. % No. % 
23 2 8.7 7 30.4 2 8.7 12 52.2 
25 3 12.0 2 8.0 
- -
20 80.0 
19 - - 9 47.4 - - 10 52.6 
20 - - 16 80.0 - - 4 20.0 19 9 47.4 7 36.8 
- -
3 15.8 
17 2 11.8 3 17.6 ' - - 12, 70.6 18 6 33.3 3 16.7 
- -
9 50.0 
8 5 ,62.5 3 37.5 
- - - -12 3 25.0 9 75.0 
- - - -6 1 16.7 5 83.3 
- - - -2 - - - ,- - - 2 100.0 
169 31 64 2 72 
100 18.3 37.9 1.2 42.6 
11 8 ,10 1 8 
100 72.7 90.9 9.1 72.7 
••• continued over 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
(cl All Establishments 
M ALE S E G MEN T 
DP M Sm 
No. No. No. % No. 
Total Emplo- 349 201 142 
yees % of 1532 
Segment 100 57.6 
Establishments using 
group % of all 
23 11 18 
establishments 100 47.8 
~: K = Knitting on a full-time day work pattern 
* = Specialisation on 1st stage of products 
** = Specialisation on 2nd stage of products 
Fm 
% 
40.7 
78.3 
Pm 
No. % 
6 
1.7 , 
4 
17.4 . 
F E M ALE S E G MEN T .' .. 1. I. 
",.' , 
W Fw Pw Tw Hw 
No. No. % No. % No. % No. % 
.-
1183 565 477 14 127 
100 47.8 40.3 1.2 10.7 
25 22 24 5 17 , 
100 88.0 95.0 20.C 58.0 
, 
TABLE 5,1 Number of Workers Residing Within Specified Distance Bands 
from the Factory (by Workforce Groups) 
Work- Total Distance from Factory (miles) 
force Work"'· 
Group Force 1 1 to <3 3 to <5 5 to <7 7 to <10 10 to <15 
Fw 402 197 132 56 13 3 1 
Pw 380 236 107 32 2 1 0 
Tw 11 10 1 0 '.' 0 0 0 . 
Hw 117 31 33 23 23 4 3 
M 65 15 18 17 8 5 2 
TABLE 5.2 Average Number of Applicants per Advertised Vacancy 
Workforce Group No. of Factories Mean No. Applicants Responding per Vacancy 
Fw 5 1.9 
Pw 3 5.0 
TABLE 5.3 Average Weekly Number of Unsolicited Applications 
Work force Group No. of Factories Mean No. Unsolicited Responding Applications per Week 
Fw 6 0.6 
Pw 11 1.9 
Tw 0 -
H 9 1.0 
, 
TV - ?n 
TABLE 5.4 Total Transport Assistance (4 companies) 
No. of In-Factory 
Workers (Iw) 
Average t-ema! e 
Earnings (£) Type of Assistance 
140 5B.OO (semi-skilled) Free private bus 
130 67.70 (skilled) free private bus 
58 58.80 (semi-skille~) free private bus 
50 54.00 (semi-skilled) Mileage allowance 
Average earnings \' 
across all 25 70.10 (skilled) 
interviewed esta- 55.70 (semi -sk ill ed) 
blishments 
TABLE 5.5 Proportion of Full-time females (fw) in the female Daytime 
Workforce (Dw) in Relation to free Transport Provision 
Compames fUl/-tlrne Dayt1me I Percentage 
Transport Assistance No. females females of full-time 
(fwl.llo. (IlWl..No. Females 
(A) free private bus 3 166 270 61% 
(B) No transport assis- - . 
tance - (all other - . 
companies) 22 399 772 52% 
(C) No transport assis-
tance - (companies 7 . 295 519 57% of similar size to 
(A) 
TABLE 5.6 Numbers of full-time females Travelling Specified Distances to 
Factories in Relation to Transport Provision 
Transport Total Distance from Factory (miles) 
Assistance Workers 
<1 1 to <3 3 to <5 5 to <7 7 to <10 10 to <15 
Sample A 166 86 41 32 4 2 1 
Sample B 236 III 91 24 9 1 -
Sample C 132 46 66 19 1 - -
Tll _ 71 
..... 
<: 
N 
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TABLE 6.1 Age Distribution 
Workgroup 16 to <20 20 to <30 
No. % No. % 
Fw 98 24 93 23 
Pw 0 0 39 11 
Tw 0 0 1 9 
Hw 3 3 31 28 
W 101 12 164 19 
TABLE 6.2 Family Commitments 
Workgroup Without Children 
No. Adj% Rel % 
Fw 121 47 30 
Pw 25 9 7 
Tw 0 0 0 
Hw 4 4 4 
W 150 23 17 
30 to <40 40 to <50 50 to <60 60 to <70 Totals 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
57 14 67 17 76 19 11 3 402 100 
123 35 91 26 61 18 34 10 348 100 
6 55 4 36 0 0 0 0 11 100 
31 28 25 22 17 15 4 4 111 100 
217 25 187 21 154 18 49 6 872 100 
With Dependent With Non-dependent Don't Know Totals Children Children 
No. Adj% Rel % No. Adj% Rel% No. Rel% No. Rel% 
78 31 19 56 22 14 147 37 402 100 
165 56 48 102 35 29 56 16 348 100 
11 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 11 100 
76 68 68 31 28 28 0 0 111 100 
330 49 38 189 28 22 203 23 872 100 
..... 
< 
N 
W 
TABLE 6.3 Ethnic Origin 
Workgroup British 
No. Adj.% Rel.% No. 
Fw 337 89 84 4 
Pw 336 96 96 2 
Tw 11 100 100 0 
Hw 108 97 97 1 
W 792 94 91 7 
TABLE 6.4 Type of Residence 
Workgroup Owner/Occupi ed 
No. Adj.% 
Fw 130 53 
Pw 139 67 
Tw 0 0 
Hw 53 83 
W 322 62 
Other 
European 
Adj.% Re1.% 
1 1 
1 1 
0 0 
1 1 
1 1 
Re1.% No. 
32 116 
40 70 
0 0 
48 11 
37 197 
Asian African/ Missing Totals West Indian Data 
No. Adj.% Rel.% No. Adj.% Re1% No. Re1.% No. Rel.% 
33 9 8 3 1 1 25 6 402 100 
10 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 348 100 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 100 
2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 III 100 
45 5 5 3 0 0 25 3 872 100 
Rented Accommodation Don't Know Totals 
Adj.% Rel.% No. Rel.% No. Re1;% 
47 29 156 39 402 100 
33 20 139 40 348 100 
0 0 11 100 11 100 
17 10 47 42 III 100 
38 23 353 40 872 100 
TABLE 6.5 Average Ages 
Workforce Type of Average ~es (Years) Type of Mode Group Distribution Mean Median Mode 
19.8 First peak 
Full-time (Fw) 
(n " 402) Bi-moda1 34.8 31.8 37.8 Trough 
51.2 Second peak 
Part-time (Pw) Positively 42.9 42.3 37.2 Single peak 
n = 348) skewed model 
Twi1 ight (Tw)-- Approximately 37.7 37.5 37.1 Single peak 
(n " 11) norma 1 
Homeworker (Hw) Positively 38.1 36.9 36.5 Single peak 
(n " 111) skewed modal 
All females (W) Positively 39.4 37.4 36.4 Single peak 
(n " 852) skewed modal 
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TABLE 7.1 Methods of Recruitment 
Workforce Total THE FORMAL CHANNEL 
Group Workers The Job Private Employers I The Formal 
Centre Employment Newspaper Channel 
Agencies Adverts. Tota 1 s 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
MALES: 
Srn + Fm 270 0 - 0 - 138 51.1 138 51.1 
Missing 
data=79 
----------
----- .. ----
----------~-----------. --------- .. -- -----------
FEMALES: 
Fw 565 34 6.0 50 8.9 337 59.7 421 74.5 
Pw 477 5 1.0 20 4.2 184 38.6 209 43.8 
Tw 14 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Hw 127 0 
-
1 0.8 14 11.0 15 11.8 
Totals: 1453 39 2.7 71 4.9 673 46.3 783 53.9 
THE INFORMAL CHANNEL 
Returning Door-ca 11 ers Employee The Inforrna 1 
ex-employees Wa i ti ng Li st Referrals Channel 
Totals 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
2 0.7 6 .2.2 124 45.9 132 48.9 
------------- --------------- -----------
-.......... -------
10 1.8 3 0.5 131 23.2 144 25.5 
1 0.2 17 3.2 250 52.4 268 56.2 
0 - 1 7.1 13 92.9 14 100.0 
" 15 11.8 0 - 97 76.4 112 88.2 
28 1.9 27 1.9 615 42.3 670 46.1 
..... 
<: 
N 
'" 
Descriptions of the Operations 
A. Females in 'Male' Operations 
Knitting of circular interlock fabric for underwear 
Heavy-gauge hand-machine knitted sweaters 
Hand-machine knitted patterned socks 
Warehouse duties 
--------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS: 
B. Males in 'Female' Operations 
Pair and fold socks 
Box assembly 
Inspection and quality control 
'Running-on' of welts onto bars 
Pressing of garments 
--------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS: 
TABLE 8.1 Job Mobility (by Gender) 
Fw 
3 
9 
0 
0 
-----
12 
-----
Number of Workers Number of 
Pw Tw Hw Total DP Establishments 
n=1532 n=25 
0 0 0 3 1 
0 0 0 9 1 
0 0 7 7 1 
1 0 0 1 1 
-----
---- 1------1----------------- ------------------
1 0 7 20 4 
Fm Pm Srn Total 
2 2 0 4 2 
1 1 0 2 2 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 ) 1 0 1 0 1 ) 
fo---- ----fo----- fo---------------- ------------------
5 4 0 9 6 
Srn Fm Pm 
Occupation Descriptions No. % No. % No. % 
First St~e 0iManuiaature 
Knitter, mechanic, or knitter 
and supervisor or mechanic 199 99.0 48 33.8 0 0.0 
combined I,· 
Bar loaders 2 1.0 2 1.4 0 0.0 
Second Stage ot. Manut.acture 
Mechanics for female machines 0 0.0 11 7.7 0 0.0 
Supervisors of females 0 0.0 8 5.7 0 0.0 
Warehouse, dispatch, internal 
distribution and dyehouse 0 0.0 68 47.9 2 33.3 
duties 
Women's operations 0 0.0 5 3.5 4 66.7 (see Table 8.1) 
--------------------------------- -------------- ----
-----
---
---.---
TOTALS: 201 100% 142 100% 6 100% 
TABLE 8.2 Male Occupations (by Workgroup) 
Workgroup Exclusive Operations Workers Establishments 
No. % No. % 
Fw Hand-machine knitting of 9 1.6 1 4.0 
n=565 heavy-knit sweaters , 
---------- ------------------------------ ------- ------
------ --------
Pw None 0 0.0 0 0.0 
n=477 
----------
-------------------------------
------- ------
------ --------
Tw None 0 0.0 0 0.0 n=14 
----.-----
--------------------------------
------- ------
------ --------
Hand-finishing of garments 33 26.0 7 28.0 
Hw Linking of garment pieces 35 27.6 2 8:0 
n=127 Ha nd -mach i ne knitting of 7 5.5 1 4.0 
socks 
Total Hw in exclusive jobs 75 59.0 10 40.0 
TABLE 8.3 Exclusive Jobs (by Female Workgroup) 
IV - 27 
, 
Srn Fm Pm 
Male Segment 
No. % No. % No. % 
Skilled jobs 199 99.0 98 69.0 2 33.0 
Semi-skilled jobs 2 1.0 44 31.0 4 67.0 
Female Segment 'Fw Pw Tw Hw 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Ski 11 ed jobs 414 73.3 339 71.1 10 71.4 66 52.0 
Semi-skilled jobs 151 26.7 138 28.9 4 28.6 61 48.0 
TABLE 8.4 The Skill Composition of the Work groups 
Opportunity Level Fw Pw Tw 
No. % No. b No. b 
Very good 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Good 1 4 0 0 0 0 
Slight 7 32 2 8 0 0 
None 14 64 22 92 12 100 
Sample sizes 22 100 24 100 12 100 
------------------------- ------------- -------------
----------------
Establishments where 
some promotion was 8 36 2 8 0 0 
possible n=25 
TABLE 8.5 Female Opportunities for Promotion to Supervisory Capacity 
(by Establishment Response) 
IV - 28 
.... 
< 
N 
ID 
Uo. of establishments stating zero mobility 
No. of establishments with mobility 
Sum.of all transfers 
Average mobility in companies where 
it occurred 
TABLE 8.6 Direct Female Inter-Group Mobility 
Types of Employees 
Males 
Skilled shift workers 
Skilled full-time day workers 
Semi-skilled full-time day workers 
----------------------------------------------. Females 
Skilled 
Semi -s kill ed 
TABLE 8.7 Average Weekly Earnings 
Fw to Pw Pw to Fw 
17 24 
5 0 
9 in 8 yr 0 
1.1 pa 0 
Basic 40 hr/wk 
£ 
100 
82 
78 
r---------------------
65 
55 
Dw to Tw Dw to Hw Tw to Dw Hw to Dw Tw to Hw Hw to Tw 
24 18 12 16 12 22 
0 6 0 6 0 0 
0 8 in 12 yr 0 7in 19yrs 0 0 
0 0.66 pa 0 0.4 pa 0 0 
Standard With Overtime Standard 
Deviation £ Deviation 
11 .3 108 B.8 
2.6 -: 102 14.6 
8.1 No overtime -
------------------ r----------------------- ----------------_. 
8.8 No overtime 
-
7.7 No overtime -
Comparisons of Homeworkers' n=22 n=139 
Pay Rates Estab- Home- % Reduc- Std. 
lishment workers tion in Devn. Rates 
No. % No. % 
Lower rates than indoor 9 41 35 25 7.50 2.75 workers 
Same rates as indoor 8 36 49 35 _ t,. workers -
Not comparable to indoor 9 41 55 40 DK DK workers 
NB Establishments do not sum to 100% because 4 establishments employed 
both comparable and non-comparable homeworkers. 
TABLE 8.8 The Intra-Establishment Comparability of Homeworkers' Piece-
Rates 
n=22 n=139 Average Standard 
Establishments Providing Hw Weekly Deviation 
'l data ' Involved Earnings 
No. % No. % x 
12 55 78 56 20.92 9.01 
TABLE 8.9 Homeworkers' Average Weekly Earnings 
, ~Vl ~ki11 ed workers Semi sk i 11 ed ,.~ U') o_~ Type of Establishment 
",Ill"'" 0", 
...: s ~ ..... sc ~...: ~.r- s:: ""Os CQJ . . :;~ Jii ~ ..... III ~ Q) CQJ "'Cl ""0> ..... ° ~ ..... 010 w..cE ...... LL. QJ'" ....,QJ ~~ ~~ ~~QJ .:.< .~ ::;::;,: Vl""O 0 ..... Vl""O O ..... E Vl""O 
No. No. x x x % 
Segregated, any size 7 262 59 9.3 -6 48 0.2 -7 18.6 n=7 
Large integrated (over 
30 employees) n=lO 10 731 68 4.5 +3 59 3.7 +4 13.2 
Small integrated, 
10;5 (under 30 employees) 8 63 66 +1 56 4.1 +1 15.2 
n=8 
Totals 25 1056 
Mean of all establishment 65 8.8 0 55 7.7 0 15.4 
TABLE 8.10 Inter-Establishment Female Wage Structure 
IV - 30 
No. and Percentage of Establishments in which the 
Benefit Scheme or Facility Applied 
M (n=23) Fw(n=22) Tw(n=24) Tw(n=5) Hw(n=17) 
No. % No % No. % No. % ... No. % 
. 
Holiday pay 23 100 22 100 24 100 4 80 2 12 
Pension scheme 6 26 5 23 3 12 0 0 0 0 
Bonuses 2 9 2 9 2 8 0 0 0 0 
Christmas 14 61 14 64 14 58 OK OK Benefits 
Long service 4 17 4 18 4 17 0 0 0 0 awards 
I Medical 23 100 22 100 24 100 4 80 n.a. pr.ovisions 
NI deductions 23 100 22 100 24 100 5 100 0 0 
PAYE deductions 23 100 22 100 24 100 5 100 6 35 
Sunmated 513 514 495 360 47 Percentages 
Maximum possi-
ble sUlMlated 800 800 800 800 700 
percentages 
Ratio of 
actual to 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.45 0.07 possible 
percentages 
Rank order of 
=1 =1 3 4 5 net advantages 
TABLE 8.11 The Incidence of Benefit Schemes and Facilities 
(by Establishment Response) 
IV - 31 
, 
Key: sf = self financing 
NA = .not applicable 
s-
COST ELEMENT .... a> .... -" 
.~ s-
..c:: 0 
V'> :3: 
Sm 
W £ 
40-hour equivalent of 
average weekly earnings 100.00 
Material spoilage sf 
Supervision 5.13 
L 
National Insurance 13.53 (March 1980) 
Holiday pay benefits 11.20 
Redundancy payments 0.06 
Dismissals and mater- neg nity 
B 
Sickness, pensions, 
neg long-service 
Transport NA 
Canteen/refreshments 0.18 
Concessionary goods 
sf scheme 
Soci a1faci 1 i ti est 0.15 ce 1 ebrati ons 
S 
Recrui:tment 0.02 
Selection neg 
Training 0.78 
K 
Capi tal non~utilisation 135.39 
T 
Factory overheads (with 
8 hours discountedi un 
1'1 . Pace constralnt NA 
Total per capita cost £ 266.44 
TABLE 9.1 
a> 
I::~ 
~ "t:> 
.... a> 
I ~ 
~~ 
~.~ 
:::J -" 
.... '" ~
a> 
~>, 
"'''' ::E: "t:> 
Fm 
£ 
86.08 
sf 
5.13 
11.65 
9.64 
0.05 
neg 
neg 
0.20 
0.18 
sf 
0.15 
0.02 
neg 
0.63 
188.48 
0.00 
NA 
302.21 
un = unavailable 
neg= negligible 
a> a> a> <11 
I:: I:: I:: s-~ 
.~ .~ ~ a> <11 
.... " .... .... ~~ la> I ~"t:> s-~ ~~ ~-o o~ 
~~ ~a> S-a> ~-" :::J'~ :::J~ '" ~ '" .... ~ .... 0 0.0 .... III 
a> 8.-;;; o~ ..c:: "t:> a> ~ 0. <11 0> '" ~>, ~~~ ~~ .~~
"'''' '" ~ '" ~ ~O 1::" E >,.~ 5 >,.r- ~O a> 
"''''-'' ~"'~ ~o. ..... 
..... -0 <11 -0<11 I-~ 
Fw Fw Pw Tw 
£ £ £ £ 
65.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 
sf sf sf sf 
3.61 3.61 3.61 0.00 
8.81 8.12 8.12 8.12 
7.28 6.72 6.72 6.72 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 
0.01 0.01 neg NA 
neg neg NA NA 
0.20 0.20 NA NA 
0.18 0.18 0.18 NA 
sf sf· sf sf 
0.15 0.15 0.15 NA 
0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 
nag neg 0.01 0.01 
0.58 0.40 0.23 0.34 
1.44 1.44 1.55 1.27 
0.00 0.00 0.00 un 
NA NA NA NA 
87.34 80.91 ~0.63 76.46 
-~ 
tIJ 
~ 
~ 
.~ 
S-~ 
a> <11 
~ 
s--o 
0'" ~~ 
"'0 1::0 
00. 
:c~ 
Hw 
£ 
51.00 
sf 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
NA 
. 
NA 
NA 
NA 
sf 
NA 
0.00 
0.01 
0.03 
1.65 
NA 
3.71 
56.40 
roup Number. 
IV - 32 
...... 
< 
w 
w 
Hours Wages Weekly Galls Cost of 
Taken (@ £80 per Distance Petrol Petrol 
No 40 hr week) miles (@ 20mpg) (@ £1.27) 
Galls £ 
10 20 68 3.40 4.32 
30 60 
- -
37.50 
9 18 65 3.25 4.13 
4 8 60 3.00 3.81 
5 10 40 2.00 2.54 
6 12 
-
4.00 5.08 
20 40 104 5.20 6.60 
2 4 
-
2.00 2.54 
5 10 
-
1.00 1.27 
- - - - -
1 2 - 1.00 1.27 
20 40 128 6.40 8.13 
24 48 216 10.80 13.72 
Mean cost per homeworker 
Standard deviation 
TABLE 9.2 Weekly Company Costs for Delivery of Work to Homeworkers 
Total Number Calculated Quoted Week 1y 
Cost of Cost per Cost per 
Homeworkers Homeworker Homeworker 
£ No. £ £ 
24.32 6 4.05 
-
97.50 20 4.88 
-
22.13 5 4.42 
-
11 .81 6 1.97 -
12.54 3 4.18 -
17.08 10 1.71 
-
46.60 11 4.24 5.00 
6.54 3 2.18 -
11.27 2 5.64- -
-
12 
-
4.17 
3.27 4 0.82 -
48.13 9 5.34 7.22 
61.72 12 5.14 4.83 
3.71 5.30 
1.61 1.33 
Establishment Sample Size . n=24 n=7 n=21 
OW Iw Hw 
Characteri sti cs No •. % No. % No. 
Previous experience: 
a) Skill; speed; quality work-
manship 19 79 3 43 13 
Workinfl. hours: 
b) Full-time, or maximum 
possible 18 75 0 0 15 
c) Downward flexibility 0 0 2 29 10 
Persona~ attributes: 
d) Ability to 'fit-in' 14 58 4 57 0 
e) Good employment record 10 42 0 0 0 
f) Job flexibility 3 12 0 0 0 
g) Commitment; motivation 2 8 7 100 15 
h) Honesty; trustworthiness 0 0 7 100 19 
i) Financial need 3 12 0 0 2 
j) Age; maturity 2 8 0 0 3 
k) Married status 2 8 0 0 0 
TABLE 9.3 Characteristics Sought During the Selection Process 
(by Establishment Response) 
Establishment Sample Size n=27 n=7 
Dw Tw 
Characteristic 
No. % Rank No. % 
Previous experience 19 79 1 3 43 
Working hours 18 75 =2 2 29 
Personal attributes 18 75 =2 7 100 
TABLE 9.4 Order of Importance of Selection Criteria 
(by Establishment Response) 
IV - 34 
, 
Rank No. 
2 13 
3 15 
1 20 
n=21 
Hw 
% 
62 
71 
95 
% 
62 
71 
48 
0 
0 
0 
71 
90 
10 
14 
0 
Rank 
3 
2 
1 
Stated Preference No. of Establishments Stating the Preference n=25 
FuZZ-time versus part-time 
\. Full-time preferred 23 
Part-time preferred 1 
No preference 1 
D~time Workers versus TwiZight Workers 
Daytime workers preferred 25 
Twilight workers preferred 0 
Daytime Workers versus Homeworkers 
Daytime workers preferred 24 
Homeworkers preferred 1 
TABLE 9.5 Stated Workgroup Preferences 
IV - 35 
Twilight Workers Homeworkers 
Employment NO. ot % NO. ot % Pattern Establishments Establishments 
n=12 100 n=22 100 
Temporary \. 
Employment 8 67 14* 64 
Permanent 4 33 11* 50 Employment 
* Responses for homeworkers do not total'to,the sample size because there 
were some double, contrasting responses'for different homeworker opera-
tions, and under different product market conditions 
TABLE 9.6 Stated Employment ,Patterns of Twilight Workers and Homeworkers 
Fw Pw 
Mean stated rank 1.12 1.16 
Standard deviation 0.44 0.37 
Rank order 1 2 
TABLE 9.7 Stated Preference for the Allocation of Work 
(by Establishment Response, n=25) 
IV - 36 
Tw Hw 
3.36 2.60 
0.91 1.06 
4 3 
Training Methods 
Experi enced Inexperienced 
Personnel Personnel 
Totals 
A B" B2 C D 
AZZ 40-hr/wk MaZes 
Number of workers - 70 0 0 211 0 281 
Percentage of 25% 0% 0% 75% 0% 100% workers· 
% of experienced! 25% 75% 100% inexperienced 
Sm+Fm Knitters onZ/i. 64 0 0 132 0 196 
Percentage of 33% 0% 0% 67% 0% 100% knitters 
% of experienced/ 33% 67% 100% inexperienced 
A ZZ other Fm opera-
tives 
Number of workers 6 0 0 79 0 85 
Percentage of 7% 0% 0% 93% 0% 100% workers 
% of experienced/ 7% 93% 100% i nexperi enced 
TABLE 9.8 Methods and Levels of Male Training by Present Employer 
IV - 37 
Training Methods 
Expen enced -Inexpen enced 
Personnel Personnel 
Totals 
A Bl B2 C D 
'., . 
Fun-time fema~es (Pw) 
Number of workers 186 28 0 199 152 565 
Percentage of 33% 5% 0% 35% 27% 100% workers 
% of experienced/ 38% 62% 100% inexperienced 
Part-time females (PuJ) 
Number of workers 243 37 10 110 77 477 
Percentage of 51% 8% 2% 23% 16% 100% workers 
% of experienced/ 59% 41% 100% inexperienced 
TWi~ight ~orkers (TW) 
Number of workers 3 3 0 8 0 14 
Percentage of 21.5% 21.5% 0% 57% 0% 100% workers 
% of experienced/ 43% 57% 100% inexperienced 
Hom~orkers (lhJ) 
Number of workers 87 10 34 0 0 131 
Percentage of 66% 8% 26% 0% 0% 100% workers 
% of experienced/ 74% 26% 100% i nexperi enced 
TABLE 9.9 Methods and Levels of Female Training by Present Employer 
IV - 38 
Knitters Fw Pw Tw Srn + Fm 
Sample size n=196 n=565 n=477 n=14 (workers) 
Total training 
received by 528 871 464 20 group members 
(weeks) 
Average tra i-
ning per 2.7 1.5 1.0 1.4 
capita (weeks) 
Rank order 1 2 4 3 
TABLE 9.10 Total Investment in Training by Present Employer 
NO. ot present NO. ot uerlVea 
Work force Group Establi- Workforce Redun"7 Previous shments dancies Work force 
Full-time and· 19 547 16 563 part-time (Dw) 
Twilight 5 14 0 14 
workers (Tw) 
Homeworkers 17 112 2 114 (Hw) 
TABLE 9.11 Stated Annual Female Group Redundancy Levels 
(by Establishment Response over 10 year period) 
IV - 39 
Hw 
n=131 
16 
0.1 
5 
Mean 
Annual 
Redundan~5 Level (X 
2.8 
0.0 
1.8 
... 
< 
Number of Present Previous I Impl ied I 
Establishments Work force Workforce Redundancies 
Twiti~ht Workers (Tw) 
Currently using Tw 5. 14 24 10 
Had used Tw in the past 7 0 28 28 
TOTALS: 12 14 52 38 
Mean Percentage Redundancy Rate = 73.1% (over 5 years) 
= 14.6% (per annum) 
Homeworkers (Hw) 
Currently using Hw 17 127 176 49 
Had used Hw in the past 5 0 26 26 
TOTALS: 22 127 202 75 
Mean Percentage Redundancy Rate = 37.1% ! over 5 years) 
• 7.4% per annum) 
TABLE 9.12 'Implied' Redundancies of Twilight Workers and Homeworkers Over a 5 Year Period (by Establishment Response) 
Stated Implied 
Work force Group Redundancies Redundancies 
per annum 
. 
(%) per annum (%) 
Full-time and 2.8 
-part-time (OW) 
Twilight workers 0.0 14.6 (Tw) 
Homeworkers (Hw) 1.8 7.4 
TABLE 9.13 Rank Order of Female Redundancies 
Males 
Level of Payment 
Pm Srn + Fm. Fw 
More than EPCA 0 0 0 
Same as EPCA 0 20 22 
Group ."does not work the 0 0 0 qualifying period" 
'.' 
"Don't known, never· 0 0 0 arisen" 
EPCA exempts this 
group 4 0 0 
Total of· Establishments 4 20 22 
TABLE 9.15 Level of Redundancy Payment Received 
(by number of establishments) 
IV - 41 
, 
Rank 
Order 
=1 
4 
3 
Females 
Pw Tw Hw 
0 0 0 
24 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 3 0 
0 1 22 
24 5 22 
MALES FEMALES 
CRITERIA Srn + Fm Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Estabs .. Workers Estabs. Workers Estabs. Workers Estabs. Workers Estabs. Workers 
> 
n=12 n=342 n=22 n=565 n=24 n=477 n=5 n=14 n=22 n=139 
No. % No· % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Formal Procedures: 
a) "last in, first out" 
plus "performance 
levels" 3 15 35 10 3 14 109 19 3 13 33 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b) "over retirement age" 
plus (a) above 5 25 135 39 6 27 246 44 6 25 196 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
TOTALS: 8 40 168 49 9 41 355 63 9 38 229 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Informal Procedures: 
c) "Don't know, it has 
never occurred" 11 55 171 50 12 55 204 36 13 54 213 44 1 20 2 14 1 4 10 7 
d) "Hope for vol unteers" 
plus (c) above 1 5 3 1 1 4 6 1 1 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e) "Spread the work until 
none available" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 40 6 43 3 14 25 18 
f) "Switch away from group 
during general redun- • 
dancy situations" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 32 7 2 40 6 43 18 82 104 75 
TOTALS: 12 60 174 51 13 59 210 37 15 62 248 52 5 100 14 100 22 100 139 100 
IMPLIED FEMALE RANK ORDER: 1 2 =4 =4 
TABLE 9.14 Procedure to Determine Specific Redundancles (by Numbers of Establishments and Workers) 
..... 
< 
..,. 
w. 
PERMANENT FEATURE ·TEMPORARY FEATURE 
Number of Durations of Number of Average Duration 
Establishments Present Shifts Establishments of Shifts (months) (months) 
1 1 2 2 
1 9 2 5 
1 24 1 7 
1 36 3 Missing data 
Total: 4 Mean 17 .5 8 Mean . 4.2 months Months 
Std.dev. (15.6) Std.dev. (2.2) 
Sample size of establishments = 12 
TABLE 9.16 Duration of Twilight Shift Working (by Establishment Response) 
...... 
<: 
No Annual 
. Variation Variation 
Female Workgroup 
No. % No. % 
Fu~~ and Part-timers (Ow) 
Number and % of establish- 12 50 3 12 ments 
Number and % of workers 296 28 126 12 
1Wi~i~ht Workers (Tw) 
Number and % of establish- 1 20 1 20 ments 
Number and % of workers 3 22 2 14 
Homeworkers (Hw) 
Number and % of establish- 3 14 0 0 ments 
Number and % of workers 29* 21 0 0 
* Engaged on operations not being performed inside their factories 
TABLE 9.17 Variability in the Amounts of Work Supplied 
(by establishment response and worker numbers) 
Seasonal Weekly TOTALS Variation Variation 
No. % No. % No. % 
9 38 0 0 24 100 
620 60 0 0 1042 lOO 
3 60 0 0 5 lOO 
9 64 0 0 14 100 
2 9 17 77 22 100 
14 10 96 69 139 100 
..... 
<: 
Dw 
Procedure n=24 
No. % 
Same as EPCA 15 62 
More than EPCA 5 21 
"Don't know, never occurred" 4 17 
EPCA does not apply 0 0 
Assigned rank order =1 
TABLE 9.18 Dismissal Procedures (by Establishment Response) 
No. 
5 
0 
0 
0 
Tw Hw 
n=5 n=24 
% No. % 
100 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 3 14 
0 19 86 
3 4 
Method of Calculation Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Overall percentage 47.8% 40.3% 1.2% 10.7% 
Rank order 1 2 4 3 
Assi~ned ranks 
Meari ass i gned rank 1.80 1.76 3.44 2.48 ,. 
Standard devi ation . 0.76 0.66 0.58 0.96 
Rank order 2 1 4 3 
TABLE 9.19 Rank. Order of Implied Preference Based on Numbers Employed 
Topic Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Level of training 1 3 2 4 
Amount of training investment 1 2 3 4 
Redundancy levels =1 =1 4 3 
Redundancy procedure 1 2 =4 =4 
Allocation of work =1 =1 3 4 
Dismissal procedure =1 =1 3 4 
Transport provision 2 3 4 1 
Workers employed: overall % 1 2 4 3 
Workers employed: ranked % 2 1 4 3 
Mean implied rank 1.22 1.78 3.44 3.33 
Standard deviation 0.44 0.83 0.73 1.00 
Overall· rank order of 1 2 4 3 implied group preference 
TABLE 9.20 Rank Order of Group Preference Implied by Employer Actions 
IV - 46 
Fw Pw 
Sample size 22 24 
"DK" or "not comparable" 2 3 or missing responses 
No. of ranks assigned 20 21 
Mean of assi gned ranks 1.45 1.29 
Standard deviation 0.69 0.46 
Rank order 3 1 
TABLE 9.21 Relative Productivity· 
Fw Pw 
Sample size 22 24 
"OK", "not comparable" 
or missing responses 5 6 
No. of ranks assigned 17 18. 
Mean of assigned ranks 1.35 1.17 
Standard deviation 0.86 0.38 
Rank order 2 1 
TABLE 9.22 Relative Competence 
Fw Pw 
Sample size 22 24 
"OK", "not comparable" 2 3 or missing responses 
No. of ranks assigned 20 21 
Mean of assigned ranks 1.25 1.19 
Standard deviation 0.79 0.60 
Rank order 2 1 
TABLE 9.23 Relative Quality of Workmanship 
IV - 47 
Tw Hw 
7 22 
. 1 13 
, 6 9 
1.33 2.33 .. ,. 
0.82 1.32 
2 4 
: 
Tw Hw 
7 19 
2 6 
5 13 
1.80 1.69 
1.10 loll 
4 3 
Tw Hw 
7 19 
1 6 
6 13 
1.67 1.31 
1.03 0.75 
4 3 
Sample Size Absenteeism Rate 
(Number of (percentage of Standard Deviation 
Establishments) contracted hours) 
8 2.58:t 2.90 
'., 
TABLE 9.24 Absenteeism Rate of Full and Part Time Females (Dw) 
No. of % of No. of % of 
Estb1mts Estb1mts Workers Workers 
Sample sizes 22 100 139 100 
Never refuses or adjusts 13 59.1 77 55.4 
Never refuses but occasio-
nally reduces volume of 3 13.6 8 5.8 
work 
Rare refusal or adjustment 3 13.6 25 18.0 
Frequent refusal or late 2 9.1 23 16.5 return 
Don't know 1 4.5 6 4.3 
TABLE 9.25 Homeworkers' Refusal of Work 
Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Sample size 22 24 7 19 
"OK", or "not comparable" 1 2 3 4 or missing responses 
No. of assigned ranks 21 22 4 15 
Mean of assigned ranks 1.67 1.91 2.00 1.33 
Standard deviation 0.91 0.81 1.41 0.72 
Rank order 2 3 4 1 
TABLE 9.26 Relative Absenteeism 
IV - 48 
Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Sample size 22 24 7 19 
"DK", "not comparable" 4 4 1 2 or missing responses 
No. of assigned ranks 18 20 6 17 
Mean of assigned ranks 1.06 1.20 2.67 2.24 
Standard deviation 0.23 0.52 1.03 1.15 
Rank order 1 2 4 3 
TABLE 9.27 Relative Reliability 
Dw Tw Hw 
Sample size 24 7 19 
OK responses 6 6 8 
No. of responses 18 1 11 
--
Mean rate (% pal 21.26 16.70 9.86 
Standard deviation 23.02 0.00 14.42 
Rank order 3 2 1 
TABLE 9.28 Voluntary Turnover Rates 
Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Full sample size 22 24 8 19 
Blank or DK responses 5 5 1 8 
No. of assigned ranks 17 19 7 11 
t4ean of assigned ranks 1.76 1.42 2.00 1.36 
Standard deviation 0.90 0.69 1.29 0.81 
Rank order 3 2 4 1 
TABLE 9.29 Relative Voluntary Turnover 
IV - 49 
Dw Tw Hw 
No. Total Duration No. No. 
Sample Size 24 7 21 
Strikes 3 4i weeks 0 0 
Wa1 k-outs 2 2 days 0 0 
Stoppages of work 8 15 hours 0 0 
Total disputes 13 0 0 
No disputes 13 7 21 
TABLE 9.30 The Incidence of Disputes over a 12-month Period (by esta-
bllshment response) 
Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Sample size 22 24 7 21 
Missing responses 0 0 1 0 
Mean of assigned ranks 1.58 1.58 1.00 1.00 
Standard deviation 0.72 0.72 0.00 0.00 
Rank order =3 =3 =1 =1 
TABLE 9.31 Relative Quiescence 
No. of No. of No. of Mean Size Std. % of Hw 
Measure ·:Establ-: Home- DP of Esta- Dev. in 
ishments workers Workers b1ishment OP 
Individual 
Negotiations 7 41 121 17 .3 8.36 33.9 (often succ-
essful) 
Complaints 6 44 633 105.5 80.61 7.0 (usually fail) 
No measures 6 29 363 51.5 32.02 8.0 
TOTALS: 19 114 1117 58.8 58.65 10.2 
TABLE 9.32 Homeworkers' Measures to Influence their Work Situation 
I V-50 
• 
..... 
<: 
Sm Fm + Fw Pw Tw 
Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of 
Estb1mts. Hours Estb1mts. Hours Es tb 1 mts. Hours Estb1mts. Hours 
11 40 22 40 1 24 1 15 
3 25 3 16 
2 28 1 221 
10 30 
5 32 
~---------------------- . 2 34 ~-----------------------.--------------------- ~----------------------Mean Hours 40 40 29.7 17 .1 
-----------------------~----------------------~----------------------~----------------------Standard 0 0 2.76 3.05 Deviation 
r----------------------~---------------------- --------------- .. ------ ----------------------Rank Order =1 =1 3 5 
* Calculated from the actual figures supplied; not the midpoints of each range. 
TABLE 9.33 Mean Hours per 8asic Week 
Hw 
Number of Number"of 
Estb1mts. Hours 
2 0 to less than 10 
4 10 to less than 20 
3 20 to less than 25 
2 25 to less than 30" 
2 30 to less than 35 
------_ ... _ .... _----------_ ...... -. 
20.0* 
---------------------~---.---. 
8.57* 
--.------------------- --_ ...... 
4 
...... 
< 
<.n 
N 
Srn Fm (kni tters) 
Incidence 
No. of Mean hrs No. of Mean hrs 
Estblmts (Std dev) Estb lmts (Std dev) 
Regular basis 0 0 5 7.4 
(2.8) 
-------------------------
--------- ... 
-----------
----------
----------Seasona lly. or 5 3.7 0 0 under pressure (1. 8) 
~-------------------------[------------------------------- ----------Very limited 0 0 0 0 overtime 
------------------------_. 
---------- -- .. ------- --------- ----------
No overtime 0 0 2 0 
~-------------------------1---------- ---------- --------- ----------
Mi ss i ng 6 0 1 0 
-------------------------
----------
----------1---------- ----------
Sample size 11 - 8 -
TABLE 9.34 Incidence of Overtime (by Establishment Response) 
Fw Pw Tw Hw 
No. of Mean hrs No. of No:. of No. of 
Estblmts (Std dev) Estblmts Estblmts Estblmts 
0 0 0 0 0 
---------- ----------
---------
-----------
---------
14 2.68 0 0 0 (1.21 ) 
-----------
----------
----------[----------- ----------
0 0 3 1 6 
-----------
---------- ---------1----------- ----------
8 0 21 4 16 1----------- .. --------- ----- ..... -- --------- .. ----------
0 0 0 0 0 
1-----------
----------
-_ ... --- .. -- - .. --------
----------
22 - 24 5 22 
Performance Dimension Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Productivity 3 1 2 4 
Competence 2 1 4 3 
Qual ity of Work 2 1 4 3 
.. I·Absenteei srn 2 3 4 1 
Re 1 i abil ity 1 2 4 3 
Voluntary Turnover 3 2 4 1 
Disputes =3 =3 =1 =1 
Hours Worked 1 2 4 3 
------------------------------ ---------~--------- --------- ----------
. Mean Overall 2.13 1.88 3.38 2.38 Performance Rank 
----._----------------------. ---------h:------- --------- f-----------
Standard Deviation 0.83 0.83 1.19 1.19 
r----------------------------- ---------"--------- -.-------
c __________ 
Performance Rank Order 2 1 4 . 3 
TABLE 9.35 Overall Performance Ranks 
Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Cost implication =4 =4 2 1 
Stated preference 1 2 4 3 
Preference implied by 1 2 =3 =3 actions 
Performance ranking 2 1 4 3 
Overall order of 2.00 2.25 3.25 2.50 preference 
Standard deviation 1.41 1.26 0.96 1.00 
------------------------------
----------
--------- --------- ---------
Overall Rank Order 1 2 4 3 
TABLE 9.36 The Order of Preference 
IV - 53 
c 
Performance Dimension Number of Volunteered Observations 
Productivity 5 
Reliability 5 
Absenteeism 4 
Voluntary Turnover", 3 
Spoilage of Work 1 
~------------------------------------- ---------------------------
Total Number of Observations 18 
~------------------------------------- ---------------------------Number of respondents volunteering 12 observations 
Sample size of respondents 25 
- . ,-
TABLE 10.1 Observations of Young Workers' Inferior Performances 
IV - 54 
Establishments DP Workers 
No. % No. % 
Unionised Establishments 14 56 1333 87.2 
Average workforce size \' 95 
- '. (Standard deviation) (56.73) 
Non-unionised Establishments 11 44 196* 12.8 
Average workforce size 18 
(Standard deviation) (8.25) 
Tota 1 s: 25 100 1529* 100 
* 3 working propriet6rs.have been excluded from the sample of workers 
TABLE 11.1 Unionised and Non-unionised. Establishments 
Establishment DP Workers 
No. % No. % 
Affiliated establishment 18 72 1403 92 
Non-affiliated esta- 6 24 103* 7 b1ishment 
Affiliation unknown 1 4 23 1 
Totals: 25 100 1529* 100% 
* 3 working proprietors have been excluded from the sample of workers 
TABLE 11.2 Establishment Affilitation to an Employers' Association 
IV - 55 
No. of No. of No. of Total % of 
Establ- Factory Home- Workers Work-
ishments Workers Workers force 
Effect unknown 1 19 4 23 11.7 
Precedent followed but 
less occasionally 2 20 21 41 20.9 
awarded 
" 
Agreement adhered to 5 61 13 74 37.8 exactly 
Agreement adhered to, 
more occasionally 3 24 34 58 29.6 
awarded 
Total s 11 124 72 196 100 
% of the DP worker 100 36.7 63.3 sample 
TABLE 11.3 The Impact of the National Pay Agreement on the Non-unionised 
Sector 
No. of % of % of the 
Homeworkers Home- Sector 
n=139 wo"rkers 
Unionised Establishments 
Not comparable 17 12.2 26.6 
Same rates 22 15.8 34.4 
Below factory rates 25 18.0 39.0 
Totals: 64 46.0 100 
Non-union Establishments 
Not comparable 38 27.3 50.7 
Same rates 27 19.5 36.0 
Below factory rates 10 7.2 13.3 
Totals: 75 54.0 100 
TABLE 11.4 Comparability of Homeworkers' Rates with Factory Rates in 
Unionised and Non-unionised Establishments 
IV - 56 
, 
..... 
< 
(J1 
...... 
. All Males Fw Pw 
No. % No. % No. % 
Unionised Estab1ish- 319 92.2 534 94.5 413 86.6 
ments 
Average workgroup 22.9 -size 38.1 - 29.5 -
(Std. dev) (22.9) 
- (29.74) - (17.85) -
Non-unionised 
Estab1 ishments 27* 7.8 31 5.5 64 13.4 
Average workgroup 3.3 
-
3.9 
-
6.4 
-size 
(Std. dev) (1.41 ) 
- (2.64) - (4.25) -
Total s: 346* 100 565 100 477 100 
* 3 working priorietors have been excluded from the sample of workers 
TABLE 11.5 Group Employment in Unionised and Non-unionised Establishments 
Tw Hw 
No. % No. % 
12 85.7 55 43.3 
. 3.0 - 6.1 -
(0.82) - (4.37) -
2 14.3 72 56.7 
2.0 - 9.0 -
(0.0) - (5.98) -
14 100 127 100 
Employers' Trade Establishments Workers 
Associa ti ons Union No. % No. % 
Yes Yes 14 56.0 1333 87.2 
Yes No 4 16.0 70 4.6 
No Yes 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No No 6 24.0 103* 6.7 
OK No 1 4.0 23 1.5 
. 
Total s: 25 100.0. 1529* 100.0 
TA8LE 11.6 Employers' Affiliation Versus Trade. Union Recognition 
All Males Fw Pw Tw Hw 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Trade Union 262 75.5 431 76.3 350 73.4 2 14.3 0 0.0 Members 
Non-Trade 
Union 80 23.1 110 19.5 121 25.4 2 14.3 100 78.7 
Members 
Membership 5 l.4 24 4.2 6 1.3 10 7l.4 27 21.3 Unknown 
Totals: 347 100 565 100 477 100 14 100 127 100 
Rank order 
of Female 1 2 3 . 4 
Groups 
TABLE 11.7 Levels of Trade Union Membership 
IV - 58 
, 
Condition of Service No. of Rating of the Impact of the Activity Est'mts M Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Earnings , 
Pay rates 11 1 1 1 0 -1 
Shift premia 2 1 0 0 -1 0 
Overtime premium 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 
Dismissals 9 1 1 1 -1 -1 
Redundancy 
Selection for redun- 6 1 1 1 -1 -1 dancy 
Redundancy pay 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 
Holidays 
Ho1 iday times 2 1 1 1 0 0 
Hol iday pay 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
School holiday 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 scheme 
Recruitm~nt 2 1 1 1 0 0 
Contract of Emp1oy- 0 0 0 0 0 -1 ment 
, 
Job Allocation 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total Ratings 
... 7 4 3 -5 -6 
Sample size = 14 unionised establishments 
TABLE 11.8 The Impact of Workplace Collective Bargaining 
Fw Pw Tw Hw 
Sample size 14 14 14 14 
Don't know responses 6 6 6 6 
Valid responses 8 8 8 8 
Mean of assi gned ranks 3.12 3.0 1.5 1.38 
Standard deviation 0.35 0.0 0.53 0.52 
Rank order for redundancy 4 3 2 1 
Assessed power position 1 2 3 4 
TABLE 11.9 Employer Perceptions of Local Trade Union Redundancy Strategy 
IV - 59 
, 
Provisions of the EP(C)A, 1978 (provision code numbers as on page 2-22) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7a .7b 7c 7d 8a 8b 8c 9a 9b 9c 
The provision does not aEE1l to: 
i. Anyone who is not an employee X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
ii. Employees working 16 hours or more with X X fewer than 4 weeks c.r.e. 
i i i. Employees working 16 hours or more with X X X X fewer than 26 weeks c.r.e. 
i v. Employees working 16 hours or more with X X X X fewer than 104 weeks c.r.e. 
v. Employees working between 8 to 16 hours X X X X X X X X X X X X X with less than 5 years c.r.e. 
vi. Employees on fixed term contracts X 
vi i • Employees on fixed term contracts of X X 12 weeks or less 
vi i i • Employees on fixed term contracts who have X waived the right to the provision 
, 
i x. Employees over 60 years (women) 65 years (men) X X 
x. Employees whose c.r.e. ends on or after tne X 60th birthday (women). 65th birthday (men) 
xi. Employees below the age of 18 X 
xii. Employees not under contract of employment up X 
. to the 11th week prior to expected confinement 
TABLE 11.10 Exclusions Clauses for Entitlement to the Provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978 
..... 
<: 
'" o 
M Fw Pw Tw Hw 
National activity =1 =1 3 4 5 
Local activity 1 2 3 4 5 
Choice 1 2 3 5 4 
Legislation =1 =1 =1 4 5 
Mean bargaining rank 1.00 1.50 2.50 4.25 4.75 
Standard deviation 0.00 0.58 1.00 0.50 0.50 
Overall power ranking 1 2 3 4 5 
TABLE 11.11 The Overall Power Structure 
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TABLE 14.1: MALE AND FEMALE FULL-TIME AND LESS-THAN-FULL-TIME OUTPUTS 
AND PAY RATES 
OUTPUT (batches) 
10% Faster Than Median 
Fm Dw ·Rw 
Weekly 825.00 105.60 660.00 
Daily 165.00 21.12 132.00 
Hourly 20.62 2 .• 64 16.50 
Median Pace 
Weekly 750.00 96.00 600.00 
Da ily 150.00 19.20 120.00 
Hourly 18.75 2.40 15.00 
10% Slower than Median 
Weekly 675.00 86.40 540.00 
Daily 135.00 17.28 108.00 
Hourly 16.90 2.16 13.50 
Short-time Out~uts 
1 day 540.00 69.12 432.00 
2 days 405.00 51.84 324.00 
3 days 270.00 34.56 216.00 
4 days 135.00 17.28 108.00 
Tilile·Rates 
Fm =. £78.00 per 40. hour week =£L95per·hbur 
Overtime and Short~tilile Rates 
Short.:time: 
Overtime: 
Piece-Rates 
£0.90 per hour. 
£0.36 per hour 
D = 62.5 Fw e~ui. x £60.0 = £0 625· b t h' 
w 6000 batc es penweeL •. per a c • 
Hw exclv. = 106005 20 = £0~0333 per batch; i.e; 
fw :+- NHw at 0.5 Fw 
52.80 
10.56 
1.32 
48.00 
9.60 
1.20 
43.20 
8.64 
1.08 
34.55 
25.90 
17.28 
8.64 
i.e. 1.6 batches per £1 
30 batches per £1 
(The above values were calculated using data from Part B 
and assumptions contained within Section 14.1) 
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TABLE 14.2: SHIFT WORKER PAY RATES AND OUTPUTS WHEN OPERATING VARYING 
NUMBERS OF MACHINES 
OUTPUT (ba rche$} 
No. of Machines 12 15 
10% Faster than Median 
Weekly 352:0 440.0' 
Da i1y 70.4 88.0 
Hourly 8.8 11.0 
Median Pace 
Weekly 320.0 400.0 
Daily 64.0 80.0 
Hourly 8.0 . 10.0 
10% Slower than· Median 
Weekly 288.0 360.0 
Daily . 57.6 72.0 . 
Hourly 7.2 9.0 . 
Short-time Outeuts 
1 day 230.4 288.0 
2 days 172.8 216.0 
3 days 115.2 144.0 
4 days 57.6 72.0 
Piece-Rates 
15 Srn x £100 6000. batches = £0.25 eer batch; i.e. 4 batches per £1 
When. reduced to a s ing1 e shift.: 
15 Srn x £81.60 . . 6000 batches· = £0.204 eer batch; i.e. 4.9 batches per £1 
Short-time and Overtime Rates and Sh ift .Premium 
Short-time: 
Overtime: 
Shift premium: 
£1.20 per hour· 
£0.36 per hour 
£0.46 per hour 
18 
528.0 
105.6 
13.2 
480.0 
96.0 
12.0 
432.0 
86.4 
10.8 
345.6 
259.2 
172.8 
86.4 
(The above values were calculated using data from Part B 
and assumptions contained within Section 14.1) 
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Figure 2:3 The Elimination of Shortage196 (Source: Thomas and Deaton ) 
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(Seasonally adjusted) 
(Source: Department of Employment and Manpower 
Services commission254) 
v ~ 4 
1975 1981 Change 
(%) (%) 197s-81 
13.4 17.7 +4.3 Agriculture. Forestry. FIShing 
4.7 4 .• -0.1 Mining and Quanyir'Ig 
39.3 :la7 -0.8 Food. Drink and Tobacco 
16.7 10.5 -.2 Coal and Petroleu'n Pn:xb:ts 
1975 0 
26.7 26.' -0.3 Chemicals and Allied IncIusIrles 1981. 
112 12.0 +0.8 Metal Manufacture 
15.1 15.5 +0.4 Mechanical Eng_ 
38 .• 34.0 -4.6 Instiument Engineering 
36.2 332 -3.0 
Electrical Eng_ 
.2 8.9 +2.7 Shlpbulldlng and Marine_ 
112 11.4 +02 Vehicles 
27 •• 24.6 -3.0 Metal Goods not elsewhere spedfied 
43.5 44 .• +1.1 Textiles 
47.0 39.5 -7.5 Leather, leather Goods and Fur 
74.9 74.0 -0.9 CIoIhIng and Footwear 
24.6 23 .• -1.0 Bricks,_,G_~eIc 
18.4 18.9 +0.5 Tlmber. Furniture ete 
32.3 30 .• -1.7 f'aJ>!><, Printing and Publishing 
35.1 32.7 -2.4 Other Manufacturing Industries 
•. 8 8.1 + 1.3 Construction 
19.9 20.6 +0.7.1 Gas, EleCUldty ~ Wale< 
17.5 19.3 +1.8 Transport and Communication 
53.2 52.8 -0.4 Distributive Trades 
46.0 SO.7 +2.7 
64.8 68.6 +3.8 Professional and Scienttfic Services 
51.6 53.4 +1.8 Miscellaneous Services 
37.2 42.0 +4.8 Public Administration 
36.2 39.9 +3.7 Ail Industries. Total 
Figure 2:7 Women as a Percentage of Industrial Labour Force, Great 
Britain 1975 and 1981 
(Sources: Department of Employment, New Earnings SUrvey 1975, 
1981; P~5~ E. Table 135 and Trades Union 
Congress ) 
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STRATEGY ONE 
limit the degree of variation in business activity 
by variations 1n: 
(A) product stocks; (B) the product range •. 
STRATEGY TliO 
vary labour input fran a fixed number of established workers 
by variations in: 
(C) payment systems; 
(E) short-time working; 
(G) work group switching; 
(I) worker redeployment; 
(K) machine/worker ratio; 
(M) subcontracting to 
homeworkers. 
(D) 
(F) 
(H) 
(J) 
(L) 
length of basic work-week; 
overtime working; 
average hours worked; 
ti me-off; 
subcontracting to firms; 
STRATEGY THREE 
vary the number of workers, without changing hiring standards 
by variations in: 
(N) shift-work patterns; 
(P) replacement recruitment; 
(R) additional recruitment 
(0) 
( Q) 
voluntary turnover; 
redundancies; 
of preferred labour. 
STRATEGY FOUR 
vary hiring standards to modify labour supply 
by modification of stipulations relating to a recruit's: 
(S) skill/experience; (T) personal attributes; 
(U) weekly hours; (V) work times; 
(W) pl ace of work. 
STRATEGY FIVE 
vary workers' earning potential to modify labour supply 
by variations in: 
(X) basic pay rates; (Y) premia and bonuses; 
(Z) fringe benefits. 
Figure 13:1 The Range of Possible Adjustment Instruments 
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Figure 14:1 Employment Schedules (Worked Example) 
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